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Within, rather than against the state? How indigenous movements in Ecuador and Peru engage with elections

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

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Within, Rather than Against the State? How Indigenous Movements in Ecuador and Peru Engage with Elections

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
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Title:

Within, rather than against the state?

How indigenous movements in Ecuador and Peru engage with elections

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Within, rather than against the state?

How indigenous movements in Ecuador and Peru engage with elections

Abstract

While indigenous movements often keep a deliberate distance from their states, political connections can be important to effect policy change. How do indigenous organizations navigate this challenge? This article analyses the electoral strategies of 19 indigenous organizations during elections in Ecuador and Peru. The analysis draws on an original data-set of organizational communication on social media, complemented with semi-structured interviews conducted during field work. We find that most organizations engage actively with elections. Aside from a more expected strategy of protesting election outcomes, they also call on followers to vote and actively mobilize in favor or against certain candidates, participating within, rather than against the state. An allied indigenous party (*Pachakutik* in Ecuador) does not explain organizations' engagement with elections per se, but it does affect the rationale for choosing one or the other strategy: organizational reasons dominated in Ecuador, while shared identity was most important in Peru.

Keywords: indigenous movements, social movements, electoral campaign, social media, Ecuador, Peru

1. Introduction

While indigenous movements often keep a deliberate distance from their states perceived as a source of historical oppression, forging connections to political candidates and parties can be important to effect policy change in the interest of indigenous peoples (Ruiz Hernandez & Burguete Cal y Mayor 2001; Schmid 2021; Van Cott 2010). How do indigenous movements navigate this challenge? To answer this question, this article analyses the electoral strategies of 19 indigenous movements during two recent general elections in Latin America: Ecuador (7 February 2021) and Peru (11 April 2021).

Analyzing the strategies of indigenous movements during elections answers scholarly calls to improve the connections between the literature on parties and elections on the one hand, and the field of social movement studies on the other (Hutter et al. 2019; McAdam & Tarrow 2010).¹ Movements' electoral strategies are often "far more assertive and influential" than the more heavily studied strategy of protest (Amenta et al. 2010: 297), yet have been studied at lot less. This article contributes new and conceptually refined insights into movements' electoral strategies and their rationale for choosing among such strategies, placing an empirical focus on indigenous movements in Latin America.

Indigenous movements represent peoples that have lived through centuries of exclusion, spanning from the colonial into the post-colonial period, when new nation-states were defined on the basis of Latino and Mestizo identities—ignoring the presence of indigenous peoples (Ruiz Hernández & Burguete Cal y Mayor

¹ For examples of studies that bridge these fields, see Andrews (1997), Fetner (2008), Pirro (2019), and of course Tarrow (2021) himself, specifically for Latin America see Anria et al. (2022).

2001). For these reasons, the relationship between indigenous movements, state institutions and formal political actors, such as political candidates and parties, can be considered particularly sensitive (ibid.). In-depth analysis of these movements' electoral strategies can therefore be seen as a least-likely case study—if we find that indigenous movements in Latin America engage not just *reactively* with elections (calling on followers to protest the electoral process or its outcome), but that they also adopt *proactive* mobilization strategies, such as embracing candidates and their campaigns (McAdam & Tarrow 2010), this is good reason to expect other types of social movements to be similarly engaged with elections.

Aside from exploring the variety of strategies indigenous movements adopt in elections, the comparative cross-country design allows us to investigate whether, and if so how, indigenous movements' electoral strategies differ in the presence (Ecuador) and absence (Peru) of an indigenous party. Unlike in Europe where even small ethnic minorities are represented by their own ethnic parties (Bernauer & Bochsler 2011), indigenous parties are only a recent addition to Latin American elections (with the most prominent cases being the MAS in Bolivia and Pachakutik in Ecuador, Van Cott 2007). While both countries have seen increasing indigenous mobilization by grass-roots organizations in recent decades, only Ecuador has a political party (the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement, hereafter Pachakutik) that centers its platform on representing the interests of indigenous peoples. In contrast, attempts to create a nationally successful indigenous party in Peru have so far been unsuccessful (Espinosa 2022). This comes despite the fact that a quarter of Peru's population identifies as indigenous (INEI 2018), compared to 7% in Ecuador (INEC 2010).

A third and final contribution of the paper lies in studying movements' electoral strategies online and offline, combining an analysis of their communication on social media with field work in both countries. We have assembled an original data-set containing *Twitter*² and *Facebook* posts of 6 indigenous movements in Ecuador and 10 indigenous movements in Peru. These include major organizations like the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), but also more specific ones speaking on behalf of territorially or intersectionally defined sub-groups (e.g. the National Organization of Indigenous Andin and Amazonian Women of Peru, ONAMIAP).³ Qualitative content analysis of all election-related posts allows us to identify what indigenous organizations communicate about candidates for presidential office and about the electoral process. As recommended by Croeser and Highfield (2020), we then validate insights of the social media analysis through field work, conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives of organizations that display diverse strategies on social media (cf. Sablina 2023). Interviewing an additional three organizations that could not be tracked on social media raises the total number of organizations covered comparatively in this article to 19. This ensures comprehensive insights into the strategic choices of a broad variety of indigenous organizations.

Our findings show that the majority of indigenous organizations in both countries motivate their communities to participate in elections, mobilizing within, rather

² By the time of writing, the platform had been renamed to "X". We stick to the former label in this article because we collected the data at a time when the platform was still called *Twitter*.

³ A list of all organizations included in the analysis of this article can be found in Appendix A.1.

than against the state. Even where they challenge the outcome of elections, they still call on followers to participate in the electoral process, but by casting a blank vote to voice their discontent. This supports McAdam's and Tarrow's (2010) expectation that movements accompany elections not only reactively (through protest in the streets, the strategy that is more heavily studied), but also proactively (supporting the electoral process itself, or a particular campaign). However, we also find two organizations in Peru that did not post any election-related content on social media, and one in each country whose representatives explained during the interviews that their organization deliberately remained politically unaligned during elections (though, interestingly, one of the latter organizations *did* post about the election on social media). An indigenous party does not explain organizations' engagement with elections *per se*, but it does affect the rationale for choosing one or the other strategy. Organizations in Ecuador supported the indigenous party's candidate primarily for organizational reasons (i.e. as the candidate of the allied party), even if he was disputed within the movement. Organizations in Peru also mostly converged on supporting one candidate, but they did so because of a perception of shared identity and social background. Ideological distance also played a role, in particular when choosing to mobilize *against* a candidate, a strategy that was more prominent in the Peruvian case.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section draws on the literature on social movements to conceptualize a set of strategies indigenous movements can apply during elections. We then introduce our research design (including the choice of countries and elections) in Section 3, document the collection and preparation of the social media data in Section 4, and the results of

the social media analysis in Section 5. Section 6 adds insights from field work and semi-structured interviews to explore the rationale behind organizations' strategic choices and validate the social media analysis. We conclude the article in Section 7.

2. Conceptualizing social movements' electoral strategies

While the literature on social movements and the literature on parties and elections have traditionally had little points of contact, recent years have seen more engagement. On the one hand, scholars of social movements had to acknowledge that movements seek to effect political and social change not only through protest, but also by forging connections with political parties and the candidates they field for political office (Amenta et al. 2010; Tarrow 2021). On the other hand, scholars of political parties had to deal with the phenomenon of "movement parties", parties that develop out of and stay closely connected to grass root organizations (Kitschelt 2006; Vittori 2022; on parties directly sponsoring protest cf. Borbáth & Hutter 2021). Technological advances that shifted communication online further contributed to blurring the lines between traditional campaigning and political activism (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 538) and eased parties' attempts to copy some of movements' more activist mobilization strategies (Pirro 2019).⁴

⁴ Nonetheless, even if parties use movement strategies, and even if movements participate in elections, we can still distinguish the two types of organizations using the criterion of whether they field candidates for public office (political parties) or not (movements) (Sartori [1976] 2005: 57).

A crucial moment at which social movements and formal political actors interact and at which the former may seek to influence the latter is during elections (Amenta et al. 2010; McAdam & Tarrow 2010). Whereas getting too close to formal actors during elections can be a risky strategy because it may alienate supporters (Mansbridge 1986), elections offer a chance for social movements to mobilize support for candidates without formally entering into an alliance with them, as well as to speak out against candidates seen as adversarial to a movement's cause (Amenta et al. 2010, 297). In steering their supporters towards some and away from other candidates, movements can influence the composition of policy-makers in favor of those that stand behind their policy goals, as well as increase the representativeness of parliaments. This is particularly relevant for movements representing groups that have been historically excluded from politics based on their gender, ethnic or racial identity and that therefore naturally start off as challengers (Cowell-Meyers 2014).

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly have been at the forefront of connecting research on formal and informal politics. Their 2001 book encourages scholars to think of "contentious politics" (i.e. actions posing challenges to the status quo and established power-holders) as a continuum of actors and strategies, rather than categorically separating social movements from challenger parties, or protest from electoral mobilization. McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 533-534) later differentiated six mechanisms through which social movements interact with electoral campaigns. Unlike the terminology suggests, three of these do not relate exclusively to elections, but to movements' strategies towards political parties

more generally.⁵ The three strategies that *are* related to elections are 1) *taking the electoral option* (when movements participate themselves in elections), 2) *proactive mobilization* (when movements heighten activity around an electoral campaign and 3) *reactive mobilization* (when movements protest against an election) (McAdam & Tarrow 2010, 534).

However, in defining proactive and reactive mobilization, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) conflate sheer activity during elections with mobilizing voters in favor or against candidates, and they conflate discontent with the substantive outcome of an election with discontent with the electoral process as such. To develop a framework for this article, we therefore improve on their conceptualization and differentiate a) whether organizations mobilize in favor or against candidates, or whether they simply talk neutrally about them; b) whether organizations dispute the electoral process, endorse it as something positive, or whether they simply take a neutral stance, for example by informing voters that elections take place (see Table 1).

