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## Exploring the influence of power on the governance of climate im/mobility in Accra and Dakar

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# Exploring the Influence of Power on the Governance of Climate Im/mobility in Accra and Dakar

Susan.S. Ekoh



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## **Abstract**

Cities are increasingly affected by the changing climate and a corresponding mobility and immobility of people. Hence, localising global and national frameworks and policies on climate im/mobility at the city level is increasingly important. This discussion paper examines how urban governance in two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, addresses climate im/mobility, focusing on the role of power in shaping urban climate governance processes. The study applies a qualitative approach, involving a review of climate action plans for both cities and interviews with key informants in the field, to investigate the presence or absence of climate im/mobility considerations in urban governance and the power dynamics influencing these processes. Results show that diverse interests of stakeholders significantly influence urban climate governance and its linkages to im/mobility. Power is observed in the interests of involved actors, in the limited financial capacity of both cities, lack of transferred competence and limited knowledge on climate im/mobility. The study recommends better vertical coordination, allocation of competencies to city authorities, equitable policy development, enhanced knowledge sharing, and the addressing of data gaps to improve urban responses to climate-induced mobility challenges. These findings are relevant for stakeholders and policy-makers working to integrate climate im/mobility into urban governance frameworks.

Key words: multi-level governance, climate im/mobility, cities, power, climate action

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## Abbreviations

CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine
EU	European Union
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MMC	Mayors' Migration Council
NDC	nationally determined contribution
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change



# 1 Introduction

Climate im/mobility refers to the complex relationship between environmental change and human responses in the form of movement – either voluntarily or involuntarily (Ekoh et al., 2023; Wiegel et al., 2019). Migration that has been prepared for is often considered as an adaptation strategy (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Gemenne & Blocher, 2017; Vinke et al., 2020), and this view of migration has made its way into policies and programmes, with projects by organisations such as the International Organization for Migration (through its Migration, Environment and Climate Change Unit), GIZ and Robert Bosch Stiftung. Furthermore, recent scholarship and policy are increasingly engaging with the concept of immobility in the context of climate change – where people may be trapped on an involuntary basis or voluntarily choose to stay in places experiencing climate risk (Cundill et al., 2021; Ekoh et al., 2023; Ekoh et al., 2022; Farbotko & McMichael, 2019). Geographic scale is also considered in the climate-mobility discourse, with respect to whether people move internally within borders or across borders. Evidence shows that more people move within borders as a result of climate impacts (Rigaud et al., 2021b). Rural-to-urban migration patterns are commonly observed with respect to climate change as a contributing driver of migration (Marandi & Main, 2021; Rosengärtner et al., 2022; Vinke et al., 2020). Cities also experience climate impacts that lead to mobility within and from them (Ekoh et al., 2023), yet urban policies do not adequately address these linkages between climate and human mobility.

In recognition of the complexity of human mobility linked to climate change and the need for adequate policy responses, several global, regional and national frameworks and policies exist. For example, global frameworks such as the Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and the Paris Agreement recognise the linkages between climate change and migration. At the national level, climate change and human mobility are also taken up as policy issues, for example in the national migration and climate change policies and strategies of Ghana and Senegal. However, at the city level, there are often limitations in the governance of climate im/mobility. National-level policies have not effectively trickled down into urban policies. Even though Ghana's and Senegal's national policies prioritise climate change and migration, this is not effectively translated to the local level – into urban policies. This problem is not unique to climate change and human mobility, but is also known from other urban governance issues such as energy and waste (Da Cruz et al., 2019; Radzi et al., 2015).

Meanwhile, at the global and national scale, cities are recognised as vital in terms of addressing climate im/mobility, and city authorities are acknowledged as actors in addressing the issue (Serraglio et al., 2020). The responsibilities of city actors according to these recognised norms involve the inclusion and integration of “climate migrants” within cities, basic service provisioning for migrants, and efforts aimed at building resilience to climate change (Rosengärtner et al., 2022; Serraglio et al., 2020). City authorities and actors may also engage in efforts towards mitigating climate displacement: supporting displaced persons and planning relocation interventions (Ekoh, 2023). However, these responsibilities are often not fully taken up by city authorities. This begs the question of why global and national policy frameworks addressing climate im/mobility are not effectively translated into urban policies.

I argue that power dynamics shape urban policy and programming outcomes and are relevant in the context of urban governance in the face of climate im/mobility. Although the role of power in urban governance is not a new topic, as demonstrated in a number of studies (see Gordon & Johnson, 2017; Jayne, 2012), situating it in the context of climate im/mobility is a timely contribution. This is important because, despite the activities and processes engaged in by actors on urban governance of climate im/mobility, there are underlying power dynamics that inform these processes and the resulting outcomes. This discussion paper therefore aims to contribute to a better understanding of the role played by power in the governance of climate im/mobility through case studies of Accra and Dakar in West Africa.

Through a review of the climate action plans of Accra and Dakar, and interviews with key experts working on climate change and migration in these cities, I assess the presence or absence of climate im/mobility as a priority area, given that Ghana's and Senegal's national priorities on climate change and migration consider the linkage. I focus on the policy process and content of the climate action plans (see Vogel & Henstra, 2015). I also investigate the role of power in shaping the priorities of the cities reflected in their climate action plans. Overall, findings show that human mobility and climate change are not prioritised in the climate action plans. However, there are adaptation and disaster risk-reduction priorities that indirectly address climate im/mobility in the action plans for both cities. The influence of power in these priority-setting processes is seen in the interests of actors, in access to financial resources, knowledge on the issue and transferred competencies. In the subsequent sections I discuss my application of Lukes' concept of power towards understanding multi-level governance of climate im/mobility in the selected case-study cities, and present findings from the analysis of urban policy documents and interviews with relevant city actors. Finally, the paper concludes with policy recommendations targeted at national governments, donors and other relevant stakeholders involved in multi-level governance of climate im/mobility.

