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Labor Supply and Child Care Choices in a Rationed Child Care Market

Katharina Wrohlich*

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This is a substantially revised version of DIW DP No. 570 (2006).

Abstract: This paper presents an empirical framework for the analysis of mothers' labor supply and child care choices, explicitly taking into account access restrictions to subsidized child care. This is particularly important for countries such as Germany, where subsidized child care is rationed and private child care is only available at considerably higher cost. I use a discrete choice panel data model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity to simultaneously estimate labor supply and the demand for child care of German mothers with at least one child under the age of seven years. The model can be used to evaluate different kinds of policy reforms, such as changes in the availability or costs of child care. Results from the illustrating policy simulations show that targeting public expenditures at an extension of child care slots has greater effects on maternal employment than a reduction of parents' fees to existing slots.

Keywords: child care, labor supply, discrete choice, panel study, Germany

JEL-classification: J22, J13, C35

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1 Introduction

The influence of costs and availability of child care on mothers' employment has long been of interest to politicians and researchers alike. In the US, the effect of child care costs on mothers' labor supply has been studied already in the 1970s and 1980s.¹ More recently, the joint estimation of labor supply and child care choices using structural models² prevailed as the analytical framework to estimate the effects of child care costs on mothers' employment and the demand for child care. This approach has also been used to study the effect of child care costs on mothers' labor supply in European countries.³ While in the US, child care costs and quality seem to be in the center of the child care policy debate, the major concern in most European countries is availability and accessibility of child care. The differing public debate reflects differences in the child care market: In contrast to the US, child care centers are highly regulated and highly subsidized in continental Europe, leading to child care slots of high and homogenous quality in subsidized facilities at low parents' fees on the one hand, but shortages and access restrictions to these facilities on the other hand. In most of the European countries, a private market of center-based child care hardly exists. Parents who do not have access to center-based care, therefore have to rely on informal care arrangements or privately organized day care that comes at relatively high cost.

Thus, for the analysis of labor supply and child care choices in a country like Germany, that is characterized by low parents' fees and at the same time low availability of center-based child care, the modeling of access restrictions to child care is crucial. I estimate mothers' labor supply and child care choices jointly on the basis of a structural utility model. Drawing on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a discrete choice panel model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is estimated. Access restrictions to center-based child care are explicitly taken into account within the households' budget constraint: I argue that also families who are restricted in the access to center-based child care have the option of non-parental child care in the form of privately organized care that comes at considerably higher cost. Following this,

¹See, among others Heckman (1974) and Blau and Robins (1988).

²See, among others Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992), Ribar (1995) or Powell (2002).

³Examples are Duncan, Paull, and Taylor (2001) and Parera-Nicolau and Mumford (2005) for the UK, Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) for Sweden, Chone, le Blanc, and Robert-Bobee (2003) for France, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) for Italy, Lokshin (2004) for Russia and Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) for Norway.

I model access restrictions to subsidized child care slots in the budget constraint by increasing child care costs to the price of "private market" child care for families who are restricted. Thus, the model can be used to analyze the influence of wages, child care costs and availability of subsidized child care on mothers' labor supply decisions and on the demand for child care.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it suggests a methodological framework for the analysis of labor supply and child care choices in the presence of access restrictions to child care, which might be of use also for studies on other countries facing similar problems. Second, it contributes empirical findings on the elasticities of the demand for child care and mothers' labor supply with respect to wages and child care costs in Germany. I also address the issue of the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumption of the availability of informal unpaid care arrangements within a detailed sensitivity analysis. Third, the model developed in this paper can be used to evaluate the effects of child care policy reforms such as changes in the parents' fees or the supply of subsidized slots on mothers' working hours and the demand for child care. Results from the illustrating policy simulations show that targeting public expenditures at increasing the supply of subsidized child care for children with working mothers is more effective in increasing mothers' labor supply than a reduction of parents' fees to existing slots.

2 Institutional setting and stylized facts

Germany constitutes a prototype example of a conservative welfare state regime. Its labor market and social policy institutions, as well as the income tax system have long been following the "male breadwinner model". This model is also reflected in a whole range of other family policy institutions: For example, family support within the income tax puts a strong weight on horizontal redistribution through measures such as the income splitting for married partners or the child tax allowance. Families following the "male breadwinner model" are supported through the income tax system and other benefits, such as the parental leave benefit, at least in the form that has been in existence until the end of 2006. ⁴ On the other hand, the needs of two-earner

⁴In 2007, a new parental leave benefit scheme has been introduced that replaces forgone income due to child care for as much as 67% of net earnings before birth. This benefit is granted for 12

families have long been neglected, which is reflected by the low provision of child care for children under three years and afternoon care for children of all age groups.

Germany's child care "market" is characterized by low parents' fees and at the same time low availability of center-based child care, in particular for children under three years. In 2002, there were only 3 slots in child care centers available per 100 children in this age group in west Germany. In east Germany, where availability of child care is traditionally higher, there were 36 slots per 100 children of the same age group in 2002. For children between 3 years and school age (usually 6 years), part-time care is available in almost all parts of Germany.⁵ It is important to stress that more than 95 percent of all child care centers are subsidized in Germany. The parents' fees that are charged by child care facilities are related to family income and make up only 30 percent of total costs on average. Thus, in an international comparison of child care expenditures, Germany usually ranks among the countries with the lowest private costs for child care.⁶ However, the low availability of subsidized child care slots leads to potentially high actual child care costs. While the average parents' fee for a full-time slot in a subsidized child care facility is about 110 Euro per month, private child care provided by a nanny or a babysitter costs more than 800 Euro per month. This explains the low utilization of private child care. Only 3 percent of all children under 3 years are in private child care, for the other age groups, utilization of this form of care is even lower (see Table 1).

In addition to these institutional characteristics, several other empirical findings have to be considered: First, we observe many children in Germany who attend a child care center at least part of the day even though their mothers are not working. As Table 1 shows, about one third of all mothers whose youngest child is in child care is not working. For mothers whose youngest child is between 3 and 6 years and in child care, the non-participation rate is even 39 percent. The reason for this is that (at least part-time) care for children aged 3 - 6 is seen as preschool education and not so much as a means to provide the possibilities for both parents to work. Moreover, peers' interactions in the absence of siblings might be another reason for this empirical finding. On the other hand, we observe working mothers who are not purchasing child

months or maximum 14 months if both parents share parental leave. Another option is to take half of the benefit for two years. For more details on this reform, see Spiess and Wrohlich (2008).

⁵Availability of full-time slots, however, is limited also for this older age group of children.

⁶See for example Immervoll and Barber (2006) for an international comparison of child care costs.

care - neither center-based nor private child care. Instead, they rely on informal care arrangements such as unpaid care by relatives. These unpaid care arrangements seem to play an important role in Germany, as can also be seen from Table 1. The third empirical finding that has to be considered when estimating maternal labor supply and demand for child care in the German context is that subsidized child care is rationed in many regions for children under 3 years. Wrohlich (2008) has shown that more than a third of all children under 3 years do not have access to center-based child care, although their parents would demand this form of child care.

Table 1: Different forms of child care and maternal employment in Germany

Child Care Utilization			
Age of child	Paid child care: center-based	Paid child care: private care	Regular unpaid child care ^a
0-2 years	10%	3%	35%
3-6 years	79%	1%	44%
7-10 years	7%	1%	34%
Employment of Mothers(All)			
Age of youngest child	Not working	Full-time working	Part-time working
0-2 years	70%	8%	22%
3-6 years	43%	13%	44%
7-10 years	31%	17%	52%
Employment of Mothers with youngest child in paid child care			
Age of youngest child	Not working	Full-time working	Part-time working
0-2 years	31%	31%	38%
3-6 years	39%	15%	46%
7-10 years	29%	20%	51%
Employment of Mothers with youngest child not in paid child care			
Age of youngest child	Not working	Full-time working	Part-time working
0-2 years	75%	5%	20%
3-6 years	55%	8%	37%
7-10 years	32%	16%	52%

^a *Question in the questionnaire:* "Are there additionally (to the utilization of child care facilities and paid nannies) other persons outside the household who regularly watch or take care of your children?" Unfortunately, there is no information on hours and frequency of these care arrangements in the SOEP.