Table 1. Conceptualizing the electoral strategies of social movements

Mc Adam and Tarrow 2010		This article
"taking the electoral option"	participate themselves in the campaign	Varied through case selection (Ecuador = yes, Peru = no)
		Mobilize in favor of candidates

⁵ Movements can inspire parties' strategies (the mechanism of "transferable innovations") or provoke polarization and divisions within political parties (the mechanism of "movement/party polarization") also outside of elections. And the sixth mechanism of "oscillations of electoral regimes" is not a deliberate strategy, but a systemic outcome that results from changes in movements' and parties' mutual support over time (cf. Pirro 2019).

“proactive mobilization”	heighten activity to support or oppose a campaign	Mobilize against candidates
	<i>Not covered</i>	Neutral stance on candidates
“reactive mobilization”	protest the election, disputing its procedures or outcome	Mobilize against electoral process
	<i>Not covered</i>	Mobilize in favor of electoral process
	<i>Not covered</i>	Neutral stance on electoral process

How applicable are these strategies to indigenous movements? Indigenous movements represent a variety of social groups that were and often continue to be excluded based on their social identity.⁶ Deprived of historical sovereignty during colonization, they do not only mobilize on particular issues, but often contest the very legitimacy of the state’s authority to rule over them (Williams & Schertzer 2019)—a characteristic they share with *nationalist* movements (Olzak 2004, 667-8). This is different from social movements such as progressive left and environmentalist movements who are defined by a set of policy preferences about

⁶ The term “indigenous” subsumes a variety of specific ethnic groups (e.g. “Aymara” or “Shuar”). However, despite such internal diversity, indigenous peoples share a) the historical experience of becoming “indigenous” only through the arrival of settlers, b) the experience of suffering from poverty and structural inequality, and c) the goal of opposing domination (Yashar 2005, 20). Indigenous identity became a direct basis for mobilization already in the 1970s; according to Yashar (2005) as a consequence of changing state-society relations. On the one hand, corporatist, class-based interest representation was dismantled. This affected indigenous farmers in the Andes. On the other hand, states extended their reach into the Amazon (Yashar 2005, 66-71).

existing or new issues that are not yet sufficiently addressed by mainstream politics.

We derive three expectations from these theoretical reflections: First, overall, we expect indigenous movements to be little engaged with elections; Second, where they engage, we expect them to mobilize against, rather than in favor of the electoral process and particular candidates; Third, we expect indigenous movements in Ecuador, where there is an allied indigenous party, to mobilize more pro-actively in favor of elections and presidential candidates than in Peru, where there is no allied indigenous party.

3. Research design

This article combines the logic of studying least likely cases (to increase the potential for generalization from a medium-N study of 19 organizations in two countries) with the logic of comparative case studies (to allow for explanatory insights into why organizations choose some strategies over others). First, among the universe of social movements, indigenous movements are selected as a type of social movement that can be expected to be particularly cautious about engaging actively with elections. Should the analysis yield active electoral strategies, and even proactive mobilization in favor of candidates/the electoral process, this “passed least likely case” would imply that we can expect social movements with a higher prior of engaging with elections to be at least as much, or even more active during elections (cf. Rohlfing 2012: pp. 84 ff.). Second, from among the universe of indigenous organizations, we follow the logic of Mill’s method of difference and select indigenous organizations in two similar political systems (Ecuador and

Peru), varying the fact whether there is an indigenous party founded from within the indigenous movement (as is the case with Pachakutik in Ecuador) or not (as in Peru). This allows us to assess whether electoral strategies are influenced by the presence or absence of an allied political party.

Our data collection strategy combines desk-research to collect social media data to measure 16 indigenous organizations' strategies during the 2021 elections with field work conducted in March and April 2023. The field work serves to explore reasons for organizations' strategic choices and validate the results of the social media analysis (cf. Croeser and Highfield 2020). During field work, we conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives of indigenous organizations that displayed diverse electoral strategies in the social media analysis. (The social media data is described in more detail in section 4 and in Appendix A.3-A.5, more detail about the interviews is provided in section 5 and in Appendix A.10-A.12).

In the remainder of this section, we discuss Ecuador and Peru as most similar systems and introduce the 2021 elections. The selection of indigenous organizations is explained in Section 4, where we introduce the social media analysis, since the initial selection of 16 organizations was influenced by their social media presence. We then added three additional organizations that we could not study on social media during field work, so that the total number of indigenous organizations covered in this article adds up to 19.

3.1 Ecuador and Peru as most similar systems

Ecuador and Peru vary regarding ethnic demography and show different trajectories of indigenous mobilization: the indigenous movement in Ecuador has

been taking the electoral option since the 1990s, while Peruvian indigenous organizations do not have an allied indigenous party. At the same time, both countries are similar regarding other factors that could influence movements' electoral strategies. Ecuador and Peru share similar political systems, geographical location and socio-economic problems (Madrid 2012; Stoiber, Knodt & Heinelt 2012; Van Cott 2007). Both countries returned to holding regular elections around a similar time (Ecuador: 1979, Peru: 1980) and at that time extended voting rights to illiterates (Van Cott 1994, 10). While the share of indigenous people in Peru (25.8 percent of the total population according to the census of 2017, INEI 2018)⁷ is higher than in Ecuador (7 percent of the population according to the census of 2010, INEC 2010), the structure of intra-group cleavages is analogous. Indigenous groups can be divided into lowland indigenous groups living in the Amazonian region, highland indigenous people living in the Andes and indigenous peoples from the coastal region (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2007). In both countries, we find larger nation-wide indigenous organizations and those targeting the high-land and low-land population more specifically, leading the organizations to differ in the issues they put on the agenda within each country, but in similar ways across countries. In both countries, indigeneity often intersects with other identities such as class-based ones. Several organizations in both countries focus on intersectional identities, for example representing "indigenous women" or "indigenous farmers" more specifically (Section 4 details

⁷ Summing the shares of people self-identifying as 'Quechua', 'Aimara', or as 'native or indigenous from the Amazon region', or as 'belonging to another indigenous or original people'.

how we selected organizations for the analysis in this article, listings of all organisations considered and eventually selected can be found in Appendix A.1 and A.2 respectively).

Since indigenous movements in Ecuador have taken the electoral option members of indigenous groups in Ecuador can cast their vote for a well-established indigenous party. Pachakutik was created by the biggest indigenous movement in Ecuador (CONAIE) during the 1990s, since at the time the indigenous population did not feel represented by the existing parties (Madrid 2012). By contrast, no major nation-wide indigenous party has so far emerged in Peru even though several local indigenous parties have at times successfully competed in subnational elections (Madrid 2012, Espinosa 2022).

The research design therefore allows comparing the mobilization strategies of indigenous movements in the presence vs. absence of a political party that can be classified as an indigenous ethnic party (in the sense that it places the championing of indigenous interests in politics at the center of its platform, cf. Chandra 2011). Importantly, however, the existence of an indigenous party in Ecuador does not a priori preclude empirical variance in movement strategies. Recent research shows Pachakutik's electorate to be multi-ethnic, and the indigenous vote to be dispersed; only a quarter of Ecuador's indigenous population voted Pachakutik in recent elections (Dávila Gordillo 2021; EC_Expert_1, 12-20). With an electoral market that is only imperfectly ethnically segmented (Zuber 2012), indigenous organizations' unified support for Pachakutik is therefore not guaranteed (Vogt 2016).

3.2. The 2021 presidential elections in Ecuador and Peru

For the purpose of studying movements' electoral strategies, it is important that Ecuador and Peru held general elections (both with mandatory voting) within the scope of two months in 2021. This ensures the comparability of movements' strategies with regard to potential period effects, in particular the Covid-19 pandemic. On February 7th 2021, Ecuadorians were asked to vote for a new parliamentary assembly and president, choosing between 16 candidates in the first round of the presidential tier of the election (Cisneros, Peña, Gordillo, & Vera, 2021). During the decade preceding the election, leftist president Rafael Correa had been shaping Ecuadorian politics, polarizing the country into a pro- and an anti-Correísmo camp (Moncagatta & Poveda, 2021; Polga-Hecimovich & Sanchez, 2021). While Correa himself could not run for president in 2021, his protégé Andrés Arauz competed for Correa's electoral coalition (the Union for Hope, UNES). The former director of Ecuador's central bank stands for the renewal of Correísmo and can be assigned to the left side of the political spectrum (Peschard-Sverdrup 2021). Most polls expected him and Guillermo Lasso (fielded by the Christian Social PSC and CREO, the "Creating Opportunities" movement) to come out in front (Peschard-Sverdrup 2021). Lasso, a former banker and minister, represents the right-wing and anti-Correísmo camp (Peschard-Sverdrup 2021). Pachakutik's main candidate, Yaku Pérez, was a lawyer who promoted indigenous rights, and adopted left-wing and environmentalist policy positions in his campaign (Polga-Hecimovich & Sanchez, 2021). He identifies as indigenous and

altered his original first name 'Carlos' to the Kichwa name 'Yaku' in 2017 (O'Boyle 2021).⁸

In the first round, Arauz received the highest vote share (32,7%), followed by Lasso (19,7%) and Perez (19,4%) (Castellanos Santamaría, Dandoy, & Umpierrez de Reguero 2021). The vote count was confirmed only two weeks after the election, so that for a while it was not clear whether Lasso or Perez would make it to the runoff. Perez requested recounts due to allegations of voter manipulation, resulting into protests by Pachakutik supports (Castellanos Santamaría et al. 2021). After accepting the official result, Pérez called on his followers to vote blank in the second round (Castellanos Santamaría et al. 2021). On April 11th, Lasso won the second round with 52 percent (Polga-Hecimovich & Sanchez 2021).

