

Becher, Anika; Basedau, Matthias

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## Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa

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Anika Becher and Matthias Basedau

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Editor of the GIGA Working Paper Series: Anja Zorob <[zorob@giga-hamburg.de](mailto:zorob@giga-hamburg.de)>  
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GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies /  
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien  
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21  
20354 Hamburg  
Germany  
E-mail: [info@giga-hamburg.de](mailto:info@giga-hamburg.de)  
Website: [www.giga-hamburg.de](http://www.giga-hamburg.de)

# **Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation?**

## **Ethnic Party Bans in Africa**

### **Abstract**

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties. Such party bans have been neglected in research, and this paper engages in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, particularistic party bans can block particularisms from entering politics but also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal or violent means. Neutral or context-dependent effects are also possible. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics on the basis of a unique inventory of party bans and readily available indicators for the dependent variables, no simple connection can be detected. Rather, context conditions seem to be of superior explanatory power. We also find a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as the causes of their implementation.

**Keywords:** Sub-Saharan Africa, party bans, ethnicity, conflict, democracy

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### **Dipl. Sowi Anika Becher**

Diploma in Social Sciences, is a Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs.

Contact: [becher@giga-hamburg.de](mailto:becher@giga-hamburg.de), website: <http://staff.giga-hamburg.de/becher>

### **Dr. Matthias Basedau**

PhD in Political Science, has been a Senior Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs since 2002 and Head of Research Programme 2, 'Violence, Power and Security', at GIGA since 2005.

Contact: [basedau@giga-hamburg.de](mailto:basedau@giga-hamburg.de), website: <http://staff.giga-hamburg.de/basedau>

## **Zusammenfassung**

### **Stärkung von Frieden und Demokratie durch Parteienregulierung?**

#### **Ethnische Parteienverbote in Afrika**

Seit der flächendeckenden (Wieder-)Einführung von Mehrparteiensystemen zu Anfang der 1990er Jahre haben fast alle subsaharischen Länder ethnische oder – allgemeiner – partikularistische Parteien verboten. Diese Verbote wurden bislang kaum untersucht und der vorliegende Artikel unternimmt eine vorläufige Analyse ihrer Auswirkungen auf Demokratie und Frieden. Theoretisch betrachtet können durch solche Verbote ethnische oder andere Partikularismen aus dem politischen System herausgehalten werden, sie könnten entsprechende Gruppen aber möglicherweise auch zum Rückgriff auf nicht verfassungsmäßige oder gewaltsame Mittel zwingen. Neutrale oder kontextabhängige Auswirkungen sind ebenfalls denkbar. Unter Anwendung makroqualitativer Vergleiche und bivariater Statistiken auf Basis einer einzigartigen Datenbasis zu Parteienverboten in Afrika und verfügbaren Indikatoren für die abhängigen Variablen können jedoch keine einfachen Auswirkungen von Parteienverboten entdeckt werden. Kontextbedingungen scheinen von höherer Erklärungskraft. Zwar sind systematische Zusammenhänge mit Variablen erkennbar, diese können aber eher als Ursachen von Parteienverboten angesehen werden.

# **Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation?**

## **Ethnic Party Bans in Africa**

**Anika Becher and Matthias Basedau**

### **Article Outline**

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Theoretical Framework: Potential Impact of Party Bans on Conflict and Democracy
- 3 Particularistic Party Bans in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis
- 4 Conclusion

### **1 Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War the number of sub-Saharan countries which have held multi-party elections has increased dramatically. In mid-2007 we could find only a few countries – examples include Eritrea, Swaziland, and Somalia – which had not held such elections. However, the (re) introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s was accompanied by fears that party politics would encourage the politicization of ethnicity and other socially attributed identities such as regional provenience and religion, resulting in intercommunal conflict and political instability. For this reason, the overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan countries have introduced legal provisions to ban such ‘particularistic’ parties.

Surprisingly, ethnic and other particularistic party bans have received little scholarly attention. The academic debate on Africa and other world regions has focused on other measures of party regulation and institutional engineering – electoral systems, party funding, federalism, and decentralisation – which are designed to accommodate intercommunal relations and contribute to the survival and consolidation of democracy.

To date there has been virtually no research on party bans in Africa, let alone their effects. The project ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans in Africa’, funded by the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, seeks to fill this gap through a study that addresses several relevant research questions, including the origins of party bans, their normative compatibility with democracy, and their actual impact.<sup>1</sup> This paper deals with what is possibly the most important aspect in terms of institutional engineering and embarks on a preliminary inquiry into the effects of implemented party bans in sub-Saharan Africa. The central research problem is thus as follows: *Is there any evidence that the implementation of ethnic and other particularistic party bans has an impact on conflict and democracy?*

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section clarifies the concept of an ethnic ban, favouring the more abstract term ‘particularistic party ban’. This is followed by a brief theoretical discussion about how particularistic party bans may affect levels and dynamics of democracy and intercommunal conflict. Based on this discussion, we develop a number of hypotheses. After presenting the database and outlining the methodology, the main section engages in a preliminary test of these hypotheses on the effects and discusses the results. The final section draws a number of conclusions in terms of theoretical and methodological as well as practical aspects and highlights areas for future research.

## **2 Theoretical Framework: Potential Impact of Party Bans on Conflict and Democracy**

### **2.1 Concept and Types of Ethnic and Particularistic Party Bans**

Even a preliminary study of the impact of ethnic party bans requires a clear cut notion of the object under investigation. What do we understand by ethnic or particularistic party bans? According to our understanding (see also Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007; Becher 2008; Bogaards 2007: 179) an ethnic or particularistic party ban denotes a highly restrictive official legal sanction that aims at prohibiting the existence or activity of a political party which is composed of, seeks the support of, and acts on behalf or in the interest of a particular ethnic or particularistic identity group. In a broad sense (Jackson 1984), ethnicity embraces all kinds of socially attributed identities such as clan, community, ethnicity, faith (religion), gender, language, regional provenance, race, sect or tribe, and the like, all of which

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<sup>1</sup> The project: ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans in Africa’ is being conducted in close cooperation with the Jacobs University Bremen and the Universities of Darmstadt and Duisburg-Essen. Anika Becher is the main researcher, Matthias Basedau is the supervisor of the ‘Hamburg chapter’ of the project.

are the result of self-ascription or ascription by others but are usually inherited by birth and cannot easily be changed by an act of individual will. In order to avoid confusion with the narrower definition, which closely resembles 'tribe', we have decided to use only the generic term 'particularistic' for the aforementioned groups (cf. Almond and Coleman 1960; Bogaards 2007: 179) and related political parties, in the sense developed above.

Using the more abstract term 'particularistic party' does not mean, however, that we do not want to differentiate between the respective social bases of a possible ban. At this stage and in light of what can be found in Africa in terms of implemented bans<sup>2</sup> it seems reasonable to distinguish parties on the basis of 1) ethnicity or tribe, 2) religion, 3) race, and 4) region under the umbrella of particularistic parties.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, these bans can take different forms with regard to the respective legal dimension of the ban. Provisions can differ in terms of whether or not they 'negatively' prohibit such particularistic parties or 'positively' proscribe specific requirements which are designed to ensure parties' non-particularistic nature. A 'positive' ban in this sense would be a requirement that a party is nationally represented in terms of party membership at the leader and/or the supporters' level. Ghana and Sierra Leone, for instance, proscribe that all parties have to maintain party branches and offices throughout the country (see Bogaards 2007: 182).

The characteristics of particularistic party bans are not confined to the nature of particularism and the differentiation between 'positive' and 'negative' bans. Another pertinent differentiation refers to the nature of the legal sanction. The term 'ban' may include 1) the banning and dissolution of an already existing party; 2) a temporary ban, that is, suspension; or 3) the denial of registration to a group that wants to transform into a political party.