Source: SOEP, wave 2002. All numbers refer to the whole sample of mothers in the SOEP, including single mothers and mothers with non-working partners.

3 The Behavioural Model

3.1 The Mothers' Choice Set

Mothers' labor supply and child care choices are estimated on the basis of a structural utility model using discrete choice technique. Both, mother's working hours and child care hours are modeled as categorical rather than as metric variables. As far as

working hours are concerned, this form of modeling takes into account the fact that hours of work are heavily concentrated at particular points. Further, the specification of a relatively small number of hours categories leads to a substantial reduction in computational burden, as the budget set has to be calculated for a few selected points only. This simplification is in fact a prerequisite for an adequate specification of the budget set given the complexities and the non-linearities induced by the German tax-benefit system. This is important for the purpose of the estimation of women's labor supply, since the joint income taxation of married couples or eligibility to means-tested benefits may result in high marginal tax rates for women from low working hours on. The reason to model child care hours as a discrete variable is that usually, German child care centers offer either part-time or full-time care.

In the following analysis, I consider two-parent families with the father working full-time. The reason to drop two-parent families with a non full-time working father is to keep the model simple: For mothers with a full-time working partner, regular child care by the father during working hours is not available.⁷

The choice set of a mother in my model consists of combinations of 4 working hours categories and 3 categories of paid child care. The working hours categories include non-participation, full-time work, part-time work or marginal employment. For mothers who have access to unpaid child care arrangements, there are three possible child care choices for each working hours category: no paid child care, full-time or part-time paid child care. Implicitly, it is assumed that in the case that mother's working hours are greater than zero but no paid child care is used, the family makes use of unpaid, informal care. In the data set I will use for the estimation, it is not possible to distinguish between maternal and other informal unpaid child care. Therefore it is assumed that in the categories where the mother is not working, maternal care is the primary child care choice, whereas in categories in which the mother's working hours are greater than zero and paid care is not observed, informal care is used at the amount of the mother's working hours. Further, it is assumed that a mother cannot work and care for the child herself at the same time.

Mothers who do not have access to unpaid care opportunities, have a restricted choice set: These mothers have to purchase child care for the hours of their market

⁷In the data set that will be used for the empirical analysis, two-parent families with a not full-time working father make up 10 percent of all families whose youngest child is less than 7 years.

work. Thus, the choice set following from this time constraint consists of 8 categories, including no market work/no child care, no market work/part-time or full-time child care, marginal work/part-time or full-time child care, part-time work/part-time or full-time child care and full-time work/full-time child care.

It should be noted that the assumption concerning the availability of unpaid care by someone else than the parents is a controversial one. Previous studies have dealt with this problem in different ways. While some authors (such as Blau and Robins (1988), Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992), Ribar (1995), Blau and Hagy (1998) and Lokshin (2004)) explicitly assume that free care is available for all mothers, others (such as Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) and Kornstad and Thoresen (2007)) stress that this assumption is unrealistic. In the latter studies, employment of mothers always implies that child care has to be purchased. As the descriptive data for Germany show, almost 20 percent of mothers are observed to be working but not using paid center-based or private child care for their children.⁸ However, assuming that this possibility exists for all households, is unlikely to be a realistic representation of their care opportunities. Thus, I decided to restrict the choice set for households who do not have access to these unpaid arrangements. This information is not directly asked in the SOEP data set. As a proxy indicator I use a information from the question “*Are there additionally (to the utilization of child care facilities and paid nannies) other persons outside the household who regularly watch or take care of your children?*” Mothers who answer that relatives or friends regularly care for their children, are assumed to have access to unpaid care arrangements, while the others have not.

As I will show in more detail, the assumption concerning the availability of unpaid care arrangements significantly affects estimation results. More details can be found in the sensitivity analysis in section 5.

3.2 The Maximization Problem

The mother’s utility U is assumed to depend on disposable household income y , her leisure time l , ”child quality” Q , and a vector of demographic characteristics such as age and number of children (D), formally

⁸There is also a recent paper by Bick (2010) showing that there is a weak linkage between labor market participation and use of center-based child care for mothers of young children in Germany.

$$U = u(y, l, Q; D) \quad (1)$$

The "quality" of a child (Q)⁹ depends on the hours of maternal care m , hours of paid (formal) child care p and hours of unpaid (informal) child care¹⁰ up ,

$$Q = q(m, p, up) \quad (2)$$

Note that the "child quality" Q is only defined for the youngest child. For simplification, it is assumed that in the case that more than one child is living in the household, all children have the same values of maternal, formal and informal care, which are those of the youngest child. It is assumed that all forms of paid child care - center-based and privately organized child care - lead to the same utility for the mother.

The utility index should be concave in household income and in the mother's leisure time, i.e.

$$\frac{\partial U(.)}{\partial y} > 0 \quad ; \quad \frac{\partial^2 U(.)}{\partial y^2} < 0 \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{\partial U(.)}{\partial l} > 0 \quad ; \quad \frac{\partial^2 U(.)}{\partial l^2} < 0 \quad (4)$$

As far as the expected sign of these derivatives with respect to paid and unpaid child care are concerned, the theoretical predictions are not clear. It cannot be derived from economic theory whether mothers consider non-parental child care as a normal good or whether it constitutes a "bad" that is necessary in order to generate income through employment. Thus,

$$\frac{\partial U(.)}{\partial p} = ? \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{\partial U(.)}{\partial up} = ? \quad (6)$$

⁹The utility function specified in this paper is similar to the one used by Blau and Hagy (1998), although in contrast to them, I do not explicitly model quality characteristics of paid child care. Formal child care facilities are strictly regulated in Germany as far as measurable quality characteristics such as staff/child ratio, other equipment and education of staff are concerned.

¹⁰In the following, I will use the terms formal and paid child care as synonyms. The same applies to the terms informal and unpaid child care. Strictly speaking, this is not correct, since informal child care can also be paid for, e.g. in the case of babysitters, whereas formal child care can be free of charge, as it is the case for many low income families in Germany who live in communities who have an income-dependent fee scheme to child care facilities. For simplification, in my model, the term "formal" includes all sorts of paid child care, either in facilities (subsidized or private) or home-based, as well as care in facilities that is for free, whereas "informal" only includes non-institutional, unpaid care arrangements.

The household’s budget constraint, i.e. its disposable income y , can be formally written as

$$y = t(h \cdot w, Z) - ec \cdot p \quad (7)$$

where $t(\cdot)$ denotes the tax-transfer function, h hours of market work, w the mother’s wage rate and Z income from other sources than the mother’s wage income. ec denotes expected costs of child care and p is hours of paid child care. Disposable household income, which is a function of mother’s market and non-market income and the tax-benefit system, is calculated for all possible choice categories using the tax-benefit simulation model STSM (see section 4).