The initial round of the Peruvian elections took place on April 11th 2021 and 22 parties competed in the election, which illustrates the fragmented party system (Muñoz 2021). None of the presidential candidates received the necessary majority of 50 percent in the first round. This led to a runoff between Pedro Castillo (running for the Free Peru Party [*Perú Libre*]) and Keiko Fujimori (fielded by the Popular Force Party [*Fuerza Popular*]) on June 6th (Muñoz, 2021). Fujimori, daughter of authoritarian ex-president Alberto Fujimori, pursued free market and authoritarian policies (Sonneland 2021; Tegel 2021). In contrast, Castillo, a teacher and unionist born in one of Peru's poorest, indigenous highland regions, was considered an outsider in the polls. While pursuing a leftist economic agenda,

⁸ Several of our interviews indicated that there was internal discussion among the indigenous organizations with some challenging, others defending Yaku Perez' identification with and commitment to the indigenous movement, both during and after the election (EC_Expert_1, 39; EC_Expert_2, 124; Ecuarunari_1, 69; Conaie_1, 50).

he presented value conservative stances and opposed gay marriage and abortion (Burghardt 2021; Tegel 2021). Unlike Yaku Perez in Ecuador, he was not running on the ticket of an indigenous party, but was nevertheless perceived as an indigenous candidate by both supporters and opponents (Aidesep_1, 82; CNA_1_2_3, 114-116; his opponents were also using racist expressions to derogate him, cf. PE_Expert_1, 5-9; PE_Expert_2, 13-14). Castillo won the second round, though the results were extremely close (50.13 percent) (Tegel 2021). Fujimori did not accept the results at first, framing the outcome as fraudulent and trying to annul certain votes from rural areas (ibid.). Hence, the weeks after the election were characterized by heightened mobilization on both sides (Muñoz 2021).

4. Collecting and preparing indigenous organizations' social media data

In order to measure and compare the electoral strategies of indigenous organizations we analyze Facebook posts and tweets collected from their social media accounts. We rely on social media data to analyze movements' electoral strategies for two reasons: First, since social media is a relatively cheap tool which allows for direct communication (Diamond 2010, Zeitzoff 2017) it allows describing how social movements sequence their strategies during the course of an election. Second, focusing on social media enables the collection of a large amount of data that is comparable across organizations.⁹

⁹ According to the Latinobarómetro (2021), Facebook was the most used social media platform in both countries in 2020 (used by ¼ of respondents); in contrast, Twitter is only used by around 4 percent. This fits research describing Twitter as a diplomacy tool to reach international audiences (Jones & Mattiaci 2019; Loyle & Bestvater 2019); it also fits indigenous organizations' own

When selecting indigenous organizations, we first strove to map them as comprehensively as possible. We started from a list of all currently active indigenous organizations in both countries based on a thorough review of the secondary literature and extensive online searches.¹⁰ In the next step, we reduced this initial list of 26 organizations in Ecuador and 18 in Peru following the process portrayed in Figure 1. Having searched for existing Twitter and Facebook accounts for each organization, we only included accounts that could be verified through either the organization's homepage, Facebook/Twitter itself or followers (journalists, politicians etc.). Consequently, we ended up with six organizations in Ecuador and ten in Peru for which we were able to collect Facebook and Twitter posts made during the election period.

For most organizations, posts were collected for both Facebook and Twitter, while for six organizations only one verified account was active/existent, as indicated in Figure 1 (cf. also Appendix A.5). Moreover, we clustered the respective organizations according to their representative focus as “nation-wide”, “highland” and “lowland”. Indigenous people from the Amazon and Andean regions have different cultural backgrounds and living conditions, which could lead to different


assessment that Facebook was more important than Twitter for reaching their communities (see Section 6). TikTok and Instagram have been gaining importance during elections in the region (Ochoa Lucas, 2022) and visual material could be quite relevant for studying movements' electoral strategies. According to our field work, who appears in a picture with whom provides information about alliances between indigenous movements, or between movements and political candidates (EC_Expert_1, 44; EC_Expert_2, 82, cf. Haiges 2023). For reasons of feasibility, we focus on textual messages nevertheless. Any differences we find when comparing electoral strategies should still be meaningful, since we analyse the same type of evidence for all organizations.

¹⁰ Research assistants with Spanish skills and prior knowledge about each country compiled this initial list by searching broadly for indigenous organizations (cf. Appendix A.2).

strategic choices of organizations representing them (Hirseland & Strijbis 2019). One example for a nationwide movement is CONAIE: it is the largest movement in Ecuador and an umbrella organization uniting many different indigenous organizations. All Ecuadorian movements in our sample are affiliated with CONAIE except for FEINE and FENOCIN.¹¹

¹¹ In our social media analysis for Peru we do not cover an organization representing only highland indigenous people. However, while CNA is a nationwide association, the cross-section of indigenous and farmer identity they represent is characteristic of Peru's highland indigenous peoples (PE_expert_1, 28; 49-52). In addition, we conducted interviews with an organization representing indigenous farmers from the highlands (CCP), for which we could not verify the social media accounts before field work and which was therefore not included in the social media analysis.

Figure 1. Selecting indigenous organizations in Ecuador and Peru for social media analysis and field work



For our social media analysis, we cover a period that begins two weeks prior to the first election round and lasts until two weeks after the second election round. The exact dates are: January 24th until April 25th 2021 for Ecuador, and March 28th until June 20th 2021 for Peru.¹² Combining Twitter and Facebook posts for all 16 organizations that posted during the election period leads to a dataset with 3935

¹² By selecting relatively short periods before and after the elections, we cannot compare indigenous organizations' communicative behavior in electoral and non-electoral periods (e.g. Haiges 2023). However, if indigenous organizations ever wanted to communicate about the elections at all, they should be doing so during these periods. If we find organizations that do not post any election-related content in this time-window, we can be quite sure that they do not engage with the elections at all.

posts. Appendix A.5 disaggregates the data by organization and platform. This shows that overall, there is fewer social media activity by indigenous movements in Peru than in Ecuador, and we also observe large differences in post numbers and followers between organizations within the same country. For example, CONAIE, the biggest organization in Ecuador, posts significantly more than smaller and regional movements. We therefore focus the analysis on relative differences in the salience of particular strategies across organizations, rather than on absolute differences in the number of posts.

5. Analysis part I: electoral strategies on social media

The main goal of the social media analysis is to cover *posts with original content that address the election* to identify electoral strategies.¹³ In a first step, we selected 1199 posts that talk about the 2021 election from the universe of all collected posts by using broad dictionary terms (Wickham 2019, for more detail on pre-processing, see Appendix A.3 and A.4). We subsequently used qualitative content analysis following Schreier (2012) to annotate these posts based on an original coding scheme that operationalizes the strategies conceptualized in section 2 of this article.¹⁴ As illustrated in Table 2, we coded if and how each organization talks about the electoral process and how they evaluate the

¹³ We only include original text authored by the respective indigenous movement/candidate and exclude reposted text from the analysis.

¹⁴ Around one quarter of the original posts were coded by both authors to secure inter-coder reliability. Krippendorff's Alpha was 0,91, a very satisfactory value that justified coding the rest of the material independently.

candidates running for president. We did so by evaluating statements about the presidential candidates or about the political parties that fielded the candidates. Please note that we therefore use the terms ‘candidate evaluation’ and ‘party evaluation’ interchangeably.

Table 2. Coding frame for the qualitative content analysis of social media posts

Category	Code	Description
Electoral Process	Process Positive	post speaks favorably of electoral procedures or calls on readers of the post to vote
	Process Negative	post criticizes electoral procedures, or calls on readers of the post to not vote or vote blank
	Process Neutral	post mentions election or electoral procedures, but in a neutral way
Candidate/ Party ¹⁵	Tone Positive	post endorses a party, candidate, or campaign, (includes hopeful calls on candidate to act for indigenous/thanking candidates for their work)
	Tone Negative	post speaks against party, candidate or campaign
	Tone Neutral	post mentions party, candidate or campaign but in a neutral way, or it is unclear whether post is positive or negative
Irrelevant	Blank	post is not about the election

¹⁵ To ease readability, we do not display here the separate evaluative codes with the names of all candidates that made it into the second round (Fujimori and Castillo in Peru; Lasso and Arauz in Ecuador) and of Yaku Perez, the indigenous candidate in Ecuador who only just did not make it to the second round. In case other candidates and parties were mentioned, we subsumed them under an additional “other candidate” code.

The code “process negative” captures statements that criticize the electoral process, but also calls to action that ask voters to attend the election, but cast a blank vote. The code “process negative” was assigned to 108 posts, and 16 of these contained statements where the organizations asked the readers to vote blank or informed them that the organization’s strategy was the blank vote. All of those posts were made by Ecuadorian organizations before the second round. After the first round many organizations asked for recounts and transparency. When Yaku Perez did not make it into the second round many organizations switched their strategy to calling for a blank vote, as the following quote illustrates:

In light of the fact that the electoral tribunal decided to rebut the appeal made by the Movement for Plurinational Unity Pachakutik, and respecting the decisions of the wider council, we will motivate the ideological blank vote, neither Lasso, nor Nebot, nor Correa. In line with our struggle, for our political project, to foster unity and strength of our organizational structure. (CONAIE, 15th of March 2021, Facebook, own translation)

The analysis of the social media data of all 16 organizations shows considerable variance in the use of strategies between organizations: Two did not post about the elections at all, two only made statements about the electoral process and twelve made statements about the candidates *and* the electoral process (one talking only negatively, and eleven communicating positive, neutral and negative evaluations).


Figures 2 and 3 visualize how the indigenous movements talked about the elections in their posts by displaying how often one strategy occurred in comparison to all other strategies over both election rounds.¹⁶ Both figures display relative use of strategies instead of absolute post numbers since we are primarily interested in whether movements use a specific strategy or not, and because the posting numbers differ significantly between organizations. (see Appendix A.6 for how many times each code was applied per organization).

In Ecuador, all indigenous movements evaluate candidates or the in their social media posts, that is, they engage in proactive mobilization. All organizations talk positively and neutrally about candidates, but only CONAIE, CONFENIAE and MICC all organizations additionally evaluate candidates negatively.¹⁷

¹⁶ The data and replication code to generate the figures will be posted to a data repository upon acceptance of this article for publication. Please note that Figures 2 and 3 summarize electoral strategies over the course of the whole election period and thus do not display temporal variation in electoral strategies over time. Appendix A.7 provides a more disaggregated comparison over time. It shows that many indigenous organizations were more active during the second round and also adapted their strategies when results of the first round confirmed the two candidates for the run-off. Appendix 8 compares strategies by platform (Facebook vs. Twitter).


