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Computational and Robustness Reproducibility of "UN Peacekeeping and Democratization in Conflict-Affected Countries"

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Christian Oswald

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August 2024

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Computational and robustness reproducibility of “UN Peacekeeping and Democratization in Conflict-Affected Countries”*

Christian Oswald, Julian Walterskirchen

August 6, 2024

Abstract

Blair et al. (2023) examine the effect of UN peacekeeping on democratization in conflict-affected countries. They use fixed effects and instrumental variable estimators and find evidence that “UN missions with democracy promotion mandates are strongly positively correlated with the quality of democracy in host countries but that the magnitude of the relationship is larger for civilian than for uniformed personnel, stronger when peacekeepers engage rather than bypass host governments when implementing reforms, driven in particular by UN election administration and oversight, and more robust during periods of peace than during periods of civil war”. Since the authors provide an impressive list of robustness checks, we focus on computational and robustness reproducibility. We replicate the findings using the `Stata` code provided in the replication material and reproduce all main analyses in `R`. We add year fixed effects to country fixed effects, cluster standard errors, use fixed and random panel regression estimators and ordered Beta regression estimators. We furthermore reproduce instrumental variable estimators with two different packages. We find that the original findings were reproducible and robust.

KEYWORDS: peacekeeping, democratization, civil war

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1 Introduction

Blair et al. (2023) seek to answer the question of whether UN peacekeeping promotes democracy in conflict-affected countries. The authors develop and test a theory of how peacekeepers can help promote democratization combining three original data sources with information about UN mandates, personnel, and activities for all post-Cold War missions in Africa between 1991 and 2018. The outcome of interest is a continuous democracy variable bounded between 0 and 1 from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2011, Lindberg et al. 2014, Teorell et al. 2019). This polyarchy index measures electoral democracy which itself consists of five components: "an elected executive, free and fair elections, universal suffrage, freedom of association, and freedom of expression" (Blair et al. 2023, 1317). The authors derive six hypotheses for which they find empirical support:

Hypothesis 1: *The quality of democracy improves when a UN mission is mandated to pursue democracy promotion in the field.*

Hypothesis 2: *The quality of democracy improves as the number of uniformed personnel deployed to a UN mission increases.*

Hypothesis 3: *The quality of democracy improves as the number of civilian personnel deployed to a UN mission increases.*

Hypothesis 4: *The magnitude of the relationship between UN personnel and the quality of democracy is (a) larger for uniformed personnel than for civilian personnel during periods of conflict and (b) larger for civilian personnel than for uniformed personnel during periods of peace.*

Hypothesis 5: *The quality of democracy improves when a UN mission pursues democracy promotion in the field.*

Hypothesis 6: *The magnitude of the relationship between democracy promotion tactics and the quality of democracy is (a) larger when a UN mission engages rather than bypasses the host government during periods of peace and (b) larger when a UN mission bypasses rather than engages the host government during periods of conflict.*

This report is prepared for the Institute for Replication (Brodeur, Mikola, Cook, Brailey, Briggs, de Gendre, Dupraz, Fiala, Gabani, Gauriot et al. 2024) to sup-

port it in its efforts to promote reproducibility and replicability in political science (Brodeur, Esterling, Ankel-Peters, Bueno, Desposato, Dreber, Genovese, Green, Hepplewhite, Hoces de la Guardia et al. 2024). We investigate whether the analytical results are computationally reproducible in **Stata**, in which the original analyses were conducted and which is provided with the replication material, and **R** (R Core Team 2022).

In terms of reproducibility, we successfully reproduced all regression tables in the paper (Tables 2 through 9) using their codes in **Stata** and could not detect any coding errors in the data manipulation part. We therefore conducted the data manipulation part in **Stata** using the original do file, saved the resulting data as dta file and used this file in all analyses provided in this report reproducing all tables (Tables 2 through 9).

We further test the replicability and robustness of the fixed effects estimators by 1) adding year fixed effects, 2) clustering standard errors, 3) switching to panel regression estimators with country fixed and random¹ and year fixed effects, and 4) switching to ordered Beta regression estimators with country fixed effects. All of these computational and robustness reproductions support the conclusions drawn in Blair et al. (2023). We further replicate the instrumental variable estimators with two different packages in **R** and notice that 1) neither reproduces the F-statistics obtained in **Stata** while getting identical coefficients, standard errors, and p-values and 2) when standard errors are clustered by country, which one of the packages does by default, statistical significance disappears. This does not substantially alter the conclusions drawn in Blair et al. (2023), however.

We want to stress again that the authors conducted an impressive and extensive list of robustness checks, with the primary appendix stretching 64 and the secondary appendix stretching 89 pages.² The appendices include information about the data collection for the original datasets used in the paper, descriptive statistics, and extensions and robustness checks such as including UN media and civil society assistance, using alternative and lagged dependent variables, using random effects, testing UN mandates, composition, and tactics simultaneously and with longer

¹The authors provide results for country random effects in the primary appendix.

²These are part of the replication material alongside code and data to generate results. We did not replicate any appendix results, however.

lags, and more. We therefore focus exclusively on computational and robustness reproducibility in this report.

2 Computational Reproducibility

We used the [replication package](#) provided on [APSR's Dataverse](#). Some data preparation code immediately preceding analyses was provided in the replication package, but only the analysis data were included. See [Table 1](#) for details. We started by re-running do files provided in the replication package. All analyses by the authors were done in `Stata`. The materials produced the exact same results as reported in the paper and we could not detect any coding errors or other issues. The reproduction in `Stata` was seamless.³ We want to note here that we report p-values instead of standard errors in brackets in all regression tables in this report in line with the Institute for Replication's preferences.⁴

3 Fixed effect regression models

The fixed effect regression models are presented in [Tables 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9](#) in [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#). We use the `lfe` ([Gaure 2013](#)), `fixest` ([Berge 2018](#)), `plm` ([Croissant and Millo 2008](#)) and `ordbetareg` ([Kubinec 2023](#)) packages to estimate fixed, and random, effects regression models.⁵

3.1 Reproduction in R

We reproduce the fixed effects estimators using the `felm` function from the `lfe` package. [Tables 2, 12, 22, 32, 42, and 52](#) show the results. We obtain the exact same results with regards to coefficients, standard errors, and statistical significance levels as reported in ([Blair et al. 2023](#)) except for Models 1 and 2 (full sample and

³Since the results were identical, we refrain from including these as tables in this report and focus on the tables produced with a different statistical software instead.