In the previous literature, the prevalent measure of child care costs has been the expenses reported by families who are actually using child care or official statistics about average parents’ fees for child care slots.¹¹ However, using these concepts, child care costs are only measured appropriately for households who have access to a child care slot when they are demanding one. For households facing access restrictions to child care slots, this measure is not appropriate. For these households the demand for child care cannot be estimated on the basis of the subsidized parents’ fees (see also Gustafsson and Stafford (1992)). In two recent studies for Russia and Norway, access restrictions to formal child care have been modeled by restricting the choice set of those households who report to be restricted (Lokshin (2004) and Kornstad and Thoresen (2007)). This implies that for families who report to be restricted, the option of paid child care is not available at all. Similarly, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) in their study on Italy restrict the choice set of families according to a simulated probability that families are restricted in the access to center-based child care. In contrast to this, I model rationing of child care explicitly in the families’ budget constraint. I will assume that rationing occurs only with respect to subsidized child care, not with child care on the ”private market”, i.e. child care by nannies or babysitters. This follows the argument that at some (potentially very high) price, each family could find a person who would look after the children. ”Expected costs of child care” are thus calculated as weighted average of parents’ fees to subsidized slots and the price of privately organized care, where the weights are chosen to reflect the probability of

¹¹See one of the few German studies by Merkle (1994).

being restricted with respect to subsidized care. Formally, expected costs of child care ec consist of the parents' fee for a subsidized child care slot c^s and a market (non-subsidized) price for child care charged by a nanny c^{ns} , weighted by the probability to get a child care slot π and $1 - \pi$, respectively.

$$ec = c^s \cdot \pi + c^{ns} \cdot (1 - \pi) \quad (8)$$

Section 4.3 explains in more detail how the components c^s , c^{ns} and π of equation 8 are computed.

The time constraint of mothers who have access to unpaid care arrangements can be written as

$$h + m + l = m + p + up = T \quad (9)$$

This equation states that a mother can allocate her time to three activities, which are market work h , maternal child care m and pure leisure l . Since a child has to be cared for over the whole day, hours of maternal care m , paid care p and unpaid (informal) care up must add up to T , which is the total time per week available. I assume that unpaid care does not exceed working hours of the mother. In other words, unpaid care is the residual in the case that working hours of the mother exceed hours of paid care, i.e.

$$up = \max(h - p, 0) \quad (10)$$

From equations 9 and 10, it follows that the mother's pure leisure¹² only takes on positive values in the case that paid child care hours exceed the mother's market work hours, i.e. $p > h$.

For families without access to unpaid child care opportunities, the time constraint from equation 9 changes to

$$h + m + l = m + p = T \quad (11)$$

¹²Household activities other than child care are not explicitly modeled. Thus, "pure leisure" might include household activities that a mother undertakes while the child(ren) is(are) cared for by another person. To be more precise, the term "pure leisure" in the context of this model defines non-market work time without children.

The time constraint of the mother is the same as in the unrestricted case, however the time of the child can now only be spent with the mother (m) or in paid child care (p). From this, it follows that the mother's market work and leisure together cannot exceed the hours that the youngest child spends in paid child care. The choice categories following this model include those from the unrestricted model (see Table 2) except categories 1,2,3 and 8.

Substituting equations 2, 7 and 9 or 11 into the utility function as stated in equation 1 yields the mother's maximization problem

$$\max_{h,f} u = u\{[t(h \cdot w, Z) - ec \cdot p], (T - h - m), Q(m, p, up); D\} \quad (12)$$

subject to the additional constraint stated in 10 and non-negativity of the choice variables.

Table 2 shows the values of the choice variables (market work and paid child care) and the values of the variables that are given by the constraints (unpaid care, maternal care and pure leisure), when the total time available T is normalized to 80.

Table 2: Values of market work, pure leisure and hours of childcare by choice category

Choice Category	Working hours (h)	Paid child-care (p)	Unpaid childcare (up)	Maternal care (m)	Pure leisure (l)
1	0	0	0	80	0
2	8	0	8	72	0
3	20	0	20	60	0
4	37	0	37	43	0
5	0	20	0	60	20
6	8	20	0	60	12
7	20	20	0	60	0
8	37	20	17	43	0
9	0	37	0	43	37
10	8	37	0	43	29
11	20	37	0	43	17
12	37	37	0	43	0

Source: Own calculation.

3.3 Econometric Specification

The parameters of the utility function as described in equation 12 are estimated using a discrete choice model. Estimation is based on the mothers' utility comparisons of

the different choice categories in every period. I assume that the terms of the "child quality" function linearly enter the utility function as stated in equation 12. The utility function itself is assumed to have a quadratic form. Thus, the utility index U of mother i for a particular working/child care hours category k at time period t can be stated as follows:

$$U_{ikt} = V_{ikt} + \epsilon_{ikt} = X'_{ikt}\beta + X'_{ikt}AX_{ikt} + \epsilon_{ikt} \quad (13)$$

with

$$X_{ikt} = (p_{ikt}, up_{ikt}, l_{ikt}, y_{ikt})' \quad (14)$$

The components of X_{ikt} are disposable household income y , the mother's pure leisure time l , hours of paid and unpaid care p and hours of unpaid care up , which all vary by household (i), choice category (k) and time period (t). ϵ_{ikt} is an unobserved error term that is assumed to follow an extreme value distribution and to be independently distributed over time, households and choice categories. Matrix A contains the coefficients of the quadratic terms and the cross terms. Vector β contains the coefficients of the linear terms. Preferences are allowed to vary across mothers through taste shifters of the linear terms of paid child care. In addition to the variation of choices across households that can be explained by differences in the levels of income and its interactions with demographic variables, there are many other sources of heterogeneity, in particular differences in the access to paid and unpaid child care and differences in attitudes towards these forms of child care, which are unobserved. I will account for this unobserved heterogeneity by letting the preference parameter on the linear term of hours of paid child care, β_p vary across households:

$$\beta_{pi} = \alpha_p^0 + D'\alpha_p^1 + \nu_i \quad (15)$$

where D is a column vector including age of the mother, number of children less than three years, number of children between 3 and 6 years, region of residence and a dummy variable indicating whether the mother holds a university degree. Following Heckman and Singer (1984), it is assumed that ν can be described by an arbitrary discrete probability distribution G with a small number of mass points $M^r, \forall r (r = 1, 2, \dots, R)$ and corresponding probabilities τ^r , where

$$E(\nu) = \sum_{r=1}^R \tau^r M^r = 0 \quad (16)$$

and

$$\sum_{r=1}^R \tau^r = 1 \quad (17)$$

Mass points and their probabilities are jointly estimated with the parameters of the model using maximum likelihood. The estimation is based on the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated to the explanatory variables. Since β_{p_i} is not known to the researcher, the unconditional probability P_{ikt} has to be estimated using

$$P_{ikt} = \sum_{r=1}^R \tau^r (M^r) \frac{\exp(V_{ikt})}{\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(V_{ijt})}; \quad k \in J \quad (18)$$

Since I observe many households in more than one period, the individual likelihood contribution is

$$L_i = \sum_{r=1}^R \tau^r (M^r) \prod_{t=1}^{T_i} \prod_{j=1}^J \left(\frac{\exp(V_{ikt})}{\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(V_{ijt})} \right)^{d_{ikt}}; \quad k \in J \quad (19)$$

where d_{ikt} is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 if the household i chooses category k in time period t and 0 otherwise.

This model is estimated using an unbalanced panel. Households are observed 1, 2 or 3 periods. In addition to cross-section variation, variation over time in disposable income comes from various sources. First, since child care costs are a decreasing function of a child's age, disposable household income changes due to the fact that children grow older every year. Second, in the observed period from 2000 - 2002, several reforms have been implemented that also lead to variation in disposable household income, such as the German tax reform (see Haan and Steiner (2005)), and a reform of the child benefit, which has been increased in 2001.

4 Description of the Data

The model described above is estimated on three waves (2001 - 2003) of the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative sample of households living in Germany with detailed information on household incomes, working hours and

household structure.¹³ While there is information on formal child care utilization in all waves, the 2002 wave also includes detailed information on child care expenditures.

4.1 Sample Characteristics

The sample used for the analysis in this paper is constrained to married or cohabiting couples with at least one child aged up to 6 years and not yet enrolled in school. Single mothers and two-parent families in which the father is working less than full-time are excluded. The reason for this restriction is to keep the child care possibilities simple. In the case that the father is working full-time, it seems plausible to assume that he cannot provide part-time or full-time child care.¹⁴ Households with self-employed mothers, mothers who are still in education or training or are severely disabled are also dropped. This gives a sample size of 1495 households, of which 548 are observed in one wave, 411 are observed in two waves and 536 are observed in three waves. In total, this adds up to 2978 observations.