## **2 Theoretical framework**

In this paper, I argue that urban governance of climate im/mobility is shaped by the power that each actor possesses and exercises in the policy process, and which gets reflected in policy outcomes. According to Hathaway (2016), power is not only reflected in actor interests and policy outcomes but also in the processes involved in negotiating such outcomes. This aspect is invisible and enables certain actors and interests to be at the forefront (Hathaway, 2016). I employ Lukes' (1974) conceptualisation of power and Gaventa's (2006) further development of Lukes' concept to understand how power shapes multi-level governance of climate im/mobility.

Lukes' (1974 p. 23) seminal work on power illustrates that "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants". This means that power is the ability of an actor to influence others to accept a policy idea through direct and indirect ways. Gaventa (2006) develops Lukes' idea of power and categorises power into "visible, invisible and hidden" dimensions. Visible power is evident in attributes possessed by actors, and institutional structures that enable them to influence policy processes and outcomes (Gaventa, 2006; Hathaway, 2016). Examples of visible power are legal and jurisdictional authority, and possession of resources (Hathaway, 2016). According to Hathaway (2016) and Marquardt (2017), a sign of power is when an actor is able to influence a policy process or outcome through the resources they possess. Jurisdictional authority is a structural form of power (Marquardt, 2017, p. 171), which may or may not be enabled through transferred competencies in the case of urban governance (Ekoh, 2023).

Hidden power on the other hand is about exclusion, when some actors and their interests are excluded from policy processes and outcomes by others (Gaventa, 2006). Invisible power is a covert form of power and is observable in the ways that certain discourses become dominant in policy circles and how these may permeate without resistance (Gaventa, 2006; Hathaway, 2016).

Knowledge is an important part of policy development (Radaelli, 1995). Knowledge embodies the three dimensions of power (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2015). The absence of knowledge in defining policy outcomes limits the extent to which an actor can shape policy priorities (Marquardt, 2017). Some actors may also be purposefully excluded from contributing their knowledge to policy processes (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2015), while certain ideas may dominate

a policy discourse, perpetuated by other actors in order to realise their interests (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2015).

Several studies follow the multi-governance perspective to understand urban governance (Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Kern & Alber, 2009; Stehle et al., 2022). This perspective means that urban governance is situated within a wider engagement on global issues with actors at multiple scales (Bulkeley, 2010). Hence, this involves horizontal and vertical forms of cooperation, coordination and devolution of competencies towards addressing global issues such as climate change (Bulkeley, 2010). Studies on urban migration governance have also utilised the multi-governance perspective (Lacroix & Spencer, 2022).

In general, urban governance of climate im/mobility is situated within wider power dynamics at play in actor interactions and processes towards policy outcomes. It is important to interrogate “the processes by which ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and implemented by different groups at different scales.” (Tanner & Allouche, 2011, p. 2). Actors are therefore, central to looking at how power shapes policy outcomes on climate im/mobility. Hence, an actor-oriented approach is useful as it is “a common approach to understanding policy processes and examines the role that actors and networks play in policy making” (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014). The actor-oriented approach also considers power dynamics involved in actors’ ability to “champion” certain policy agendas (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014). This is useful within the context of this study, considering that cities across the world engage with diverse actors in urban governance. Each actor is driven by certain interests (Jakob et al., 2020). In the area of migration, some actors’ interests may be to restrict migrants, while others’ may be to integrate them (see: Adam et al., 2020; Rosengärtner et al. 2022). Climate migration interests may also be about economic opportunities for cities through increased population growth in areas that have experienced population decline (Marandi & Main, 2021). Subsequently, I examine the role of power in shaping urban climate im/mobility governance in Accra and Dakar from a multi-governance perspective.

## **3 Materials and methods**

### **3.1 Selection of case studies**

Internal migration is predicted to be on the rise by 2050 in West Africa due to climate change (Rigaud et al., 2021; Schraven et al., 2020). Accra and Dakar are selected as typical cases in West Africa to explain the role of power in urban climate im/mobility governance (see Seawright & Gerring, 2008). These cities are major urban centres and capitals of their respective countries, and offer useful cases on climate im/mobility in the West African context. In Ghana, models of migration patterns show medium-to-high likelihood of mobility from rural areas to cities (Black et al., 2013). Migrants are attracted to Accra and Dakar because they seek economic opportunities and diversification of their livelihood (Black et al., 2013; Rigaud et al., 2021). The quest for opportunities in cities as an adaptation response to the impacts of climate change on agro-based livelihoods is driven by unequal development of rural areas compared to urban areas in Africa. Even though the impacts of climate change push people to Dakar and Accra, these cities are also vulnerable to climate change. Impacts related to climate change, such as floods and sea-level rise, threaten coastal cities like Accra and Dakar (Black et al., 2013; Schraven et al., 2020; Nyadzi et al., 2020; Gueye et al., 2015). These impacts have economic implications, such as the loss and damage worth about US\$140 million from the 2009 floods in Dakar (Schraven et al., 2020).

In terms of governance structures, Accra and Dakar are similar in the sense that they both operate under decentralisation laws (Sané, 2016; Ayee, 2008). While policy issues such as climate change or migration are the responsibility of the national governments, national policies

and frameworks on migration and climate change are intended to be mainstreamed locally by relevant sub-national authorities (IOM, 2019; Mixed Migration Center, 2023). Table 1 summarises the key variables discussed in this section that form the basis of selecting Accra and Dakar as case studies for the study.