Moreover, it makes a difference whether the party bans are just a 'legal option' or whether a ban is actually executed or implemented. Each may have different effects (see discussion below). Given the limited number of countries without legal possibilities and the likely more measurable impact of actual implementation, we have decided to focus on the implementation of particularistic party bans.

Although this paper concentrates on implemented bans and only stresses the differences regarding the social basis and legal nature of particularistic bans, a typology of party bans may refer to numerous other features (see Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007; Bogaards 2007b; Becher 2008) such as legal source (constitution, party, or electoral code) and responsible institution (courts, registrar of parties, ministry of home affairs, electoral commission, etc.) or – beyond the differentiation between 'positive' and 'negative' measures –

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<sup>2</sup> We limit the meaning of 'implementation' to any event in which a (would-be) political party is actually legally sanctioned with suspension, dissolution or denied registration. 'Enforcement' of party bans means that the provisions are observed. This may include an implemented party ban but not necessarily so, for instance, when no such (would-be) party emerges.

<sup>3</sup> In order to capture the behavioural dimension of the ban ('acts on behalf of or in the interest of'), we assign respective party bans on, for instance, 'tribalism' to ethnic parties, 'racism' to racial parties, and 'regionalism' to regional parties.



the regulated dimension of party politics (name, symbol, organization, membership, programme, campaigns, etc.) as well as the degree of ‘restrictiveness’: In a given setting parties may be easier to ban and opportunities and actual bans might extend to a larger number of identities and groups (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Relevant Characteristics of Particularistic Party Bans**

	Social Basis	Legal Form of Sanction	Dimension of Party Politics	Legal Source	Responsible Institution
<b>Examples</b>	Ethnic Regional Religious Race	Dissolution Suspension Denial of registration	Name Symbol Programme Campaign Membership	Constitution Electoral code Party code	Courts Ministries Electoral commission Registrar of parties

Source: Authors’ compilation.

## 2.2 How Particularistic Party Bans May Affect Conflict and Democracy

Given the culturally heterogeneous structure and the history of intercommunal conflict in many African countries (and elsewhere), the political, and particularly the partisan, organization of ethnic and other particularistic identities can be seen as generally undesirable (cf. Horowitz 1985; 1991; Salih 2003; McMahon 2004). According to Bogaards (2007b: 5), the politicization of ethnicity in Africa has been associated with ethnic conflict and ethnic violence; human rights violations; repression – even genocide; political instability; democratic erosion; and the establishment of non-democratic regimes. But how does the politicization of ethnic and other particularistic identities produce such results? Basically, there are at least four transmission channels (Bogaards 2007b: 5-6):

First, in the case of an ethnic or cultural majority, (party) politics along cultural lines may lead to the marginalisation and exclusion of a cultural minority. As a consequence and second, such minorities may feel encouraged to resort to undemocratic or even violent means in order to counter this dominance. Third, irrespective of the relative size of particular identity groups, ethnic and other identity-based politics are likely to raise the stakes of the game, fanning emotions and reinforcing in- and out-group identities, thus increasing the likelihood of disturbances of public order. When religious divisions involve conflict over values – which can hardly be subject to compromise given their divine origin – the politicization of particularistic identities is particularly risky. Fourth, particularistic parties will probably entrench such societal divisions, keeping people apart instead of bringing them together. In sum, the politicization of particularistic identities makes intercommunal conflict and, as a result or independently, undemocratic politics more likely.

What can party bans do about these risks? From a functionalist perspective, the party system is the central intermediate structure between society and government (Sartori 1976: ix). In

this sense, the party system should articulate and aggregate societal interests, transforming them into political programmes and, once a particular party has been successful at the ballot box, government policies (cf. Basedau 2007: 108-112). Prohibitions of particularistic parties, if effective, have the potential to block particularistic politics from entering party politics or to remove it from the party system (cf. Bogaards 2007: 176-180). Once accepted or effectively demonstrated, such bans may have an additional pre-emptive effect. Political parties then have to organize along other lines, seeking support from several identity groups and using other cleavages (class or ideas and values) as the basic source of partisan support.

However, one may also argue – from the same functionalist perspective – that particularistic party bans have an adverse impact on intercommunal relations and democracy. Since party bans block certain societal interests from articulation and expression in the political system, particularistic groups may feel marginalised and seek other, extra-legal and sometimes even violent means of expression. Bans may reduce the legitimacy of the system and hence become subject to conflict themselves.<sup>4</sup> In the worst of cases, particularistic party bans form part of the ‘menu of manipulation’ (Schedler 2002) and are abused to suppress the opposition, and the idealist motive of ‘bringing people together’ may be nothing but a pretext.<sup>5</sup> It may be more conducive to democracy and peace that the law does not block particularistic politics but seeks to aggregate or transform it (see Bogaards 2007: 180-187).

It is also possible that party bans, either implemented or only legally possible, have very little or no impact on democracy and peace. One can think of at least two reasons for this: First, there is little doubt that both democracy and conflict have numerous and interrelated determinants. Classical risk factors for democracy and peace in Africa include abject poverty, prior conflict, dysfunctional formal and informal institutions, and the lack of wise and responsible leadership, not to mention specific path dependent and contingent historical developments. In such a setting party bans might have no noteworthy influence. Second, even if the regulations are regularly and rigidly enforced and/or implemented – which cannot be taken for granted, in some cases due to poor regulatory capacity – particularistic parties may find ‘loopholes’ to escape legal sanctions. Requirements to fill leadership positions with members of different groups can be easily bypassed by finding ‘alibi’ members. Particularistic interests may organize as political associations and exert legal and non-violent influence.<sup>6</sup> Taking the intermediate position of the party system discussed above into account, the complete absence of effects of party bans does not seem very likely. Party bans, like other party regulation and general institutional measures, have the potential to *transform* society and

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<sup>4</sup> At this point it becomes clear that normative aspects cannot be completely separated from functionalist or empirical aspects. For a discussion on the normative aspects see Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007.

<sup>5</sup> It could be argued that many of the one-party regimes in post-colonial Africa usually legitimised themselves – at least partly – by stating the need to combat ethnicity and/or through the politicization of cultural diversity.

<sup>6</sup> With no noteworthy impact, the existence of party bans may simply be a result of past problems or, if abusively implemented, an expression of authoritarianism rather than an effective tool of institutional engineering. However, this question should be addressed by a study of the causes of party bans (see Bogaards 2007b: 3).

government or governance. Rather, the magnitude (or relative weight) and direction of effects of party bans vis-à-vis democracy and peace will depend on surrounding or context conditions:

First, the political relevance of the party to be banned or group to be barred from becoming a party is of utmost importance. A ban on a major opposition group certainly differs from a similar legal action targeted at a small and marginal group or party. Second and possibly related, effects may depend on the 'particularistic landscape' of the country. In the case of cultural majorities, the ban of particularistic parties representing cultural minorities may be problematic for democracy. In terms of conflict, it might be risky to ban a party which represents one of the major particularistic (and politicized) groups. Similar to what Horowitz (1985) has argued regarding the likelihood of ethnic conflict, a ban on just one particularistic party in a highly fragmented setting may have no negative impact. Third, the adverse effects of a ban on conflict and democracy are more likely when the political system has found other, successful ways to deal with diversity: If the ban thwarts other, more permissive regulations, it may be less accepted and is thus more likely to have negative consequences. In fact, it has to be understood that party bans are only one tool in a large box of possible methods for party regulation and institutional engineering, including proportional and compensatory electoral systems (Sisk/Reynolds 1998; Reynolds 1999; Reilly/Reynolds 1999; Bogaards 2004), federalism (De Villier 1997; Osaghae 1999; Levy/Tapscott 2001) and decentralisation (Mehler 2001). Fourth, the type of party ban may matter. For instance, one could argue that positive measures, particularly regional distribution requirements, do not necessarily block particularistic interests but are rather an effective incentive to aggregate them (Bogaards 2007: 181-182). Moreover, the fact that dissolutions and suspensions of already existing and established parties will trigger more problems than the denial of registration cannot be excluded; in this respect the social basis of the (would-be) party concerned may also matter. Fifth, the nature of the regime and the party system might count. Positive effects are more probable when bans are executed in a democratic setting and a non-dominant party system because marginalisation and legitimacy problems are less likely. Finally, the constellation of the general surrounding conditions probably largely affects the magnitude of party-ban effects. Similar to the effects of institutions on democracy discussed by Dahl (1996), party bans may be rather irrelevant if conditions such as socio-economic development, the general record of intercommunal relations, leadership features, control over forces of coercion, and external influences jointly point in a positive or negative direction. In less clear-cut constellations the party bans may matter.