Table 7 in Appendix 1 shows some basic descriptive statistics, such as the distribution of households across categories and the corresponding average number of children as well as the age of the youngest child. More than a third of all households are observed in the category with no child care and zero working hours of the mother. As expected, in this category the average age of the youngest child (1.5 years) is lower than in all other categories, while the average number of children per household (2.1) is high. In all categories with paid child care hours, the average age of the youngest child is three years or older.

4.2 Net Household Income

Net household income is calculated for the actual working hours category and simulated for alternative hours categories on the basis of the microsimulation model STSM.¹⁵ This tax-benefit model contains the main features of the German tax and transfer system. The calculation of taxable income is based on information on earnings from dependent employment, income from capital, property rents and other income. For

¹³For more information on the SOEP, see <http://www.diw.de/english/sop/>.

¹⁴Dropping all families in which the father is not working full-time reduces the number of observations by 10 percent.

¹⁵For a detailed documentation of the STSM, see Steiner, Wrohlich, Haan, and Geyer (2008).

most households, earnings from dependent employment is the most important source of income. These earnings are calculated by multiplying gross hourly wages by the respective working hours in each category.

For non-working individuals gross wages cannot be observed. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate their expected gross hourly wage. I estimate a Mincer wage equation with selection effects using information of the working population and interpret the predicted hourly wages of non-working individuals as the mean of the distribution of offered wages. As is standard in the literature, I use non-labor income, health indicators and presence of young children as exclusion restrictions.¹⁶ The wage estimation is performed separately for East and West Germany. Estimation results are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix.

Gross household income is the sum of all income components of all household members. Taxable income is calculated by deducting child allowances and other expenses from gross household income. The income tax is computed by applying the income tax formula to the individual incomes of unmarried spouses; for married spouses, income is taxed jointly, with an income splitting factor of 2. Income tax and social security contributions are deducted from gross income, and social transfers such as child benefits, child-rearing benefits, unemployment compensation, housing benefits and social assistance are added to get net household income.¹⁷

4.3 Child Care Costs

From this net household income, expected child care costs as stated in equation 8 are deducted according to the child care category in order to calculate the household's disposable income. The monthly parents' fees for center-based child care (c^s) are estimated on the basis of a Tobit model, since about 10 percent of parents do not have to pay for center-based child care.¹⁸ Explanatory variables include the age of the child,

¹⁶In particular, the presence of young children is a critical exclusion restriction since those with young children might be non-working due to rationing of childcare. In a robustness check I have estimated the wage equation without including presence of children in the selection equation, and find that results do not change.

¹⁷STSM uses retrospective information of income components in order to compute net household incomes for a given year. Thus, the incomes computed on basis of the SOEP waves 2001-2003 are in fact incomes for the years 2000-2002.

¹⁸Some authors of US studies argue that child care expenditures as a measure of child care costs are potentially endogenous given that they might not only measure utilization but also quality, see Ribar (1995). However, in Germany the costs for subsidized child care vary much more with the income of

number of siblings in center-based care, regional variables and net household income. Since detailed information on child care expenses are only available for the year 2002, the estimated coefficients are used in order to predict the parents' fees for 2001 and 2003. Furthermore, these fees are predicted for each household for all working hours categories since the fees vary with net household income. The results of this estimation as well as predicted values are shown in Tables 16 and 18 in Appendix 2.

The costs of private child care (c^{ns}) cannot be estimated on the basis of the SOEP data, since only very few families are observed to use this sort of child care. Therefore, I set the market price of child care at 5 Euro per hour for all households, which seems to be the national average of the price charged by nannies in 2002 (see Beblo et al. (2005)).

The individual probability of getting a slot in a child care facility (π) is estimated on the basis of a partial observability model. This is necessary since the SOEP data only provide information on utilization of center-based child care and not on its actual demand. In the presence of rationing, it is not known whether families who are not observed to use center-based child care do not demand this form of child care or they demand it but are not offered a slot. On the basis of a partial observability model, demand and supply of child care can be disentangled. The partial observability model used here has been developed in Wrohlich (2008) and is a bivariate probit model where the dependent variable is utilization of center-based care. This is the joint outcome of the unobserved variables demand and supply of center-based child care. Explanatory variables for the demand for child care include characteristics of the child (e.g. age), the mother (education, nationality, age) and the household (number of siblings in child care centers, number of adult persons, region etc.). The individual probability to be offered a child care slot is assumed to depend on the regional availability of child care slots¹⁹ as well as child and household characteristics. In addition to these exclusion restrictions, identification is based on the assumption that children who have been in a child care center already the year before are not restricted in the current year. The likelihood function of this model and estimation results can be found in the Appendix. Using the estimated coefficients, it is possible to predict the individual probability that

the parents (because of the income-contingent fee structure) than by quality. Thus, endogeneity of child care expenses is not an issue in this context.

¹⁹Regional availability is defined as number of slots per 100 children in the particular age group. This information is available on county level (there are 440 counties in Germany).

a child is restricted in the access to center-based child care, which is the probability parents demand child care for a child but are not offered a slot. These probabilities are used as weights $(1 - \pi)$ in equation 8. As can be seen from Table 18 in Appendix 2, the average probability that families whose youngest child is under three years is rationed amounts to 0.37, while families whose youngest child is between three and six years are rationed only with a probability of 0.10. Average fees to center-based child care and average expected child care costs are also shown in Appendix 2, illustrating by how much the expected costs of child care differ from parents' fees that subsidized institutions charge.

After expected child care costs are calculated for every child, the sum over child care costs for all children in the household is subtracted from net household income according to child care hours. Table 8 in Appendix 1 lists net household incomes for all choice categories before and after deducting child care costs. This table shows how child care costs affect work incentives for secondary earners with young children in Germany.

If a mother who has a child under three years starts working, net household income on average increases by 173 Euro in the case of marginal employment (8 hours per week), by 426 Euro in the case of part-time employment (20 hours per week) and by 823 Euro per month if she takes up full-time work. These relatively low net income gains from employment reflect the high marginal tax rates that are induced by joint income taxation of married couples and by the withdrawal of social transfers in the case of single mothers. If child care has to be purchased for the time the mother is working, net household income can hardly be increased by taking up employment. If a mother whose youngest child is less than three years takes up a full-time job and has to purchase full-time child care, disposable income of the family only increases by 343 Euro per month. For families whose youngest child is between three and six years, child care costs are considerably lower. On average, disposable income increases by 529 Euro per month in the case that a mother takes up a full-time job and needs to buy full-time child care.

5 Results

5.1 Estimation Results

The coefficients of the estimated model described in section 3 are shown in Table 3. The coefficients of the variables can be interpreted as effects on the mother’s utility. However, the interpretation of these coefficients is not straight-forward due to the large number of interaction terms. Calculating first and second derivatives of the utility function with respect to income, leisure, paid and unpaid child care, thus is more informative as far as the plausibility of the estimation results is concerned. The model yields results that are in line with predictions based on theoretical considerations: The first derivatives of the utility function with respect to income and leisure are positive for all households. The second derivatives of these variables are all negative. Thus, the conditions of the theoretical model such as derived in equation 3 are fulfilled.

The first derivative of the utility function with respect to formal child care is positive for about 25 percent of all households, for the other 75 percent it is negative. A more disaggregate analysis shows that for the majority of households in east Germany, the first derivative is positive. For mothers whose youngest child is older than three years, this derivative is positive for almost 50 percent of all households. The first derivative of unpaid (informal) child care is negative for all households. These results suggest that some households consider paid child care to be a good, whereas other households consider paid child care as a “bad”, i.e. having a negative influence on the mothers’ utility. Unpaid child care seems to have a negative influence on the mothers’ utility in all cases. This reflects the fact that either parents do not consider informal child care of being of the same quality as formal child care, or that there are some costs associated with this form of child care that are not measured in the budget constraint. As Averett, Peters, and Waldman (1997) point out, these costs might be for example time costs of future obligations incurred in trade for child care services.