### 3.1.1 Context for case selection

**Table 1: Summary of contextual variables for Accra and Dakar**

Contextual variables	Accra	Dakar
<b>Climate im/mobility context</b>	Internal migration, displacement and immobility	Internal migration, displacement and immobility
<b>Governance structure</b>	Decentralised	Decentralised
<b>National migration policy</b>	Yes	Drafted but not officially adopted
<b>National climate policy</b>	Yes	No. Senegal submitted a Nationally Determined Contribution under the framework of the Paris Agreement in 2020
<b>Responsibility for migration</b>	National-level development of migration policies. Decentralisation policies allow for the mainstreaming of national policies on migration at the local level (IOM, 2019).	National-level responsibility for migration. Decentralisation policies allow for the mainstreaming of migration into local development plans (Mixed Migration Centre, 2023)
<b>Responsibility for climate change</b>	National government agencies are responsible for climate change. However, some competencies are transferred locally. For example, Accra Metropolitan Assembly can manage disasters and coastal risk. The National Disaster Management Organization, under the Ministry of Interior has decentralised offices at the metropolitan, municipal, district and zonal levels that are able to address issues related to climate change.	National entities such as the National Committee on Climate Change (COMNACC), Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD)

Source: Author

The analysis for this study includes a combination of document analysis and semi-structured interviews. In the first step of the analysis, the city climate action plans for Accra and Dakar were reviewed. Policy priorities in these documents were identified, forming the basis of the development of the interview guide used in the next stage of data collection. Results of the document review are summarised in Table 3 in the results section.

The second stage of data collection involved conducting semi-structured interviews with nine informants in Dakar and eight informants in Accra between September and October of 2022. In-person interviews were planned but some participants opted for virtual interviews due to convenience. Interviewees were selected based on their roles as experts working on climate change or human mobility in the cities. Some interview participants were identified by the author from a review of policy documents, while others were selected using the snowball technique and through recommendations from the author's network. See Table 2 for a summary of participants and their affiliations.

### 3.2 Interview participants

**Table 2: Interview participants and affiliation**

City	Interviewees (number in brackets) and affiliations
Accra, Ghana	Academics (3), municipal departments (2), national agencies (1), NGO (1), international organisation (1)
Dakar, Senegal	Academics (2), consultant (1), municipal department (2), national agencies (2), NGO/CSO (2)

Source: Author

It was important to get opinions from political and societal actors (see Jakob et al., 2020). Societal actors include civil society organisations, nongovernmental organisations, international organisations and academics, while political actors include government agencies, ministries, political offices and organisations. These informants work on climate change, migration and/or the nexus of both issues in the selected cities. Interviews lasted for an average of 60 minutes. The total number of interviews was 16. This was expected because of the unit of analysis and the limited number of urban actors who work specifically on migration and/or climate change in the cities. However, the interviews are supplemented with publicly available documents and communication materials from both cities.

An interpreter accompanied the author for interviews in Dakar when the preferred language by the participants was French. Interview responses in French were translated by a research assistant. I used Atlas.Ti qualitative analysis software to code and analyse all interview transcripts. The transcripts were coded through a mix of inductive and deductive approaches. Memos were used to document key points and patterns observed in each interview and across the interviews. The "code-document analysis" function on Atlas.Ti was used to cross-tabulate the data to identify relationships, and also to see if certain themes were comparable across the cities. The "co-occurrence" and "query" tools in Atlas.Ti were also used to analyse relationships observed in the data. Results of these analyses are discussed in the subsequent section.

## 4 Results

In this section, I start by presenting an overview of findings from the review of policy documents for the cities of Accra and Dakar in Table 3. The table summarises results from the review of the policy content of Accra and Dakar's climate action plans in the context of climate im/mobility. The summary of findings is followed by results from interviews with relevant actors in Accra and Dakar who work on climate change, migration or climate im/mobility.

## 4.1 Climate action plans – Policy content in the context of climate im/mobility

**Table 3: Policy content related to climate im/mobility in Accra and Dakar's climate action plans**

Policy content overview	Accra	Dakar
Reference to global frameworks and agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Paris Agreement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Paris Agreement</li> <li>SDGs</li> </ul>
Reference to national policies on migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>None</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>None</li> </ul>
Reference to national policies on climate change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS)</li> <li>National Climate Change Policy (NCCP)</li> <li>Nationally determined contribution (NDC)</li> <li>Implementation of the SDGs</li> <li>A manual for mainstreaming Ghana's climate change and green economy SDGs into the development plans of metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) (UNDP &amp; MESTI, 2017)</li> <li>National medium-term development policy framework – <i>An agenda for jobs (2018–2021)</i> (Government of Ghana, 2018)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nationally determined contribution (NDC)</li> <li>National Climate Adaptation Plan (PNA)</li> </ul>
Priority areas identified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Solid waste and wastewater</li> <li>Energy, buildings and industry</li> <li>Transportation</li> <li>Land use and physical planning</li> <li>Mainstreaming climate change threats in development processes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Urban planning and development</li> <li>Living environment and public hygiene</li> <li>Energy and energy efficiency</li> <li>Transport</li> <li>Solid waste and wastewater</li> <li>Funding climate action</li> </ul>
Human mobility in the context of climate change reflected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rural–urban migration</li> <li>Coastal risk is acknowledged and the impact on coastal livelihoods, but no link is made to displacement or migration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Displacement of coastal populations due to coastal erosion and sea-level rise</li> </ul>
Relevant programmes on climate change and human mobility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project with IOM</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>None is mentioned</li> </ul>
External donor support for action plan development	Yes	Yes

Source: Author

## 4.2 Actors' interests shape policy priorities

Actor interests come into play in the process of setting policy agendas amongst diverse actors (Smith et al., 2014). In this process, actors negotiate their interests using the power they possess, to achieve policy agendas (KI 4, Accra). The interests of actors involved in Accra's and Dakar's urban governance processes in the context of climate im/mobility are examined below.