⁴Except for the ordered Beta regression models.

⁵In addition to the packages specifically mentioned we used the `tidyverse` ([Wickham et al. 2019](#)) and `purrr` [Wickham and Henry \(2023\)](#) for data manipulation and `texreg` ([Leifeld 2013](#)) for formatting regression outputs.

subsample of countries with ongoing civil wars) using the number of civilian personnel as the main explanatory variable in Table 22 which show one fewer observation compared to the original results and the coefficient in Model 2 (subsample of countries with ongoing civil wars) is slightly bigger with 0.016 compared to 0.015. The models were thus, with these very minor exceptions, perfectly reproducible in R and support the conclusions drawn in the paper.

3.2 Add year fixed effects

Tables 3, 13, 23, 33, 43, and 53 show the same models as above with year fixed effects added. Year fixed effects account for common annual shocks and are a common way to guard against endogeneity issues. Coefficients became slightly smaller in size, which is to be expected, but kept statistical significance levels throughout all models and tables. In five instances the coefficient became slightly bigger, all of which were Model 2 (subsample of countries with ongoing civil wars). One previously statistically insignificant variable, measuring any voter activities, changed direction in four out of five models but remained insignificant in Table 53 and has thus no substantial bearing. All conclusions drawn in the paper were supported after adding year fixed effects.

3.3 Add clustered standard errors

Economists tend to say that fixed effects should be accompanied by clustered standard errors (Huntington-Klein 2021). However, clustering with fixed effects needs to fulfill two conditions to make sense: 1) treatment effect heterogeneity, such that the treatment is different for different units (here countries), and 2) the units (here countries) are a non-random sample of the population, such that some countries are more likely to be in the sample than others (Huntington-Klein 2021, Abadie et al. 2023). These two conditions seem to be met here since the effect of UN missions might well differ between countries and the countries selected for UN missions are not a randomly selected sample of the population of countries. Tables 4, 14, 24, 34, 44, and 54 show the results of this model specification. Statistical significance levels mostly dropped slightly and only four out of 30 models dropped statistical

significance completely. These concerned Models 2 and 5 (subsamples of countries with ongoing civil wars and with at least three years of peace) in Table 34, with the main independent variable measuring any democratic activities, and Models 4 and 5 (subsamples of countries with at least two and three years of peace) in Table 44, with the main independent variable measuring any democratic engagement with the host state. In contrast, the main independent variable measuring any democratic bypassing of the host state now reaches some statistical significance in Model 2 (subsample of countries with ongoing civil wars). The findings are overall robust.

3.4 Add year fixed effects and clustered standard errors

In line with the arguments presented in the above two subsections, we combine adding year fixed effects and clustering standard errors - a model specification observed frequently in applied economic and political science research. Tables 5, 15, 25, 35, 45, and 55 show the results for this specifications. 16 out of 30 models show lower statistical significance levels for the main independent variables whereas an additional 3 are not statistically significant anymore. These concern the main independent variable measuring any democratic engagement with the host state in Models 4 and 5 (subsamples of countries with at least two and three years of peace) in Table 45 and the main independent variable measuring any election activities in Model 5 (subsample of countries with at least three years of peace) in Table 55. Overall the conclusions in the paper are supported, however. Interestingly though, the main independent variable measuring any democratic bypassing of the host state reaches highest statistical significance levels while keeping a positive sign in three models (subsamples of countries with ongoing civil wars and with at least one and two years of peace) in Table 45. This does not happen in any of the other model specifications used in this report but is still noteworthy.

3.5 Panel regression models with country and year fixed effects

We use the `plm` package (Croissant and Millo 2008) to estimate panel regression models. We scaled and centered (standard deviation) the numerical right-hand side variables among the control variables since `plm` initially was not able to estimate

the model.⁶ In order to make the following comparison fairer, we first reproduced the original models with scaled and centered numerical right-hand side variables among the control variables using the `felm` function from the `lfe` package.⁷ Tables 6, 16, 26, 36, 46, and 56 show the results. We then also reproduced the original models with year fixed effects added, likewise using the `felm` function from the `lfe` package. Tables 7, 17, 27, 37, 47, and 57 show the results. The models specified with `plm` are essentially identical to the ones specified with `felm` with both country and year fixed effects and thus serve as additional robustness check. Tables 8, 18, 28, 38, 48, and 58 show that coefficients, standard errors, and significance levels are indeed identical, providing additional evidence supporting the paper's conclusions.

3.6 Panel regression models with country random and year fixed effects

As was mentioned earlier, the authors provide country random effects models for four of the fixed effects regression models presented in the paper in the appendix. What we add here to the country random effects are the year fixed effects. It is important to recall what country fixed effects are good for. Including country fixed effects in model specifications allows to control for unobserved characteristics, or time-invariant confounders (Cunningham 2021, Huntington-Klein 2021). In contrast, random effects do not fully partial out unit-level heterogeneity. This procedure boasts increased efficiency and less data loss but introduces somewhat more biasedness (Gelman and Hill 2006). Tables 9, 19, 29, 39, 49, and 59 present results from these model specifications. What we can observe is that across all tables and models, the variables of interest do not reach statistical significance levels. However, this should be taken with a grain of salt since simulation studies have shown that fixed effects models are superior compared to random effects models when there is a sufficiently large number of units and observations per unit (Clark and Linzer 2015). Furthermore, random effects estimators are only reliable if the individual ef-

⁶See this exchange which explains that `Stata` has a larger built-in tolerance compared to `R` which is why `plm` initially produced the error that the system is computationally singular: <https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/90020/random-effects-model-with-plm-system-is-computationally-singular-error>.

⁷This was also necessary for the ordered Beta regression models later since the chains did not converge otherwise and results were unstable. We should note here, and the reader will see when comparing the tables, that the results for scaled and unscaled numerical right-hand side variables among the control variables are almost identical.

fects, here the country effects, are unrelated to the treatment and control variables (Huntington-Klein 2021), which seems like a tough sell in this particular case. We therefore do not take these particular findings as evidence against the conclusions drawn in the paper, especially given all the other findings presented in this report.