¹⁷ Please note that here we do not differentiate about which candidate (indigenous or non-indigenous) they talk. Appendix A.9 has detailed information by candidate name.

Figure 2: Electoral strategies on social media in Ecuador



All organizations in Ecuador publish posts that evaluate the election process as negative, for example by asking their followers to vote blank in the second round as outlined earlier. The literature predicts such negative statements protesting the elections from social movements. However, we also observe that all organizations report neutrally about the elections and that some of them (e.g. MICC) even talk positively about the electoral process. This shows that the repertoire of electoral strategies used by social movements is indeed broader than acknowledged so far in the literature.

Figure 3: Electoral strategies on social media in Peru



In contrast to Ecuador, Peruvian organizations show more variation in the strategies they use (cf. Figure 3). CODEPISAM and COMARU did post content on social media during the elections, but none of these posts were election-related according to our analysis. This shows that not all indigenous organizations engage with elections on social media. With regard to the evaluation of the presidential candidates, Figure 3 illustrates that negative statements against candidates are more prevalent in Peru than in Ecuador. While organizations also talk positively or neutrally about candidates (e.g. CNA or AIDSESEP) they do so to a lesser extent and not all organizations actively endorse a candidate. Moreover, there are organizations like FENAMAD that do not make any candidate evaluations, but only talk positively and neutrally about the electoral process, again showing a broader variety of electoral strategies than protesting the elections.

Having said this, the majority of Peruvian organizations do indeed publish posts containing negative evaluations of the electoral process. Often one and the same post will criticize the electoral process, while simultaneously mobilizing against Fujimori:

#warning. They negate our existence and want to annul our votes. We call on the indigenous communities to declare ourselves to be in a state of emergency to defend our vote even in international institutions. Let us reject the maneuvers and the verbal, legal and media violence of Fujimorismo. Let us prepare civic acts of mobilization because the rights of indigenous self-determination are achieved through the democratic construction of a democratic society without racism and without oppression of any kind (AIDESEP, 11th of June 2021, Facebook, own translation).

In Peru one can also observe some differences between organizations representing lowland indigenous people and organizations speaking for indigenous people nationwide. The latter ones (CNA or ONAMIAP) rely on a broader set of strategies, which fits the fact that they represent a broader variety of interests. By contrast, in Ecuador there are no systematic differences between organizations representing different types of indigenous peoples.

In closing this section, we can relate the results back to our three theoretical expectations. First, a very solid majority of 14 out of 16 indigenous organizations chose to post election-related content during the 2021 election, disproving the

expectation that indigenous movements would be little engaged with elections. Second, the 14 organizations that did post-election related content went well beyond social movements' typical strategy of protesting the outcome of elections. Only a minority of organizations did not have anything positive to say about either the elections or particular presidential candidates. The majority of the organizations studied therefore constitute passed least-likely cases that justify updating our theoretical priors about social movements' engagement with elections upwards (Rohlfing 2012, pp. 84 ff.). Third, the cross-country comparison shows that the absence of an indigenous party in Peru did not prevent Peruvian organizations from actively engaging with the elections, but it is associated with a broader variety of electoral strategies. Two Peruvian organizations chose to abstain completely from posting any election-related content, and some organizations opted to exclusively mobilize *against*, and not in favor of any, candidates.

6. Analysis Part II: insights from semi-structured interviews

Social media analysis is good for systematically comparing electoral strategies across organizations and countries. However, it does not allow us to understand organizations' reasons for choosing these strategies. We also do not know whether the strategies observed online are representative of how an organization strategically approaches elections more generally.

To explore reasons for strategy choice and to validate the use of social media as a measurement for movements' electoral strategies, we conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives of six indigenous organizations in Ecuador and five in Peru between late March and early April 2023. We first selected

organizations that displayed divergent strategies in the social media analysis, and then added three additional organizations for which we could not collect any social media data, to assess what a pure social media analysis might be missing (adding Ecuarunari and FEINE in Ecuador and CCP in Peru).¹⁸

To get a good understanding of organizations' communicative strategies, as well as their more general strategic orientation, we aimed to interview two members of each organization, one member responsible for communication and one member of the organization's leadership. For the majority of organizations, this was successful. For four out of the 11 organizations, we could only secure one interview due to time constraints on the organization's side. Two further interviews were conducted with multiple interview partners at the same time, preventing rigorous triangulation across interview partners for these organizations (CNA_1_2_3; Fenmucarinap_1_2). In sum, we conducted 22 interviews with a total of 25 representatives of indigenous organizations and five additional interviews (three in Ecuador and two in Peru) with experts of indigenous politics. Three interviews took place on Zoom, all others face to face. All interview partners gave their written and informed consent to the use of the interviews for academic publications. Appendix A.10 provides a complete list of all interviews conducted, the interview guideline can be found in Appendix A.11 and the consent form in Appendix A.12).

¹⁸ While our consent form does not cover sharing complete interview transcripts, additional excerpts from the anonymised transcripts are available upon request.

6.1. Do the strategies we observe on social media match organizations' own accounts of their electoral strategies?

To assess whether observed strategies on social media match organizations' intended strategies, we asked our interview partners what role their organization had played in the 2021 general elections. In analogy to the social media analysis, we coded the interview transcripts with a view to respondents' position on the electoral process, as well as their choice to mobilize in support (or against) the indigenous and non-indigenous candidates (taking Yaku Perez as the indigenous candidate in Ecuador, and Pedro Castillo in Peru). We then compared the interview-based account of strategies to the social media analysis. The results of this comparison are displayed in Table 4.

Where we could triangulate statements across interview partners (because both gave substantive answers on this question, which was not always the case), interview partners mostly agreed in their account of electoral strategies. We therefore do not differentiate the findings by interview partner, but provide the assessment of the partner higher-up in the organizational hierarchy directly (in case separate interviews were conducted).¹⁹ The table also includes the strategies of three additional organizations we did not cover in the social media analysis. Including them did not add any new strategies compared to the social media analysis, but it did bring to light that one organization in Ecuador (FEINE) also

¹⁹ The only case of substantive disagreement was Pueblo Kayambi in Ecuador, where our first interview partner stated that the organization mobilized in favor of the indigenous candidate, while the second interview partner claimed that it had stayed clear of recommending any candidate to its people. Table 4 shows the assessment of the interview partner higher up in the hierarchy.

chose not to engage with the elections, even if there was an indigenous party. We had earlier concluded that the presence or absence of an indigenous party covaries with whether there are organizations that choose to abstain entirely from engaging with the elections, since our social media analysis did not cover FEINE in Ecuador – this shows that focusing only on organizations with an active and verifiable social media presence can underestimate the actual variance of strategies.

Overall, the comparison shows that the classification of strategies on social media corresponds to organizations' own accounts of their strategies in the interviews. Where social media and interviews contradicted each other directly (either because positive and negative evaluations conflicted, or because strategies of engagement and no engagement conflicted), we marked the fields in grey.

Table 4. Validating social-media based categorization of electoral strategies with interviews

Coun-try	Organiza-tion & Interview Identifier	Social Media on Electoral Process	Interview Partner on Electoral Process	Social Media on Indigenous Candidate	Interview Partner on Indigenous Candidate	Social Media on Non-Indigenous Candidate	Interview Partner on Non-Indigenous Candidate
ECU	Conaie_1	negative > neutral	negative & neutral	positive & neutral	positive	negative	negative
ECU	Pueblo-Kayambi_1	neutral > negative	-	positive & neutral	positive	neutral	negative
ECU	Confeniae_1	negative > neutral > positive	negative	positive & neutral	positive	positive & neutral & negative	-
ECU	MICC_1	neutral > negative	-	positive & neutral & negative	positive	negative	negative

ECU	Ecuarunari_1	<i>Social media not covered</i>	-	<i>Social media not covered</i>	positive	<i>Social media not covered</i>	-
ECU	FEINE_1	<i>Social media not covered</i>	-	<i>Social media not covered</i>	no engagement	<i>Social media not covered</i>	no engagement
PER	Aideseq_1	neutral > negative	positive	positive	positive	neutral & negative	-
PER	Conap_2	negative > positive	no engagement	-	no engagement	negative	no engagement
PER	CNA_1-2-3	negative > neutral > positive	no engagement 1st round	positive & neutral	positive	negative	negative
PER	FENMUCARI-NAP_1-2	negative	negative	-	positive	negative	-
PER	CCP_2	<i>Social media not covered</i>	-	<i>Social media not covered</i>	positive	<i>Social media not covered</i>	-

The most striking contradiction occurred in the case of CONAP, an Amazonian organization from Peru that explicitly said in the interview that they did not orient their followers' vote in any way and chose not to engage with the election, while on social media, we did see both negative and positive statements about the electoral process as well as posts mobilizing against the non-indigenous candidate.

6.2 How do indigenous movements choose their electoral strategies?

From the social media and interview analysis, we can conclude (1) that most indigenous organizations in Ecuador and Peru indeed engage actively with elections; (2) that if they do, they mobilize proactively for the indigenous candidate and against the non-indigenous candidate (which also happens in Peru, where a candidate with indigenous, rural background ran, but was not affiliated with an indigenous party) and (3) that many organizations support the electoral process *per se*, but that they also protest elections.

How do indigenous organizations choose these strategies? Starting with the strategy to not engage with the elections, CONAP, a lowland organization from Peru had the clearest position on this. It connected this strategy to the absence of a party that would truly represent indigenous interests. Independence towards formal politics was preferred, because sooner or later, “this government, whether left or right, violates the rights of indigenous peoples, you will not embrace your enemy” (CONAP_2, 38).²⁰ Within the broader interview, this organization also expressed the need to form an indigenous party. The strategy of remaining distanced to elections and/or candidates fits most clearly with the expectation that given their specific history, indigenous organizations would stay distanced to mainstream politics.²¹

²⁰ According to an expert in indigenous politics in Peru, the sensation that neither the political left nor the political right are capable of representing indigenous interests was common among indigenous peoples of the Amazon, while those of the Andes were more clearly affiliated with the left (PE_Expert_1, 28-32).