Certainly, these considerations are far from being exhaustive. One conclusion, however, seems to be safe at this stage. How, to what extent, and in what direction party bans affect peace and democracy is far from being clear-cut. One can think of a multitude of diverging, sometimes contradictory hypotheses which are summarized in Table 2.

**Table 2: Hypotheses on the Impact of Implemented Particularistic Party Bans (IPPB)**

Direction of Impact	Affected Area	
	Peace and Political Stability	Democracy
<b>Positive</b>	H 1.1 IPP bans decrease the politicization of ethnicity and other particularistic identities. As a result, inter-communal and other violence is less likely. Hence, indirectly, party bans contribute to political stability and peace.	H 2.1 IPP bans help to create a moderate (behavioural) polarization in the party system because particularistic parties tend to aggravate relations between parties. Hence, indirectly, party bans contribute to the functioning of democracy.
	H 1.2 IPP bans indirectly contribute to peace due to their positive effect on democracy.	H 2.2 IPP bans indirectly contribute to democracy due to their pacifying effect on interethnic and other inter-communal relations.
<b>Negative</b>	H 1.3 IPP bans have a negative impact on interethnic conflicts because they exclude relevant political actors from the political scene and thus reduce the regime's legitimacy and/or force particularistic actors to resort to violent means. Party bans themselves may become an object of conflict.	H 2.3 IPP bans have an adverse effect on democracy because the bans are abused (or used as pretexts) to suppress the opposition and violate freedom rights.
		H 2.4 IPP bans have an indirect adverse effect on democracy because party bans force particularistic groups to express their interests with extra-legal and often violent means (H 1.3), which is detrimental to democracy.
<b>Neutral</b>	H 1.4 IPP bans have no effect on conflict but are an expression of past problems.	H 2.5 IPP bans have no effect on democratization but are an expression of authoritarianism.
	H 1.5 IPP bans are not systematically connected to conflict. Other pertinent variables, particularly risk factors (level of socio-economic development, government effectiveness, prior conflict, etc.), are superior in explaining the levels of conflict	H 2.6 IPP bans are not systematically connected to democracy. Other pertinent variables (level of socio-economic development, government effectiveness, conflict, etc.) are superior in explaining the levels of democracy.
	H 1.6 Ethnic party bans have no impact on interethnic conflicts because the main actors in conflicts are not political parties but other ethnic political groupings not affected by the party ban OR because, despite bans, particularistic parties find loopholes to continue to operate.	
<b>Context Dependent</b>	H 1.7 There are several types of effects of IPP bans. Some cases follow the pro-peace and others the anti-peace logic.	H 2.7 There are several types of effects of IPP bans. Some cases follow the pro-democracy and others the anti-democracy logic.
	H 1.8 Negative, neutral or positive effects of IPP bans on conflict depend on the context. Positive effects are more likely when the following conditions exist: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Little political relevance of targeted party or group</li> <li>- No cultural majorities</li> <li>- Low levels of ethnic/particularistic politicization</li> <li>- No undemocratic regimes</li> <li>- Non-dominant party systems</li> <li>- More-proportional electoral systems</li> <li>- Rather positive general surrounding conditions</li> <li>- Ban is exercised through denial of registration</li> </ul>	H 2.8 Negative, neutral or positive effects of IPP bans on conflict depend on the context. Positive effects are more likely when the following conditions exist: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Little political relevance of targeted party or group</li> <li>- No cultural majorities</li> <li>- Low levels of ethnic/particularistic politicization</li> <li>- No undemocratic regimes</li> <li>- Non-dominant party systems</li> <li>- More-proportional electoral systems</li> <li>- Rather positive general surrounding conditions</li> <li>- Ban is exercised through denial of registration</li> </ul>

Source: Authors' compilation.

### 3 Particularistic Party Bans in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis

#### 3.1 Database and Methodology

##### 3.1.1 Empirical Strategy and Samples

Given the large number of hypotheses – and the many contextual conditions involved – we have to admit that not all hypotheses can be fully tested at this preliminary stage. Given that the project on ‘ethnic party bans’ is still a work in progress, there were a number of reasons not to employ more sophisticated quantitative and qualitative methods such as QCA or multivariate regressions. The compilation of our database has thus far resulted only in a fairly limited number of available cases, and some of the variables were on a nominal scale only (see below and Annex I).

Hence, a multivariate quantitative approach, in particular, does not seem suitable at this stage. Instead, we have embarked on a possibly less sophisticated comparative approach, which, however, has the advantage of keeping individual cases identifiable and will serve as a starting point for further testing.

Generally, a two-step approach was applied (see Table 3). As a first step we looked at the population of all implemented party bans (N = 22) between 1990 and 2006 (‘Sample I’). Cases were coded as country years; any implementation of one (or more) particularistic party ban(s) is a case (e.g., Rwanda 2003, Nigeria 1999). Thus, if in one particular year more than one party was banned, it was nevertheless counted as one case.<sup>7</sup> We did not use formal cross-table statistics (that is Chi-Square Statistics) because the number of cases here is too low. In order to find out whether these cases are systematically connected to our dependent and intervening variables, we used simple macro-qualitative comparison in cross tables. For instance, if particularistic party bans positively affect the dynamics of peace and democracy, we must expect that in most of the cases we can find improvements in the two areas after the ban.

**Table 3: Samples and Methods**

	Sample I	Sample II
<b>Population</b>	All party bans 1990-2006 in country-years (e.g. Rwanda 2003)	All sub-Saharan countries with the legal possibility of party bans
<b>Number of cases</b>	22	41
<b>Main method for detecting significant relationships</b>	Cross-table macro-qualitative comparison	Cross-table macro-qualitative comparison Bivariate statistics (correlation coefficients according to scale type)

Source: Authors’ compilation.

<sup>7</sup> This could be questioned, since there might be many differences with regard to several bans in one particular year and country. However, in almost all cases with various bans in one year, the official reason was identical. The only exception is Mauritania, which had a ban due to race and a denial of registration due to ethnicity in 2002 and, thus, is counted twice.

In order to control for the differences with countries where no party bans were implemented, we had to apply a different sampling logic. We used a second sample ('Sample II') of all sub-Saharan countries which have the legal possibility to ban particularistic parties,<sup>8</sup> dichotomizing the independent variable in terms of whether or not one or more party bans were implemented. The exercise resulted in a sample of 41 countries. Similarly to what we did in the first step, we used simple macro-comparative cross tabs in this case, but the variance in the independent variable and the higher number of cases also allowed us to apply a bivariate analysis. If bans are effective, we expect 'ban countries' to perform better in dynamics of peace and democracy than 'non-ban countries'. Bivariate statistics should show a positive correlation between positive dynamics of peace/democracy and the implementation of bans. Controlling surrounding conditions allows for the testing of other possible determinants of peace and democracy.

### 3.1.2 Database and Sources

Even a preliminary study of the effects of party bans requires a fairly voluminous set of indicators. Though certainly far from being complete in terms of what can be conceptualized as theoretically important, the following paragraphs present an overview of the variables we have collected thus far. A detailed description of the data – particularly the scale levels, operationalizations, and sources – is available in Annex I.