3.7 Ordered Beta regression models

We reproduce the models using the ordered Beta regression estimator with country fixed effects. Ordered Beta regression models are designed for continuous dependent variables with upper and lower bounds such as V-Dem's polyarchy index which is bounded between 0 and 1. It is also more efficient than alternatives such as ordinary least squares (which assumes an unbounded Normal distribution), other types of Beta regression, and fractional logit models (Kubinec 2023).⁸ They can be estimated with both fixed and random effects but we limit ourselves to fixed effects for the reasons outlined above. Tables 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 show the results for this estimator with country fixed effects whereas Tables 11, 21, 31, 41, 51, 61 show results with country and year fixed effects. All variables of interest which reached statistical significance in the original analyses have null hypothesis values outside of the confidence interval. Thus all ordered Beta regression models provide support for the conclusions drawn in Blair et al. (2023).

4 Instrumental variable regression models

The instrumental variable regression models are presented in Tables 3 and 7 in Blair et al. (2023). We reproduce the instrumental variable estimators using two separate R packages: `lfe` (Gaure 2013) and `fixest` (Berge 2018). We focus on reproducibility here and leave aside issues such as enhancing identification by for example exploiting first stage heterogeneity or nonlinearities (Abadie et al. 2024, Schwarz et al. 2024).⁹

⁸It has furthermore been used in applied research where the dependent variable was continuous and bounded in political science and other disciplines such as behavioral ecology (Kubinec et al. 2021, Oswald et al. 2023, Hartman et al. 2023, Monti et al. 2024).

⁹We also refrain from giving extensive explanations of instrumental variable approaches. Interested readers may consult Cunningham (2021) or Huntington-Klein (2021) for intuitive introductions and various resources for further reading.

4.1 Regular standard errors

Blair et al. (2023) report instrumental variable results with regular standard errors and a first stage F-statistic of 15.378 for Table 3 and 11.873 for Table 7. We were able to reproduce these results and F-statistics in *Stata*. Tables 62 and 64 show reproductions using the `feols` function from the `fixest` package (first column) and the `felm` function from the `lfe` package. We get identical coefficients, standard errors, and significance levels with both functions for Table 3. However, both estimators produce different F-statistics compared to Blair et al. (2023). The F-statistics produced for Table 62 are 9.317 and 9.855, respectively, which are below the rule of thumb size of 10 to be able to speak of strong (enough) instruments. We were likewise able to get identical coefficients, standard errors, and significance levels with both functions for Table 7. We again obtained different F-statistics in Table 64 of 3.671 and 3.784, respectively, well below the rule of thumb size of 10. We can and should not hold this in any way against the authors but it should be noted that there seem to be some internal differences in calculating F-statistics between *Stata*, the `feols` and the `felm` functions.¹⁰

4.2 Clustered standard errors

We also provide results when including clustered standard errors since we noticed that it is implemented by default in the `feols` function from `fixest`. Tables 63 and 65 present the results with clustered standard errors. Democracy mandate loses its statistical significance in both instances and, interestingly, while F-statistics remained the same when calculated with `feols`, they get smaller in size when calculated with `felm`, producing statistics of 2.235 (Table 63, compared to 9.855 in Table 62 and 15.378 in *Stata*) and 1.105 (Table 65, compared to 3.784 in Table 64 and 11.873 in *Stata*). This issue has been raised on GitHub but was still open at the time of writing.¹¹ Again, we can and should not hold this against the authors in any way and want to note differences among statistical software solutions.

¹⁰We found a number of open and closed issues and questions on GitHub and Stack Overflow but none related to this particular issue. The `xtivreg` rather than the `ivreg` command was used in *Stata* but changing this in the do file and removing fixed effects did not change the F-statistic.

¹¹See <https://github.com/lrberge/fixest/issues/448>.

5 Conclusion

We want to stress first that the replication package provided by [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#) ran smoothly, reproduced all results presented in the paper, and we could not find any obvious coding mistakes. We reproduced the analyses conducted in **Stata** by the authors in **R**. The fixed effects regression models reproduced smoothly in **R** and we added year fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and both year fixed effects and clustered standard errors and found overall support for the conclusions drawn in [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#). We further estimated a mixture of random and fixed effects with mixed results which should be taken with caution, for reasons outlined above. We, finally, estimated ordered Beta regression models with country fixed effects and both country and year fixed effects and found support for the conclusions drawn in [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#). With regards to the instrumental variable estimators, we discovered differences in calculating F-statistics in the three software solutions used. Still, we were able to reproduce coefficients, standard errors, and statistical significance levels (without clustering standard errors) and found overall support for the conclusions drawn by [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#). We believe we demonstrated that the results from [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#) are reproducible and overall robust.

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6 Tables

Table 1: Replication Package Contents and Reproducibility

Replication Package Item	Fully	Partial	No
Raw data provided			✓
Analysis data provided	✓		
Cleaning code provided		✓	
Analysis code provided	✓		
Reproducible from raw data			✓
Reproducible from analysis data	✓		

