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# Copyright callouts and the promise of creator-driven platform governance

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**Abstract:** Responding to frustrations with the enforcement of copyright on YouTube, some creators publish videos that discuss their experiences, challenge claims of infringement, and critique broader structures of content moderation. Platform callouts, or public complaints about the conduct of or on platforms, are one of the primary ways creators challenge the power imbalance between users and corporations. Through an analysis of 135 videos, we provide a rich empirical account of how creators publicly define the problem of copyright enforcement, propose solutions, and attribute responsibility to other creators, the platform, and external actors like media conglomerates. Creators criticise the prevalence of “false” copyright claims that ignore fair use or serve ulterior motives like harassment, censorship, and financial extortion, as well as the challenges of communicating with the platform. Drawing inspiration from organisational theory, we differentiate horizontal and vertical callouts according to the institutional positioning of the speaker and target. Horizontal callouts, or public complaints between peers, offer a mechanism for community self-policing, while vertical callouts, or public complaints directed towards organisations, provide a mechanism for influencing centralised content moderation policies and practices. We conclude with a discussion of the benefits and limitations of callouts as a strategy of creator-driven platform governance.

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## Introduction

Social media platforms are more popular than ever due, in part, to a growing subset of “commercializing and professionalizing” users known as creators (Cunningham & Craig, 2021, p. 1). Through ad-revenue sharing agreements (Caplan & Gillespie, 2020), brand deals (Hund, 2023), and a combination of merchandise, fan funding, and affiliate programs (Rieder et al., 2023), creators monetise their audiences and contribute to the “creator economy,” currently valued at 250 billion USD (Perelli, 2023). As a career path, content creation offers significant flexibility and autonomy (Cunningham & Craig, 2021), yet comes with precarious working conditions (Duffy et al., 2021). Creators, like all social media users, are subject to opaque and often automated forms of platform governance where content can be removed and accounts terminated with little notice or explanation (Gorwa et al., 2020). These conditions generate a “crisis of legitimacy” (Zuckerman & Rajendra-Nicolucci, 2023), with polls finding, for example, that three-quarters of Americans do not trust social media companies to moderate content fairly (Kemp & Ekins, 2021). Issues with content moderation also generate social, emotional, and economic consequences for creators (Are & Briggs, 2023; Kingsley et al., 2022), chill speech (Myers West, 2018), deter the use of platform reporting tools (Vaccaro et al., 2020), and promote conspiracy theorising about platform operations (Riedl et al., 2023).

In the face of such frustrations, creators have little recourse given the implicitly feudal design of platforms where users are “subject to a power structure that is apparently absolute and unalterable by those who lack such power” (Schneider, 2022, p. 1966). As a consequence, creators employ an assortment of strategies to navigate the fickle creator economy, including optimising content production (Halpin, 2023), sharing theories about how platforms operate (Kaye & Gray, 2021), and joining intermediary commercial organisations (Siciliano, 2020). However, each strategy concerns opportunities for success within a given platform context. Creators who seek to transform platform operations have two primary strategies for organisational change: exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970; see Frey & Schneider, 2023 for an elaboration of these options in a platform context). In other words, creators can either leave the platform or communicate their displeasure. Neither

option is necessarily appealing: the former is disincentivised by the lack of market competition and the latter beset with questions of who can or should address their complaints.

Platform callouts, or public complaints about the conduct *of* or *on* platforms, are one of the primary ways that creators voice their frustrations with governance issues. Compared to other expressions of consumer discontent, creators benefit from in-built audiences and their professional specialisation in public communication. Such conditions also differentiate creator complaints from other callouts on social media associated with the collective behaviour of semi-anonymous masses (Kim et al., 2022). While creators have spoken up about censorship, economic opportunity, copyright abuse, algorithmic bias, and predatory behaviour (Kaye & Gray, 2021; Kumar, 2019; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024; Tarvin & Stanfill, 2022), questions remain over the ability of voice-based strategies to overcome the inherent imbalances of platform power (Nielsen & Ganter, 2022). Platforms are selective about which controversies they respond to (Shapiro et al., 2024) and public responses can leave structural issues unchecked, resulting in what Tarvin and Stanfill call “governance washing” (2022). Furthermore, the reliance on public outrage, from creators or otherwise, may trap platforms in reactionary cycles with unsatisfying solutions (Annany & Gillespie, 2016). Despite these structural constraints, the persistence of public complaints motivates our investigation into the role platform callouts play in the broader governance ecosystem.

To do so, we turn to a particularly entrenched domain of platform governance where we would expect creators to have little influence: copyright policy. Platforms’ copyright policies are heavily shaped by regulations that favour the interests of major corporate rights holders (Dergacheva & Katzenbach, 2023; Gray, 2020) and copyright enforcement is an established point of frustration for creators (Fiesler et al., 2023; Kaye & Gray, 2021). Focusing on YouTube, an industry leader in copyright management (Gray, 2020) and creator monetisation programmes (Caplan & Gillespie, 2021), we analyse callout videos, defined as social media content where creators discuss their experiences with copyright enforcement, challenge claims of infringement, and critique the broader structures of content moderation. In what follows, we present the possibilities for user participation in platform governance and briefly describe YouTube’s copyright management system. We then outline our methodological approach and show how callout videos alternatively address other creators, the platform itself, and external actors like corporate rights holders, spammers, and scammers. Finally, we differentiate between horizontal and vertical callouts, distinguished by the relationship between institutional posi-

tioning of the speaker and target, and discuss the implications of both as tools of creator-driven platform governance.

## Participation structures of platform governance

While content moderation includes advanced automation (Gorwa et al., 2020), most platforms also delegate work to their users via tools to report violations (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). User reports of copyright infringement or community guidelines violations provide a valuable signal for platforms' Trust and Safety teams (Pfefferkorn, 2022) and offer a mechanism of user participation in platform governance, although the design of reporting systems minimises public deliberation and collective action (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). Even in these circumstances, users across platforms and the political spectrum have appropriated flagging tools (e.g. Fiore-Silfvast, 2012; Zhao & Chen, 2023), transforming reports into a site of "contested platform governance" where users challenge the "core values, identity, and/or purposes of the platform" (Sybert, 2022, p. 2312). In doing so, users threaten the integrity of user reports as a signal for corporate platform governance objectives (Zhao & Chen, 2023).

Some platforms further delegate responsibility, consulting with civil society organisations (Caplan, 2023) and providing tools for community-driven moderation (Zuckerman & Rajendra-Nicolucci, 2023). The latter setup is particularly evident on decentralised platforms (Struett et al., 2023) and forum platforms like Reddit, where individual interest groups, or subreddits, have specific rules and volunteer moderators who enforce them (Seering, 2020). Seemingly centralised platforms like Facebook provide users tools to moderate different "sub-platforms" like personal profiles, pages, and Facebook groups (Navon & Noy, 2023). Similarly, YouTube provides tools for creators to moderate the comments that appear alongside their videos, posts, and livestreams. Although a community-driven approach to participation is more robust than flagging tools, it remains limited by how platforms define community (e.g. individual accounts on YouTube vs. subreddits on Reddit), the tools they provide, and the supplementary status of community moderation, where users can add new rules but cannot challenge platform-wide policies.

For users frustrated with centralised platform governance, there are few opportunities for recourse. Like any consumer, users can exit the market (Hirshman, 1970) and switch to a new platform or reduce social media use. However, as an industry, social media is dominated by a few big players and lacks robust competition. Furthermore, platforms heavily draw their value from network effects, making plat-

form migration socially and technically difficult (Fiesler & Dym, 2020). These factors are intensified for creators, who draw personal and economic value from the audiences they foster on particular platforms (Cunningham & Craig, 2021). While the rare creator has successfully transitioned their career from one platform to another (Shapiro et al., 2024), this remains an exceptional accomplishment. Finally, given the scale of major platforms, a substantial number of users must exit to send a clear signal to corporate leadership.

Given the constraints on leaving a platform, some users try to change platforms from within through voice-based strategies (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30). Users can express frustrations through official channels such as appealing a content moderation decision. When official channels fail or are unavailable, users may go public with their complaints (Meisner, 2023; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024). However, platforms are selective in which voices they respond to (Shapiro et al., 2024), favouring users with important roles for platform functionality like moderators on Reddit or high-profile creators on YouTube. Even among these populations, there are concerns about the efficacy of voice as a response, reflected in Frey and Schneider's (2023) distinction between effective and affective voice where the former refers to direct influence and the latter to indirect persuasion. Public complaints clearly fall in the category of affective voice, joining a broader conversation about callouts, cancellations, and new strategies of public accountability (Lewis & Christin, 2021).