²¹ We find such a strategy of non-engagement also in case of an organization in Ecuador that we interviewed but had not covered in the social media analysis (FEINE), but the only interview

The fact that the majority of indigenous organizations do engage actively is more surprising in light of the theoretical expectations, especially so in Peru, where there was no candidate fielded by an indigenous party. In Ecuador, the dominant reason for proactively mobilizing for the indigenous candidate was then indeed an organizational one: Yaku Perez was the candidate of Pachakutik, the party that was born from within the indigenous movement to function as its “political arm” (Confeniae_1, Ecuarunari_2, Conaie_2, MICC_1), in fact as our interview partner from Confeniae put it, the party “belongs to the movement” (Confeniae_1, 81).²² By contrast, the major reason for supporting Pedro Castillo in Peru was his identity and the shared experience interview partners assumed to lie behind that identity (an assessment shared by experts, cf. PE_Expert_1, 35, PE_Expert_2, 20). Interestingly, this argument was made by *both* highland and lowland organizations, even though as a rural highlander, Castillo resembled more a highland/farmers than a lowland/Amazonian identity. This can be seen in the following quotes:

Every organization was free to elect whom they wanted.

Practically, in majority we the indigenous population selected Castillo. We believed [in] a president who came from a community, a president who knew what it means to live in

partner we were able to interview from that organization did not provide any reason for the choice to not engage with the elections (FEINE_1).

²² This did not mean that there were no internal disagreements among the organizations that form members of CONAIE, in fact such disagreements appear to have been quite severe (CONAIE_1, 50-51; Pueblo Kayambi_1, 70-71; Pueblo Kayambi_2, 56-59; EC_Expert_2, 36-55; EC_Expert_3, 20). CONAIE, however, deliberately aims to not show internal disagreements publicly to maintain the impression of a unified indigenous movement (CONAIE_1, 55).

the Amazon or live like farmers, and all the rest (Aideseq_1, 82).

Yes, yes, definitely, in the political realm in 2021, the very important factor for Senor Castillo to win the elections has been all the identity. Because we as community people [comuneros], as indigenous peoples identify fully with the teacher Pedro Castillo. Why? Because he comes from a community. He is 'rondero', farmer, teacher. So, for us he was an alternative, a hope (CNA_1_2_3, 119, similar: CCP_1 and CCP_2).

Aside from organizational reasons and identity, ideology was also mentioned as an explanation (through more as a reason to mobilize *against* right wing candidates) by one organization in Ecuador (Pueblo Kayambi_1, 76) and one in Peru (Fenmucarina_1_2, 77).

All in all, the presence of an indigenous party does play a role in that it provides a clear organizational link to a party and its candidate, turning the choice of mobilization strategy more into a matter of coordination within and between indigenous organizations. The absence of an indigenous party, however, does not mean that indigenous organizations will stay clear of engaging with the elections. Even in the absence of an indigenous party, most indigenous movements in Peru clearly identified a candidate worthy of support based on his identity and background. And even in the presence of an indigenous party, one organization, in Ecuador (FEINE) chose to not engage with the elections. In both countries,

ideology played a role for rallying against candidates from the right-wing of the political spectrum.

The fact that indigenous organizations in both countries choose to engage with elections and mobilize within, rather than against state institutions should not be read as evidence that the scars of colonialism no longer play a role. To the contrary, during the broader context of our interviews, several organizations explained how the legacies of colonialism still affected present-day inequalities in both countries (Ecuadorunari_1, 30; MICC_1, 33; MICC_2, 27; CONAP_2, 100; FENMUCARINAP_1-2, 140). And one organization directly expressed the vision of recovering an original type of democracy predating the arrival of the colonial state, whose democratic credentials are deemed questionable:

How to put it, they try to pretend that we live in an egalitarian state where supposedly we have everything, but, well, no! We are fighting exactly for this. We are looking for a democracy that was taken from us many years ago. (FENMUCARINAP_1-2, 140).

However, despite awareness of historical injustices and concerns about the legitimacy of the states they inhabit, a clear majority of organizations nonetheless opts for engaging with, rather than side-lining, official electoral processes.

6.3 How important is social media for indigenous mobilization?

Finally, we also used the interviews to validate social media communication as a measure of electoral strategies. The majority of 9 out of the 11 organizations interviewed confirmed the importance of social media for communicating with their communities, as well as the wider public. Representatives of three out of these 9 organizations (CONAP, Ecuadorunari and Aidesep) explicitly mentioned that

both types of social media we analyze in this paper (Twitter and Facebook) are important tools of communication, but Facebook was mentioned more often and was also discussed as a more adequate tool for engaging with ordinary people (rather than with journalists and politicians):

When we take into account the characteristics of Twitter, it is more adequate for advocating politically and for reacting immediately [...] On Facebook we have a more consolidated community, a little more allied we could say, in this sense our primary...primary web to strengthen our community, not only the pueblos [indigenous peoples of Ecuador] but also of the, let's say, the urban zones is Facebook (CONAIE_2, 32; 44-45, own translation).

While these insights reassured us of our strategy of measuring electoral strategies on social media, some of our interview partners put the types of media we analyze into perspective. In particular Peruvian CONAP's expert for communication emphasized that due to connectivity issues in the Amazon region, the organization's own people could actually *not* follow what was posted on social media, which instead functioned more as a window to the world (CONAP_1, 45). We also learned that social media is only one option among a wide range of other communication tools that are important to indigenous organizations when communicating internally, as well as with their followers and the broader public (ranging from WhatsApp groups to radio, television and live assemblies).

7. Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the electoral strategies of indigenous social movements in Ecuador and Peru, a type of social movement that in virtue of the groups it seeks to represent can be expected to be particularly cautious about forging relations to political parties and candidates and engaging with formal politics (Ruiz Hernández & Burguete Cal y Mayor 2001; Williams & Schertzer 2019).

Our findings from analyzing social media posts show that a majority of 14 out of 16 organizations posted actively during both country's general elections in 2021, and that most of them also mobilized in favor of and against concrete parties and candidates. They did so even in Peru, where there is no indigenous party on the national political scene and where engaging with elections therefore means engaging with non-indigenous political organizations.

Content-analyzing the social media posts yielded two main insights: First, indigenous organizations in both countries appear largely consensual about which candidates to support and which to disparage. This is less of a surprise for Ecuador, where most of the movements we analyze form part of the same roof organization (CONAIE), and where this organization originally founded the indigenous party that fielded its own candidate; it is more interesting in Peru, where neither was the case. Despite the absence of an indigenous party, the majority of Peruvian indigenous movements we analyzed converged on supporting the leftist candidate (Pedro Castillo) for president after the second round (though mobilization *against* Keiko Fujimori played a bigger role). Second, disputing the electoral *process* and calling on followers to protest the elections was more pronounced in Ecuador, after the endorsed indigenous candidate did not make it into the second round; in turn mobilization against *candidates* was

more pronounced in Peru, where no candidates were fielded by an indigenous party.

Combining social media analysis with field work allowed us to validate these insights: We found very few disagreements between our observations based on social media and organizational representatives' own accounts of their electoral strategies shared during semi-structured interviews. The interviews allowed us to additionally explore the rationale behind the strategies. We learned that organizational ties to an indigenous party are a major motivation to engage proactively with the election, but that the existence of an indigenous party does not do away with challenges of coordination. The interviews brought to light half-hearted support and even outright criticism of Pachakutik's candidate, though Ecuador's indigenous organizations tried to not show these internal fissures towards the outside during the elections. Not having an indigenous party was a reason for not engaging with the elections for one Amazonian organization in Peru, CONAP (though that organization did post some election-related content), but this was the exception, not the rule: In the absence of organizational ties to a party, Peruvian movements used perceptions of shared identity and ideology to settle on a candidate during the election. The field work also brought to light an organization in Ecuador that chose to not engage with the election which was missing from the social media analysis due to the absence of a verifiable social media account. This shows the importance of combining social media analysis with field work.

All in all, these findings support McAdam and Tarrow's (2010) expectation that movements accompany elections both reactively (disputing and protesting them) and proactively (supporting a campaign). They also show that proactive electoral

mobilization should not only be thought in terms of whose campaign movements embrace, but also in terms of whom they disparage as an adversary (cf. Pirro 2019). By choosing the least-likely case of indigenous social movements that can be expected to be rather cautious of engaging actively with elections (in particular if there is no allied indigenous party, as in Peru), we can expect other types of social movements to be at least similarly, or even more active during elections. However, when it comes to the concrete strategies we observed, the potential to generalize the exact choice of strategy is limited by the fact that we only cover one election in each country. Idiosyncratic features of the elections clearly mattered, such as the indigenous candidate narrowly not reaching the run-off in Ecuador, which triggered strong reactive mobilization, or the fact that the daughter of former dictator Fujimori reached the run-off in Peru, which led to strong mobilization against this candidate.²³

Further research is needed to relate these electoral strategies to concrete outcomes, answering questions such as: did proactive mobilization in favor of candidates increase the share of indigenous votes for these candidates?²⁴ To what extent can reactive mobilization indeed motivate voters to cast a blank vote? Is active engagement with electoral campaigns appreciated by indigenous

²³ Some of our interview partners mentioned that as soon as there is an electoral alternative associated with *Fujimorismo*, it is not relevant *who* its competitor is – the main goal is to vote *against Fujimorismo* (CCP_1_1-Apr-2023, 102; PE_Expert_1, 31; note that this contrasts with PE_Expert_2, 63 who locates the main reason for Castillo’s victory in the preferences of leftist Peruvian voters).

²⁴ Such analyses would have to take into consideration that voting reactively, i.e. based on what candidates had achieved in the past, appears to match an indigenous understanding of politics much better than voting proactively (i.e. based on candidates’ promises) (PE_Expert_1, 116).

constituencies, or rather seen as problematic? Having established that indigenous movements who have a strained history of relations with the colonial state do engage actively with elections, and that they use a broad variety of strategies, we hope to have inspired future research on how these strategies impact the outcomes of elections on the ground.