### 4.2.1 External actors

In the case of Accra and Dakar, several government and non-government actors across multiple levels – international, national and local – were engaged in the process of developing the climate action plans for both cities. The *Territorial climate energy plan of Dakar 2021–2025* (City of Dakar, n.d.) was developed as a climate action plan for the city. The plan received funding from the European Union (EU) and the Greater South Paris Community Agglomeration. Technical support was provided by the Covenant of Mayors in Sub-Saharan Africa (CoMSSA)<sup>1</sup> (City of Dakar, n.d.). At the time of this initiative, the mandate of the Covenant of Mayors was to pursue climate mitigation as part of the EU's green deal outside Europe by supporting the development of sustainable energy access and climate action plans (CoMSSA, n.d.). Based on this objective, they provided support for a “territorial climate energy plan” in Dakar. It is therefore not surprising that Dakar's plan reflects the funder's focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and strongly features emission reduction as a priority for the city – and that this should become integral to strategies outlined in the plan.

A sign of power is when an actor is able to influence a policy process or outcome through the resources that it possesses (Hathaway, 2016; Marquardt, 2017). Although cities themselves can be powerful actors in urban policy making, they often benefit from partnerships with various actors to address policy issues (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011). This is the case with the climate plans of Accra and Dakar, both of which were developed with the financial support of international actors such as the EU and German development cooperation. Funding is therefore a source of “visible power” for international actors to influence policy outcomes (Hathaway, 2016). This prompts cities to “sometimes respond to the partner's agenda” (KI 3, Dakar).

Other featured priorities in Dakar's plan include disaster risk reduction, urban planning, waste management and general climate adaptation and resilience efforts (City of Dakar, n.d.). However, comparing mitigation and adaptation priorities in the plan shows that mitigation makes up 64% of strategies outlined in Dakar's action plan, while adaptation makes up 36% (Palermo et al., 2022), which suggests that climate mitigation was a stronger priority in the climate action plan.

In addition, because the climate–migration nexus involves the alignment of two policy fields, there are diverging interests of various actors in these spaces. On the migration side, partnerships between the EU and national governments in Africa such as those of Ghana and Senegal tend to focus on limiting irregular migration to Europe and on return and reintegration (KI 1, Dakar; KI 9, Dakar; KI 6, Accra). This is shaped by the EU's interests and that of member countries such as Germany (KI 6, Accra). According to an informant, Ghana's migration policy “started off as a very narrow policy which was targeting just international migration – as in, emigration in particular [...] because that was the interest of the funders at the time, [...] especially the EU.” (KI 6, Accra). The interviewee goes on to say:

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1 CoMSSA is a sub-Saharan African chapter of the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy – an alliance of city and local governments, as well as networks working together to address climate change and mobilise climate finance at the local level

on the face of it, it looks progressive and well-intentioned, but the ultimate ulterior motive is stemming the flow of irregular migration to their countries, so they use their vehicles like GIZ, which is the implementing agency for the German government. The Spanish Government is also heavily involved in this. The British Government, through the British High Commission, and then DFID is also carrying out activities. (KI 6, Accra)

Here, external partner interests and resources shape policy development and activities on the topic of migration. Meanwhile, the governments of Ghana and Senegal are similarly interested in the engagement of their nationals living abroad, and in particular to enhance diaspora contributions to development rather than only focus on the EU's main migration interests (Adam et al., 2020). Ghana's and Senegal's national governments also promote the inclusion of their internal interests in policy development processes funded by external actors such as the EU (this is discussed further in the next sub-section). For example, Ghana's national migration policy has since been followed up with a sectoral labour migration policy and a diaspora engagement policy, which are both of interest to Ghana (KI 6, Accra). Laudably, this interest in diaspora contributions in Ghana has led to a partnership between the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Ghana called "Diaspora 4 Climate Action" (D4C). The project supports the engagement of government institutions in the UK with the Ghanaian diaspora and government institutions in Ghana to identify areas for promoting climate action in Ghana (IOM, n.d.).

#### 4.2.2 Internal actors

As well as the interests of the Covenant of Mayors and the EU, those of the city's leadership in climate mitigation/energy were also represented in Dakar's climate action plan development. An interviewee stated, "The municipality then decided to act on this or that sector. For example, for the city of Dakar, the municipality chose the energy efficiency sector as one of the priority sectors." (KI 7, Senegal). This suggests that sub-national governments are not powerless when it comes to priority setting (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011). Despite the fact that a city needs the technical support and funding for projects from external partners, it deploys its jurisdictional power as a city authority in defining priorities that align with its interests. This represents a "visible form of power" according to Lukes' typology of power (Lukes, 2021). In this case, the city possesses authority over the design and implementation of the action plan (see Hathaway, 2016 p. 120). External actors therefore need the buy-in of the city government to yield desired outcomes in the action plan.