A comparison with estimation results of a model without unobserved heterogeneity shows that unobserved heterogeneity is present in this model. The Akaike Information Criterion is larger for the model with unobserved heterogeneity than for the one without unobserved heterogeneity.²⁰ For the distribution of β_p , two mass points could be

²⁰I also estimated several models with different specifications of unobserved heterogeneity, such

identified.²¹ The corresponding probabilities can be interpreted as respective shares of groups of households in the population. There is one large group for whom the coefficient of formal child care hardly changes, however for the smaller group, the positive effect of formal child care on utility is much larger than for the other group.

Table 3: Estimation Results

Explanatory Variables	Model with unobserved heterogeneity		Model without unobserved heterogeneity	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
net income	0.2250	0.0262	0.2156	0.0286
net income squared	0.0001	0.0004	0.0002	0.0004
leisure	-0.0010	0.0110	-0.0022	0.0112
leisure squared	-0.0004	0.0002	-0.0003	0.0002
paid childcare	0.0061	0.0092	0.0430	0.0115
paid childcare squared	-0.0014	0.0001	-0.0025	0.0002
unpaid childcare	-0.1235	0.0131	-0.1226	0.0136
unpaid childcare squared	0.0015	0.0002	0.0016	0.0002
unpaid childcare * youngest child < 3 years	-0.0878	0.0038	-0.1151	0.0056
paid childcare * east Germany	0.0619	0.0046	0.0657	0.0006
paid childcare * German nationality	0.0088	0.0005	0.0139	0.0007
paid childcare * single mother	0.0092	0.0060	0.0071	0.0080
paid care * mother holds university degree	0.0309	0.0055	0.0359	0.0076
net income * leisure	0.0008	0.0002	0.0008	0.0003
net income * paid childcare	-0.0005	0.0002	-0.0003	0.0002
net income * unpaid childcare	-0.0012	0.0003	-0.0012	0.0003
Probabilities and locations of random effects				
location of mass point 1 (M^1) ^a	0.1220	0.0132		
log-odd of probability 1 ^b	-1.7613	0.2158		
log likelihood	-4990.9261		-4728.8779	
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) ^c	9386.3156		9489.7558	
number of observations	2978			
number of households	1495			

^a The location of the second mass point can be calculated using the formula $M^2 = -\frac{M^1 \cdot \tau_1}{\tau_2}$ and amounts to -0.0209.

^b The two corresponding probabilities, τ_1 and τ_2 are 0.1466 and 0.8534.

^c AIC is calculated as $-2 * (\log - \text{likelihood}) + 2 * p$ where p is the number of parameters of the model. *Source:* Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2001-2003.

Since child care institutions and other family policy measures affect families with children below three years and those with children aged three to six in very different ways, pooling both groups in one model might not be adequate. However, as the results of separate estimations presented in Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix 1 show, the findings are the same as those obtained from the pooled model.

A comparison of actual and predicted share of mothers within each choice category as a parametric specification of the random term of formal child care and both a parametric and a semi-parametric specification of a random term on net income. All these specifications lead to very similar results as the ones reported here.

²¹In a model with three mass points, convergence of the likelihood function could not be achieved.

Table 4: Actual and Predicted Frequencies of Choice Categories

Choice Categories		actual values	predicted values
0	0	0.41	0.40
marginal	0	0.09	0.15
part-time	0	0.10	0.06
full-time	0	0.03	0.04
0	part-time	0.11	0.07
marginal	part-time	0.10	0.12
part-time	part-time	0.15	0.17
full-time	part-time	0.05	0.04
0	full-time	0.01	0.01
marginal	full-time	<0.01	0.02
part-time	full-time	0.03	0.03
full-time	full-time	0.08	0.06

Source: Calculations based on SOEP, waves 2001 - 2003 and the micro-simulation model STSM.

(Table 4) shows that the estimated model fits the data quite well. Most categories are predicted very well. Only the share of mothers choosing category marginal employment/no formal child care is overestimated (0.15 predicted versus 0.09 actual), while the share of mothers choosing part-time employment/no formal child care is underpredicted (0.06 predicted versus 0.10 actual).

In order to compare the estimation results with the previous literature, I calculate wage elasticities and child care costs elasticities of labor supply by simulating a one percent increase in gross hourly wages and expected child care costs, respectively. These elasticities are presented in Table 5. According to these estimates, a 1 percent increase of the gross hourly wage leads to an increase in the participation rate of mothers with at least one child under 6 years by 0.14 percentage points and an increase in average working hours by 0.53. These are very similar to elasticities that previous studies found for German mothers (see Beblo, Lauer, and Wrohlich (2005) or Steiner and Wrohlich (2008)).²²

Labor supply elasticities with respect to child care costs are found to be relatively low, compared to previous estimates in Germany and also compared to estimates for other countries: A one percent increase in expected costs of child care would lead to a 0.13 percent decrease in average working hours. For Germany, Beblo, Lauer, and

²²In Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) labor supply of men and women in couple households has been estimated jointly. The similarity of the elasticities obtained from this model as compared to the elasticities obtained by Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) is encouraging evidence that the simple assumption that the labor supply behavior of the husband can be treated as exogenous does not lead to biased estimates.

Wrohlich (2005) estimate a decrease in average working hours by 0.11 percent in east and 0.25 percent in west Germany in the case that child care costs increase by one percent. These results however, have been estimated on a sample of mothers with children aged 7 to 10 years. Furthermore, Beblo et al. use a model that does not allow the option of unpaid non-parental child care, which also leads to higher elasticities than the more flexible model used here.

Previous literature for Germany that used descriptive models to assess the effect of child care costs or availability on mothers' labor supply found mixed results. Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000), for example, find that the local availability of child care slots does not influence mothers' labor supply. However, a more recent study by Spiess and Buechel (2002) does find a significant effect of availability of full-time child care slots on mothers' labor supply.

Compared to the international literature, the estimated elasticities of labor supply with respect to child care costs lie at the lower end of what different authors find for various countries. For example, Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) find for Norway that the mothers' participation rate would fall by 0.12 percentage points in the case of a one percent increase in child care costs. Similar results are reported for Russia by Lokshin (2004). For the French case, however, Chone, le Blanc, and Robert-Bobee (2003) find values more similar to those for Germany, amounting to -0.04 percentage points. For the US, different authors report a wide range of values lying between -0.03 and -0.09 such as reported by Ribar (1995) up to -0.20 found by Blau and Hagy (1998). The reason for the relatively low child care costs elasticities of maternal labor supply in Germany might be the relatively weak link between employment and child care for children aged less than six years, as has been described in Section 2.

The model estimated here also allows to calculate elasticities of the demand for child care. The demand for child care is positively influenced by wage increases, a one percent increase of the gross hourly wage leading to an increase in the "child care participation" by 0.04 to 0.06 percentage points. The own-price elasticities of the demand for child care are quite large, a one percent increase in expected child care costs leading to a decrease in "child care participation" between 0.05 and 0.07 percentage points.

Table 5: Elasticities of labor supply and demand for childcare

Elasticities of labor supply		
	1% increase in gross hourly wage	1% increase in expected childcare costs
<i>Change in participation rates (in percentage points)</i>		
All mothers	0.13 (0.12 - 0.15)	-0.04 (-0.04 - -0.03)
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.12 (0.11 - 0.15)	-0.03 (-0.04 - -0.03)
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.14 (0.13 - 0.16)	-0.04 (-0.04 - -0.03)
<i>Change in working hours (in percent)</i>		
All mothers	0.49 (0.45 - 0.58)	-0.13 (-0.15 - -0.11)
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.51 (0.47 - 0.62)	-0.16 (-0.19 - -0.14)
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.47 (0.43 - 0.54)	-0.08 (-0.10 - -0.07)
<i>Change in childcare "participation" (in percentage points)</i>		
All mothers	0.05 (0.04 - 0.06)	-0.06 (-0.07 - -0.05)
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.05 (0.03 - 0.06)	-0.05 (-0.06 - -0.04)
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.06 (0.04 - 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.08 - -0.06)

Note: Numbers in parentheses show 95%-confidence intervals obtained by the bootstrap method (100 repetitions).