The main problem in empirical research on the effects of party bans in Africa is certainly the almost complete lack of systematic descriptive data on the prevalence of and the exact nature of legal provisions and the actual implementation of party bans. Thus, one of the main tasks of the project has been the collection of systematic information on respective legal sources and actual events, resulting in a unique inventory on particularistic party bans. Data collection included a systematic assessment of all constitutions, party codes, and electoral laws which were in effect in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and late 2006. This resulted in an almost complete collection and examination of such sources (less than 5% missing).

However, the legal possibility of particularistic party bans served exclusively as a filter for the population of our second sample (see above). According to our research question, the independent variable is the actual implementation of party bans. Raising data for this variable proved difficult. In particular, it is a serious challenge to verify that a party ban was not implemented. In order to capture all such cases, we systematically examined pertinent sources such as various editions of the German language *Afrika-Jahrbuch* (1990-2003) and its English language successor the *Africa Yearbook* (2004-2005), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country reports, Freedom House country reports, U.S. Department of State human rights country reports, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) country

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<sup>8</sup> We also included Kenya and Zambia, where particularistic parties were denied registration even if there apparently was no explicit legal possibility to do so (Zambia only introduced the possibility in 2006).

reports. In addition, we conducted an expert survey of some 100 experts on the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa – from which approximately two thirds responded. As a result of this investigation we found out that particularistic party bans are more frequently implemented than originally assumed. Out of 41 countries which have the legal possibility of banning (particularistic) parties, 11 countries implemented altogether 71 of those bans.

Moreover, we did not limit the data collection to counting the number of countries and targeted parties; we also identified the official legal reasons and the precise form of legal action. Altogether there were seven outright bans and two suspensions. In 62 cases would-be parties were denied registration. In 54 cases the reason was ‘region’, in 9 cases ‘ethnicity’, in 7 cases ‘religion’, and in one case ‘race’.

In contrast to the case of the independent variable, for the dependent variable we could draw on already available data from sources usually employed in empirical studies. For conflict we used several sources and distinguished between the levels of conflict using two thresholds (‘minor/latent’ vs. ‘major’): For major conflict (Conflict I) the *Uppsala Conflict Data Programme* (UCDP) data, with a 25-battle-death threshold per annum, as well as the database of the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung* (AKUF) were used. In order to capture minor conflicts we consulted the *Konfliktbarometer* of the *Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung* (HIK), which also takes into account minor or latent conflict below the UCDP threshold. This resulted in a second dummy variable which includes minor *and* major conflicts (Conflict II). For democracy we relied on Freedom House (FH), although both dimensions of the FH ratings – political rights and civil liberties – were taken into account.

For both conflict and democracy variables we tried to capture the dynamic dimension of both phenomena by using not only information on absolute levels – for instance, in 1990 and 2007 – but also data from before and after the implementation of party bans, usually one year before and one year after.

In order to be able to control important context conditions, we also compiled data on four clusters of such conditions, more than 45 variables altogether. In almost all cases we drew on data from readily available sources (for details see Annex I) and tried to capture different points of time and dynamics. These clusters include the following (see also Table 4):

- Data on the ‘particularistic landscape’ of the countries in question including the share of different religious groups (see Basedau/De Juan/Körner 2007), several measures for ethnic fractionalization and politicization (see Posner 2004), and pertinent information from the Minorities at Risk project such as the number of minorities and the existence of a minority problem.
- (Other) information on the context of conflict, such as the type of conflict, in terms of possible cause of conflict, time span and prior conflict.
- Indicators of other phenomena seen as classical economic and political ‘risk factors’ such as dependence on primary commodities, level of income and human development, and regime stability before 1990.

- Data on political institutions, namely the electoral system, the party system, and the form of government. In this case we used sources such as Basedau (2007) and Hartmann (2007) but also compiled data from several websites ourselves.

**Table 4: Overview of Variables in the Database\***

Independent Variables (Party Bans)	Intervening and Context Variable Clusters	Dependent Variables
Implemented particularistic party ban (years) Countries with IPPBs (Countries with legal possibility of PPBs)	Ethnic and religious context (Other) 'risk factors' (Other) conflict specific variables Political institutions variables	Conflict level and change (major conflict) Conflict level and change (minor conflict) Democracy level and change (Freedom House)

\* For a more detailed description of data and sources see Annex I.

Source: Authors' compilation.

### 3.2 Analysis

According to our hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, particularistic party bans may have positive, negative, neutral or context-dependent effects on both conflict and democracy. In order to undertake a preliminary test of these hypotheses, we will embark on a two-step analysis of possible effects as outlined above in the empirical strategy. First, we will look at the sample of particularistic party bans, and second, we will use differences between 'ban countries' and 'non-ban countries' to determine whether we can detect theoretically plausible correlations with the dynamics of peace and democratization. Although contextual hypotheses are controlled for in some respects, we do not engage in a systematic test of their interaction with peace and conflict on the one hand and party bans on the other hand.

#### 3.2.1 Sample I: Ban Cases Only

If particularistic party bans are a successful way to address conflict, we must expect that the level of conflict decreases after the implementation of a party ban. In turn, increased or unchanged levels of conflict support the hypotheses that bans have an adverse or no impact. As for our variables 'start' or 'end' of a major or minor conflict, the results point to rather neutral effects. Regardless of the level of conflict in terms of thresholds, the implementation of party bans is mostly related to 'no change'.<sup>9</sup> Out of 22 cases, 19 remained unchanged one year after the implementation of a party ban. A similar result is returned when we look at the intensities of conflict (as shown in Tables 5 and 6) – in this case only data for major conflict (i.e., above the 25-battle-death threshold) was available. Out of 21 cases (Namibia had to be coded as a missing case), 17 cases showed no change one year after party ban implementation.

<sup>9</sup> Due to space constraints, results are not reported in tables.



**Table 5: Delta Conflict Intensity and Legal Form of Sanction\***

Delta Conflict Intensity	Legal Form of Sanction			
	Ban	Denial of Registration	Suspension	
More Conflict	Uganda (1993)	-	Burundi (1997)	2
No Change	CAR (1995) Mauritania (2002)	Burundi (1992) Equatorial Guinea (1994) Kenya (1992) Mauritania (1991) Mauritania (2000) Mauritania (2002) Mauritania (2004) Nigeria (1996) Nigeria (1998) Nigeria (2002) Rwanda (2001) Tanzania (1992) Tanzania (2005) Zambia (1993)	CAR (1998)	17
Less Conflict	Rwanda (1994) Rwanda (2003)	-	-	2
	5	14	2	21

\* Namibia (2006) not included.

Source: Authors' compilation, based on project and UCDP data.

**Table 6: Change of Conflict Intensity and Reason for Ban\***

Delta Conflict Intensity	Official Reason for Ban				
	Ethnicity	Religion	Race	Region/ Secessionism	
More Conflict	Burundi (1997)	Uganda (1993)	-	-	2
No Change	Burundi (1992) CAR (1998) Equatorial Guinea (1994) Mauritania (2002) Randa (2003)	CAR (1995) Kenya (1992) Mauritania (1991) Mauritania (2000) Mauritania (2004) Zambia (1993)	Mauritania (2002)	Nigeria (1996) Nigeria (1998) Nigeria (2002) Tanzania (1992) Tanzania (2005)	17
Less Conflict	Rwanda (1994) Rwanda (2003)	-	-	-	2
	8	7	1	5	21

\* Namibia (2006) not included.

Source: Authors' compilation, based on project and UCDP data.

Although there is apparently a general trend towards neutral or no impact on the aggregate, exceptions point to the fact that in individual cases there might have been negative or positive effects: In three cases major conflicts began after party ban implementation (in Burundi in 1993 and in Mauritania in 2003, counted twice).<sup>10</sup> With regard to intensities (in terms of UCDD coding), we could also detect positive dynamics. Whereas in Burundi (1997) and Uganda (1993) conflict levels increased, the implementation of party bans in two Rwandan cases (1994 and 2003) was followed by eased conflict.<sup>11</sup>

This is not to say that we conclude that party bans are indeed the major cause of the respective dynamics in these individual cases. Yet, it is also not likely that – in the whole setting of surrounding conditions – party bans did not play any role at all.