Financial resources are critical for sub-national action on issues such as climate change and/or migration. Results from this study show that financial capabilities of cities influence their interests. In Dakar's case, the city's interests in energy efficiency were shaped by potential cost reductions for the municipality (KI 2 & 7, Dakar). This is reflected not only in priorities that are present in the action plan but also in implementation of the plan (KI 7, Dakar). According to a key informant, "all sodium lamps are being replaced by low-energy lamps. The objective is threefold. The first is that it allows the city to reduce its energy bill. Where the city used to pay West African CFA 500 million per year, it will now pay CFA 200 million. The CFA 300 million can be injected into activities for young people that would allow them to be stabilised in economic development activities" (KI 2, Dakar). This suggests that by aligning with emission reduction targets of the external donors, the city reduces its energy costs while simultaneously benefiting certain sustainable development targets.

Overall, the city appears to prioritise mitigation projects over adaptation when it comes to implementing the action plan. According to an informant, "the municipality focuses on the immediate impacts that the projects bring. That's why they are more tempted to go for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects than for adaptation projects, which cost more" (KI 7, Dakar). This tendency for cities to focus on mitigation rather than adaptation is documented in



the literature (Birkmann et al., 2010; Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). Limited access to global adaptation funds hampers action on well-needed adaptation projects. The sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows the trend of more finance going towards climate mitigation than adaptation in Africa (Trisos et al., 2022). Cities being constrained by financial capacities can only implement actions that yield cost benefits (Trisos et al., 2022). This raises the question of the implications for human mobility. Dakar's action plan on "coastal protection infrastructure development" is seen as potentially useful for mitigating out-migration due to the impacts of climate change on coastal livelihoods (KI 3, Dakar). However, prioritising this area is not possible because of the costs of implementation (KI 7, Dakar). In particular the interviewee states that "coastal protection costs too much which is the reason why it is not one of the priorities of the municipalities." (KI 7, Dakar).

In Accra, internal interests also played a role in priorities reflected in the city's action plan. Waste management, for example, emerged as a key priority due to the mayor's interest in the issue and is being directed by the mayor's office (KI 2, Accra). According to Accra's action plan, waste is connected to a lot of environmental risk challenges in the city, but also emissions (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2020). Although another mayor has been appointed since the development of the action plan, this new mayor continues to address issues of waste in Accra, with financial support from external sources such as C40 Cities Finance Facility (C40 Cities n.d.). Interestingly, waste management is also now integrated within the climate im/mobility lens through a programme that supports migrant informal waste workers in Accra (C40 Cities, 2022). This reflects an added policy interest that was initially not visible in the city's climate action plan, beyond the recognition of rural-to-urban migration patterns in Accra. The current mayor, Elizabeth Kwatsoe Tawiah Sackey, has been very instrumental in linking the waste management priorities of the city to climate im/mobility. City authorities hence wield a form of visible power due to their jurisdictional authority to champion certain policy interests.

#### 4.2.3 Networks

The entry of climate im/mobility as a policy area in Accra and Dakar has been largely shaped by engagement with city networks such as the Mayors Migration Council (MMC) and C40 cities. Beyond exhibiting visible power through providing access to financial resources for the cities, there is the invisible form of power that city networks wield. City networks, through their activities, reinforce the narrative of city authorities as leaders in addressing global challenges (Van der Heijden, 2019). They do this by providing the spaces for engagement on thematic areas, either on a peer-to-peer basis or in global policy-making spaces such as the United Nations (Angenendt et al., 2021). For example, the previous mayor of Dakar, serving as a C40-MMC taskforce member, significantly contributed to the development of a Global Mayors Action Agenda on Climate & Migration that was presented at the UNFCCC's twenty-sixth Conference of Parties (COP26) in 2021 (C40 Cities, n.d.). In a press release by the C40 Cities on 22 June 2021, Dakar's then mayor, Soham El Wardini, stated,

of the climate finance that reaches Africa every year, very little is directed to cities, where climate change impacts are felt most acutely. I am proud to join the C40-MMC Task Force to advocate for better access to data and financing and to pave the way for other African cities preparing for and adapting to climate and migration. (C40 Cities, 2021)

In Accra, engagement with C40 cities and the MMC has contributed strongly to the city's activities on climate change and human mobility. In fact, Accra's city officials anticipate an update of the action plan to include more concrete references to climate im/mobility (KI 2, Accra). This reflects C40 cities and MMC's power in influencing Accra's urban policy visibly, through resources, and invisibly, by contributing to positioning the mayor as a leader on addressing climate migration.

City networks themselves receive funding from a variety of avenues to carry out activities, for example from foundations, countries, the private sector and global financial facilities. Further research beyond this paper is needed to see how these funding streams shape the interests of city networks and their activities in collaboration with cities.

#### 4.2.4 Non-state actors

Non-state actors are vital to urban policy development and implementation. An interviewee mentioned the role of elements of civil society in mediating negotiations between actors when interests differ (KI 7, Dakar). This means that non-state actors have the power to facilitate policy processes even when there are contentions. Another interviewee highlights the role of civil society in serving as a sounding board for the government, calling attention to aspects of policies and programmes that are ineffective (KI 3, Accra).

Document reviews and the interviews conducted for this study show that stakeholder engagement was part of the priority-setting process for the development of the urban climate action plans for both cities. In Dakar, consultations were held in all the communes, with representatives from religious institutions, neighbourhood leaders, and youth and women's associations (KI 2, Dakar). In this case, civil society is able to visibly define the priorities of the action plan. However, another statement by an interviewee highlights the downside of these stakeholder engagement processes. The participant said,

I think that in Senegal we are champions in setting up multi-stakeholder processes and platforms. We have a lot of multi-stakeholder platforms, but the problem [is that] they are mostly project-based. That means projects come, develop a multi-stakeholder process, but [...] at the end of the project everything vanishes because we have not developed it sustainably. (KI 6, Dakar)

The project-based nature of urban policy development in both Accra and Dakar suggests the power of funding organisations in shaping policy priorities. Meanwhile, there is a risk that efforts will no longer be sustainable once the project cycle is over.