Notes: This table summarizes the replication package contents contained in [Blair et al. \(2023\)](#).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.121*** (0.000)	0.059*** (0.000)	0.183*** (0.000)	0.185*** (0.000)	0.201*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.764	0.847	0.798	0.811	0.841
R ² (proj model)	0.227	0.203	0.260	0.265	0.305
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.753	0.828	0.782	0.794	0.826
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.191	0.105	0.200	0.199	0.236
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 2: Table 2 replication (original)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.091*** (0.000)	0.055*** (0.000)	0.156*** (0.000)	0.152*** (0.000)	0.161*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.815	0.872	0.847	0.862	0.894
R ² (proj model)	0.084	0.097	0.168	0.179	0.247
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.799	0.841	0.824	0.837	0.873
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.008	-0.124	0.039	0.032	0.094
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 3: Table 2 replication (country + year fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.121*** (0.004)	0.059* (0.052)	0.183** (0.014)	0.185** (0.018)	0.201** (0.021)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.764	0.847	0.798	0.811	0.841
R ² (proj model)	0.227	0.203	0.260	0.265	0.305
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.753	0.828	0.782	0.794	0.826
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.191	0.105	0.200	0.199	0.236
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Table 2 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.091*** (0.005)	0.055** (0.021)	0.156*** (0.000)	0.152*** (0.000)	0.161*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.815	0.872	0.847	0.862	0.894
R ² (proj model)	0.084	0.097	0.168	0.179	0.247
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.799	0.841	0.824	0.837	0.873
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.008	-0.124	0.039	0.032	0.094
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 5: Table 2 replication (country + year fixed effects and clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.121*** (0.000)	0.059*** (0.000)	0.183*** (0.000)	0.185*** (0.000)	0.201*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.764	0.847	0.798	0.811	0.841
R ² (proj model)	0.227	0.203	0.260	0.265	0.305
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.753	0.828	0.782	0.794	0.826
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.191	0.105	0.200	0.199	0.236
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 6: Table 2 replication (original - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.091*** (0.000)	0.055*** (0.000)	0.156*** (0.000)	0.152*** (0.000)	0.161*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.815	0.872	0.847	0.862	0.894
R ² (proj model)	0.084	0.097	0.168	0.179	0.247
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.799	0.841	0.824	0.837	0.873
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.008	-0.124	0.039	0.032	0.094
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 7: Table 2 replication (country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.091*** (0.000)	0.055*** (0.000)	0.156*** (0.000)	0.152*** (0.000)	0.161*** (0.000)
R ²	0.084	0.097	0.168	0.179	0.247
Adj. R ²	0.008	-0.124	0.039	0.032	0.094
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 8: Table 2 replication (panel regression country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.123 (0.424)	0.056 (0.827)	0.184 (0.466)	0.177 (0.535)	0.199 (0.526)
s_idios	0.075	0.054	0.072	0.069	0.061
s_id	0.133	0.123	0.154	0.155	0.158
s_time	0.003	0.019	0.004	0.018	0.004
R ²	0.007	0.065	0.015	0.012	0.001
Adj. R ²	-0.002	0.044	-0.000	-0.007	-0.020
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 9: Table 2 replication (panel regression country random + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.556* [0.459; 0.655]	0.298* [0.175; 0.428]	0.799* [0.653; 0.947]	0.804* [0.641; 0.961]	0.887* [0.724; 1.063]
R ²	0.755	0.830	0.785	0.798	0.830
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1816.539	-866.037	-997.284	-873.428	-823.862
WAIC	-1818.218	-868.748	-999.114	-875.757	-825.876

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 10: Table 2 replication (ordered beta regression country fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Democracy mandate	0.402* [0.313; 0.487]	0.285* [0.166; 0.409]	0.671* [0.542; 0.804]	0.651* [0.503; 0.798]	0.694* [0.556; 0.856]
R ²	0.813	0.850	0.838	0.850	0.881
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1989.802	-868.717	-1074.175	-936.297	-900.405
WAIC	-1991.382	-874.657	-1077.245	-940.136	-904.856

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 11: Table 2 replication (ordered beta regression country and year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.008*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.016*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
R ² (full model)	0.776	0.852	0.812	0.815	0.840
R ² (proj model)	0.211	0.191	0.267	0.276	0.294
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.765	0.833	0.797	0.798	0.824
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.173	0.088	0.207	0.210	0.223
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 12: Table 4 replication (original)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.006*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
R ² (full model)	0.820	0.878	0.854	0.864	0.892
R ² (proj model)	0.082	0.111	0.184	0.196	0.242
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.805	0.848	0.831	0.839	0.871
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.005	-0.110	0.056	0.051	0.089
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	27	27	27	27	27

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 13: Table 4 replication (country + year fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.008** (0.017)	0.003** (0.036)	0.016** (0.019)	0.017** (0.025)	0.017** (0.027)
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
R ² (full model)	0.776	0.852	0.812	0.815	0.840
R ² (proj model)	0.211	0.191	0.267	0.276	0.294
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.765	0.833	0.797	0.798	0.824
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.173	0.088	0.207	0.210	0.223
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 14: Table 4 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.006** (0.022)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
R ² (full model)	0.820	0.878	0.854	0.864	0.892
R ² (proj model)	0.082	0.111	0.184	0.196	0.242
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.805	0.848	0.831	0.839	0.871
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.005	-0.110	0.056	0.051	0.089
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	27	27	27	27	27

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 15: Table 4 replication (country + year fixed effects and clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.212*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.016*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
R ² (full model)	0.776	0.852	0.812	0.815	0.840
R ² (proj model)	0.211	0.191	0.267	0.276	0.294
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.765	0.833	0.797	0.798	0.824
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.173	0.088	0.207	0.210	0.223
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 16: Table 4 replication (original - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.006*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
R ² (full model)	0.820	0.878	0.854	0.864	0.892
R ² (proj model)	0.082	0.111	0.184	0.196	0.242
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.805	0.848	0.831	0.839	0.871
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.005	-0.110	0.056	0.051	0.089
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	27	27	27	27	27

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 17: Table 4 replication (country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.006*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)
R ²	0.082	0.111	0.184	0.196	0.242
Adj. R ²	0.005	-0.110	0.056	0.051	0.089
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 18: Table 4 replication (panel regression country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.009 (0.464)	0.003 (0.827)	0.017 (0.465)	0.017 (0.490)	0.017 (0.534)
s_idios	0.074	0.053	0.071	0.069	0.061
s_id	0.135	0.128	0.159	0.158	0.163
s_time	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.006	0.000
R ²	0.002	0.055	0.014	0.015	0.001
Adj. R ²	-0.007	0.033	-0.002	-0.003	-0.020
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 19: Table 4 replication (panel regression country random + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uninformative personnel	0.041* [0.034; 0.049]	0.018* [0.011; 0.026]	0.074* [0.062; 0.088]	0.077* [0.062; 0.091]	0.077* [0.062; 0.092]
R ²	0.772	0.837	0.804	0.806	0.832
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
loo IC	-1813.627	-853.078	-1013.565	-871.632	-816.639
WAIC	-1814.604	-855.634	-1016.188	-873.881	-818.801