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2001-2003.

5.2 Sensitivity Analysis

As has already been pointed out previously, the assumptions concerning the access restrictions to informal care are controversial in the literature. While in the majority of the papers in this field, it is assumed that unpaid care arrangements are not an option, some authors assume that all families have access to these arrangements. However, to my knowledge, so far a systematic sensitivity analysis regarding the influence of this assumption on estimated elasticities has not been published yet.

I have performed a sensitivity analysis in which I compare estimation results and resulting elasticities of models in which all families have full access to informal care (Model A), and in which no one has access to informal care (Model B). For the estimation of this latter model, all mothers who report to be working and not using paid child care are dropped. The results show that labor supply elasticities are considerably higher in the model that allows all mothers to be engaged in market work without using paid childcare (Model A). On the other hand, Model B, in which mar-

ket work always implies the use of paid child care, leads to lower elasticities of labor supply. (See Tables 12 to 15 in Appendix 1). Interestingly, the intensive margin of labor supply is not as sensitive to this assumption as the extensive margin. While a 1% wage increase leads to the same reaction as far as working hours are concerned (increasing by approximately 0.6% in both models), I find large differences as far as the change in participation rates is concerned. A 1% wage increase leads to an increase in participation by 0.16 percentage points in model A but only by 0.09 percentage points in model B. The elasticities that result from the model with the choice set that I have presented in the section above are in between the estimations of the models A and B (0.14%).²³

5.3 Results from Policy Simulations

The model can be used to calculate the effect of various policy reforms such as a change in parents fees to existing slots or an extension of subsidized slots. These reforms can be simulated by changing parameters such as the parents' fees (c^s in equation 8) or the availability of subsidized slots (π). In fact, reforms of this kind have been introduced in Germany: For example, in 2005 a law has been passed that aims at providing child care slots for all children under three years whose parents both work or wish to work.²⁴ On the other hand, the abolishment of parents' fees to child care slots in care centers for all children between three and six years - independent of the parents' employment status - has been introduced by several federal states. For a better comparison of the results, I simulate both reform scenarios for children of both age groups.

Table 6 shows the results of simulations of these two policy reforms. Increasing the availability of child care leads to larger labor supply reactions than providing the existing child care slots for free: In the former scenario (Reform 1), the labor force participation rate of mothers would increase by almost 4 percentage points, while in the latter case (Reform 2), it would increase by only 2 percentage points. Also average working hours would increase almost twice as much in reform scenario 1 (+12.4 percent) than in reform scenario 2 (+7.25 percent).

²³However, the confidence interval of the model presented in section 5.1 includes the point estimate of model A.

²⁴This reform is simulated in the following by setting the probability of getting a subsidized child care slot in the calculation of expected child care costs to 1 for those choice categories in which the mother has positive working hours.

Table 6: Reactions in Labor Supply and the Demand for Childcare after Two Policy Reforms

	Reform 1 increasing slots	Reform 2 abolishing fees
	<i>Change in participation rates (in percentage points)</i>	
All mothers	3.93 (3.46 - 4.61)	2.00 (1.76 - 2.34)
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	3.25 (2.68 - 3.98)	1.30 (1.13 - 1.62)
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	4.83 (4.31 - 5.46)	2.91 (2.55 - 3.33)
	<i>Change in working hours (in percent)</i>	
All mothers	12.40 (10.74 - 14.98)	7.25 (6.33 - 8.69)
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	14.38 (12.13 - 17.47)	7.65 (6.76 - 9.08)
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	9.77 (8.58 - 11.51)	6.72 (5.78 - 8.14)
	<i>Change in child care "participation" (in percentage points)</i>	
All children	3.54 (2.92 - 4.31)	3.42 (3.10 - 3.97)
Children <3	3.26 (2.53 - 4.17)	2.00 (1.71 - 2.51)
Children ≥ 3	3.90 (3.31 - 4.49)	5.31 (4.76 - 6.01)

Note: Numbers in parentheses show 95%-confidence intervals obtained by the bootstrap method (100 repetitions).

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2001-2003.

The effect on child care "participation" differs by age group. For children under three years, reform scenario 1 clearly has the larger effect (+3.3 percentage points) than reform 2 (+2 percentage points). For children aged three to six years, however, the effect of the second reform is higher (5.31 versus 3.9 percentage points).

A comprehensive comparison of two reforms also needs to take the costs of the different scenarios into account. Aggregating parents' fees over all families yields the costs of reform 2 which amount to about 2.6 billion Euro per year. Reform 1 would cost slightly less, about 2.1 billion Euro per year. Since reform 1 is slightly less expensive and would imply a greater impact in terms of mothers' labor supply reactions, one can conclude that increasing availability of child care is more effective than providing the existing slots for free. This is a result from the fact that subsidies under reform 1 are targeted at children with working mothers only, while in reform 2, the subsidies are not tied to the mothers' employment status.

6 Conclusion and Policy Implications

The model developed in this paper is suitable to analyze labor supply and child care choices in a setting of a child care market characterized by low fees to subsidized institutions and high costs for privately organized child care. These characteristics of the child care market, that lead to a shortage of subsidized child care slots, can be found in many continental European countries. An empirical application is presented for the case of mothers with preschool-aged children in Germany. Since access restrictions to subsidized child care are explicitly taken into account, the effect of parents' fees and availability of child care on the demand for child care and maternal employment decisions can be disentangled.

Policy simulations show that an increase in the availability of center-based child care for working mothers would lead to an increase in the labor force participation of mothers by almost 4 percentage points. The abolishment of parents' fees to existing child care slots would increase mothers' labor force participation by 2 percentage points. Given that costs are very similar in both reform scenarios, it is noteworthy that reform 1 leads to a higher increase in mothers' labor supply than reform 2. If the goal of family policy is to facilitate work-life balance of two-earner families, policy reforms aiming at an extension of child care slots should be the government's choice.

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Appendix 1: Tables

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics

Choice Categories		Frequency			
working hours of the mother	child care hours of the youngest child	All Households		Families with youngest child less than 3	
		Absolute Number	Share (in %)	Absolute Number	Share (in %)
0	0	1223	41	978	64
marginal (8)	0	104	4	76	5
part-time (20)	0	108	4	71	5
full-time (37)	0	45	2	23	2
0	part-time (20)	328	11	28	2
marginal (8)	part-time (20)	285	10	124	8
part-time (20)	part-time (20)	429	14	114	7
full-time (37)	part-time (20)	61	2	13	1
0	full-time (37)	46	2	12	1
marginal (8)	full-time (37)	4	< 1	1	< 1
part-time (20)	full-time (37)	87	3	21	1
full-time (37)	full-time (37)	258	9	71	5
Sum		2978	100	1532	100

Choice Categories		Average over all households		
working hours	child care hours	Age of youngest child	Number of children under 6	Total number of children in the household
0	0	1.5	1.4	2.0
marginal (8)	0	1.8	1.3	1.8
part-time (20)	0	2.2	1.2	1.7
full-time (37)	0	2.5	1.1	1.8
0	part-time (20)	3.9	1.1	2.0
marginal (8)	part-time (20)	2.8	1.2	1.9
part-time (20)	part-time (20)	3.4	1.1	1.7
full-time (37)	part-time (20)	3.4	1.1	1.6
0	full-time (37)	3.3	1.2	1.4
marginal (8)	full-time (37)	4.2	1.0	0.7
part-time (20)	full-time (37)	3.4	1.1	1.3
full-time (37)	full-time (37)	3.4	1.1	1.6
Overall average		2.5	1.3	1.9

Source: SOEP, waves 2001 - 2003.