As public complaints that use shaming to promote social norms, callouts heavily depend on social media platforms for circulation. Most research focuses on callouts that target individuals rather than engage in institutional or organisational critique (e.g. Kim et al., 2022; Lee & Abidin, 2024). In this context, researchers have expressed concern that callouts may facilitate harassment or struggle to promote behavioural change (Billingham & Parr, 2020; Kim et al., 2022; Marwick, 2021). Despite these concerns, the act of calling out can provide expressive benefits for speakers (Herbison & Podosky, 2024) and constitute a form of civic engagement (Kligler-Vilenchik, 2017). Furthermore, as a public conversation, the target is not the only relevant audience; indeed, callouts can promote communal norms without changing the attitude or behaviour of the target (Lewis & Christin, 2021). To investigate the role of callouts in platform governance, we turn to a fundamental source of friction between users and platforms: copyright policy.

## **Copyright on YouTube as a test case for platform power**

Copyright has long been a source of contention on YouTube as an area where “balancing the interests of the platform's various ‘markets’ (of content suppliers, audi-

ences, advertisers, and media partners) is most complex and questionable in the fairness of its application” (Burgess & Green, 2018, p. 48). States legislate copyright agendas to protect intellectual property rights, foster innovation, and, occasionally, serve the public interest (Gray, 2020). Platforms enforce policies and develop technological solutions to maintain legal compliance, pre-empt potentially burdensome legislation, appease copyright holders, and foster an appealing environment for users (Gray, 2020; Suzor, 2019). Where copyright was “once the exclusive domain of corporate lawyers and policymakers”, its centrality on digital platforms has increased public awareness and interest (Gillespie, 2007, p. 5), reflected in the prevalence of “copyright gossip” on YouTube (Kaye & Gray, 2021) and discussions among transformative fandom communities (Fiesler et al., 2023). Yet, as Gray argues, when it comes to legislation, the public interest is poorly represented and large corporate stakeholders dominate (Gray, 2020, p. 132).

The external governance of copyright on YouTube includes a diverse and international patchwork of legislation. Central among these is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act from the United States, passed in 1998, which instituted the “notice and takedown” approach to copyright violations (Decherney, 2014). Even beyond the context of copyright, the notice and takedown approach “has become the go-to model for those attempting to solve any number of online disputes over intellectual property, online speech, and other issues”, including trademark and the right to be forgotten claims (Decherney, p. 19). Google has also played a major role in exporting U.S. copyright norms, including the “notice and takedown” approach and “fair use” principles, to other countries through policies, lobbying, and user education initiatives (Decherney, 2014). Yet the United States is not the only relevant regulatory actor, as the 2019 passage of Article 17 of the European Union Copyright Directive demonstrates. This legislation addressed long-standing complaints of music rights holders in Europe that digital platforms, especially YouTube, used safe harbour principles to undervalue copyrighted works (Bridy, 2019). While the implications of the Copyright Directive continue to unfold, research suggests that its enactment has led to increased copyright takedowns on YouTube (Dergacheva & Katzenbach, 2023).

The internal governance of copyright by YouTube revolves around the platform’s Content Management Suite which includes three primary tools: the Webform, the Copyright Match Tool, and the Content ID system. The Webform is an online reporting tool that allows anyone to manually claim infringing content. The Copyright Match tool automatically identifies videos reuploaded by other channels and is available to members of the YouTube Partner Program or creators with a history



of content takedowns. Finally, Content ID is a “scaled tool” that fully automates the copyright claim process and is available to “those with the most complex rights management needs, such as movie studios, record labels, and collecting societies” (Google, 2022, p. 3). In the first half of 2022 alone, ContentID processed more than 750 million claims, accounting for 98% of all copyright claims on the platform (Google, 2022, p. 4). Automated copyright enforcement is both an expression of Google’s platform power and a reflection of the economic power of media conglomerates. Indeed, part of the market appeal of Content ID is that it enables rights holders to earn significant revenue, upwards of US\$30 billion over the past three years (Google, 2022, p. 1).

YouTube’s Content Management Suite offers unequal resources to corporate stakeholders and independent content creators, leading some creators to conclude that copyright governance on the platform does not serve their interests (Fiesler et al., 2023; Hui, 2021). As ethnographer Michael Siciliano explains, many creators he spoke with “felt powerless, describing a silence and inscrutability similar to other users of Google’s infrastructures and recounting lengthy appeal processes that often failed” (2020, p. 149). One way that creators aim to make their work less precarious is through the circulation of “gossip” in videos where they share “their experiences with copyright enforcement on YouTube” and strategies for avoiding or addressing copyright enforcement (Kaye & Gray, 2021, p. 1). Creators have also critically engaged with copyright policy in the case of the #WTFU hashtag campaign<sup>1</sup> started by The Nostalgia Critic in 2016 over frustrations with Content ID, which led the YouTube policy team to issue a statement acknowledging community concerns (Edwards, 2018). Together, this work provides evidence that users play a role in the governance of copyright enforcement on the platform, fitting within a broader pattern of “communal solidarity” emerging among creators (Kumar, 2019), although the particular norms, community boundaries, and mechanisms of governance remain opaque.

## Methods

To collect YouTube copyright callout videos, we conducted targeted keyword searches using YouTube Data Tools (Rieder, 2015).<sup>2</sup> We restricted the results to videos published after 2019 to update existing research,<sup>3</sup> and removed videos that

1. An acronym for “Where’s the fair use?”.

2. We collected 50 videos for each of the following search terms: copyright, copyright claim, copyright strike, DMCA, content id YouTube, YouTube copyright system, YouTube copyright drama, YouTube copyright abuse, YouTube copyright update, YouTube copyright fair use, false copyright, copyright troll, copystrike, copyright claim steal, and copyright rant.



were off-topic, uploaded by non-creators (i.e. from an official YouTube channel), and not primarily in English. We also screened out exclusively descriptive videos for lacking the element of “complaint” central to our definition of callouts. We then manually added 20 videos that appeared in platform recommendations or news coverage of copyright issues, resulting in a dataset of 230 videos. Two authors watched 10 videos from the dataset to develop the codebook, adapting categories from previous research to fit with the data (Kaye & Gray, 2021; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024). Our codebook addresses how callout videos define the problem of copyright enforcement, attribute responsibility, and propose solutions (see Appendix 1 for the full codebook). Given prior research showing strong gender segregation in YouTube communities (Wegener et al., 2020) and greater representation of men in platform callout videos (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024), we also coded the perceived gender of creators, prioritising self-identification when available, using conventional visual and verbal markers otherwise,<sup>4</sup> and treating VTubers and furries as a separate category.<sup>5</sup>

Two authors began independently coding the videos, one working from the top and the list and the other from the bottom, meeting to discuss findings throughout. We stopped coding at 135 videos when we noticed significant repetition in the results (see Appendix 2 for video details). Most videos received more than 50,000 views, although there was nearly an even split (see Table 1). The overwhelming majority of speakers were men ( $n=101$ ), along with a small minority of women ( $n=13$ ) and VTubers/furries ( $n=7$ ), aligning with prior work on YouTube callouts (Hallinan & Reynolds, 2024). Channels represented various genres including gaming, music reviews, film reviews, react videos, and cultural commentary.

**TABLE 1:** Descriptive statistics of videos included in the final dataset

DATE	N	VIDEO LENGTH	N	VIEWS	N
2019	35	0:00-4:59	19	<1000	16
2020	22	5:00-9:59	53	1000-10,000	24

3. Kaye and Gray’s study of copyright gossip focuses on videos published from 2017 – 2019; we chose 2019 as the starting point for our study to provide a point of overlap with their research without fully duplicating their time period.
4. We recognise that this approach is problematic and risks reinforcing gender stereotypes and a binary approach to gender. To mitigate the risks, we report on the coding in aggregate and do not assign labels (or pronouns) to specific creators in the text when self-definition is not available.
5. VTuber, or virtual YouTuber, is a creator that uses a virtual avatar. While not all furries are VTubers, and not all VTubers are furries, the furries in our dataset used virtual anthropomorphized animal avatars.