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 20: Table 4 replication (ordered beta regression country fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of uniformed personnel	0.031* [0.025; 0.038]	0.021* [0.013; 0.028]	0.064* [0.052; 0.076]	0.063* [0.050; 0.075]	0.061* [0.048; 0.074]
R ²	0.819	0.858	0.846	0.853	0.881
Num. obs.	808	302	444	382	340
loo IC	-1951.633	-860.427	-1071.680	-927.784	-888.702
WAIC	-1953.019	-865.824	-1075.006	-931.935	-892.587

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 21: Table 4 replication (ordered beta regression country and year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.035*** (0.000)	0.016*** (0.000)	0.108*** (0.000)	0.131*** (0.000)	0.166*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
R ² (full model)	0.811	0.875	0.844	0.852	0.882
R ² (proj model)	0.177	0.193	0.251	0.270	0.332
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.801	0.857	0.829	0.836	0.868
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.132	0.075	0.182	0.194	0.255
Num. groups: country	30	28	27	25	24

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 22: Table 5 replication (original)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.027*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	0.104*** (0.000)	0.119*** (0.000)	0.140*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
R ² (full model)	0.841	0.897	0.872	0.880	0.909
R ² (proj model)	0.073	0.121	0.204	0.215	0.274
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.826	0.870	0.851	0.856	0.889
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.015	-0.118	0.069	0.061	0.112
Num. groups: country	30	28	27	25	24
Num. groups: year	25	24	24	24	24

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 23: Table 5 replication (country + year fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.035* (0.070)	0.016* (0.083)	0.108** (0.012)	0.131** (0.012)	0.166*** (0.007)
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
R ² (full model)	0.811	0.875	0.844	0.852	0.882
R ² (proj model)	0.177	0.193	0.251	0.270	0.332
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.801	0.857	0.829	0.836	0.868
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.132	0.075	0.182	0.194	0.255
Num. groups: country	30	28	27	25	24

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 24: Table 5 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.027* (0.070)	0.017** (0.017)	0.104*** (0.001)	0.119*** (0.001)	0.140*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
R ² (full model)	0.841	0.897	0.872	0.880	0.909
R ² (proj model)	0.073	0.121	0.204	0.215	0.274
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.826	0.870	0.851	0.856	0.889
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.015	-0.118	0.069	0.061	0.112
Num. groups: country	30	28	27	25	24
Num. groups: year	25	24	24	24	24

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 25: Table 5 replication (country + year fixed effects and clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.182*** (0.000)	0.016*** (0.000)	0.108*** (0.000)	0.131*** (0.000)	0.166*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
R ² (full model)	0.811	0.875	0.844	0.852	0.882
R ² (proj model)	0.177	0.193	0.251	0.270	0.332
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.801	0.857	0.829	0.836	0.868
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.132	0.075	0.182	0.194	0.255
Num. groups: country	30	28	27	25	24

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 26: Table 5 replication (original - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.027*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	0.104*** (0.000)	0.119*** (0.000)	0.140*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
R ² (full model)	0.841	0.897	0.872	0.880	0.909
R ² (proj model)	0.073	0.121	0.204	0.215	0.274
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.826	0.870	0.851	0.856	0.889
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.015	-0.118	0.069	0.061	0.112
Num. groups: country	30	28	27	25	24
Num. groups: year	25	24	24	24	24

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 27: Table 5 replication (country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.027*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	0.104*** (0.000)	0.119*** (0.000)	0.140*** (0.000)
R ²	0.073	0.121	0.204	0.215	0.274
Adj. R ²	-0.015	-0.118	0.069	0.061	0.112
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 28: Table 5 replication (panel regression country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.033 (0.623)	0.017 (0.839)	0.108 (0.539)	0.133 (0.546)	0.163 (0.562)
s_idios	0.071	0.048	0.068	0.067	0.058
s_id	0.145	0.133	0.166	0.166	0.174
s_time	0.010	0.018	0.012	0.008	0.000
R ²	0.004	0.059	0.012	0.024	0.004
Adj. R ²	-0.006	0.033	-0.006	0.003	-0.021
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 29: Table 5 replication (panel regression country random + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.178* [0.136; 0.217]	0.086* [0.049; 0.121]	0.504* [0.406; 0.595]	0.609* [0.497; 0.736]	0.760* [0.624; 0.885]
R ²	0.807	0.861	0.836	0.843	0.875
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
loo IC	-1655.449	-803.091	-922.321	-797.190	-766.119
WAIC	-1656.535	-805.815	-926.196	-800.702	-768.838

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 30: Table 5 replication (ordered beta regression country fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
# of civilian personnel	0.138* [0.098; 0.176]	0.099* [0.061; 0.132]	0.479* [0.382; 0.571]	0.539* [0.430; 0.653]	0.621* [0.490; 0.750]
R ²	0.836	0.875	0.864	0.868	0.897
Num. obs.	699	268	388	331	292
loo IC	-1724.694	-801.471	-951.128	-814.650	-787.760
WAIC	-1726.463	-808.444	-957.203	-820.308	-793.015