Furthermore, long-term engagement with non-state actors is necessary beyond the development of policies. An NGO representative from Dakar communicated frustration over the number of times that government entities have been approached for engagement on migration issues without response (KI 9, Dakar). This represents a form of hidden power by city governments because by ignoring calls for dialogues, non-state actors face exclusion from informing policies on migration or climate change. Moreover, civil society actors have expressed criticism of Senegal's migration policy as not being fully reflective of migration issues in the Senegalese context, but rather of significantly reflecting EU interests (Dime & Jaji, 2023).

Civil society and NGO interests are influenced by the groups they represent but also by the mandate of their organisations. In both cities, climate im/mobility linkages are barely reflected in the activities of non-state actors. In Dakar, the focus of migration activities by CSOs and NGOs tends to lean towards curbing irregular migration as well as return and reintegration of migrants. An NGO interviewee in Accra mentions the absence of funders as a reason why climate migration was not initially taken up as a priority for the organisation (KI 5, Accra). The NGO and civil society representatives interviewed in this study, however, acknowledge the impact of climate change on patterns of mobility among the communities they work with. In Accra, non-state actors have recently started to engage on climate im/mobility activities as implementing partners of Accra Municipal Assembly, C40 cities and the MMC (KI 5, Accra).

### 4.3 Lack of transferred competencies

Although city authorities recognise climate im/mobility as an issue, they are unable to prioritise it due to the absence of transferred competencies on migration (Ekoh, 2023). This represents a “structural dimension of power” (Marquardt, 2017, p. 171). The absence of jurisdictional power on migration contributes to its lack of priority in city climate action plans. Meanwhile, global frameworks on migration such as the Global Compact on Migration recognise the role of sub-national actors as important actors in the area of migration, but the reality on the ground is different, with cities not having the power to act on these issues. An interviewee stated,

When the municipality does not have jurisdiction over this activity or sector, it does not find it necessary to address this area too much. Migration is the domain of the central state, that's why they didn't address this issue too much because in the end they wouldn't have too many solutions to propose in relation to it. (KI 7, Dakar)

Another participant said,

“Since migration is not a transferred competence to local authorities, we are rather passive on the issue” (KI 8, Dakar). Hesitance to engage on migration reflects limited understanding of the issue. Some city-level actors seem unaware that it goes beyond cross-border movements and includes internal migration, displacement and even immobility that occurs within borders and cities (Ekoh, 2023).

In Ghana and Senegal, the national governments have the mandate to address migration issues. In Senegal, migration is handled by national agencies such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad. (Adam et al., 2020). Similarly, in Ghana, the Ghana Immigration service – under the Ministry of Interior, Diaspora Affairs Bureau and the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs all deal with issues relating to migration (Mixed Migration Centre, 2023). Nevertheless, Ghana’s national migration policy was developed with input from sub-national authorities (Ministry of Interior, Ghana, 2016). Its National Climate Adaptation Plan Framework (Environmental Protection Agency, 2018) also involved consultations with city authorities to understand issues faced at the urban level (KI 3, Accra).

The national migration policies of Ghana and Senegal highlight internal migration dynamics, especially the rural-to-urban migration patterns. Ghana’s national migration and climate change policies particularly emphasise climate im/mobility as priority areas. The climate change policy highlights the peculiar vulnerabilities faced by internal climate migrants in urban areas, and the need for social protection to address these vulnerabilities (MESTI, 2013). Similarly, Senegal’s NDC lists coastal protection and/or relocation of vulnerable coastal populations as part of its adaptation objectives (Government of Senegal, 2015, p. 15).

Based on decentralisation policies, local governments are expected to localise national policies and this is acknowledged by national agencies. One interviewee highlighted that while efforts are being made to encourage municipalities to reflect national priorities on climate change and migration in local policies, this is challenging due to limited understanding by local actors of the nexus, necessitating the need for sensitisation on the topic (KI 1, Dakar). According to the participant,

The Senegalese government is working to help the communes integrate this dimension with the support of partners who provide technical and financial support to raise awareness and integrate this dimension. So, they play a specific role, especially as we have common objectives on these different issues. For example, the first workshop we organised to develop tools to integrate the migration and climate change dimension was supported by the IOM in Dakar. Just to tell you that international organisations such as IOM support the government in its initiatives. (KI, Dakar)

This statement also shows the visible power of external actors in shaping urban governance processes.

In localising national policies on migration and climate change, city authorities are expected to play a significant role in the provision of social services to urban dwellers, which includes migrants. Ghana's national climate change policy outlines access to health care services, education, social safety nets and, in general, social protection measures for migrants in destination areas (MESTI, 2013). Similarly, Ghana's national migration policy highlights roles that sub-national authorities should play in implementing the policy, such as social protection for migrants, equitable urban planning and data collection (Ministry of Interior, Ghana, 2016). With limited resources, city authorities are unable to fully provide social services (KI 4, Dakar; KI Accra, 2, 9, 10). Meanwhile, mobilising funds from global climate facilities, such as the Green Climate Fund, is complicated for sub-national actors (KI 3, Dakar; KI 6, Dakar). Interventions are often led by national agencies, and by private sector actors with support from NGO/CSOs and city authorities (KI 3, Accra). For example, entrepreneurial programmes in Ghana that target migrants in cities such as Accra seek to develop skills for alternative livelihoods that can sustain them when they move back to their place of origin (KI 3, Accra). In Accra, city authorities also support efforts to register residents in the national health insurance scheme, which has also benefited migrants (IOM, 2019). There is therefore a need to enable access to resources for cities so they can lead on efforts to address climate im/mobility.