Table 8: Net Household Incomes by Choice Categories

Choice Categories	Net Household Income					
	Before		After		Before	
	Deducting child care costs		Deducting child care costs		Deducting child care costs	
working hours	child care hours	All Households	Families with youngest child <3 years	Families with youngest child 3-6 years	After	After
0	0	2730	2658	2827	2827	2827
marginal	0	2891	2831	2966	2966	2966
part-time	0	3144	3084	3219	3219	3219
full-time	0	3548	3481	3632	3632	3632
0	part-time	2730	2658	2827	2827	2645
marginal	part-time	2891	2831	2966	2966	2895
part-time	part-time	3144	3084	3219	3219	3140
full-time	part-time	3548	3481	3632	3632	3458
0	full-time	2730	2658	2827	2827	2476
marginal	full-time	2891	2831	2966	2966	2722
part-time	full-time	3144	3084	3219	3219	2961
full-time	full-time	3548	3481	3632	3632	3356

All amounts refer to Euro per month.

Source: Calculations based on SOEP, waves 2001 - 2003 and the micro-simulation model STSM. Note: SOEP weighting factors are used.

Table 9: Wage estimation

	<u>East Germany</u>		<u>West Germany</u>	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
<i>Wage Equation</i>				
Years of Education	0.053	0.003	0.068	0.002
Years of Full Time Work	0.009	0.002	0.012	0.003
Years of Full Time Work ²	-0.024	0.005	-0.019	0.008
Years of Part Time Work	-0.003	0.002	0.000	0.004
Years of Part Time Work ²	-0.001	0.010	-0.011	0.019
Tenure	0.028	0.002	0.012	0.003
Tenure ²	-0.046	0.005	-0.014	0.011
Loss of human capital	-0.054	0.008	-0.039	0.008
Civil servant	0.036	0.009	0.029	0.003
Years of Education x German			0.002	0.002
Years of Full Time Work x German			0.005	0.003
Years of Full Time Work ² x German			-0.021	0.008
Years of Part Time Work x German			-0.001	0.004
Years of Part Time Work ² x German			0.005	0.020
Tenure x German			0.006	0.003
Tenure ² x German			-0.006	0.011
Loss of human capital x German			0.010	0.009
Constant	1.653	0.053	1.413	0.050
<i>Selection Equation</i>				
Medium Education	1.202	0.084	0.559	0.030
Higher Education	1.689	0.073	1.084	0.027
Vocational Degree	1.400	0.064	0.836	0.020
University Degree	2.097	0.071	1.528	0.026
Years of Full Time Work	0.093	0.009	0.077	0.002
Years of Full Time Work ²	-0.282	0.044	-0.203	0.005
Years of Part Time Work	0.015	0.015	0.064	0.003
Years of Part Time Work ²	-0.159	0.125	-0.217	0.011
German			-0.104	0.023
Health 1	-0.011	0.006	-0.006	0.001
Health 2	0.008	0.007	-0.012	0.002
Married	0.431	0.043	-0.034	0.015
Child younger 3	-0.641	0.056	-0.775	0.031
Child between 3 and 6	0.083	0.056	-0.155	0.025
Child between 6 and 17	0.205	0.041	0.267	0.016
Other Household Income	-0.0001	0.000	-0.0002	0.000
Constant	-1.676	0.085	1.124	0.050
Mills Ratio	-0.003	0.016	0.025	0.009
Number of observations				
Censored		9028		27488
Uncensored		5918		17245

Notes: Wages are gross hourly wages measured in logs. Loss of human capital is a weighted measure of years of unemployment capturing depreciation of human capital. Estimation is based on pooled data for the period 1999-2005. Time and region specific (Bundesland) dummies as well as dummies for industry sector and firms size and a constant term have been included in the estimation.

Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2005.

Table 10: Estimation Results of two separate models by age of youngest child

Explanatory Variables	Families with youngest child under 3		Families with youngest child 3-6	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
net income	0.1820	0.0441	0.2528	0.0562
net income squared	0.0008	0.0007	-0.0002	0.0008
leisure	-0.0060	0.0219	0.0213	0.0187
leisure squared	-0.0014	0.0006	-0.0006	0.0004
paid child care	-0.1500	0.0155	0.0782	0.0168
paid child care squared	-0.0001	0.0003	-0.0037	0.0003
unpaid child care	-0.1367	0.0205	-0.0784	0.0269
unpaid child care squared	0.0015	0.0004	0.0015	0.0005
paid child care * east Germany	0.0843	0.0107	0.0844	0.0112
paid child care * German nationality	0.0202	0.0102	0.0088	0.0093
paid care * mother holds university degree	0.0333	0.0102	0.0368	0.0116
net income * leisure	0.0014	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005
net income * paid child care	-0.0005	0.0004	-0.0004	0.0004
net income * unpaid child care	-0.0011	0.0006	-0.0019	0.0007
Probabilities and locations of random effects				
location of mass point 1 (M^1)	0.0581	0.0113	-0.0113	0.0044
log-odd of probability 1	-0.1996	0.3729	2.7686	0.5547
log likelihood	-1934.7886		-2137.1175	
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	3901.5771		4306.235	
number of observations	1532		1446	
number of households	899		748	

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2001-2003.

Table 11: Elasticities of labor supply and demand for childcare, obtained from two separate models

	1% increase in gross hourly wage	1% increase in expected childcare costs
<i>Change in participation rates (in percentage points)</i>		
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.13	-0.04
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.15	-0.04
<i>Change in working hours (in percent)</i>		
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.57	-0.19
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.47	-0.08
<i>Change in childcare "participation" (in percentage points)</i>		
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.06	-0.06
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.06	-0.08

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2001-2003.

Table 12: Estimation results, Model A

Explanatory Variables	Model with unobserved heterogeneity		Model without unobserved heterogeneity	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
net income	0.2089	0.0247	0.2254	0.0236
net income squared	0.0001	0.0003	0.0000	0.0003
leisure	-0.0061	0.0111	-0.0016	0.0110
leisure squared	0.0002	0.0002	0.0001	0.0002
paid childcare	0.0480	0.0115	0.0092	0.0099
paid childcare squared	-0.0029	0.0002	-0.0018	0.0001
unpaid childcare	-0.1594	0.0097	-0.1624	0.0095
unpaid childcare squared	0.0020	0.0001	0.0020	0.0001
unpaid childcare * youngest child u3	-0.1341	0.0055	-0.1107	0.0045
paid childcare * east Germany	0.0729	0.0063	0.0755	0.0051
paid childcare * German nationality	0.0087	0.0068	0.0089	0.0059
paid childcare * single mother	0.0030	0.0079	0.0056	0.0065
paid care * mother holds university degree	0.0301	0.0072	0.0312	0.0058
net income * leisure	0.0008	0.0002	0.0007	0.0002
net income * paid childcare	-0.0006	0.0002	-0.0007	0.0002
net income * unpaid childcare	-0.0009	0.0002	-0.0009	0.0002
Probabilities and locations of random effects				
location of mass point 1 (M^1) ^a	-0.0112	0.0018		
log-odd of probability 1 ^b	2.9786	0.1790		
log likelihood	-4990.9261		-5278.6259	
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	9386.3156		10589.252	
number of observations	2978			
number of households	1495			

^a The location of the second mass point can be calculated using the formula $M^2 = -\frac{M^1 \cdot \tau_1}{\tau_2}$ and amounts to 0.0219.

^b The two corresponding probabilities, τ_1 and τ_2 are 0.9516 and 0.0484.

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2001-2003.