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 31: Table 5 replication (ordered beta regression country and year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.107*** (0.000)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.158*** (0.000)	0.146*** (0.000)	0.140*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.758	0.842	0.791	0.801	0.826
R ² (proj model)	0.209	0.177	0.235	0.225	0.238
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.747	0.823	0.774	0.783	0.809
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.172	0.076	0.173	0.155	0.163
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 32: Table 6 replication (original)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.079*** (0.000)	0.045*** (0.001)	0.132*** (0.000)	0.111*** (0.000)	0.107*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.811	0.870	0.841	0.853	0.884
R ² (proj model)	0.069	0.082	0.136	0.124	0.172
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.796	0.838	0.817	0.826	0.860
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.009	-0.142	0.002	-0.033	0.004
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 33: Table 6 replication (country + year fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.107** (0.013)	0.039 (0.124)	0.158** (0.036)	0.146* (0.070)	0.140 (0.117)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.758	0.842	0.791	0.801	0.826
R ² (proj model)	0.209	0.177	0.235	0.225	0.238
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.747	0.823	0.774	0.783	0.809
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.172	0.076	0.173	0.155	0.163
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 34: Table 6 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.079** (0.017)	0.045** (0.039)	0.132*** (0.006)	0.111** (0.019)	0.107** (0.047)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.811	0.870	0.841	0.853	0.884
R ² (proj model)	0.069	0.082	0.136	0.124	0.172
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.796	0.838	0.817	0.826	0.860
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.009	-0.142	0.002	-0.033	0.004
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 35: Table 6 replication (country + year fixed effects and clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.178*** (0.000)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.158*** (0.000)	0.146*** (0.000)	0.140*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.758	0.842	0.791	0.801	0.826
R ² (proj model)	0.209	0.177	0.235	0.225	0.238
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.747	0.823	0.774	0.783	0.809
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.172	0.076	0.173	0.155	0.163
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 36: Table 6 replication (original - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.079*** (0.000)	0.045*** (0.001)	0.132*** (0.000)	0.111*** (0.000)	0.107*** (0.000)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.811	0.870	0.841	0.853	0.884
R ² (proj model)	0.069	0.082	0.136	0.124	0.172
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.796	0.838	0.817	0.826	0.860
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.009	-0.142	0.002	-0.033	0.004
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 37: Table 6 replication (country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.079*** (0.000)	0.045*** (0.001)	0.132*** (0.000)	0.111*** (0.000)	0.107*** (0.000)
R ²	0.069	0.082	0.136	0.124	0.172
Adj. R ²	-0.009	-0.142	0.002	-0.033	0.004
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 38: Table 6 replication (panel regression country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.108 (0.481)	0.042 (0.868)	0.155 (0.525)	0.140 (0.602)	0.140 (0.619)
s_idios	0.076	0.055	0.074	0.072	0.064
s_id	0.134	0.124	0.153	0.154	0.156
s_time	0.004	0.023	0.016	0.021	0.012
R ²	0.002	0.061	0.016	0.012	0.001
Adj. R ²	-0.006	0.040	0.000	-0.007	-0.020
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 39: Table 6 replication (panel regression country random + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.489* [0.395; 0.588]	0.189* [0.067; 0.307]	0.713* [0.566; 0.850]	0.667* [0.510; 0.821]	0.655* [0.495; 0.804]
R ²	0.750	0.826	0.780	0.790	0.817
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1797.604	-855.588	-984.540	-855.228	-794.668
WAIC	-1798.936	-859.447	-986.302	-857.380	-796.800

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 40: Table 6 replication (ordered beta regression country fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. activities	0.349* [0.259; 0.438]	0.234* [0.112; 0.355]	0.583* [0.449; 0.713]	0.497* [0.362; 0.640]	0.494* [0.364; 0.645]
R ²	0.810	0.848	0.833	0.841	0.873
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1976.301	-861.324	-1056.336	-911.834	-871.101
WAIC	-1978.575	-868.296	-1059.536	-915.292	-876.296

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 41: Table 6 replication (ordered beta regression country and year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.098*** (0.000)	0.015 (0.454)	0.133*** (0.000)	0.113*** (0.000)	0.108*** (0.000)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.003 (0.893)	0.039 (0.101)	0.011 (0.700)	0.024 (0.432)	0.021 (0.514)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.755	0.844	0.784	0.794	0.820
R ² (proj model)	0.200	0.185	0.210	0.200	0.211
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.744	0.824	0.766	0.775	0.801
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.162	0.082	0.144	0.126	0.130
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 42: Table 8 replication (original)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.073*** (0.000)	0.023 (0.267)	0.102*** (0.000)	0.078*** (0.001)	0.076*** (0.001)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.000 (0.990)	0.036 (0.137)	0.030 (0.266)	0.035 (0.218)	0.030 (0.298)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.810	0.871	0.838	0.849	0.880
R ² (proj model)	0.061	0.090	0.115	0.105	0.148
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.794	0.839	0.812	0.822	0.856
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.019	-0.136	-0.025	-0.058	-0.028
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 43: Table 8 replication (country + year fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.098** (0.037)	0.015 (0.506)	0.133* (0.068)	0.113 (0.140)	0.108 (0.237)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.003 (0.903)	0.039* (0.054)	0.011 (0.548)	0.024 (0.263)	0.021 (0.551)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.755	0.844	0.784	0.794	0.820
R ² (proj model)	0.200	0.185	0.210	0.200	0.211
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.744	0.824	0.766	0.775	0.801
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.162	0.082	0.144	0.126	0.130
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 44: Table 8 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.073** (0.044)	0.023 (0.330)	0.102** (0.045)	0.078 (0.120)	0.076 (0.242)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.000 (0.990)	0.036*** (0.006)	0.030** (0.021)	0.035** (0.021)	0.030 (0.371)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.810	0.871	0.838	0.849	0.880
R ² (proj model)	0.061	0.090	0.115	0.105	0.148
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.794	0.839	0.812	0.822	0.856
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.019	-0.136	-0.025	-0.058	-0.028
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 45: Table 8 replication (country + year fixed effects and clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.162*** (0.000)	0.015 (0.454)	0.133*** (0.000)	0.113*** (0.000)	0.108*** (0.000)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.004 (0.893)	0.039 (0.101)	0.011 (0.700)	0.024 (0.432)	0.021 (0.514)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.755	0.844	0.784	0.794	0.820
R ² (proj model)	0.200	0.185	0.210	0.200	0.211
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.744	0.824	0.766	0.775	0.801
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.162	0.082	0.144	0.126	0.130
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 46: Table 8 replication (original - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.073*** (0.000)	0.023 (0.267)	0.102*** (0.000)	0.078*** (0.001)	0.076*** (0.001)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.000 (0.990)	0.036 (0.137)	0.030 (0.266)	0.035 (0.218)	0.030 (0.298)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.810	0.871	0.838	0.849	0.880
R ² (proj model)	0.061	0.090	0.115	0.105	0.148
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.794	0.839	0.812	0.822	0.856
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.019	-0.136	-0.025	-0.058	-0.028
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 47: Table 8 replication (country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.073*** (0.000)	0.023 (0.267)	0.102*** (0.000)	0.078*** (0.001)	0.076*** (0.001)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.000 (0.990)	0.036 (0.137)	0.030 (0.266)	0.035 (0.218)	0.030 (0.298)
R ²	0.061	0.090	0.115	0.105	0.148
Adj. R ²	-0.019	-0.136	-0.025	-0.058	-0.028
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 48: Table 8 replication (panel regression country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.096 (0.645)	0.015 (0.967)	0.131 (0.651)	0.106 (0.732)	0.106 (0.745)
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.008 (0.976)	0.043 (0.919)	0.016 (0.965)	0.027 (0.943)	0.027 (0.949)
s_idios	0.076	0.055	0.075	0.073	0.065
s_id	0.135	0.125	0.157	0.157	0.157
s_time	0.005	0.023	0.013	0.023	0.015
R ²	0.002	0.064	0.009	0.005	0.000
Adj. R ²	-0.008	0.039	-0.009	-0.016	-0.024
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 49: Table 8 replication (panel regression country random + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.445* [0.320; 0.576]	0.078 [-0.101; 0.249]	0.612* [0.447; 0.783]	0.530* [0.353; 0.701]	0.523* [0.346; 0.695]
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.026 [-0.128; 0.184]	0.180 [-0.018; 0.395]	0.030 [-0.167; 0.247]	0.081 [-0.149; 0.283]	0.070 [-0.167; 0.288]
R ²	0.746	0.827	0.771	0.781	0.807
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1785.578	-856.578	-965.633	-837.404	-777.217
WAIC	-1786.868	-860.970	-968.636	-840.031	-779.517