#### **4.4 Knowledge shapes priorities of municipalities**

Knowledge is an important part of policy development (Radaelli, 1995). Knowledge is also a form of power, and the absence of knowledge in defining policy outcomes limits the extent to which an actor can shape policy priorities (Marquardt, 2017). Research shows that climate change coupled with demographic, economic, social and political factors may lead people to move (Black et al., 2011). For local governments, this complexity, as well as knowledge on entry points of intervention, hinders what they prioritize in urban plans. According to a participant, "capacity is an issue, because cities have not focused on migration for quite some time. For years now. I'm not too sure cities have what it takes [...], have staff, with the requisite knowledge and understanding of issues of migration" (KI 2, Accra). Limited knowledge inhibits actors from wielding power during the process of policy decision making (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2015). In this case, the participant suggests that city authorities have been unable to fully engage on migration due to limited knowledge on the subject.

Even when migration is considered in the context of climate change, policy interventions focus on limiting migration rather than seeing migration as an adaptation strategy (KI 10, Accra). The dominance of a particular discourse in policy making reveals an invisible form of power in knowledge production (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2015). On climate migration, the initial dominant discourse was based on viewing people on the move as threats to security (Bettini, 2013; Durand-Delacre et al., 2021). The problematic discourse focused on large-scale climate refugees from the Global South to the Global North (Bettini, 2013). A deviation to this narrative is seen in the discourse on migration as an adaptation strategy. An interviewee said, "... till date, all the attention is on how to adapt strategies that will reduce migration from areas that are experiencing disasters and climate change" (KI 10, Accra). This suggests contention in implementing policy interventions on climate change and migration in Ghana because the country's national migration policy frames climate migration as an adaptation strategy.

In Dakar, knowledge of the links between coastal risk and human mobility contributed to the inclusion of coastal management in their climate action plan (Ekoh, 2023). This knowledge can be linked to the broader recognition of coastal displacement in Senegal's NDC. In the development of Dakar's climate action plan, there was also recognition of the impacts of climate

change on livelihoods that push people to migrate – sometimes irregularly (KI 2, 3, Dakar). An informant stated,

We tried to work to see what were the coastal risks associated with climate change. We found that coastal risk is a factor of [im]migration. We now intend to put the results obtained into practice to minimise the coastal risk. [...] It is precisely in this context that the Governadapt project was developed and in which the city was involved in the search for solutions. (KI 3, Dakar).

Dakar's climate action was partly informed by a vulnerability assessment which highlighted coastal protection as a key need for the city (KI 2, Dakar). Hence, coastal protection could aid in building resilience for coastal communities by reducing likelihood of displacement.

City authorities are also limited by lack of data to enable interventions (KI 2, Accra, KI 9, Accra; KI 5, Accra, KI 8, Dakar). "There isn't good data on migrants in the city. [...] The only records are on migrants that approach the authorities voluntarily", said a participant (KI 9, Dakar). There is lack of data on the number of migrants or displaced persons who live in both cities linked to the impacts of climate change. Addressing these knowledge gaps is possible through research and engagement with city networks (Angenendt et al., 2021; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Eissa & Khalil, 2022). In Accra, this gap is being filled through support by the MMC for a project aimed at collecting data on migrant workers involved in the informal waste sector. This project seeks to equip the city with data needed to provide services to migrants in the city and to build resilience to climate change (Mayors Migration Council, 2022). This project was in part shaped by results from a follow-up gap analysis, which showed that migrants involved in the informal waste sector are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (KI 2, Accra). In Dakar, there are plans by the city to conduct a study among migrants in the city to better understand factors that influence their mobility, including climate change (KI 8, Dakar).

Knowledge may also be shared through improved vertical and horizontal coordination. A participant stated,

now many of the things at the national level are sometimes not incorporated at all into their city policies, even though on paper it is supposed to be the case. And that is why we are doing a lot of training for them. For instance, through IOM, we have organised training programmes for district planners. Many of them don't know anything about migration. They have been taught planning as a technical area." (KI 10, Accra)

According to Gaventa and Cornwall (2015), hidden power may be observed in the exclusion or inclusion of actors in knowledge production. By organising training programmes for sub-national actors, national authorities facilitate access to necessary knowledge that is needed to localise policies on climate change and human mobility.

Overall, filling knowledge gaps and capacity development were strongly emphasised for both cities in the interviews, including suggestions to strengthen collaborations between universities and research centres in the Global North and South.

## 5 Discussion

Since, at the national level, climate change and migration are recognised as important policy areas in Ghana and Senegal, it is expected that these issues will be reflected in urban policy priorities. I explore the role of power in shaping policy outcomes for Accra and Dakar, and whether climate im/mobility considerations are captured by policy actors. This paper contributes to knowledge on how the visible, hidden and invisible dimensions of power manifest in urban climate im/mobility governance. Visible power, which is about the possession of authority,

access to resources and several structural attributes that enable actors to shape decision making (Gaventa, 2006; Hathaway, 2016), is observed in the involvement of external actors in urban policy making in Accra and Dakar. For example, EU funding for the development of Dakar's climate action plan reflects the EU's interest in externalising the EU Green Deal. EU interests are also observed in migration policies in Ghana and Senegal in the area of addressing irregular migration. This aligns with other studies that show how external actors' interests, like those of the EU, influence national policies in Africa (Adam et al., 2020; Lietaer & Durand-Delacre, 2021; Niemann & Zaun, 2023, Dime & Jaji, 2023). The findings of this study expand the knowledge on EU influences on African policies, including the urban context.