DATE	N	VIDEO LENGTH	N	VIEWS	N
2021	19	10:00-14:59	31	10,001-50,000	27
2022	35	15:00-19:59	13	50,001-100,000	19
2023	24	20:00-24:59	6	100,001-500,000	22
		25:00-29:59	4	500,001-1M	13
		30:00+	9	1M-5M	14

## Calling out copyright on YouTube

In our dataset, when YouTubers called out copyright enforcement, they were primarily concerned with so-called “false” claims that ignore fair use or serve ulterior motives like harassment, censorship, and financial extortion (see Table 2). Creators criticised the abuse of manual copyright reporting tools at nearly twice the rate of automated claims, even though Content ID accounts for 98% of all copyright claims on the platform (Google, 2022). The pronounced concern with the abuse of copyright reporting tools echoes findings from interview and survey research with creators (Fiesler et al., 2023; Kingsley et al., 2022), as well as previous research on copyright gossip (Kaye & Gray, 2021), lending credence to the claim that creators understand the problems of copyright enforcement differently than the platform or large corporate rightsholders (Gray & Suzor, 2022). Whether automated or manual, callout videos framed false copyright claims as a threat to financial and personal well-being given the risk of account termination from repeated copyright violations. Creators also expressed frustration about the lengthy process of appealing copyright claims, its associated risks to privacy,<sup>6</sup> and the platform’s opaque communications with users, in line with previous research (Fiesler et al., 2023; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024).

Following their definition of the problem, the videos we analysed primarily discussed solutions for navigating false copyright claims. Almost no creator proposed leaving YouTube.<sup>7</sup> Instead, creators described an assortment of “little hacks” for navigating content moderation (Gillet et al., 2023), including self-censorship to avoid being copyright-claimed, editing or removing videos that have already been copyright-claimed, and strategies for subverting automated copyright detection on the platform. A majority of videos also discussed voice-related strategies for ex-

6. Filing a counter-notice to a copyright claim is a legal process that requires the creator to provide their name and mailing address to the claimant, which some perceived as a form of “self-doxxing” (e.g. YTC131 — see Appendix 2 for video details).

7. Indeed, the low frequency is reflected in the lack of a stand alone code for quitting, which we instead bundled into the assorted category of “other” solutions.

pressing dissatisfaction (Hirschman, 1970). Creators described their often ineffective experiences appealing a decision or contacting creator support. In response to the perceived limitations of YouTube’s official communication channels, they also discussed alternative strategies like going public and enlisting audiences and fellow creators to “signal boost” the message by sharing it on social media. Even when voice was not explicitly discussed, creators implicitly endorsed the strategy by publishing a callout video to the platform. Yet we found the role of voice depended on how creators assigned responsibility for the problem of false copyright claims. In what follows, we present three main targets of accountability: other creators, the platform, and external actors.

**TABLE 2:** How YouTubers framed the problem of copyright enforcement in callout videos

ASPECT	N	PROBLEM	N	TARGET OF RESPONSIBILITY	N	SOLUTION	N
Copyright strike	106	False claim	115	YouTube	73	Appeal	74
Manual claim	67	Fair use	85	Bad actors	66	Go public	68
Deplatforming	53	Financial harms	83	Corporations	60	Signal boost	37
Automated claim	34	YouTube policy	66	Other creators	57	Legal system	31
Unspecified	14	Harassment	49	Algorithms	18	Contact claimant	23
Lawsuit	12	Appeal system	46	The law	11	Creator support	20
		Norm violation	43	Self	8	Self-censor	17
		Creator wellbeing	37	YouTube employees	6	Edit video	13
		Copyright law	30	Susan Wojcicki	1	File report	12
		Creator bias	29			Other	11
		Communication	14			Remove video	9
		Privacy violation	13			Third-party service	7
		Free speech	13			Subvert system	7
		Extortion	7			Intercession	6
		Content theft	4				

## Calling out creators

In a video calling out another creator for employing a rights management company to claim copyright (and thus ad revenue) on videos that feature clips of their content, political streamer Hasan Piker appealed to shared community norms:

There are certain rules that every content creator knows not to fucking break... there's a reason why so many people lose their minds, so many random YouTubers

will get incredibly fucking mad about this because it would ruin the entire space.<sup>8</sup>

The rule that Piker invoked is a prohibition against using copyright management tools to claim clips of content featured in reaction or commentary videos.<sup>9</sup> While platforms like YouTube regulate copyright enforcement through policy documents and design, unspoken rules also determine community membership. Such norms are reinforced through callout videos like Piker's, which does not exist in isolation. Other videos in our dataset described creators who "falsely" claimed copyright as coming "under the commentary crosshairs"<sup>10</sup> for committing "one of the biggest crimes a YouTuber can do"<sup>11</sup> and undermining "a very homey system, a very handshake system" that creators depend on to negotiate copyright on the platform.<sup>12</sup> Entire genres of content like reaction videos and established practices like collaborating depend on this "handshake system" where creators permit forms of copying and sharing without remuneration, just as the commercial viability of YouTube depends on copyright enforcement tools that appease major corporate intellectual property rights holders (Gray, 2020).

Creators in our dataset shamed others for claiming videos to primarily extract revenue, taking down videos to suppress speech, or filing multiple strikes to punish an antagonist on the platform — especially if the perpetrator was a successful channel targeting smaller accounts. While some of the videos in our dataset acknowledged legitimate reasons for disagreement and grievance among creators, they maintained that creators should not use the copyright enforcement system as a tool to harm an opponent or settle a dispute. Responding to a situation where another creator used copyright claims to silence critique, The Act Man explained

YouTube is a platform where we should all be able to hate each other and co-exist... Hopefully, the YouTube community can come together and demand YouTube implement better systems so that content creators who abuse this system are much more heavily reprimanded and discouraged from abusing it.<sup>13</sup>

Creators like The Act Man framed copyright reporting tools as more powerful than other content moderation systems for good reason.<sup>14</sup> Reporting a community

8. YTC131, quotes have been lightly edited for readability.

9. See also YTC046, YTC053

10. YTC132

11. YTC090

12. YTC133

13. YTC029

guidelines violation sends a signal to the platform that it may or may not act upon while filing a copyright claim produces an immediate effect: the user receives a notice about the claim and must either accept or dispute it. The copyright appeals process is also structured differently, requiring the targeted account to provide their name and mailing address to the claimant and ultimately leaving the assessment of the appeal in the claimant's hands. As movie channel Heavy Spoilers put it, when it comes to copyright enforcement, creators are “guilty until proven innocent”.<sup>15</sup> Given the public criticism and comparative power of copyright reporting tools, some creators expressed significant trepidation or unwillingness to copyright strike other channels,<sup>16</sup> even in cases of blatant abuse like ripping and re-uploading unedited videos.

Creators occasionally shamed those who used their (purported) experience with copyright enforcement to exploit audiences. For example, our dataset included two videos accusing Lady Decade, a gaming creator, of lying about being “extorted” over a copyright strike and “exposing” her behaviour as a grift.<sup>17</sup> Finally, although minimally represented in our dataset, some videos shamed other creators for taking copyrighted material, upholding the importance of copyright, identifying valid reasons to use copyright management tools, and giving guidance about how to “fairly” use copyrighted material.<sup>18</sup> By drawing boundaries around legitimate uses, creators try to protect popular genres and practices that fall in a legal grey area from additional enforcement.