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 50: Table 8 replication (ordered beta regression country fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. eng. with host state	0.320* [0.201; 0.432]	0.130 [-0.060; 0.305]	0.470* [0.308; 0.625]	0.371* [0.206; 0.522]	0.371* [0.222; 0.536]
Any dem. byp. of host state	0.011 [-0.120; 0.155]	0.160 [-0.054; 0.365]	0.104 [-0.085; 0.288]	0.123 [-0.076; 0.322]	0.105 [-0.082; 0.313]
R ²	0.809	0.848	0.828	0.837	0.868
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1966.840	-860.628	-1043.155	-898.475	-856.474
WAIC	-1968.906	-866.847	-1046.625	-902.550	-861.616

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 51: Table 8 replication (ordered beta regression country and year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.010 (0.649)	-0.001 (0.975)	0.045 (0.140)	0.038 (0.225)	0.057* (0.079)
Any election act's	0.120*** (0.000)	0.048** (0.047)	0.145*** (0.000)	0.131*** (0.000)	0.108*** (0.001)
Any pol. party act's	-0.011 (0.536)	-0.009 (0.712)	0.010 (0.685)	0.011 (0.657)	0.013 (0.605)
Any voter act's	-0.003 (0.905)	0.021 (0.372)	-0.007 (0.818)	-0.004 (0.908)	-0.005 (0.878)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.759	0.845	0.788	0.799	0.822
R ² (proj model)	0.211	0.192	0.225	0.219	0.220
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.746	0.824	0.770	0.779	0.803
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.171	0.083	0.157	0.141	0.135
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 52: Table 9 replication (original)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.004 (0.826)	-0.014 (0.572)	0.026 (0.357)	0.015 (0.615)	0.036 (0.218)
Any election act's	0.081*** (0.000)	0.060** (0.015)	0.118*** (0.000)	0.100*** (0.000)	0.069** (0.015)
Any pol. party act's	-0.006 (0.739)	-0.005 (0.837)	0.008 (0.743)	0.008 (0.729)	0.012 (0.598)
Any voter act's	0.016 (0.447)	0.011 (0.628)	0.014 (0.627)	0.016 (0.611)	0.022 (0.459)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.812	0.872	0.841	0.853	0.881
R ² (proj model)	0.071	0.098	0.136	0.128	0.155
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.796	0.839	0.815	0.825	0.856
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.010	-0.135	-0.006	-0.038	-0.027
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 53: Table 9 replication (country + year fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.010 (0.590)	-0.001 (0.972)	0.045 (0.103)	0.038 (0.108)	0.057* (0.099)
Any election act's	0.120*** (0.004)	0.048** (0.043)	0.145** (0.024)	0.131* (0.060)	0.108* (0.091)
Any pol. party act's	-0.011 (0.558)	-0.009 (0.654)	0.010 (0.741)	0.011 (0.686)	0.013 (0.660)
Any voter act's	-0.003 (0.872)	0.021 (0.108)	-0.007 (0.805)	-0.004 (0.905)	-0.005 (0.866)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.759	0.845	0.788	0.799	0.822
R ² (proj model)	0.211	0.192	0.225	0.219	0.220
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.746	0.824	0.770	0.779	0.803
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.171	0.083	0.157	0.141	0.135
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 54: Table 9 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.004 (0.746)	-0.014 (0.511)	0.026* (0.085)	0.015 (0.301)	0.036* (0.070)
Any election act's	0.081** (0.016)	0.060** (0.030)	0.118** (0.016)	0.100* (0.056)	0.069 (0.138)
Any pol. party act's	-0.006 (0.726)	-0.005 (0.759)	0.008 (0.763)	0.008 (0.721)	0.012 (0.622)
Any voter act's	0.016 (0.364)	0.011 (0.441)	0.014 (0.616)	0.016 (0.632)	0.022 (0.467)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.812	0.872	0.841	0.853	0.881
R ² (proj model)	0.071	0.098	0.136	0.128	0.155
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.796	0.839	0.815	0.825	0.856
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.010	-0.135	-0.006	-0.038	-0.027
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 55: Table 9 replication (country + year fixed effects and clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.010 (0.649)	-0.001 (0.975)	0.045 (0.140)	0.038 (0.225)	0.057* (0.079)
Any election act's	0.186*** (0.000)	0.048** (0.047)	0.145*** (0.000)	0.131*** (0.000)	0.108*** (0.001)
Any pol. party act's	-0.015 (0.536)	-0.009 (0.712)	0.010 (0.685)	0.011 (0.657)	0.013 (0.605)
Any voter act's	-0.003 (0.905)	0.021 (0.372)	-0.007 (0.818)	-0.004 (0.908)	-0.005 (0.878)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.759	0.845	0.788	0.799	0.822
R ² (proj model)	0.211	0.192	0.225	0.219	0.220
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.746	0.824	0.770	0.779	0.803
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.171	0.083	0.157	0.141	0.135
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 56: Table 9 replication (original - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.004 (0.826)	-0.014 (0.572)	0.026 (0.357)	0.015 (0.615)	0.036 (0.218)
Any election act's	0.081*** (0.000)	0.060** (0.015)	0.118*** (0.000)	0.100*** (0.000)	0.069** (0.015)
Any pol. party act's	-0.006 (0.739)	-0.005 (0.837)	0.008 (0.743)	0.008 (0.729)	0.012 (0.598)
Any voter act's	0.016 (0.447)	0.011 (0.628)	0.014 (0.627)	0.016 (0.611)	0.022 (0.459)
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
R ² (full model)	0.812	0.872	0.841	0.853	0.881
R ² (proj model)	0.071	0.098	0.136	0.128	0.155
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.796	0.839	0.815	0.825	0.856
Adj. R ² (proj model)	-0.010	-0.135	-0.006	-0.038	-0.027
Num. groups: country	31	28	28	26	25
Num. groups: year	28	28	28	28	28