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Appendix for the article: “Within, rather than against the state? How indigenous movements in Ecuador and Peru engage with elections”

A.1 List of indigenous organizations included in the analysis of this article

The following table lists all organizations covered in the social media analysis or in the semi-structured interviews (marked with “X”) with their abbreviation and full name.

Abbreviation	Full Name	Country	SM	Interviews
COICA	Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica	Ecuador	X	
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador	Ecuador	X	X
CONFENIAE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana		X	X
ECUARUNARI	Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador	Ecuador		X
FEINE	Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos	Ecuador		X
FENOCIN	Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras	Ecuador	X	
MICC	Movimiento Indígena y Campesino de Cotopaxi	Ecuador	X	X
Pueblo Kayambi	Confederación del Pueblo Kayambi	Ecuador	X	X
AIDSEP	Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana	Peru	X	X
CCP	Confederación Campesina del Perú	Peru		X
CNA	Confederación Nacional Agraria	Peru	X	X
CODEPISAM	Coordinadora de Desarrollo y Defensa de los Pueblos Indígenas de la región San Martín	Peru	X	
COMARU	Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba	Peru	X	

CONAP	Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú	Peru	X	X
FENAMAD	Federación Nativa del Río Madre de Dios y Afluentes	Peru	X	
FENMUCARINAP	Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Artesanas, Indígenas, Nativas y Asalariadas del Perú	Peru	X	X
ONAMIAP	Organización Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas Andinas y Amazónicas del Perú	Peru	X	
ORPIO	Organización Regional De Los Pueblos Indígenas Del Oriente	Peru	X	
ORAU	Organización Regional Aidesep Ucayali	Peru	X	

A.2 Indigenous organizations initially considered for inclusion

Table A.2.1. Indigenous organizations initially considered in Ecuador

Abbreviation	Full name	Founded
ANAZPPA	Asociación de la Nacionalidad Zápara de la Provincia de Pastaza	1998
COICA	Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica	1984
CONACNIE	Consejo Nacional de Coordinación de Nacionalidades Indígenas	1980
CONAICE	Confederación de Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana	?
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador	1986
CONCONAWEP	Consejo de Coordinación de la Nacionalidad Waorani de Pastaza	?
CONFENIAE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana	1980
CONFUNASSC-CNC	Confederación Nacional de Afiliados al Seguro Social Campesino - Coordinadora Nacional Campesina	?

CTE	Confederación de Trabajadores Ecuatorianos	1944
ECUARUNARI	Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador	1972
FCUNAE	Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana	1978
FEI	Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios	1944
FEINE	Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos	1980
FENOC	Federación de Organizaciones Campesinas	1968
FENOCIN	Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras	1988
[INRUJTA-] FICI	[Organización Histórica del] Pueblo Quichua de la Provincia de Imbabura	1974
FICSH	Federación Interprovincial de Centros Shuar	1964
FOCIFC	Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas de las Faldas del Chimborazo	?
FOIN	Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas del Napo	2011
FULCI	Frente Único de Lucha Campesina e Indígena	1978
FUT	Frente Unitario de Trabajadores	1973/1980
ICCI	Instituto Científico de Culturas Indígenas	1986
MICC	Movimiento Indígena y Campesino de Cotopaxi	1978/2001
OPIP	Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza	1979
Pueblo Kayambi	Confederación del Pueblo Kayambi	2002
UNORCAC	Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas de Cotacachi	1977
	Fundación Altropico	2017
	Fundación Pachamama	1997

Table A.2.2. Indigenous organizations initially considered in Peru

Abbreviation	Full name	Founded
AIDSESP	Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana	1980
AIDSESP Atalaya	Coordinadora Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas de AIDSESP Atalaya	?
ARPI Selva Central	Asociación Regional de Pueblos Indígenas de la Selva Central	2004
CCP	Confederación Campesina del Perú	1947
CHIRAPAQ	Centro de Culturas Indígenas del Perú	1986
CNA	Confederación Nacional Agraria	1974
CODEPISAM	Coordinadora de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas de la región San Martín	2007
COMARU	Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba	1984
CONAP-Loreto	Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú – Loreto	?
CONAP	Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú	1987
CORPI SL	Coordinadora Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas de San Lorenzo	1996
FENAMAD	Federación Nativa del Río Madre de Dios y Afluentes	1984
FENMUCARINAP	Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Artesanas, Indígenas, Nativas y Asalariadas del Perú	2006
ODECOFROC	Organización de Desarrollo de las Comunidades Fronterizas del Cenepa	?
ONAMIAP	Organización Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas Andinas y Amazónicas del Perú	2009
ORAU	Organización Regional Aidesep Ucayali	1999
ORPIO	Organización Regional De Los Pueblos Indígenas Del Oriente	?

ORPIAN-P	Organización Regional de Pueblos Indígenas de la Amazonía Norte del Perú	?
UNCA	Unión Nacional de Comunidades Aymaras	1985

A.3 Social Media Data Collection & Preparation

The social media posts were collected between January 2021 and September 2021 from publicly accessible social media accounts. We utilized the Twitter API and R Package *rtweet* to collect Tweets (Kearney 2019). At the beginning of our analysis, we only focused on two organizations per country (CONAIE and CONFENIAE in Ecuador, AIDSEP, and ONAMIAP in Peru). For those four movements we collected Facebook posts regularly during the election period to avoid the potential problem that posts might be deleted ex post. Tweets for CONAIE and CONFENIAE were collected on June 7th 2021 after the election took place. Tweets for AIDSEP and ONAMIAP were collected on June 7th 2021 as well as on June 14th and June 21st 2021 to capture statements directly after the second election round in Peru.

In September 2021, i.e. a couple of months after both elections took place, we decided to extend our dataset and cover more indigenous organizations per country. We therefore collected social media posts for all organizations except CONAIE, CONFENIAE, AIDSEP, and ONAMIAP in September 2021. Some social media posts might have been deleted during the electoral process or after the elections took place and might not be captured in our dataset. None of the interview partners during our field work, however, mentioned the possibility that posts might have been strategically deleted and the strategies of the organizations

whose posts we collected in real time do not look systematically different in the content of their postings / in their evaluation of candidates than those whose posts we collected ex post.

Due to the terms of Facebook and Twitter we cannot publish the raw content of the original social media posts. We can therefore not provide direct access to the annotated social media dataset. However, examples of selected social media posts with our codes attached can be provided upon request. The exported coding results as numeric data and the R-code for the quantitative analysis and to create the figures will be made available on a data repository upon publication of this article.

We make use of the *stringR* package in R to pre-process the text data (Wickham 2019). This includes the removal of special characters and the transformation into lower case, before creating a dictionary that contains words connected to the election (e.g. *elecciones* or *voto*) or the candidates (name of the candidate, party name). To ensure that we do not miss important buzzwords or hashtags, we went manually over a random sample of 200 original posts to identify further words that could indicate that a post deals with the 2021 election. Now all posts are selected that contain at least one of the dictionary words. In order to capture different variations of words, we mostly rely on root words as search terms. For example, we did include “vot” in our dictionary instead of “voto”, “votar”, “votación” and so on. While this increases the probability of identifying more posts with different word variations, it increases the likelihood of including posts that do not mention the election, but include a word that starts with “vot”. It therefore constitutes a conservative strategy: we are more likely to err on the side of being

too inclusive in the first instance, while our qualitative analysis then allows us to reliably identify the posts that are really about the election.

A.4 Word List for Dictionary to Filter Social Media Posts

We use dictionaries to filter posts that potentially speak about the election from the universe of all postings collected during the relevant time periods. The dictionaries consist of buzzwords that are related to elections, as well as the party names and abbreviations and the name of their main candidate, names of the indigenous organizations we identified as relevant in each country, as well as synonyms for “indigenous”. If there is a blank space between the word and the quotation mark the exact word was searched for. If there is no blank space, all words beginning with those letters will be identified.

Ecuador: Dictionary for posts by indigenous organizations

“elec”, “vot”, “urn”, “primeravuelta”, “segundavuelta”, “presidencia”, “andres”, “arauz”, “unes”, “unionpor”, “guillermo”, “lasso”, “creo”, “yaku”, “perez”, “mupp”, “pachakutik”, “cesar”, “montufar”, “honestidad”, “alianzahonestidad”, “isidro”, “romero”, “avanza”, “partidoavanza”, “lucio”, “gutierrez”, “psp”, “partidosociedadpatri”, “xavier”, “hervas”, “id”, “izquierdademoc”, “ximena”, “pena”, “pais”, “alianzapais”, “gustavo”, “larrea”, “democraciasi”, “juan”, “velasco”, “mc25”, “movimientoconstruye”, “guillermo”, “celi”, “suma”, “partidosuma”, “pedro”, “freile”, “vallejo”, “amigo”, “movimientoamigo”, “geron”, “almeida”, “eu”, “ecuatorianounido”, “carlos”, “sagnay”, “fe”, “partidofuerza”, “paul”, “carrasco”, “juntospodemos”, “giovann”, “andrade”, “ue”, “unionecuador”

Peru: Dictionary for posts by indigenous organizations

“elec”, “vot”, “urn”, “primeravuelta”, “segundavuelta”, “presidencia”, “fuerzapopular”, “keiko”, “fujimori”, “fp”, “perulibre”, “pedro”, “castillo”, “pl”, “ppnpl”, “juntosporel”, “veronika”, “mendoza”, “jp”, “partidonacionalista”, “ollanta”, “humala”, “pnp”, “elfrenteamplo”, “marco”, “arana”, “frenteamplo”, “partidomorado”, “julio”, “guzman”, “pm”, “perupatria”, “rafael”, “santos”, “pps”,

"victorianacional", "george", "forsyth", "vn ",
 "accionpopular", "yonhy", "lescano", "ap ", "avanzapais", "partidodeintegr",
 "hernando", "soto", "podemosper", "daniel", "urresti", "pp ",
 "partidopopularcristiano", "alberto", "beingolea", "ppc",
 "unionporelper", "jose", "vega", "upp ", "renovacionpopular", "rafel", "lopez", "rp ",
 "renacimientounid", "ciro", "galvez", "runa", "somosper",
 "artidodemocraticosomos", "daniel", "salaverry", "democraciadirecta", "andres",
 "alcantara", "dd ", "alianzaparaelprogreso", "cesar", "acuna", "app "

A.5 Social Media Data for Indigenous Organizations by Platform

The following table displays how many followers each organization had on Facebook and/or Twitter and how many posts we include in our dataset. Please note that the numbers of followers on Twitter and Facebook were collected a year after the election on October 27th 2022. We therefore do not know the exact number of followers at the time of the election but the numbers can still give an impression of the relative reach of each organization in comparison to its peers.