## Calling out the platform

In a video describing how Onision, an infamous creator accused of an array of personal misconduct, has repeatedly abused the copyright reporting tools to take down any videos that talk about him, YouTuber Repzion directly appealed to the platform for redress:

Hi Google, people at Team YouTube. This is a plea. I know some of you guys are watching this because this has to go through the approval process and I'm gonna tweet you guys this video but this is a real plea to anyone who works at Team YouTube or is involved with YouTube as a whole. This is a video simply begging

14. See also YTC034

15. YTC007

16. See YTC029, YTC086, and YTC093

17. YTC068, YTC080

18. YTC015, YTC038, YTC042, YTC046, YTC121, and YTC122

you guys to take this seriously.<sup>19</sup>

Videos that directly addressed the platform, including its employees and corporate leadership, typically sought to rectify an enforcement problem, punishing an account for as-of-yet unrecognised misconduct or overturning punishments wrongly issued. Most wrongful decision claims were concerned with the inability of the Content ID tool to recognise fair use.<sup>20</sup> These arguments reflect the uptake of fair use standards from the United States, even among creators from other countries with other policies for using copyrighted material — a finding that aligns with an interview-based investigation of creatives from Australia (Pappalardo et al., 2017). Occasionally creators critiqued structural aspects of copyright enforcement, focusing on specific policies or the appeals process. For example, Australian arm wrestler and sports podcaster Ryan Blue Bowen called on YouTube to “stand up and listen” after his experience of having his videos claimed by Argentinian hackers and to change the system so that other creators would not be subjected to this kind of abuse in the future.<sup>21</sup>

Callouts that targeted the conduct of YouTube often invoked the importance of a cross-platform messaging strategy in response to the challenge of getting a corporation to listen. Reflecting on the limitations of official channels for appealing a claim, music educator Rick Beato concluded, “the only recourse is to go to Twitter”.<sup>22</sup> Other creators emphasised the importance of collective action and asked their audiences to signal boost the message by tagging official YouTube accounts, retweeting and replying to messages from the creator, and using a designated hashtag. The importance of Twitter, or X as it is now known, is echoed in the findings of other platform callout research (Berge, 2023; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024) and interview studies with creators (Kingsley et al., 2022). Although the platform has since been purchased by Elon Musk and undergone a corporate name change operation, these developments were not reflected in our dataset. It thus remains an open question whether and to what extent X provides a viable means of “making some noise” (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024), even as YouTube’s corporate accounts like @TeamYouTube remain active on the platform.

19. YTC018

20. See, for example, YTC027, YTC032, YTC088, YTC134. This complaint was particularly common among creators who make or review music.

21. YTC001

22. YTC023

## Calling out external actors

Interventions directed towards external actors were less frequent, perhaps reflecting a perception that callout videos were less likely to influence these actors. As gaming creator Matt Lowne lamented,

To be honest, I'm not expecting much major progress. YouTube is infamously apathetic when it comes to this sort of thing and Sony has no real incentive to try and straighten things out, so this is probably just to the situation and there's not much I can do about it.<sup>23</sup>

Although large media companies are active on the platform, their activity is not subject to the same community ideals professed by creators (Burgess & Green, 2018; Lewis & Christin, 2021). Indeed, the antagonism between creators and media corporations has a long history on the platform (Burgess & Green, 2018). If major corporations like Sony have little incentive to acknowledge appeals from independent creators, other external actors like hackers and spammers, which operate outside community and legal norms, are even less invested, making persuasive appeals to modify their behaviour unlikely to succeed. Additionally, it was not always possible to distinguish between the work of bad actors and corporations when it came to creators' complaints about copyright trolls.<sup>24</sup> As a rhetorical move of delegitimation, so-called copyright trolls could refer to entities employed by corporations to protect their IP or independent operators serving their own interests.

Notably, while creators occasionally described copyright law as part of the problem, they almost never attributed responsibility to the law.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, none of the videos in our dataset addressed conventional state policy actors, even as earlier copyright callout videos have served this purpose.<sup>26</sup> Like other external actors, the law exists beyond the boundaries of YouTube. Its remoteness may contribute to the perception that the law is not a part of their daily lives, in contrast with the proximity of copyright enforcement on YouTube. A final explanation comes from the positive reception of fair use principles, which were frequently invoked, including several creators going through the four factors that courts in the US consider when

23. YTC087

24. YTC005

25. The main example of a creator critiquing copyright law is a video where PewDiePie protests what was then known as Article 13 of the EU Copyright Directive (YTC063). Perhaps the law only emerges as a target during times of change.

26. For example, as part of the #WTFU campaign, The Nostalgia Critic published a video directing his audience to share their experiences with copyright takedowns with the U.S. Copyright Office, resulting in almost 100,000 comments posted in 30 hours (Channel Awesome, 2018).



making a fair use evaluation.<sup>27</sup> The popularity of fair use discourse may be due to the concept's prominence in YouTube's "Copyright School", a set of educational videos that creators must watch after receiving a copyright strike (Fiesler et al., 2023). Regardless of its origins, the repeated invocation of fair use as a friend to creators that is overlooked by the platform and ignored by corporations fosters an affinity between creators and the law.

## **Vertical and horizontal callouts as tactics of platform governance**

Our dataset of copyright callout videos indicates that frustration with the prevalence of "false" copyright claims is a primary motivator for creators to speak out. As a category, the strategic ambiguity of false claims makes the accusation persuasively appealing: it is broad enough to encompass a wide variety of behaviour, it is prohibited by both YouTube's policies and copyright law (Google, 2022; Mazzone, 2011), and the label's negative associations make few likely to defend it wholesale. Despite general agreement over the problem of false copyright claims, creators offered diverse accounts of what distinguishes fraudulent uses of copyright management tools. While a few videos expressed extreme views such as the position that claiming copyright "is the worst thing you can do"<sup>28</sup> or that copyright enforcement is a "no man's land" where valid strategies are only determined by what someone can get away with,<sup>29</sup> most professed relatively moderate positions somewhere between total freedom and total control. For example, H3 Podcast host Ethan Klein described the competing interests of different stakeholders shaping copyright policy to his audience:

You guys got to understand there are laws that YouTube has to abide by. There are legal precedents that if they don't abide by – the DMCA – then the system which we enjoy is just simply not possible. YouTube cannot exist. Because they have this treaty, it's like a diplomatic agreement in a war.<sup>30</sup>

In approaching copyright management as a balancing act, most creators adopted the general disposition of copyright law (Burgess & Green, 2018; Gray, 2020), even if they disagreed on what constitutes balance in practice.

27. YTC103, YTC110, and YTC122

28. YTC093

29. YTC024

30. YTC076

Despite their shared concern with “false” copyright claims, we found a distinction in how the videos leveraged shame that broadly aligns with who they deem responsible for the problem. Creators who called out other creators addressed their peers, while creators who called out the platform or other corporations addressed entities with greater institutional status. While all callouts present a violation of social norms and appeal to (presumably) shared values (Herbison & Podosky, 2024), we argue that callouts perform different functions for platform governance depending on the institutional relationship between the speaker and the target of the callout. The distinction between horizontal and vertical communication in organisational scholarship helps clarify our argument. Horizontal communication “refers to that between colleagues on an equal hierarchical level” while vertical communication “is that which travels up and down the hierarchy” (Bartels et al., 2010, p. 212). Building on this distinction, we differentiate between horizontal and vertical callouts.

*Horizontal callouts* refer to public criticism where the speaker and the target share the same institutional status, which, in the context of our study, involved social media creators addressing other creators. Horizontal callouts primarily appealed to *community* as a shared value. Although it would be a mistake to speak of a singular culture on YouTube given its scale, geographic reach, and linguistic diversity, as well as the platform’s commercialisation (Burgess & Green, 2018), creators and audiences alike have long adopted the language of community, especially when engaging in normative debates about platform values (Burgess et al., 2016; Lewis & Christin, 2021). Some callout videos specified particular groups on the platform such as the “gacha reaction community”,<sup>31</sup> while others appealed to a broader platform identity through the use of terms like “creators” or “YouTubers”. While community is an expansive category in copyright callout videos, it is not limitless. We did not, for example, find any callouts trying to enrol spammers or scammers into the shared norms of a community — instead, creators typically appealed to the platform to intervene or encouraged other creators to protect themselves. In drawing boundaries around communal identity and acceptable behaviour, horizontal callouts perform a similar function to metadiscussion on forums, with both offering a “mechanism through which groups can interrogate the boundaries of what is acceptable, can construct norms... and can enforce a certain degree of compliance to those norms” (Burnett & Bonnici, 2003, p. 342).