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 57: Table 9 replication (country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.004 (0.826)	-0.014 (0.572)	0.026 (0.357)	0.015 (0.615)	0.036 (0.218)
Any election act's	0.081*** (0.000)	0.060** (0.015)	0.118*** (0.000)	0.100*** (0.000)	0.069** (0.015)
Any pol. party act's	-0.006 (0.739)	-0.005 (0.837)	0.008 (0.743)	0.008 (0.729)	0.012 (0.598)
Any voter act's	0.016 (0.447)	0.011 (0.628)	0.014 (0.627)	0.016 (0.611)	0.022 (0.459)
R ²	0.071	0.098	0.136	0.128	0.155
Adj. R ²	-0.010	-0.135	-0.006	-0.038	-0.027
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 58: Table 9 replication (panel regression country + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.010 (0.970)	-0.016 (0.970)	0.045 (0.902)	0.029 (0.941)	0.052 (0.903)
Any election act's	0.124 (0.605)	0.060 (0.891)	0.147 (0.670)	0.126 (0.741)	0.108 (0.795)
Any pol. party act's	-0.011 (0.960)	-0.005 (0.990)	0.010 (0.974)	0.008 (0.979)	0.014 (0.967)
Any voter act's	-0.004 (0.989)	0.013 (0.975)	-0.009 (0.982)	0.001 (0.998)	-0.002 (0.996)
s_idios	0.076	0.055	0.074	0.072	0.065
s_id	0.138	0.116	0.162	0.162	0.159
s_time	0.001	0.023	0.007	0.023	0.012
R ²	0.003	0.071	0.008	0.005	0.000
Adj. R ²	-0.009	0.040	-0.014	-0.021	-0.030
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 59: Table 9 replication (panel regression country random + year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.061 [-0.106; 0.222]	0.013 [-0.198; 0.235]	0.203 [-0.007; 0.424]	0.181 [-0.061; 0.391]	0.262* [0.028; 0.483]
Any election act's	0.546* [0.403; 0.704]	0.237* [0.043; 0.442]	0.633* [0.438; 0.848]	0.572* [0.349; 0.790]	0.482* [0.262; 0.709]
Any pol. party act's	-0.051 [-0.187; 0.089]	-0.045 [-0.239; 0.167]	0.061 [-0.119; 0.247]	0.073 [-0.109; 0.254]	0.091 [-0.081; 0.285]
Any voter act's	-0.000 [-0.163; 0.163]	0.097 [-0.100; 0.298]	-0.022 [-0.246; 0.210]	-0.011 [-0.275; 0.222]	-0.018 [-0.253; 0.241]
R ²	0.749	0.827	0.775	0.785	0.808
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1792.199	-852.649	-967.829	-839.427	-773.824
WAIC	-1793.420	-857.561	-969.721	-842.169	-776.988

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 60: Table 9 replication (ordered beta regression country fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Any dem. institution act's	0.024 [-0.127; 0.175]	-0.058 [-0.284; 0.151]	0.105 [-0.098; 0.298]	0.063 [-0.138; 0.270]	0.158 [-0.030; 0.375]
Any election act's	0.348* [0.202; 0.486]	0.319* [0.111; 0.515]	0.508* [0.329; 0.702]	0.424* [0.221; 0.630]	0.298* [0.094; 0.493]
Any pol. party act's	-0.024 [-0.154; 0.103]	-0.048 [-0.259; 0.146]	0.050 [-0.114; 0.225]	0.056 [-0.108; 0.224]	0.084 [-0.085; 0.250]
Any voter act's	0.090 [-0.052; 0.240]	0.051 [-0.142; 0.239]	0.066 [-0.138; 0.270]	0.069 [-0.153; 0.287]	0.101 [-0.107; 0.330]
R ²	0.810	0.848	0.832	0.840	0.868
Num. obs.	834	312	454	389	345
loo IC	-1969.059	-857.121	-1046.829	-901.528	-850.415
WAIC	-1971.700	-865.776	-1050.935	-907.198	-857.365

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 61: Table 9 replication (ordered beta regression country and year fixed effects - scaled variables)

	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - feols	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - felm
Democracy mandate	1.317*** (0.002)	1.317*** (0.002)
F-statistic (first stage)	9.317	9.855
R ² (full model)	-1.769	-1.769
Adj. R ² (full model)	-1.897	-1.897
Number of observations	834.000	834.000

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 62: Table 3 replication (original)

	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - feols	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - felm
Democracy mandate	1.317 (0.145)	1.317 (0.145)
F-statistic (first stage)	9.317	2.235
R ² (full model)	-1.769	-1.769
Adj. R ² (full model)	-1.897	-1.897
Number of observations	834.000	834.000

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 63: Table 3 replication (clustered standard errors)

	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - feols	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - felm
Democracy mandate	2.062* (0.052)	2.062* (0.052)
F-statistic (first stage)	3.671	3.784
R ² (full model)	-6.168	-6.168
Adj. R ² (full model)	-6.501	-6.501
Number of observations	834.000	834.000

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 64: Table 7 replication (original)

	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - feols	Elec. dem. (V-Dem) - felm
Democracy mandate	2.062 (0.302)	2.062 (0.302)
F-statistic (first stage)	3.671	1.105
R ² (full model)	-6.168	-6.168
Adj. R ² (full model)	-6.501	-6.501
Number of observations	834.000	834.000

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Table 65: Table 7 replication (clustered standard errors)