Looking at the specific types of party ban – if we want to conceptualize this as a context condition – does not point to spectacular relationships. With regard to the *legal form of action*, however, Table 5 illustrates that a denied registration (14 cases) is exclusively connected to no change in conflict intensities, whereas an outright ban (dissolution order) has more ambiguous ‘effects’. Out of five cases, two show no change, another two positive dynamics, and one case negative dynamics. Suspension (two cases) is associated with either no change or more conflict. A similarly complex picture is derived from the analysis of the *official reasons of bans* (Table 6). Exclusively neutral are apparently bans on the grounds of ‘race’ and ‘region’ (or secessionism). This holds true roughly for ‘religion’, with just one case connected to more intense conflict after ban implementation and six cases which correspond to unchanged intensities. Ethnicity shows more divergent effects, with Burundi and Rwanda as opposed cases vis-à-vis conflict.

The absolute level of conflict before the implementation of the ban does not produce convincing results either. There might be a slight tendency that when there is no conflict any change is rather unlikely (just one change out of 16 cases). With already existing conflict (five cases), changes are likelier but point in different directions (two negative, two positive, one no change).<sup>12</sup> Although it is risky to draw conclusions at this point, one could argue that existing conflicts are more sensitive to the impact of party bans.

Similar to what we found for conflict, there is little evidence that points to a simple connection between the implementation of particularistic party bans and democratization. If we look at the changes of Freedom House values (average rating of ‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’) before and after bans, no clear-cut patterns emerge. However, implementation is less frequently associated with ‘no change’ than with conflict. Out of 22 cases, only five party bans are connected to stable ratings while six cases show negative and 11 show positive dynamics (see Table 7). This could be interpreted as evidence that democracy is more sensitive to the ef-

<sup>10</sup> The second conflict variable - including minor conflicts - only shows a conflict start in Mauritania because Burundi is counted as being a conflict case since 1991.

<sup>11</sup> Uganda must be seen as a special case, however, since party activity was not allowed under the Movement System of Museveni.

<sup>12</sup> Due to space constraints, results are not reported in tables.

fects of party bans. Given that 50% of the cases display improvements, we may also conclude that particularistic party bans are – at least in the short run – more likely to foster democratization than to hinder it. However, this may also be due to methodology in the narrow sense, because changes are more likely for Freedom House ratings, with its 1-7 scale, than the conflict scales, which run from 0 to 2 at best. In fact, changes are very small: Only in the cases of Nigeria (1998), Rwanda (1994), and Zambia (1993) does the change in the ratings exceed 0,5.

**Table 7: Change of Level of Democracy and Reason for Ban**


Direction Delta Freedom House	Official Reason for Ban				
	Ethnicity	Religion	Race	Region/ Secessionism	
<b>Negative</b>	Burundi (1992) Mauritania (2002) Rwanda (1994)	CAR (1995) Zambia (1993)	Mauritania (2002)	-	<b>6</b>
<b>No Change</b>	Equatorial Guinea (1994)	Mauritania (1991)	-	Namibia (2006) Tanzania (1992) Tanzania (2005)	<b>5</b>
<b>Positive</b>	Burundi (1997) CAR (1998) Rwanda (2001) Rwanda (2003)	Kenya (1992) Mauritania (2000) Mauritania (2004) Uganda (1993)	-	Nigeria (1996) Nigeria (1998) Nigeria (2002)	<b>11</b>
	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>

Source: Authors' compilation, based on project and Freedom House data.

Cautiously, we can conclude at this stage that we have several types of connections and that an impact, if there is one, depends on the context. If this is the case, the crucial context condition does not seem to be the type of ban in terms of official reason or legal sanction.<sup>13</sup> All cases are almost evenly distributed with regard to the dynamics of democratization on the one hand and the official reason or the legal action on the other.

When the base level of democracy (before the implementation of a ban) – ‘free’, ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’ – is examined, somewhat more interesting results are returned: The first finding shows that when a ban is implemented positive dynamics in terms of democracy are apparently more likely in ‘not free’ settings. Out of 14 ‘not free’ cases, nine show positive and only two negative dynamics while in ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ regimes the outcomes are fairly evenly distributed. We should not overrate this finding, however. For non-free countries, the worst category in Freedom House, it may be easier to improve than for others. Yet, another result seems remarkable: Although this points rather to the causes of party bans – which is not the focus of this paper – only two out of 22 party bans were implemented in ‘free’ or democratic countries. Apparently, party bans are particularly popular in non-democratic settings (see Figure 1).

<sup>13</sup> Due to length constraints, detailed results are not reported.

**Figure 1: Levels of Democracy before Party Ban Implementation**


Source: Authors' compilation, based on project and Freedom House data (FH 1 year before implementation).

### 3.2.2 Sample II: Ban Countries vs. Non-ban Countries

Thus far we have detected little evidence of a simple connection between party bans and conflict (as well as democracy). Does comparing 'ban countries' and 'non-ban countries' produce different results? For this purpose we introduced four conflict dummy variables – major conflicts only (Conflict I), conflict also including minor conflicts (Conflict II), termination of Conflict I, and termination of Conflict II – and tested them against the dichotomized dependent variable (country with any kind of particularistic party ban/or not). Bivariate correlation coefficients were calculated according to the scale level. In order to capture the possible impact of surrounding conditions, we also included the variables of the four clusters of intervening variables or context conditions.

At first sight, the somewhat disappointing results of the previous analysis are confirmed. None of the conflict variables is significantly connected with the independent variable. It apparently does not make a difference for conflict whether any particularistic party ban is applied or not (for detailed results see Annex II). The implementation of a party ban (regardless of legal form or reason for implementation) did not lead to the termination of an existing major conflict (see Figure 2). If we include minor conflicts, we see that in one country a conflict may have been ended.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> The country concerned is Mauritania which is not counted as a conflict case if only major conflicts are included.

**Figure 2: Implemented Party Bans and Terminations of Major Conflicts (Conflict I)**

Source: Authors' compilation, based on project and Freedom House data.

However, we find strong evidence that the prevalence of (violent) conflict and its continuation depends significantly on surrounding conditions. In particular, classical risk factors such as human development and income level in 1990, as well as major prior conflicts, are systematically connected to (ongoing) Conflict I (major conflicts only) and Conflict II (also including minor conflicts), with the signs pointing in the theoretically expected direction. Lower levels of development and higher levels of prior conflict render conflict more likely. Measures for the 'particularistic landscape' apparently affect major conflicts only. In addition to prior intrastate conflict (including latent conflicts), a larger Muslim population, a higher degree of ethnic or cultural fractionalization (according to Alesina et al. 2003 and Fearon 2003), and the number of communal contenders – according to the *Minorities at Risk* (MAR) project – seem to have an impact on (ongoing) major conflict. Only the variables regarding the existence of a minority problem and the number of groups at risk (both according to MAR) show – somewhat weaker – significant relationships with both forms of conflict. Variables regarding the political system produce fewer, but still some, significant correlations. There is some evidence that higher levels of behavioural – not ideological – polarization (that is, confrontation) in the party system are linked to conflict and its continuation. This is also true for the number of legislative multiparty elections (1990 to 2007). This may be a proxy for stability or levels of democratization, and we also find some support for the assumption that more advanced democratization – here conceptualized as an intervening variable – renders peace and conflict resolution or termination more probable.

Does this mean that party bans can be neglected in terms of the causation of conflict because surrounding conditions are much more important? Although we could not yet systematically test the interaction between all context conditions, conflict, and party bans, one finding points to the importance of party bans in terms of conflict. The legal possibility of a particularistic party ban is positively related to the prevalence of major and ongoing conflict (0,321, significant at the 5% level). It would be premature, however, to conclude that such provisions contribute to the emergence of violence; major conflict after 1990 is significantly correlated to prior conflict (at the 5% level), and thus the introduction of such a legal provision can be interpreted as a reaction to past problems.