*Vertical callouts* refer to public criticism where the speaker and the target have dif-

31. YTC017. Gacha refers to video games such as *Genshin Impact* that implement a “gashapon” mechanic, referring to toy vending machines popular in Japan.

ferent institutional statuses: in the context of our study, this typically involved creators addressing social media platforms. Vertical callouts primarily appealed to *fairness* as a shared value, highlighting both individual content moderation decisions and the structural conditions of copyright enforcement on YouTube as unfair. However, the entrenched power disparity between creators and corporations requires a collective response to increase the chance of being heard (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024). Thus, calling out platforms and external actors is largely about marshalling a community, composed of audiences and fellow creators, to draw attention to an area of concern and appeal to broadly endorsed values. Where horizontal callouts direct community practices, vertical callouts seek corporate intercession to address problems that cannot be resolved through community agreement, including specific content moderation actions like removing a copyright strike, as well as more structural factors involving the process of adjudicating copyright claims. Although the vertical callouts in our dataset primarily addressed YouTube, a few creators requested media conglomerates like Nintendo and Universal Music Group to treat users more fairly and acknowledge reviewing a video game or teaching audiences how to play music as fair use. The infrequency of addressing external corporations may reflect a lack of confidence that callout videos are an effective mechanism for change. While creators also expressed doubt that “YouTube” was listening, they invoked precedents from their own experience or the experience of other creators where going public with a problem successfully led to its resolution.

## Conclusion

Responding to the call to analyse how “power is distributed amongst various stakeholders whose platforms exert distinctive yet interdependent functions in the ecosystem” (van Dijck et al., 2019, p. 12), our account foregrounds the existing and potential role of creators in platform governance without romanticising the agency of individuals or overlooking structural factors. While platforms configure highly asymmetrical relationships among different stakeholders (Nielsen & Ganter, 2022; Shapiro, 2024), scholarly focus on the exercise of power by a platform risks treating the power of platforms as an overly deterministic, top-down affair, something done to and through users. In so doing, these theorisations struggle to account for a distinctive feature of social media as a venue where messages circulate and publics form, and thus downplay the role of users as “vital agents of platform politics” (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2021, p. 3268). Although YouTube lacks any “formalised process of stakeholder participation” (Kumar, 2019, p. 15), contributing to the precarity of creators and giving the company significant discretion in the concerns it

chooses to address, creators engage in platform governance through novel strategies of “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). We identified two strategies of participation: horizontal callouts, which direct public criticism towards peers, and vertical callouts, which direct public criticism towards institutional superiors including the leadership of commercial platforms.

Horizontal and vertical callouts serve different roles in the platform governance ecosystem: the former offers a mechanism for community self-policing (Seering, 2020) while the latter provides a mechanism for influencing centralised content moderation policies and practices (Shapiro et al., 2024). Assessing the efficacy of callouts, or the “conditions under which voice-based mechanisms” can “ensure accountability” (Schneider, 2022, p. 1980), would thus benefit from understanding the different functions that callouts serve. For example, the effectiveness of horizontal callouts could be reflected in shared ideas of acceptable conduct, along with behavioural or attitudinal changes from the target of the callout. While the creators in our dataset roughly agreed that false copyright claims are a problem, to what extent other creators or audiences share particular ideas of platform community or “fair” use remains an open question. Similarly, the effectiveness of vertical callouts could be reflected in whether, and in what ways, the platform responds to publicised complaints, only some of which will be reflected in public statements. Although our dataset contained stories of YouTube overturning particular decisions, the prevalence of this practice, as well as the inequalities involved in who is able to successfully leverage public appeal (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024; Shapiro et al., 2024), merit further investigation. Finally, the assessment of both horizontal and vertical callouts would benefit from greater attention to the expressive benefits of calling out as a practice (Herbinson & Podosky, 2024; Kligler-Vilenchik, 2017). What factors lead creators to go public with their problems? How do they evaluate the experience of doing so? And is there variation between the motivations and experiences of horizontal versus vertical callouts?

Horizontal callouts, like any form of community governance, raise important considerations around the boundaries of the community (Marwick, 2021; Seering, 2022), especially on a platform the scale of YouTube. While we found significant commonalities in the articulation of community in our dataset, our study also highlights a few prominent limitations. First, we only analysed English-language videos on a profoundly multi-lingual, multi-national platform. Second, the speakers in our sample are overwhelmingly men, even though women actively participate in copyright discussions in other contexts (Fiesler et al., 2023) and engage in other genres of YouTube callouts (Lewis and Christin, 2022). More work is needed

to understand the relatively low levels of participation from women in copyright disputes and its implications for community governance. Third, our dataset highlights the meaningful differences in participation among big and small creators. YouTube provides big creators with better tools for managing copyright and official channels for voicing frustrations (Caplan & Gillespie, 2021). While small creators may be able to leverage community-directed power within particular niches on the platform, their overall ability to participate is contingent on catching the attention of a larger creator or going viral.

Although vertical callouts can be successfully mobilised to affect the platform's decision-making, they are a blunt and unwieldy tool that reactively responds to issues with existing policies and enforcement rather than proactively participating in the development of new policies. Vertical callouts may also be a strategy of diminishing returns. Social media platforms are no strangers to controversy, resulting in a situation where "individual controversies — small shocks that make platform governance look less legitimate — can be weathered by technology companies without real lasting change" as tech companies develop and adopt crisis communication strategies (Suzor, 2019, p. 121; see also Ananny & Gillespie, 2017). Furthermore, the platform ecosystem itself is changing. While YouTube seems relatively stable in social media terms, X, the other platform that YouTubers relied on to mobilise public attention, is in a more liminal state following its purchase by Elon Musk. Whether X will continue to help users attract the right type of attention to publicly pressure YouTube and other corporations remains an open question.

Together, practical considerations about the continued efficacy of vertical callouts combined with the exclusions inherent to any conception of community invoked through horizontal callouts, especially in large and diverse platform environments, offer reasons to resist any simple celebration of user agency. At the same time, our analysis of copyright callouts complicates accounts of platform power that focus on the technological and economic influence of major corporations. Theorisations of platform power should consider not only the power of platforms or the regulatory power over platforms but also the power afforded to creators by virtue of the audiences they garner and the communities they cultivate on and through digital media platforms. Here we invoke a different connotation of platform as "a place from which to speak and be heard" (Gillespie, 2010, p. 352). Yet creator-driven approaches to platform governance need not stop at callouts. Platforms like YouTube can move beyond the minimal tools for user involvement like flagging systems (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016), taking inspiration from the community moderation

tools developed on other platforms (Seering, 202) to harness community expertise and bring more humans into the moderation process – a feature consistently requested by users (Vaccaro et al., 2020). For regulators, creators represent an opportunity to bring more public participation into legislation. As the early example of the Nostalgia Critic’s #WTFU campaign attests, creators can effectively mobilise their audiences and networks of other creators to participate in public hearings (Edwards, 2018). Such opportunities promise ways of expanding an understanding of the unspoken rules governing digital platforms, the roles of creators in shaping and enforcing them, and pathways towards a more balanced configuration of platform power.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Codebook

1. What aspect of copyright enforcement is discussed in the video? (check all

that apply)

1. Automated claim - the use of Content ID to flag “infringing” content
  2. Manual claim - human flagging of “infringing” content
  3. Copyright strike - a penalty applied to a YouTube channel following a formal takedown notice or repeated copyright violations
  4. Deplatforming - the removal of a YouTube channel
  5. Lawsuit - a legal court proceeding to adjudicate potential copyright infringement
  6. Unspecified
2. **How does the video define the problem(s) of copyright enforcement on YouTube?** (check all that apply, but make sure that the topic is framed as an issue rather than neutrally discussed)
1. False claim - someone intentionally filing a false claim against a video
  2. Fair use - an argument that “infringing” video should be protected as fair use
  3. Free speech - an argument that “infringing” video should be protected as free speech; also includes discussions of censorship
  4. Harassment - the use of copyright enforcement system to harass a creator
  5. Appeal system - the YouTube system for responding to claims and strikes
  6. YouTube communication - issues with how YouTube communications information about a specific issue or about the platform’s general policies
  7. Creator wellbeing - harm to creators involving stress, mental health, etc. (should involve more than mere expression of frustration)
  8. Financial harms - harm to creators' ability to monetize their content, make an income, or cost to litigate claims
  9. Extortion - creator is threatened or coerced to pay someone
  10. Creator bias - differential enforcement of policies based on creator attribute (e.g., social factors, size of account)
  11. Content bias - differential enforcement of policies based on type of content (e.g., music, reaction videos, gaming)
  12. YouTube policy - platform policies around copyrighted material
  13. Copyright law - copyright law (e.g., DMCA, Article 13) or related internet governance laws (e.g., Section 230)
  14. Privacy violation - concern with revealing personal or private information, typically as part of the appeals process; discussions of doxing
  15. Norm violation - discussion of behaviour that violates cultural norms on the platform (e.g., talking about striking a video as a “nuclear option”)