Country	Organization	Classification	Follower Facebook/ Twitter	Facebook Posts	Tweets	Posts Total
Ecuador	CONAIE	Nationwide	566042/194500	99	148	247
Ecuador	FENOCIN	Nationwide	x/2599	x	102	102
Ecuador	COICA	Lowlands	19827/13400	203	106	309
Ecuador	CONFENIAE	Lowlands	138021/46700	462	938	1400
Ecuador	MICC	Highlands	41747/21000	219	65	284
Ecuador	Pueblo Kayambi	Highlands	6259/x	221	x	221
Peru	CNA	Nationwide	3922/4256	162	67	229
Peru	ONAMIAP	Nationwide	20910/7912	131	467	598
Peru	AIDSESEP	Lowlands	46178/13900	104	86	190
Peru	CODEPISAM	Lowlands	2131/x	13	x	13
Peru	COMARU	Lowlands	1855/x	5	x	5
Peru	CONAP	Lowlands	x/1557	x	13	13
Peru	FENAMAD	Lowlands	13137/132	45	6	51
Peru	FENMUCARINAP	Lowlands	x/1816	x	9	9
Peru	ORAU	Lowlands	4034/1385	119	44	163

Peru	ORPIO	Lowlands	10397/2987	93	8	101
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Please note that for the columns “Facebook Posts” and “Tweets”, the entry “x” denotes that we could not identify a verified account that was active during the election period.

A.6 Absolute and Relative Code Frequency by Indigenous Organization (organizations with election-related content only)

	fenamad	conap	cna	fenmucari	orpio	orau	onamiap	chirapaq	confeniae	conaie	coica	fenocin	aidesep	pueblokay	micc
electoral process															
• process positive	2	1	3		1		2	1	3			2			7
• process negative		2	21	1	1		5	12	34	18	2	3	3	1	17
• process neutral	3		11			1	2	6	26	9	1	2	5	5	18
Combinations															
• tone negative x arauz/creo										2					2
• tone negative x fujimori/fp		1	26	1	3		17	2					1		
• tone negative x lasso/crep-psc									1	2					7
• tone negative x other candidate			2							4					
• tone negative x perez/pachakutik															2
• tone neutral x arauz/creo									4			4		1	
• tone neutral x castillo/ppnpl			5		2			1							
• tone neutral x fujimori/fp													1		
• tone neutral x lasso/crep-psc									5					3	
• tone neutral x other candidate								1							
• tone neutral x perez/pachakutik									9	6	1			3	8
• tone positive x arauz/creo												7			
• tone positive x castillo/ppnpl			13		2		1						4		
• tone positive x lasso/crep-psc									5						
• tone positive x perez/pachakutik									11	7	1	1		2	12

	fenamad	conap	cna	fenmucari	orpio	orau	onamiap	chirapaq	confeniae	conaie	coica	fenocin	aidesep	pueblokay	micc
electoral process															
• process positive	40.0%	25.0%	3.7%	0.0%	11.1%	0.0%	7.4%	4.3%	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	0.0%	9.6%
• process negative	0.0%	50.0%	25.9%	50.0%	11.1%	0.0%	18.5%	52.2%	34.7%	37.5%	40.0%	15.8%	21.4%	6.7%	23.3%
• process neutral	60.0%	0.0%	13.6%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	7.4%	26.1%	26.5%	18.8%	20.0%	10.5%	35.7%	33.3%	24.7%
Combinations															
• tone negative x arauz/creo	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%
• tone negative x fujimori/fp	0.0%	25.0%	32.1%	50.0%	33.3%	0.0%	63.0%	8.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone negative x lasso/crep-psc	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.6%
• tone negative x other candidate	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone negative x perez/pachakutik	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%
• tone neutral x arauz/creo	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.1%	0.0%	0.0%	21.1%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%
• tone neutral x castillo/ppnpl	0.0%	0.0%	6.2%	0.0%	22.2%	0.0%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone neutral x fujimori/fp	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone neutral x lasso/crep-psc	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%
• tone neutral x other candidate	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone neutral x perez/pachakutik	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.2%	12.5%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	11.0%
• tone positive x arauz/creo	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	36.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone positive x castillo/ppnpl	0.0%	0.0%	16.0%	0.0%	22.2%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone positive x lasso/crep-psc	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
• tone positive x perez/pachakutik	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.2%	14.6%	20.0%	5.3%	0.0%	13.3%	16.4%

A.7 Electoral Strategies Disaggregated Over Time

Figures A.7.1 and A.7.2 show which strategies indigenous organizations used in election round 1 (two weeks before the first round until first election round) and round 2 (after first election round until two weeks after the second round).

Figure A.7.1. Electoral strategies in round 1 and round 2 (Ecuador)





Figure A.7.2. Electoral strategies in round 1 and round 2 (Peru)



A.8 Electoral Strategies Disaggregated for Platforms

Figures A.8.1 and A.8.2 display whether organizations used different strategies on Facebook and Twitter. (Only organizations with verified Twitter *and* Facebook accounts are displayed).

Figure A.8.1. Comparing electoral strategies on Facebook and Twitter (Ecuador)





Figure A.8.2. Comparing electoral strategies on Facebook and Twitter (Peru)



A.9 Positive, Neutral and Negative Mentions of Presidential Candidates

Figures A.9.1 and A.9.2 display whether indigenous organizations talked positively, neutrally or negatively about the main candidates.

Figure A.9.1. Presidential candidate evaluation (Ecuador)





Figure A.9.2. Presidential candidate evaluation (Peru)



A.10 Field work, researcher positionality, ethical issues and interviews

During March and April 2023, the authors of this article conducted field work in Ecuador and Peru to conduct interviews with representatives of indigenous organizations and experts on indigenous politics. During our stay in Ecuador, the project was academically hosted by the Universidad San Francisco de Quito. During our stay in Peru, we had no academic host institution. Our field work in Peru coincided with a period of intense street protests in the country's South following the ousting of president Pedro Castillo. Prior to contacting representatives of indigenous organizations, we therefore contacted academic experts working on indigenous politics in both countries to enquire about the feasibility of conducting interviews with indigenous organizations at a time of mobilization. Several local experts assured us independently of each others that interviews could be conducted in the capital, where most of the larger organizations held offices and that they could see no potential harm in contacting indigenous organizations during the time of high mobilization. After this reassurance, we proceeded to contact indigenous organizations directly via email or via social media.

To reflect on our position as non-indigenous researchers studying indigenous politics, we included a question into our interview guideline that asked interview partners what they thought about two researchers from Europe, who are researching questions of indigenous politics. The majority of interview partners expressed positive sentiment in response to this question, several of them explicitly stated that they were content that our project took an interest into organizational strategies and organizational communication, which they saw as a

change from other research projects covering matters of indigenous rights or indigenous justice.

Two of our interview partners, however, voiced frustration about what they saw as an exploitative nature of research on indigenous peoples, where researchers would not share their results or give anything back to the communities. One of the two critical interview partners explicitly criticized that interviews were a waste of time, because they would not lead to any positive social change.

Interview partners also expressed that there was not enough knowledge about the situation of indigenous peoples in Ecuador/Peru in Europe, and that they hoped we could spread such knowledge and that they were also genuinely interested in receiving the results.

To answer to these expresses wishes and also to the critical voices, we are therefore preparing an overview of our findings in Spanish language which we will share with all interview partners (document available upon request), and we are planning to publish a blog post with our core findings in our country to also reach beyond the academic community and live up to the wish to spread information about the situation of indigenous communities.

A list of all interviews conducted can be found below in Table 7. All interview partners gave their written consent for the use of the interview in publications, including limited quotations from the transcripts (see consent form in Appendix A11). They were informed before the interview about the project and the modalities of the interview and its academic use and received contact details (email and cell phone numbers) to come back to us at any time in case of any questions. We did not seek consent to sharing the entire transcripts of the

interviews with the research community and can therefore not share these during or after the review process. Additional quotations supporting the inferences made in the article could, however, be shared with reviewers upon request.

All interviews were conducted by the authors of this article. All interviews with representatives of indigenous organizations were conducted in Spanish, two of the five expert interviews were conducted in English. All interviews were transcribed verbatim and proof-read by a native speaker of Spanish. The recordings of the interviews, the anonymized transcripts and the consent forms are stored on a password protected, university-owned server.