With regard to the level of democracy, bivariate statistics and macro-qualitative comparison return no systematic connection to the application of a particularistic party ban. The levels of democracy in 1990 and 2006 measured by Freedom House (averages of political rights and civil liberties) show no significant relationships (see Annex II). The same is true if we distinguish between different types of implemented legal sanctions. Possibly, there is more evidence of positive effects when we look at the dynamics of democratization between 1990 and 2006. As illustrated by Table 8, the implementation of party bans is exclusively connected to positive developments. Yet, one should not overrate this finding: There are many countries without a party ban that show the same positive dynamics. And we should keep in mind that we could find negative dynamics in six cases when looking at periods directly related to the implementation and not the long period of 1990 to 2006, which partly coincided with the political opening up of sub-Saharan Africa. As well, the countries that implemented party bans were all rated 'not free' in 1990, except Namibia ('free') and Nigeria ('partly free'). Thus, the possibility of showing a negative dynamic was fairly small in comparison to the non-ban countries which showed higher levels of democracy in 1990.

**Table 8: Dynamics of Democratization and Implementation of Party Ban**

Direction Delta Freedom House 1990-2006	Any Particularistic Party Ban?		
	No	Yes	
<b>Negative</b>	Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia		<b>3</b>
<b>No Change</b>	Cameroon, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan		<b>4</b>
<b>Positive</b>	Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo DR, Congo Rep., Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissao, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tomé, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Togo	Burundi, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia	<b>34</b>
	<b>30</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>41</b>

Source: Authors' compilation based on project and Freedom House data.

While there is apparently no strong nexus between party bans and democracy, surrounding conditions largely return the expected results: Democracy is less likely when there are longer conflicts and when these conflicts have not yet been terminated. However, the simple prevalence of major and minor conflict after 1990 is not connected to the level of democracy in 2006. The classical risk factors for conflict also show significant relationships with democracy. The absence of prior conflict and higher human development levels in 1990, as well as higher growth rates before 1990, are significantly associated with higher levels of democracy. Interestingly, none of the variables for the particularistic landscape show significant results. Contrary to their effects on conflict, many political system variables affect the levels of democratization. In particular, less-dominant party systems and low levels of confrontation in the party system – polarization in the behavioural sense – are strongly and significantly linked to the success of democracy in 2006. In fact, polarization of the party system produces the strongest results of all variables (average polarization 1990-2001: 0,684 significant at the 1% level). Another finding refers to the possibility of a party ban. It has already proven significant for the relationship with conflict. Though only significant at the 10% level, if party bans are legally possible, it is also likely that the country is less democratic in 2006. Although we have not systematically tested the interaction of context conditions with democracy (or conflict), it should be mentioned that we indeed find that the prevalence of an implemented party ban is not independent from other context conditions. However, such variables can be seen as possible causes: We observe that party bans are typically implemented in countries which have presidential systems, were less democratic before 1990, and have a specific particularistic landscape. The variable ‘any ban implemented’ is positively and significantly linked to more Christians and less ‘Animists’ (i.e., adherents to African traditional religions) as well as a larger numbers of indigenous groups, communal contenders, and groups at risk. Remarkably, the degree of numerical ethnic polarization – that is the presence of relatively few groups – is negatively associated with the implementation of a party ban. Contrary to what would be expected, less-polarized countries are apparently more likely to ban particularistic parties.

### 3.2.3 Summary of Results

The results of our preliminary analysis can be summed up as follows: First, there is apparently no clear-cut and simple connection between the implementation of party bans on the one hand and conflict and democracy on the other. The hypotheses of strong positive and negative effects are not supported. Both the analysis of the bans and the comparison of ban and non-ban countries have not returned any significant relationship, possibly save the legal possibility of a party ban, which was not our independent variable. The only finding pointing to positive impacts may be that none of the countries which implemented a ban after 1990 showed worse Freedom House values in 2006 as compared to 1990.

Second, we find that conflict can be better explained by classical risk factors and variables describing the cultural constellation as well as some political system variables. Political system variables, particularly regarding the party system, and risk factors are strongly related to democracy.

Third, the strongest results as regards links to implemented party bans are produced when we look at variables which are possible causes of the implementation of party bans. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to look at the causes of party bans – implemented or not – a by-product of our analysis was the finding that the implementation of party bans is systematically connected to, among other things, presidentialism and features of the particularistic landscape.

Fourth, although surrounding or context conditions appear to be superior in explaining the prevalence of particularistic party bans – which supports hypotheses claiming that party bans have no impact – it would be premature to conclude that party bans have no effects at all. This is not because of methodological reasons – additional indicators for context conditions and methods allowing to control for more complex causalities have to be applied in the future – but also because of the findings from Sample I. In particular, party bans are associated with ups and downs in levels of democracy, and we have at least anecdotal evidence that in countries such as Rwanda (cf. Reyntjens 2004) and Nigeria (Bogaards 2007) party bans may be part of a larger process of politics which is certainly relevant for democracy and conflict. Determining exactly which cases show positive or negative dynamics deserves a more in-depth investigation.

#### **4 Conclusion**

Since the sweeping (re) introduction of multiparty systems at the beginning of the 1990s, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties. Particularistic party bans target different social identities such as ethnicity, religion, race and regional provenance. Other relevant characteristics of such party bans include the legal form of the action (bans/dissolution, denied registration, and suspension) and the question of whether the ban is just a possibility or actually implemented. Party bans in Africa have been largely neglected as an area of research, and this paper has engaged in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, particularistic party bans have the potential to block particularisms from entering politics, but they also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal means. Given important surrounding conditions, neutral and/or context-dependent effects on democracy and conflict are also possible. Respective hypotheses were preliminarily tested by drawing on both a database including a unique inventory on party bans and readily available data regarding conflict, democracy, and context conditions.



Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics, we have found that there is no simple connection between the implementation of party bans on the one hand and democracy and conflict on the other hand. Rather, context conditions seem of superior explanatory power. We have also found a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as causes of their implementation.

Although the results have admittedly been somewhat disappointing thus far, it would be premature to conclude that the study of the effects of party bans is superfluous. We could detect at least some evidence that points to the context-dependent impact of such bans in individual cases. Given the preliminary stage of research, many questions remain unanswered. For instance, it seems possible that it is not the actual prohibition of a particular particularistic party that has strong effects but rather the legal possibility: If all relevant actors observe the provision, a pre-emptive – and invisible – impact may emerge without any party ban being necessary. Regarding implemented bans, the interaction of party bans with context conditions is probably the most promising area of future research in theoretical terms.

Thus, the main conclusion to be drawn refers to methodological challenges. First, future analyses have to take into account invisible pre-emptive effects arising from the mere legal possibility of party bans and find ways to measure them, for instance, by comparing countries with and without these possibilities. Second, the database should be extended both in terms of additional and modified indicators. For instance, a more advanced typology of particularistic party bans including characteristics such as ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative’ measures and the general degree of ‘restrictiveness’ may help in finding more convincing relationships. Moreover, other measures of party regulation and specific measures to accommodate inter-communal relations, particularly specific features of electoral systems, should be integrated. The application of different indicators of conflict and democracy is also recommended (e.g., various additional periods of time, other democracy measures, and the exact nature and intensity of inter-communal conflict).

Third, additional and more sophisticated macro-qualitative and macro-quantitative methods such as QCA or ‘fuzzy sets’ or multivariate regressions can be applied as soon as the database allows for it. Finally, we should not confine ourselves to methods aiming at generalization. Small-N and in-depth case studies – which may also look at changes over time – will probably be the most promising tool to control complex sets of conditions and to understand and explain what impact particularistic party bans may have in individual cases.

In any case, we should know more about the actual effects of a measure of party regulation whose normative compatibility with democracy remains uncertain.