16. Content theft - other creators stealing their content / copyrighted material
17. Other - please specify
3. **Who or what is responsible for the problem?** (check all that apply)
  1. Self - the person (or people) who has uploaded the video
  2. Other Creators - other creators on the platform
  3. The Audience - audience members involved in coordinated behaviour
  4. Corporations (not YouTube) - companies that hold or manage intellectual property rights, including companies described as copyright trolls
  5. YouTube - the platform itself
  6. Algorithms - automated systems including ContentID
  7. The law - law related to copyright or internet governance, as well as any associated governments
  8. Bad actors - individual bad actors not affiliated with YouTube or specific corporations, such as hackers, scammers, and trolls
  9. Other - please specify
4. **What step(s) has the creator taken or plans to take to resolve the problem?** (check all that apply, but only code for actions that someone has done or actively plans to do)
  1. Go public - discussions of how the creator goes public, such as making a video or posting on Twitter to draw attention to the situation
  2. Signal boost - the audience acts on behalf of the creator to draw more attention to the situation by, for example, using a coordinated hashtag or tagging @YouTube (this should be beyond just “paying attention”); can also involve another creator drawing attention to an issue by making a video
  3. Legal system - seek legal advice by contacting a lawyer or challenge the claim in court (including more speculative discussions like “I’ll go to court if I have to”)
  4. Contact creator support - communicate with creator support team, including YouTube partner manager, about the situation
  5. Contact claimant - communicate directly with the person or company that filed a claim
  6. Appeal - appeal the claim or strike on YouTube
  7. Edit video - edit video to remove or modify infringing content
  8. Subvert system - use “workarounds” to avoid having content claimed (or elaborate systems to manage anticipated complications with copyright enforcement)
  9. Remove video - take infringing video down
  10. Report video - report video for misconduct on YouTube (including copyright violation)
  11. Third-party service - use a third-party service to avoid copyright

issues or resolve copyright disputes (typically commercial licensing companies)

12. YouTube copyright school - attend YouTube's online program to learn about copyright enforcement
13. Self-censor - stop making a certain type of content in response to concerns about copyright enforcement (e.g., avoid using music, stop making reaction videos)
14. Other - please specify
5. **What is the video's stance towards YouTube?**
  1. Positive - explicitly and consistently praising the platform
  2. Negative - explicitly and consistently criticizing the platform
  3. Mixed - mix of both positive and negative assessments of the platform
  4. Neutral/Undetermined - no clear attitude expressed towards the platform
6. **What is the video's stance towards copyright law?**
  1. Positive - explicitly and consistently praising copyright law
  2. Negative - explicitly and consistently criticizing copyright law
  3. Mixed - mix of both positive and negative assessments of copyright law (e.g., pro copyright but sees need for reform)
  4. Neutral/Undetermined - no clear attitude expressed towards copyright law
7. **How many people speak in the video?** (only count people from the channel or invited guests, not people featured in reaction video clips)
  1. 1
  2. 2
  3. 3
  4. 4+
8. **What is the gender of the creator in the video?** (1. Treat v-tubers and furies as a separate category. 2. Prioritize self-identification when available, such as the inclusion of pronouns in bio or video descriptions, or verbal accounts in video introductions like "hey it's your girl" / "hey it's your boy." 3. If no self-identification is available, use conventional visual and verbal markers, focusing on active choices creators make around dress and communication style. 4. Use the other category to specify alternative genders such as non-binary, genderqueer, or two-spirit, and to list the genders for multiple creators.)
  1. Man
  2. Woman
  3. VTuber/Furry
  4. Unclear
  5. Other - please specify

Appendix 2: Video dataset details

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
YTC001	Ryan Blue Bowen	Australia	A7CHlrpGPp8	False Copyright Claims   Exposing and Beating Hackers   YouTube Must Update Policy	4833	596	174
YTC002	KonekoKitten	United States	qfLGv6F6qLQ	roblox is FALSE COPYRIGHT STRIKING a youtuber...	404722	22661	4498
YTC003	Bowblax	Canada	H6-XwiO6k6I	Cole Carrigan Tries Stealing Money From Me!! (Copyright Claim)	36346	2223	282
YTC004	Armando Ferreira	United States	idMcy0xLB3s	I Got a YouTube COPYRIGHT STRIKE for Fair Use!!!	52826	3214	397
YTC005	Inform Overload	Canada	lo3n0lFqMgo	Exposing ViralHog The Copyright Trolls	56691	313	28
YTC006	World of MrGrey	United Kingdom	Q4PVs9eTUol	The Tartarian Conspiracy - BIT OF A RANT ABOUT COPYRIGHT - Slapped Ham Breakdown and Analysis	2139	263	76
YTC007	Heavy Spoilers	United States	Bdank4KvmdA	PROOF That Universal Is Abusing The Youtube Copyright System	54270	5587	853
YTC008	Adam Neely 2	N/A	KM6X2MEI7R8	warner music claimed my video for defending their	2546046	188421	10864



LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				copyright in a lawsuit they lost the copyright for			
YTC009	ymfah	United States	ieErnZAN5Eo	How to Break YouTube (Copyright Claim your own video)	1478598	114755	5923
YTC010	SomeOrdinaryGamers	Canada	SOuc4AGxGpE	How YouTube Failed Us And Sided With Quantum TV...	945994	43126	3789
YTC011	The Original Ace	United States	Mz14UL-r63w	Abusing YouTube Copyright Claims (Tutorial)	839966	48431	2794
YTC012	Fran Blanche	United States	DEH88GMeOWw	Copyright Trolls And Film Questions	25616	2447	315
YTC013	Nuxanor	Canada	Yqa2E2mMLXI	A Documentary On Copyright Abuse In 2023 (IMPORTANT)	30271	2836	151
YTC014	SadowickProduction	Canada	O5w6z_N4fZs	Youtube Tutorial People Are Not Immune To DMCA & Copyright Abuse	1782	73	23
YTC015	Alexander Bosko	United States	DpC7Y6roXxo	How to File a Copyright Claim to Remove Stolen Videos on YouTube	139	5	1
YTC016	Rekieta Law	United States	2giv_N4KcoK	This is How You DO Play: BTFO Copyright Trolls, feat. DarksydePhil   Rekieta	23326	1684	279

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				Law			
YTC017	VixenVillage	United States	ZvAju35ZyQ4	Gacha Reaction videos are copyright magnets! // first rant!	2932	178	
YTC018	Repzion	United States	bwFCrHfrXto	A Plea To Team Youtube On Onision's False Copyright	360756	32749	4844
YTC019	DSP Tries It - Memology 101	United States	8rY5_Td8Ljs	DSP Rant About YouTube Copyright System, Believes He Has Over 40K Videos Claimed	7044	240	123
YTC020	Turkey Tom	United States	OTmTkD0BxUE	Ray William Johnson's Rampant Copyright Abuse	225125	11929	902
YTC021	MattShea	Canada	kyr4tK70LI8	Youtube's Copyright System is Still Shit	218204	12553	2941
YTC022	Rev says desu	United States	OY7sWMrYzkU	MiHoYo Is Abusing YouTube's Copyright System...	73504	5878	659
YTC023	Rick Beato	United States	ESIY_DbUsoK	I Got My First Copyright Strike...I'm Pissed (Rant)	1412861	125027	22320
YTC024	EmpLemon	United States	BPIC2A_Yel0	The YouTube Copyright Metagame (Part 1)	1047818	49389	3002
YTC025	Barley The Cat	United States	E32xomE4jko	furry youtuber false strikes other furry youtubers	1739	191	39
YTC026	Conant Reacts	N/A	HpFPXI0Gj0Q	How to Dispute	53986	1093	298