Table A.10.1. List of interviews conducted, Ecuador and Peru, March – April 2023

No	Country	Organisation	Identifier	Function	Date and place (year = 2023 for all)	Interviewer
1	ECU	CONAIE	Conaie_1	Leadership	18 March, Quito	1
2	ECU	CONAIE	Conaie_2	Communication expert	22 March, Quito	2
3	ECU	CONAIE	Conaie_3	Communication expert	22 March, Quito	2
4	ECU	Pueblo Kayambi	Pueblo-Kayambi_1	Leadership	20 March, Cayambe	1
5	ECU	Pueblo Kayambi	Pueblo-Kayambi_2	Leadership	20 March, Cayambe	1
6	ECU	ECUARUNARI	Ecuadorunari_1	Communication expert & leadership	20 March, Quito	2
7	ECU	ECUARUNARI	Ecuadorunari_2	Communication expert	22 March, Quito	1
8	ECU	CONFENIAE	Confeniae_1	Communication expert	22 March, Zoom	2
9	ECU	MICC	MICC_1	Leadership	24 March, Latacunga	1
10	ECU	MICC	MICC_2	Leadership	24 March, Latacunga	2
11	ECU	FEINE	Feine_1	Leadership	24 March, Zoom	1
12	ECU	PACHAKUTIK	Pachakutik_1	Politician	19 March, Cayambe	2

14	ECU	Expert	EC_Expert_1	Expert, worked locally with Pachakutik ¹	25 March, Quito	2
15	ECU	Expert	EC_Expert_2	Expert, campaigned w Pachakutik	21 & 22 March, Quito	1 & 2
16	ECU	Expert	EC_Expert_3	Expert, academia	23 March, Quito	1
17	PER	AIDSESEP	Aideseep_1	Leadership	30 March, Lima	1
18	PER	AIDSESEP	Aideseep_2	Communication expert	3 April, Lima	2
20	PER	CCP	CCP_2	Leadership	4 April, Lima	2
21	PER	CCP	CCP_1	Communication expert	1st April, Lima	1
22	PER	CONAP	Conap_2	Leadership	3 April, Lima	1
23	PER	CONAP	Conap_1	Communication expert	1 April, Lima	2
24	PER	CNA	CNA_1-2-3*	Leadership	30 March, Lima	2
25	PER	CNA	CNA_1-2-3*	Communication expert	31 March, Lima	2
26	PER	CNA	CNA_1-2-3*	Leadership	32 March, Lima	2
27	PER	FENMUCARINAP	Fenmucarinap_1-2*	Leadership	26 April, Zoom	1
28	PER	FENMUCARINAP	Fenmucarinap_1-2*	Leadership	26 April, Zoom	1
29	PER	Expert	PE_Expert_1	Expert, academia	4 April, Lima	2
30	PER	Expert	PE_Expert_2	Expert, academia	4 April, Lima	2

* denotes one interview conducted with multiple interview partners

¹ While expert 1 and 2 in Ecuador were both affiliated with Pachakutik, they represent two sides of an internal division within Pachakutik that arose around and after the candidacy of Yaku Perez.

A 11. Interview Guideline, Ecuador & Peru, March-April 2023

Note that questions printed in bold were to be asked in every interview (if possible), questions not printed in bold were optional. The order of questions could be varied by the interviewer. The Spanish guideline is the original guideline used in all interviews with representatives of indigenous organizations. For convenience of the reader, an English translation is included after the original guideline.

1. Temas

Me gustaría empezar la entrevista conversando sobre los temas a los que se dedica su organización.

- a. **Me puede(n) contar en qué temas trabajan actualmente**
- b. **¿Usted(es) considera(n) que los temas en los que trabaja(n) afectan a los pueblos indígenas del Ecuador / Perú y a la población no-indígena de forma diferente? ¿Me puede(n) comentar sobre ello?**
 - i. ¿Qué diferencias hay, si existen, entre las necesidades de los pueblos indígenas de la Selva y de la Sierra?
- c. **Un tema que ocupa a muchos de momento es la desigualdad: ¿Qué significa la palabra “desigualdad” para su organización?**
 - i. ¿Y qué papel juega este tema en el trabajo de su organización?

2. Estrategia

Como segundo tema, quisiera hablar sobre las estrategias de su organización.

- a. **¿Qué estrategias utilizan para avanzar con sus temas de trabajo?**
 - i. Si se necesita concretización: Hay varias formas de hacer política, se puede ir a la calle, se puede entrar en contacto con miembros del parlamento – ¿cómo lo hace su organización?
- b. **¿Cuáles son las razones principales para elegir una u otra estrategia?**
- c. **¿Cómo entran en intercambio con sus miembros?**
- d. **¿Qué medios de comunicación utilizan y con qué objetivo?**
 - i. ¿Qué papel juegan las redes sociales en la comunicación de su organización?

3. Partidos Políticos

- a. **¿Cómo parte de su estrategia han considerado formar un partido político y por qué sí/por qué no?** Por el CONAIE: ¿Qué papel juega el hecho de tener un brazo político con el partido Pachakutik?
- b. **Y en general, ¿cómo se relaciona su organización con los partidos políticos en Ecuador/Perú?**
 - i. ¿Hay partidos que son especialmente abiertos para tratar los asuntos de su organización? O, por el contrario, ¿hay partidos que son más cerrados en este aspecto?

- ii. Cuándo se relacionan con partidos políticos, ¿existe el interés de los mismos partidos de acercarse a su organización? ¿O son más bien ustedes quienes se acercan a los partidos?

4. Elecciones Nacionales de 2021

Ahora quisiera enfocar nuestra entrevista en las elecciones nacionales pasadas en 2021 -

- a. **¿Qué papel jugó su organización en las elecciones?**
 - i. **¿Qué trabajo realizaron con respecto a la movilización del voto?**
 - ii. **En concreto, ¿a favor o en contra de cuales candidatos movilizaron y porqué?**
 - iii. ¿Desde el punto de vista de su organización, han sido legítimas las elecciones?
- b. Si pudiera(n) imaginar(se) la representación ideal de los intereses de los indígenas, ¿cómo me la describiría(n)?
- c. Y, hablando a un nivel más global, ¿qué me puede(n) comentar sobre cómo afecta hoy en día el pasado colonial del Estado a la política de Ecuador/Perú?

5. Organización y sus miembros

Me gustaría escuchar un poco más sobre los miembros de su organización

–

- a. ¿Cómo me describiría(n) a sus miembros? ¿A qué pueblos/grupos pertenecen?, ¿a qué profesión u oficio se dedican? ¿A qué clase social pertenecen? ¿Hay variedad de géneros y de edades?
- b. ¿Cuentan con miembros que tengan experiencia política o en partidos políticos? ¿cómo influye esto en su trabajo al interior de la organización?
- c. Existen muchas organizaciones no estatales en Ecuador / Perú – ¿Por qué considera(n) que sus miembros decidieron unirse a su organización y no a una de las otras?

6. Europeos y temas indígenas

Estamos llegando al final de nuestra entrevista y me gustaría hacerle una pregunta más bien a nivel personal, si me lo permite.

¿Qué piensa(n) usted(es) sobre el hecho de que investigadoras [region of origin of researchers blinded for peer review] se ocupen de temas indígenas?

7. Final

Esto es todo por mi parte – ¿hay algo más que desearía(n) añadir?

Interview guideline, English translation

1. Topics

I would like to begin the interview talking about the topics your organization is working on.

- a. **Can you tell me which topics you work on at the moment?**
- b. **Do you think that the topics on which you are working affect indigenous peoples and the non-indigenous population of Ecuador / Peru in different ways? Can you tell me about this?**
 - i. What differences if any are there between the needs of the indigenous peoples of the rainforest and the highlands?
- c. **A topic that matters to a lot of people at the moment is inequality. What does the Word “inequality” mean for your Organization?**
 - i. And what role does this topic play in the work of your organization?

2. Strategy

As a second topic, I would like to talk about the strategies of your organization.

- a. **What strategies do you use to carry your topics forward?**
 - i. If specification is needed: There are different ways to do politics, one can go to the street, one can enter into contact with members of parliament – how does your organization proceed?
- b. **What are the main reasons for choosing one or the other strategy?**
- c. How to you enter into exchange with your members?
- d. What means of communication do you use and with what objective?
 - i. What is the role played by social networks in the communication of your organization?

3. Political parties

- a. **As part of your strategy, have you considered to form a political party? If yes, why yes, if no, why not? For CONAIE:**
What is it like to have a political arm with the party Pachakutik?
- b. **And in general, how does your organization relate to political parties in Ecuador/Peru?**
 - i. Are there parties that are especially open to discussing the affairs of their organization? Or, on the contrary, are there parties that are more closed in this regard?
 - ii. When you interact with political parties, is there an interest on the part of the parties themselves to approach your organization? Or are you rather the ones who approach the parties?

4. National elections of 2021

Now I would like to focus our interview on the past national elections of the year 2021 -

- a. **What role did your Organization play in these elections?**
 - i. **What work did you do to mobilize votes?**

- ii. **More concretely, in favor of and against which candidates did you mobilize and why?**
- iii. From the perspective of your organization, have these elections been legitimate?
- b. If you could imagine the ideal representation of indigenous interests, how would you describe it to me?
- c. And, speaking at a more global level, what can you tell me about how the State's colonial past affects the politics of Ecuador/Peru today?

5. Organization and its members

I would like to hear a bit more about the members of your organization.

- a) How would you describe your members? What pueblos/groups do they belong to? What profession or job do they engage in? What social class do they belong to? Is there a variety of genders and ages?
- b) Do you have members who have political experience or experience in political parties? How does this influence your work within the organization?
- c) There are many non-state organizations in Ecuador / Peru – Why do you think your members decided to join your organization and not one of the others?

6. Europeans and indigenous topics

We are coming to the end of our interview and I would like to ask you a question on a more personal level, if I may?

What do you think about the fact that [region of origin of researchers blinded for peer review] researchers investigate indigenous topics?

7. Final question

This is all from my side – is there anything else you would like to add?

A 12. Consent form

Note that interview partners were provided with researchers' contact information (email and cell phone) for any follow-up questions, as well as with information about the project's affiliation and an explanation of the purpose and modalities of the interviews. All this information was provided in the first email used to make contact.

Declaración de consentimiento sobre el uso de la entrevista Proyecto: Movimientos indígenas y representación indígena

[Nombre y apellidos] _____ declara estar de acuerdo con que la entrevista realizada con XXX / XXX [anonymised for peer review] [fecha] _____ puede ser registrada, transcrita y analizada en el marco del proyecto "Movimientos indígenas y representación indígena".

Estoy consciente de que en el transcrito como en la análisis no va a aparecer mi nombre u otra información individual, pero si va a aparecer el nombre de la organización que represento en esta entrevista.

Declaro también mi consentimiento para que extractos limitados de la entrevista puedan ser citados en publicaciones académicas.

Lugar, fecha y firma

English translation: Declaration of consent about the use of the interview Project: Indigenous movements and indigenous representation

[Name and surnames] _____ declares that he or she agrees that the interview conducted with XXX / XXX [anonymized for peer review] on [date] _____ can be recorded, transcribed and analyzed within the framework of the project "Indigenous movements and indigenous representation."

I am aware that in the transcript as well as in the analysis my name or other personal information will not appear, but that the name of the organization that I represent will appear.

I also declare my consent with the citing of limited excerpts of the interview in academic publications.

Place, date and signature

References

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