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**Annex I: List of Variables****Table I.1: Party Ban Variables**

Variable	Response Options/Scale	Source*
Any implemented particularistic party ban (IPPB)?	1 Yes 0 No	EPB
Type of legal sanction	1 Ban 2 Denial of registration 3 Suspension	EPB
Ban/dissolution of a particularistic party?	1 Yes 0 No	EPB
Official reason	1 Ethnicity 2 Religion 3 Race 4 Regionalism/ Secessionism	EPB
Denial of registration of a particularistic party?	1 Yes 0 No	EPB
Official reason	1 Ethnicity 2 Religion 3 Race 4 Regionalism/ Secessionism	EPB
Suspension of a particularistic party?	1 Yes 0 No	EPB
Official reason	1 Ethnicity 2 Religion 3 Race 4 Regionalism/ Secessionism	EPB
Particularistic party ban possible?	1 Yes 0 No	EPB

\* EPB = Ethnic Party Bans in Africa Project.

**Table I.2: Conflict Variables**

Variable	Response Options/Scale	Source*	Remarks
Time span I	In years	AKUF, UCDP	Only major conflicts (≥ 25 battle deaths)
Time span II	In years	AKUF, HIIK, UCDP	Including latent conflicts
Conflict after 1990 I	1 Yes 0 No	AKUF, UCDP	Only major conflicts (≥ 25 battle deaths)
Conflict after 1990 II	1 Yes 0 No	AKUF, HIIK, UCDP	Including latent conflicts
Delta Conflict after 1990 I	-1 Start of conflict 0 No change 1 End of conflict	AKUF, UCDP	1 year before and 1 year after implementation
Delta Conflict after 1990 II	-1 Start of conflict 0 No change 1 End of conflict	AKUF, HIIK, UCDP	1 year before and 1 year after implementation
Conflict type	1 Anti-regime 2 Autonomy 3 Others 4 Mixed 0 No conflict	AKUF	Domestic conflicts only
Conflict termination I	1 Yes 0 No	AKUF, UCDP	As of end of 2006, only major conflicts
Conflict termination II	1 Yes 0 No	AKUF, HIIK, UCDP	As of end of 2006, including latent conflicts
Conflict 1 year before implementation	0 No conflict 1 Minor conflict 2 War	UCDP	
Conflict year of implementation	0 No conflict 1 Minor conflict 2 War	UCDP	
Conflict 1 year after implementation	0 No conflict 1 Minor conflict 2 War	UCDP	
Delta Conflict 1 year before and 1 year after implementation	(-2)-(2)	UCDP	

\* AKUF = Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung,  
 UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Programme,  
 HIIK = Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung.

**Table I.3: Democracy Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Response Options/Scale</b>	<b>Source</b>
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1990	1-7	Freedom House
Freedom House 1990	1 Free 2 Partly Free 3 Not free	Freedom House
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 2006	1-7	Freedom House
Freedom House 2006	1 Free 2 Partly Free 3 Not free	Freedom House
Delta Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1990-2006	(-6)-6	Freedom House
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1980	1-7	Freedom House
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1989	1-7	Freedom House
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1 year before implementation	1-7	Freedom House
Freedom House 1 year before implementation	1 Free 2 Partly free 3 Not free	Freedom House
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1 year after implementation	1-7	Freedom House
Average Political Rights – Civil Liberties 1 year before and 1 year after denial of registration: PP	(-6)-6	Freedom House
Direction Delta Freedom House	-1 Negative 0 No change 1 Positive	Freedom House

**Table I.4: (Other) Factors Relevant for Conflict and Democracy (Risk Factors and Particularistic Landscape)**

Variable	Response Options/Scale	Source*	Remarks
Income level	Income p.c. 1990 (in Atlas Dollar)	African Development Indicators 1992	
Growth before 1990	1986-1990 (in %)	African Development Indicators 1992	
Human Development 1990	HDI 1990	HDR/UNDP 1992	
Dependency on primary commodities	Exports to GDP %	Commodity Yearbook 2003/Vol. I	
Prior conflicts I	0-	UCDP	Cumulated conflict intensity, including interstate and independence wars
Prior conflicts II	1 Yes 0 No	AKUF, HIIK, UCDP	Only intrastate conflicts, including latent conflicts
Regime stability before 1990	In years before 1990	<a href="http://africanelections.tripod.com/">http://africanelections.tripod.com/</a>	
Christians %/population	0-100	WCD (2007)	
Muslims %/population	0-100	WCD (2007)	
African traditional religion %/population	0-100	WCD (2007)	
Polarity I	1-3	GIGA	Unless one group over two thirds (1), number of groups over 25%
Religious fractionalization	0,00-1,00	Alesina et al. 2003	Constructed according to Alesina et al. 2003
Polarization Index I (three religious families)	0,00-1,00	GIGA	Constructed according to Montalvo/Reynal-Querol (2005)
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina	0,00-1,00	Alesina et al. 2003	
Ethnic fractionalisation Fearon	0,00-1,00	Fearon 2003	
Cultural fractionalization Fearon	0,00-1,00	Fearon 2003	
Ethnic fractionalization PREG	0,00-1,00	Posner 2004	
Ethnic fractionalization ELF	0,00-1,00	Posner 2004	
Ethnic polarization	0,00-1,00	Montalvo/Reynal-Querol 2005	
Minority problem?	1 Yes 0 No	Minorities at Risk	Existence of groups at risk or not
Number of Ethno-national Groups	0-	Minorities at Risk	
Number of Indigenous Groups	0-	Minorities at Risk	
Number of Ethno-class Groups	0-	Minorities at Risk	
Number of Communal contenders	0-	Minorities at Risk	
Number of Religious sects	0-	Minorities at Risk	
Number National minorities	0-	Minorities at Risk	
Number of Groups at Risk	0-	Minorities at Risk	Sum of groups of all types

\* AKUF = Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung,  
UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Programme,  
HDR = Human Development Report,  
HIIK = Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung,  
UNDP = United Nations Development Programme,  
WCD = World Christian Database.

## Definitions:

### *Types of Groups at Risk According to Minority at Risk Project*

*Ethno-national:* These are regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy and their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government, who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945.

*Indigenous:* These are conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups.

*Ethno-class:* These are ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, most of whom occupy a distinct social and economic stratum or niche.

*Communal Contenders:* These are culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in heterogeneous societies who hold or seek a share in state power. Disadvantaged communal contenders are subject to some degree of political, economic, or cultural discrimination but lack offsetting advantages. Advantaged communal contenders are those with political advantages over other groups in their society. Dominant communal contenders are those with a preponderance of both political and economic power.

*Religious Sects:* These are communal groups that differ from others principally in their religious beliefs and related cultural practices, and whose political status and activities are centred on the defence of their beliefs.

*National Minorities:* These are segments of a trans-state people with a history of organized political autonomy whose kindred control an adjacent state but who now constitute a minority in the state in which they reside.



**Table I.5: Political System Variables**

Variable	Response Options/Scale	Source*	Remarks
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) I	1 Plurality in multi-member constituencies 2 Plurality in single-member constituencies 3 Absolute majority in single/multi-member constituencies 4 Segmented systems/mixed-member proportional systems 5 Proportional representation in small constituencies 6 Proportional representation in medium and large constituencies 7 Pure proportional representation	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	Date of first election
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) II	Cf.	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	Date of last election
Year of change	Year	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	
Party system type I	1 Dominant 2 Near-dominant 3 Two-party 4 Moderate pluralism 5 Extreme pluralism	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	As at year of first election, relevant parties according to Sartori
Party system type I rec.	1 Dominant/near-dominant 2 Two-party 3 Moderate/extreme pluralism	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	As at year of first election, relevant parties according to Sartori
Party system type II	Cf.	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	As at year of first election, relevant parties according to Sartori
Party system type II rec.	Cf.	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, Hartmann 2007	As at year of first election, relevant parties according to Sartori
Total N of MP legislative elections 1990-2007	0-	Erdmann/Basedau 2007	Lower Chamber
Number of regime changes	0-	EPB	Extra-constitutional government change
Seat share winner first multiparty election 1990ff	In %	Erdmann/Basedau 2007, African Elections Database	
Seat share winner last multiparty election	In %	Erdmann/Basedau 2007	
Polarization (behavioural) first election 1990ff	0-6	EPB on the basis of Lindberg 2004	
Polarization (behavioural) last election (before 2002)	0-6	EPB on the basis of Lindberg 2004	
Average polarization score (TPS) per election (1990-2001)	0-6	EPB on the basis of Lindberg 2004	
Presidentialism score	1 Parliamentarism 2 Semi-presidentialism 3 Presidentialism	Basedau 2005, EPB	

\* EPB = Ethnic Party Bans in Africa Project.