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				Copyright Claims under FAIR USE for any YouTube reactors			
YTC027	Nik Nocturnal	Canada	xRwwYwko2cA	Youtube's Copyright System is BROKEN!	48497	3282	256
YTC028	baldbookgeek	United Kingdom	0idSfl5V7XU	youtube fix your copyright and fair use / rant	158	13	10
YTC029	The Act Man	United States	k1OWLq2dO2c	Copyright Abuse on YouTube - Featuring Quantum TV	2536546	185165	25197
YTC030	igobyneq	United States	4XvweoOhxlw	How distribution services are trying to steal your copyrights	424	29	15
YTC031	3klikphilip	United Kingdom	la1Li_AtZa0	Bob Tik VS Door Stuck Meme	511253	28839	1202
YTC032	Screen Sanctum	United States	WhEnYFA8P_E	YouTube Copyright Strike / Dispute Rant	76	7	7
YTC033	DJ Pain 1	United States	ZkrcT200TC8	The Problem With Uploading Beats to YouTube: How I Deal With Copyright Claims	43186	2320	396
YTC034	Asmongold TV	United States	PzhcRBYGMy4	Asmongold Reacts to Copyright Abuse on YouTube by The Act Man	1428193	39731	3968
YTC035	Matt Lowne	United Kingdom	FyLSosFLGIA	IT'S OVER - Copyright-Claim FINAL Update	121788	7441	746

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
YTC036	Anime America	United States	6OkPsYilc5o	Is Toei Animation Going Too Far? - Copyright and Fair Use Rant	21753	1642	304
YTC037	Simon Mas	Italy	7vbmrl32Biw	The IDIOCIES of Music Copyright: A rant	11	2	0
YTC038	YT Torials	United States	G0MkO5g-p_Y	How to make a Copyright claim on YouTube 2021	37848	836	114
YTC039	TJR	N/A	IX5fu4vcDjo	Youtube Admits To Millions Of False Copyright Claims	988	99	24
YTC040	Bowblax	Canada	Cu246b4W4h4	The Most Insecure Commentator on YouTube (JustDestiny Copystrike Abuse)	16912	608	229
YTC041	David Pakman Show	United States	Z43JMffa1x0	CNN AND NBC Drop Hammer on David Pakman Show	68417	5364	968
YTC042	Edy Chandra	N/A	pPOqq-kckSs	How Do You Get Copyright Strikes on Youtube	3682	85	22
YTC043	MinxyOne	United States	BF3hUy4Qx1w	Copyright Abuse on Youtube By The Act Man   Minxy Reacts	7270	275	52
YTC044	Optimus	United States	QjNvTCcQug8	YouTube Is SUING A Notorious Copyright Troll	167043	8610	996
YTC045	Celpon	N/A	RE9KL5l7X1	Kobo	65359	3849	83

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
	Ceha.		c	worried about getting copyright (DMCA)?Call i Kobo?			
YTC046	ReviewTech USA	United States	z_JUQd8syNE	Angry Joe Is Getting Screwed Over By False Copyright Claims	107425	6447	766
YTC047	Papa Gut Archive	N/A	uldR2qlsjk8	Educating Myself On The Quantum TV Copyright Abuse Controversy	9423	363	44
YTC048	The Act Man	United States	XOQhV6YqIfI	The YouTube Drama Never Ends...	663816	51486	3204
YTC049	tfatk	United States	_ImE2OfRRw	Chris D'Elia Filed False Copyright Claim In Attempt To Takedown Documentar y	35111	753	230
YTC050	YongYea	United States	dG7duZ56dB0	Jukin Media Extorts YouTuber MxR By Abusing YouTube's Awful Copyright System	475453	37518	4629
YTC051	Novakast	United States	CWtO6fDfELc	False Copyright Claim - Onision - ONISION TRIES TO RELATE TO GAMERS   Novakast	1048	73	25
YTC052	Upper Echelon	United States	GueXtu54CYg	This Needs to END - False Copyright Strike SAGA	100643	10155	688

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
YTC053	Amanda the Jedi	Canada	j27bj2Z9q_I	Chris Hansen is False Copyright Striking Channels ALL over YouTube	36661	2017	144
YTC054	EckhartsLadder	Canada	5R6j6jIU3tY	The Scumbags Abusing YouTube's TERRIBLE Copyright System	131079	11324	1231
YTC055	DarkFlare	United States	3XCQvXJeK_w	Nintendo: The Biggest Copyright Trolls	2126	126	36
YTC056	Video Marketing Unicorn - Karin Angelly	United States	bGzLyVw99MI	Should You Remove Copyright Claims On YouTube?	47197	2063	947
YTC057	Quissath	United Kingdom	GXcScBqlyzw	Quissath Reacts to Copyright Abuse on YouTube - Featuring Quantum TV	1069	54	16
YTC058	TwoSetViolin	Australia	uoT3jCOZwlI	Update on the Copyright Issue	504087	34482	2201
YTC059	Moist Meta	United States	NR0qWUwZfD4	Moistcr1tikal Reacts To Copyright Abuse on Youtube By The Act Man	234	4	0
YTC060	Internet Comment Etiquette with Erik	United States	dwp881tK6lA	Internet Comment Etiquette: "Bogus Copyright Claims"	600968	37315	1378
YTC061	Dave Simpson	N/A	rfDem-C45YY	Yet More Copyright Strikes (RANT ALERT)	7561	626	313
YTC062	SmokingEssy7887	United States	XTxLwOFKKkw	What is a copyright © troll	17	1	0

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
YTC063	PewDiePie	Japan	yMuEeUyMfUo	STOP DOING THIS! - Copyright Striking Criticism etc	9179842	558591	40528
YTC064	justmehabibi	N/A	7_CQonpTSRo	YouTube Copyright is Broken...	129084	7365	663
YTC065	Islam Critiqued	N/A	lZ9K0xgcB-8	An Open Letter to YouTube: Yasir Qadhi and Copyright Abuse	18008	1885	191
YTC066	GalaxyIsOk	Belarus	sn0dDnWShVc	Jellobug Abuses The Copyright System: Rant Pt2	75727	4042	1531
YTC067	Andrei Terbea	Romania	7iRILbewgos	The Lamentable Tale of POKIMANE	6096963	352698	32898
YTC068	Canadian Gamer	Canada	OAb7KCHrd a8	It's all an act! (Lady Decade rant)	3893	233	253
YTC069	fantano	N/A	wLRjhjQ4Dy8	YouTube Updates Copyright Claiming Policy	123308	4839	395
YTC070	TreasureChrist	N/A	u4Qa8jGtNFs	Pastors Abuse YouTube Copyright   Joel Osteen, Steven Furtick, Benny Hinn, Mike Winger	56162	3985	199
YTC071	PewDiePie	Japan	Ku1ykhGP764	Youtube copyright seriously pisses me off.. PEW NEWS	3044074	307211	12145
YTC072	MadcoreMoFo	Australia	zzyeg6wKVrs	Faran Balanced Tries To Delete Divinity Said -	1437	183	25



LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				YouTube False Copyright Abuse, Guest Tell Stories			
YTC073	Cxlvxn	United States	y5_SsmxqRXI	YOUTUBE SUES THE PERSON THAT FALSE COPYRIGHTED MY VIDEOS (Chris Brady)	52276	3096	272
YTC074	PyroLIVE	N/A	eJSwv1DHLmA	Huge Nikocado Avocado Drama	875352	49895	2315
YTC075	Pointless	United Kingdom	cG0NwmY4BL4	IShowSpeed IS OFFICIALLY CANCELLED. .. (exposed)	16449	864	197
YTC076	H3 Podcast	United States	lYeKevWNUOg	YouTube Ends Copyright Abuse - H3 Podcast #135	1127427	27323	5414
YTC077	InfernoPlus	United States	PrpOh0Qo8Iw	Copyright Abuse Is Killing Youtube	1636716	122324	16838
YTC078	Kavos	United Kingdom	V2hdgb9Tq3E	IShowSpeed Has Been Doing This Behind Everyone's Back... (CAUGHT RED HANDED)	124736	7394	918
YTC079	Chef Bojack	United States	Z9Kou_HplDs	An Intervention with Jalyn About False Copyright Strikes and Mental Health	461	35	30
YTC080	Tipster	United States	mJqegC7itCU	YouTuber Lady Decade EXTORTED by Copyright	5346	271	449