Visible power is evident in the availability or unavailability of resources for policy making (Hathaway, 2016). Those who possess resources have the power to influence policy outcomes, as seen in this study. In terms of financial resources, this discussion paper shows that due to limited resources, cities are compelled to prioritise certain actions over others in urban governance. Hence, cities are likely to focus on more affordable interventions, such as favouring energy-saving strategies over adaptation efforts. This has implications for possible strategies on climate im/mobility, such as planned relocation that may require substantive resource investments (Balachandran et al., 2022; Boston et al., 2021). In addition, the study shows that financial gaps are often filled by external actors who have the financial power to shape policy outcomes in cities. Financing for climate mitigation in cities is far more developed than for adaptation (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011). At the same time, the entrance of climate im/mobility into the urban policy sphere in Accra is to a large extent shaped by external funding from international actors and networks.

The paper also shows that visible power though jurisdictional authority is present in the inclusion of the interests of city authorities in urban policies. For Dakar, the city's interest in cost reductions enabled it to align with EU interests on emission reduction strategies. Likewise, waste management, which is of interest in Accra, was included as a priority in the city's action plan. At the same time, city authorities are often constrained by lack of transferred competencies from national governments to deal with certain policy issues, as evidence in several studies shows (Angenendt et al., 2021; Van der Heijden, 2019; Vedeld et al., 2016). This paper reveals similar limitations, showing the shortcomings of decentralisation policies and lack of clarity on decentralised roles that cities are expected to play in localising national policies on migration and climate change. Results therefore contribute to the understanding of jurisdictional authority as a form of visible power (Hathaway, 2016).

Sometimes, interests align between donors, governments and other non-state actors engaged in policy processes, and at other times they are debated and negotiated. For example, EU support for Ghana's national migration policy was initially heavily focused on international dimensions until push back from academics who were engaged in the development process, who advocated for a more holistic migration policy (Segadlo, 2021). This study reveals similar findings, where non-state "actors draw the attention of donors to the real concern of the municipalities" in the development of climate action plans (KI 7, Dakar). Although, non-state actors are able to shape urban policies, access to the policy space is a critical factor that enables them to deploy this power. The exclusion of non-state actors in the policy process is a form of hidden power deployed by other actors (Gaventa, 2005). Lack of continuous dialogue with non-state actors by government authorities leads to their exclusion from urban policy implementation, as seen in this study. The role of migrants themselves in urban policy-making and implementation is an area where further research is needed.

This study contributes to the understanding of invisible power dimensions, which is about the dominance of discourses perpetuated by certain actors, which other actors adopt without resistance (Gaventa, 2006). The study's findings reveal that city networks deploy invisible power in perpetuating the discourse of city authorities as global leaders. Other studies have looked into the concept of mayors as saviours, with some in support and others with a more critical

stance (Brescia & Marshall, 2016; Johnson, 2017; Van der Heijden, 2019). I do not argue for or against this idea, but rather show that discourse is a form of invisible power exerted by city networks to nudge the engagement of cities on certain policy issues. In particular, this study shows that Accra's current engagement on climate im/mobility, even though it was not initially prioritised in the climate action plan, is due to the influence of city networks such as C40 Cities and the Mayors Migration Council. Hence, this contributes to growing scholarship on the power that city networks have in shaping urban policy agendas (Davidson et al., 2019; Gordon, 2019; Oomen et al., 2018). Although these partnerships are vital to multi-level governance of critical issues such as climate im/mobility, it is necessary for actors to recognise the ways that power shapes policy-making and implementation. This awareness should lead to a more just approach to achieving policy outcomes by actors.

Finally, this paper contributes to understanding knowledge as a form of power – in particular, how lack of knowledge on the climate im/mobility nexus affected its prioritisation in the climate action plans of Accra and Dakar. Furthermore, lack of data on how climate change impacts human mobility patterns towards, within and from cities, discourages city authorities from prioritising this area.

## **6 Policy recommendations**

In conclusion, several recommendations are outlined to strengthen climate im/mobility governance in cities based on the findings of this paper. Firstly, while diverse actors are necessary to address global issues such as climate im/mobility, it is important to recognise that each actor will come in to the process with their own interests. Care must be taken by donors, development partners and city networks to ensure that local needs are accounted for, despite these interests. This should be done through truly participatory processes to ensure that diverse voices are represented in the development of policies. In the case of Accra and Dakar, urban policy-making should involve diverse actors, including often marginalised groups such as migrants. These participatory processes are not only relevant in the design of policies but also in implementation. Hence, continuous efforts to engage with non-state actors by city authorities and donors is recommended.

The challenges of localisation of national migration and climate change policies at the urban level can be resolved through improved vertical coordination efforts. This includes filling the knowledge gaps of city authorities and actors through knowledge exchange and capacity-building efforts. National governments/agencies, city networks, donors and academics have a role to play in facilitating these exchanges by providing access to information and resources. Furthermore, national governments should define and enable city authorities with the competencies needed to act on migration issues, including climate im/mobility. The absence of competencies or lack of clarity on competencies for cities to deal with migration issues has hindered city authorities from taking up efforts towards addressing climate im/mobility.

Finally, direct access to funds for cities to address climate im/mobility is vital. Current global climate finance mechanisms are complicated, creating barriers for sub-national actors. These funding mechanisms need to be eased and the capacity of cities needs to be strengthened to enable them to have direct access to funds. National governments must also ensure sufficient budgetary allocations to cities to enable national policy priorities on climate change and human mobility to be applied at the local level.



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