Table 13: Elasticities of labor supply and demand for childcare, Model A

Elasticities of labor supply		
	1% increase in gross hourly wage	1% increase in expected childcare costs
<i>Change in participation rates (in percentage points)</i>		
All mothers	0.16	-0.02
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.17	-0.01
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.15	-0.03
<i>Change in working hours (in percent)</i>		
All mothers	0.60	-0.05
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.68	-0.04
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.50	-0.07
<i>Change in childcare "participation" (in percentage points)</i>		
All mothers	0.04	-0.06
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.02	-0.04
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.06	-0.08

Note: Numbers in parentheses show 95%-confidence intervals obtained by the bootstrap method (100 repetitions).

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2001-2003.

Table 14: Estimation results, Model B

Explanatory Variables	Model with unobserved heterogeneity		Model without unobserved heterogeneity	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
net income	0.3459	0.0403	0.3585	0.0367
net income squared	-0.0018	0.0005	-0.0018	0.0005
leisure	0.0523	0.0146	0.0567	0.0142
leisure squared	-0.0003	0.0003	-0.0004	0.0003
paid childcare	0.0009	0.0134	-0.0507	0.0125
paid childcare squared	-0.0022	0.0002	-0.0009	0.0002
paid childcare * east Germany	-0.1540	0.0067	-0.1174	0.0057
paid childcare * German nationality	0.0819	0.0092	0.0822	0.0064
paid childcare * single mother	0.0132	0.0079	0.0102	0.0071
paid care * mother holds university degree	0.0276	0.0097	0.0031	0.0080
net income * leisure	0.0475	0.0097	0.0339	0.0073
net income * paid childcare	-0.0002	0.0003	-0.0001	0.0003
net income * unpaid childcare	-0.0002	0.0002	-0.0002	0.0002
Probabilities and locations of random effects				
location of mass point 1 (M^1) ^a	-0.0174	0.0039		
log-odd of probability 1 ^b	2.5659	0.1985		
log likelihood	-2191.0838		-2208.3828	
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	4344.3515		4442.7657	
number of observations	1873			
number of households	992			

^a The location of the second mass point can be calculated using the formula $M^2 = -\frac{M^1 \cdot \tau_1}{\tau_2}$ and amounts to 0.2258.

^b The two corresponding probabilities, τ_1 and τ_2 are 0.9286 and 0.0714.

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2001-2003.

Table 15: Elasticities of labor supply and demand for childcare, Model B

Elasticities of labor supply		
	1% increase in gross hourly wage	1% increase in expected childcare costs
<i>Change in participation rates (in percentage points)</i>		
All mothers	0.09	-0.04
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.05	-0.03
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.14	-0.06
<i>Change in working hours (in percent)</i>		
All mothers	0.59	-0.31
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.66	-0.43
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.51	-0.16
<i>Change in childcare "participation" (in percentage points)</i>		
All mothers	0.05	-0.06
Mothers whose youngest child is <3	0.04	-0.04
Mothers whose youngest child is ≥ 3	0.07	-0.08

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2001-2003.

Appendix 2: Calculation of Child Care Costs

Table 16: Estimation of parents' fees for center-based childcare (Tobit)

Explanatory Variables	Part-time care		Full-time care	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
dummy variable indicating that child is aged 0-3	7.4184	10.8023	43.4753	13.0425
net monthly income	0.0076	0.0016	0.0220	0.0038
number of siblings aged 0-2 in childcare	-18.1861	6.6246	-26.4059	11.9324
number of siblings aged 3-6 in childcare	-23.7067	6.7316	-36.4697	10.5190
North-West	28.5948	8.6460	14.2949	18.0786
Middle-West	3.9476	8.5101	26.2354	13.3217
Northrhine-Westphalia	-4.5614	8.6056	26.5227	14.5548
Baden-Wuerttemberg	-2.0203	8.6098	-1.3348	16.3141
Bavaria	-7.4778	8.8023	11.7826	18.4299
constant	36.3428	8.3372	19.3916	11.9123
s.e. (ancillary parameter)	45.9441	1.5701	63.0967	3.3076
Log-Likelihood	-2500.93		-1062.62	
Number of observations	533		204	
Thereof: Left-censored	72		16	

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2002.

Estimation of the individual probability of being restricted to center-based child care

The likelihood function of the partial observability model is

$$L = \prod_{NC=1} [\Phi(X_D \beta_D)]^C [1 - \Phi(X_D \beta_D)]^{1-C} \cdot \prod_{NC=0} [\Phi_2(X_D \beta_D, X_S \beta_S; \rho)]^C \cdot [1 - \Phi_2(X_D \beta_D, X_S \beta_S; \rho)]^{1-C}$$

where $NC = 1$ are the children who are known to be not restricted in their access to child care and $NC = 0$ are the children who might be restricted. X_D denotes the variables in the demand equation, X_S the variables in the supply equation and β_D and β_S the respective coefficients. C is the outcome variable “child is in center-based child care” which is the joint outcome of the two latent variables demand for and supply of center-based child care. Identification of β_D and β_S comes from exclusion restrictions (e.g. X_D includes individual characteristics such as education level of the mother that are not part of X_S , while X_S includes regional availability of child care slots, which is not part of X_D), as well as from the fact that some children are known not to be restricted since they have attended a child care center already the year before. More details about this model can be found in Wrohlich (2008).

Table 17: Estimation results of demand and supply of center-based childcare (partial observability model)

Explanatory variables	Demand equation		Supply equation	
	Coeff.	St. Err.	Coeff.	St. Err.
mother holds high school degree	0.2832	0.1057	–	–
mother holds university degree	0.0032	0.1871	–	–
mother holds university degree*child aged 0-3	0.8073	0.8040	–	–
mother visits church frequently	-0.1709	0.0966	–	–
other adult apart from parents living in the household	-0.3691	0.1884	–	–
mother has German nationality	0.0101	0.1557	0.0265	0.2580
father is living in the same household	-0.2206	0.1754	0.0847	0.2308
child is aged 0-1	-1.6848	0.8244	-1.6165	0.6211
child is aged 2	-1.9280	0.4611	-0.3783	0.6896
child is aged 3	-0.3869	0.1330	-0.6745	0.3640
child aged 0-3 * family living in east Germany	2.1704	0.6313	–	–
child aged 7-10 * family living in east Germany	0.5931	0.3638	–	–
child is aged 7-10	-1.5757	0.3154	-1.0631	0.8136
number of sisters aged 10-16	-0.2964	0.1316	–	–
number of siblings aged 0-3	-0.2370	0.1121	–	–
number of siblings aged 4-6	-0.7366	0.3263	–	–
number of siblings aged 7-10	-0.2092	0.0871	–	–
number of siblings aged 0-3 in child care	0.1603	0.1727	0.0170	0.1288
number of siblings aged 4-6 in child care	0.8426	0.3254	-0.0652	0.1811
North-West	-0.3668	0.1960	-0.1942	0.6054
Middle-West	-0.1217	0.1691	-0.2234	0.5194
Northrhine-Westphalia	-0.3428	0.1788	-0.0494	0.5381
Baden-Wuerttemberg	-0.0926	0.1774	-0.3920	0.4910
Bavaria	-0.2972	0.1740	0.1076	0.4799
rural area	-0.0715	0.1446	0.0726	0.1985
local availability of child care slots	–	–	1.0101	.5569
constant	1.6237	0.2446	0.1656	0.7596
rho	-0.2710	0.6946		
Number of observations	3103			
Log pseudolikelihood	-937.56108			
Wald chi2(25)	90.68			

Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2002.

Table 18: Average estimated parents' fees for a subsidized slot and expected costs of child care

	Children aged		
	0-2 years	3-6 years	7-10 years
Probability of being restricted to center-based care	0.37	0.10	0.28
Parents' fees for center-based care:			
part-time	62	60	49
full-time	127	96	–
Total expected costs of child care			
part-time	183	90	144
rfull-time	397	167	–

Note: Euro per month.

Source: Own calculations on basis of SOEP, wave 2002.