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				Troll!?!?			
YTC081	Boid	N/A	_aA52v193mo	My False Copyright Striker's Email Reponse [Reupload]	83513	5252	481
YTC082	GamerThumbTV	United States	KcweFAuuk1k	It's Time to Fight Back Against Copyright Claim Abuse	16471	1541	319
YTC083	TheProfessional	N/A	AsxiDwueq-k	UMG Claimed My 11 Hour Walkthrough For 11 Seconds!!, Copyright Abuse Proof!	57819	3725	1007
YTC084	Daniel Batal	United States	FrZQNS_J-vQ	What Happens if You Steal YouTube Videos?   YouTube Copyright Rules	40250	1443	823
YTC085	GiBi	N/A	9Nv65vustb0	Copyright Trolls   How YouTube Fails Its Users	4343	291	67
YTC086	JackSucksAt Stuff	United Kingdom	UiW7IPsSk1s	This Youtube channel is stealing ALL my videos!!	1156639	45448	1697
YTC087	Matt Lowne	United Kingdom	jnvBil-Whbk	Channel Update after the Copyright Claims	78315	7532	967
YTC088	Paul Barton	Thailand	2Ap9mkgV52Q	YouTube Copyright Abuse and Scammers	21261	2037	249
YTC089	Freedom!	United States	9JhUlalfB8	What is Content ID and How can You Use it   Freedom! Quick Tips	6665	109	69

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				(2020)			
YTC090	PapitronPrime	Ireland	C1N5dL9d7Oo	iShowSpeed Caught Stealing From Fans   Copyright Abuse Drama   Thumb Media & Cartigan Exposed	318	20	14
YTC091	SomeOrdinaryGamers	Canada	Px14aJGZRH Y	This YouTuber Keeps Abusing The Copyright System...	711342	43727	3599
YTC092	Mattias Holmgren	Sweden	AFhkiHyTcBk	Copyright Strikes - TikTok vs YouTube (Rant)	1431	99	71
YTC093	PyroLIVE	N/A	AEtYaMtsZc4	Huge iShowSpeed Drama	708191	43248	1589
YTC094	JobbytheHoning	United States	DxfexPENMWc	COPYRIGHT CLAIM REVIEW	143199	11261	2080
YTC095	Tech Informant	Nigeria	HLE2BLzW52g	New Monetization Update   YouTube Shorts   Creator Music Copyright	1925	103	43
YTC096	Chris Zissis	United States	meM8f1I4XDY	How to NEVER Get A Copyright Strike On YouTube..	2734	115	1
YTC097	The Original Ace	United States	NLA5b_UalPI	Abusing YouTube Copyright Claims 2	435614	25988	1174
YTC098	TankTheTech	United States	jMlu2taavhg	Why I REFUSE to Battle the YouTube Copyright System	23997	2004	443
YTC099	Kinetik001	N/A	d2fmpGMg300	Kinetik001 Channel	254558	14518	753

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				Update (R.I.P. Door Stuck!?)			
YTC100	Perfecto De Castro	United States	oXoq6L96nH8	214 Copyright Claim UPDATE + Rico's Comment	296639	4770	582
YTC101	Mental Outlaw	United States	tasgdeBvRgl	The Biggest YouTube ContentID Scam in History.	94933	6064	536
YTC102	dial2fast	United States	62xktLJVXd0	Using Youtube Copyright Match Tool - Stolen Videos	3846	216	55
YTC103	Beyond the Game	Canada	gjH7QE0CukM	How does FAIR USE apply to sports on YouTube	16401	951	80
YTC104	Rick Beato	United States	F7AyZq5dVFI	How I Fixed My COPYRIGHT STRIKE Takedowns	575740	30315	4215
YTC105	Daniel Greene	United States	2PZTBj5SXT E	I Got A Copyright Strike and Now Have To Stop...	175129	12559	929
YTC106	Kira	United Kingdom	gHPLsCj7R8w	Earth 2 Youtuber Filing False Copyright Takedowns on my Channel	81414	5874	1082
YTC107	Business English Success	Germany	l0Xn8eaCgHI	YouTube Copyright Claim Abuse Solution - Business English Success	19	2	0
YTC108	SmellyOctopus	Canada	w4WC9CbFEy8	Youtube Copyright Claimed My Voice ~ What's Going On?	734575	27878	5593

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
YTC109	The Ultimate Classical Music Guide by Dave Hurwitz	United States	FUSE1xqbFvg	Music Chat: A Rant About YouTube Copyright Claims	4430	340	143
YTC110	Ian Corzine	United States	j9WFGSEKftM	YouTube COPYRIGHT Rules 2021   LAWYER's EASY Tutorial!!!	46334	1478	328
YTC111	YongYea	United States	J6gtmZI8oUU	Nintendo Attempts DMCA/ Copyright Abuse On Did You Know Gaming's Heroes Of Hyrule Video, Backfires	269915	15481	2357
YTC112	EckhartsLader	Canada	-D2KPK89Xol	My channel is being ATTACKED by Copyright Trolls... and it has me worried	95861	11564	2086
YTC113	pwnyy	United States	uWnmxiQup e0	Youtube Copyright System Abuse	672	34	4
YTC114	TheTekkitRealm	United States	Md2R3Io9o kg	Man Strikes Over 1,000,000 Videos by Abusing The YouTube Copyright System	171495	7405	766
YTC115	CrasherTalks &More	Canada	4Cu028XhNQg	RE: This channel is being deleted... Here's why   YOUTUBE, FIX YOUR COPYRIGHT SYSTEM!!	630	57	21
YTC116	vidIQ	United States	iUIUFO9kg hQ	COPYRIGHT STRIKE: What It Is & How To Fix It	18268	1464	117

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
YTC117	H3 Podcast	United States	ulfHGdz6KB8	PewDiePie's Wedding & YouTube Sues Copyright Troll - H3 Podcast #136	1184055	31277	3979
YTC118	Edy Chandra	N/A	dw8UmL1tDTQ	How to Remove Youtube Copyright Strike 2021	41398	846	235
YTC119	CDawgVA	United Kingdom	xaErQbCF8e0	I Tried Explaining YouTube's Broken Copyright System To My Mum	80187	8143	745
YTC120	Coffeezilla	United States	tyJhurbs51M	Youtube's Copyright System is being Abused to Dox, Threaten, and Blackmail Creators	86225	5849	496
YTC121	ThriftyAV	United States	wHM8P_-NF98	My Vid Was STOLEN!... The Copyright Complaint Process on YouTube, DMCA	439	21	18
YTC122	MagnatesMedia	United Kingdom	MSCSh7ZVtCc	Fair Use: Legally Use Movie Clips & Copyrighted Material In Your YouTube Videos	420328	16103	1244
YTC123	AngryJoeShow	N/A	diyZ_Kzy1P8	Lionsgate & YT Copyright Claims are out of Control! - Angry Rant	879347	55262	6125
YTC124	MadWolf	United States	DDRhiBPfA0w	youtube's copyright problem	991	57	34

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				(Angry Rant)			
YTC125	tfatk	United States	d5EqnlH9mNw	Brendan Schaub FALSE Copyright Claims	17698	552	192
YTC126	The Piano Keys	United States	8tJ0PzotrRg	Victory Over False Copyright Claim!	7385	949	212
YTC127	Gus Johnson	United States	Tqj2csL933Q	YouTube's content claim system is out of control	1258726	110797	6899
YTC128	Mayanja's Masterclass	N/A	tdXcxDByliA	How To Quickly Remove A COPYRIGHT STRIKE On YouTube In 2022	11056	278	117
YTC129	JaWoodle	Australia	IQSByWoBc1Q	An Update on Demonetisations, Copyright Strikes and Where my Outro Music Went?   Vlog	22388	3381	742
YTC130	Matt Lowne	United Kingdom	dcjVJ3Cznec	My channel got Copyright-claimed I guess	139390	15881	2798
YTC131	HasanAbi	United States	aaTAOdL7YQg	Do Not F**k With Me Adin Ross.	860,404	40,026	3374
YTC132	TheAsherShow	United States	BSatHmR-r-Q	Adin Ross keeps abusing YouTube's Copyright.	40,796	2,200	128
YTC133	Mogul Mail	United States	fqipx_gGPYE	Huge Adin Ross Drama	1,237,792	69,771	2185
YTC134	Paul Davids	Netherlands	inr-hBiVHCw	The Abuse of YouTube's Copyright Policy	211,891	10,994	1147
YTC135	Bel's Classroom	Brazil	K6dHwwViAPY	TRISHA PAYTAS	218	7	1

LABEL	CHANNEL NAME	CHANNEL LOCATION	VIDEO ID	VIDEO TITLE	VIEWS	LIKES	COMMENTS
				COPYRIGHT STRIKES SCANDAL			

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