Definitions:

### Type of Party System

*Dominant:* One party wins absolute majority in all elections.

*Near-dominant:* One party wins absolute majority in all elections but one (relative majority)

*Two-party:* two parties alternate in gaining absolute majorities.

*Moderate pluralism:* Two to four parties needed to gain absolute majorities OR no clear-cut pattern that predominantly resembles moderate pluralism.

*Extreme pluralism:* At least five parties needed to gain absolute majorities OR no clear-cut pattern that predominantly resembles extreme pluralism.

### *Polarization (Behaviourial Level between Cooperation and Confrontation)*

Sum of scores to three questions:

- 1) Did the opposition participate? Yes, all (0)  
Some parties (1)  
No (2)
- 2) Did the losers accept the results? Yes, immediately (0)  
Only some or initially not (1)  
No, not at all (2)
- 3) Was the election peaceful? Yes (0)  
Isolated violent incidents (1)  
No, not at all (2)

## Presidentialism Score

*Parliamentarism:* Chief executive is elected by parliament and can be dismissed by no-confidence vote; no directly elected president OR if yes, no executive powers.

*Semi-presidentialism*: Directly elected chief executive and prime minister depends partly on parliament; chief executive cannot independently appoint AND dismiss prime minister.

*Presidentialism:* Directly elected chief executive, no prime minister OR directly elected chief executive can independently dismiss and appoint prime minister.

**Annex II: Bivariate Statistics****Table II.1: Birivariate Statistics for 'Any Implemented Particularistic Party Ban' and Conflict Variables**

Independent Variables	Any IPPD?	Conflict after 1990 I	Conflict after 1990 II	Conflict Termination I	Conflict Termination II
<i>Party ban variables</i>					
Particularistic party ban implemented	-				
Registration refused to particularistic party	-				
Suspension of particularistic party	-				
particularistic party ban possible	-	0,321**		-0,328**	
Any IPPB?	-				
Conflict variables					
Time span I		-	-	-	-
Time span II		-	-	-	-
Conflict after 1990 I		-	-	-	-
Conflict after 1990 II		-	-	-	-
Type of conflict		-	-	-	-
Conflict termination I		-	-	-	-
Conflict termination II		-	-	-	-
<i>Democracy</i>					
Average Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) (1990)		0,317**		-0,380***	
Average PR-CL (2006)				-0,303**	-0,361**
Average PR-CL (1980)					
Average PR-CL (1989)		0,312**		-0,363**	
<i>Other risk factors</i>					
Income level		-0,270*	-0,397***	0,276*	0,402***
Growth before 1990					
Human Development 1990		-0,426***	-0,280*	0,425***	0,282*
Dependency on primary commodities					
Prior conflicts		0,365**	0,271*	-0,406***	-0,254*
Prior conflicts II		0,259*		-0,271*	
Regime stability before 1990			-0,315**		0,328**
Christians %/population	0,315**	-0,252*			
Muslims %/population		0,255*		-0,243*	
African traditional religion %/population	-0,282*				
Polarity I (1-3)					
Religious fractionalization					
Polarization index					

Independent Variables	Any IPPD?	Conflict after 1990 I	Conflict after 1990 II	Conflict Termination I	Conflict Termination II
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina		0,396***		-0,392***	
Ethnic fractionalization Fearon					
Cultural fractionalization Fearon		-0,274*		0,273*	
Ethnic fractionalization PREG					
Ethnic fractionalization ELF					
Ethnic polarization ETHPOL	-0,295*				
Minority problem		0,363**	0,505***	-0,369**	-0,507***
Number of Ethno-national Groups					-0,248*
Number of Indigenous Groups	0,282*				
Number of Ethno-class Groups					
Number of Communal-contenders	0,319*	0,332**		-0,343**	
Number of Religious sects					
Number of National minorities	No case	No case	No case	No case	No case
Number of Groups at Risk	0,342**	0,278*	0,281*	-0,292*	-0,290*
<i>Political variables</i>					
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) I		0,247*			
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) II					
Party system type I					
Party system type I rec					
Party system type II					
Party system type II rec					
Total N of MP legislative elections 1990-2007		-0,297**	0,355**	0,324**	0,396***
Number of regime changes					
Seat share winner first multiparty election 1990ff					
Seat share winner last multiparty election					
Polarization first election 1990 ff			0,290*	-0,281*	-0,315**
Polarization last election (before 2002)					
Average polarization score (TPS) per election (1990-2001)					-0,265*
Presidentialism score	0,316**				

Significances: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10% (Pearson's r and Spearman-Rho), (-) not calculated.

**Table II.2: Bivariate Statistics for Democracy Level and Change**

Independent Variables	Any IPPB? <sup>1</sup>	Arithmetic Mean PR-CL 2006
<i>Party ban variables</i>		
Particularistic party ban implemented	-	
Registration refused to particularistic party	-	
Suspension of particularistic party	-	
Particularistic party ban possible	-	0,244*
Any IPPB?	-	
<i>Conflict variables</i>		
Time span I		0,296**
Time span II		0,244*
Conflict after 1990 I		
Conflict after 1990 II		0,237*
Type of conflict		
Conflict termination I		-0,303**
Conflict termination II		-0,361**
<i>Democracy</i>		
Average PR-CL (1990)		0,512***
Average PR-CL (2006)		
Delta Average PR-CL (1990-2006)		-0,690***
Average PR-CL (1980)		0,263*
Average PR-CL (1989)		0,424***
Delta Average PR-CL (1980-1989)	-0,320**	0,090*
<i>Other risk factors</i>		
Income level		
Growth before 1990		-0,354**
Human Development 1990		-0,354**
Dependency on primary commodities		
Prior conflicts		0,345**
Prior conflicts II		0,339**
Regime stability before 1990		
Christians %/population	0,315**	
Muslims %/population		
African traditional religion %/population	-0,282*	
Polarity I (1-3)		
Religious fractionalization		

Independent Variables	Any IPPB? <sup>1</sup>	Arithmetic Mean PR-CL 2006
Polarization index		
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina		
Ethnic fractionalization Fearon		
Cultural fractionalization Fearon		
Ethnic fractionalization PREG		
Ethnic fractionalization ELF		
Ethnic polarization ETHPOL	-0,295*	
Minority problem		
Number of Ethno-national Groups		
Number of Indigenous Groups	0,282*	
Number of Ethno-class Groups		
Number of Communal contenders	0,319*	
Number of Religious sects		
Number of National minorities	No case	No case
Number of Groups at Risk	0,342**	
<i>Political variables</i>		
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) I		
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) II		
Party system type I		
Party system type I rec		-0,306**
Party system type II		
Party system type II rec		-0,264*
Total N of MP legislative elections 1990-2007		-0,595***
Number of regime changes		
Seat share winner first multiparty election 1990ff		
Seat share winner last multiparty election		
Polarization first election 1990 ff		0,643***
Polarization last election (before 2002)		0,550***
Average polarization score (TPS) per election (1990-2001)		0,684***
Presidentialism score	0,316**	0,315**

<sup>1</sup> Reported to facilitate comparison.

Significances: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10% (Pearson's r and Spearman-Rho), (-) not calculated.

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