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2009-06-30

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This study explores cultural integration paths of 8 migrant groups in Switzerland. It specifically analyzes the evolution of objective behaviors and subjective attitudes from the first to the second generation. To deepen our analysis, we look at this evolution from different perspectives: across cohorts (older vs. younger migrants) and across types of couples (individuals in endogamous vs. mixed couples). Gender differences are also paid attention to. First, we look at behaviors by examining performance of migrants at school (educational attainment and gender gap). As women play a key role in the transmission of cultural traits and the socialization of the second generation, we turn to their position in the couple (marriage, intermarriage, age and education gap between partners, early marriage, cohabitation, fertility, divorce) and on the labor market (labor force participation). Then we look at migrants' use of language, their feelings towards Switzerland, as well as their attitudes towards gender, religious and political issues. We find evidence of overall convergence. As the most striking and lasting differences across groups do not relate to educational achievement, religious or political attitudes, but to gender related attitudes and even more to gender related behaviors in endogamous couples, we recommend to better take into account migration-related gender issues and migration-specific "household dynamics" in the design of future cultural integration policies.

1 Introduction

In 1922 the Swiss people voted over a popular initiative proposing to tighten access to citizenship and expel "foreigners threatening national security". In 1970, 1974 and 1977 the three famous Schwarzenbach initiatives against "foreign grip and overpopulation" requested the expulsion of every third migrant and the establishment of stricter quotas. Recently, extremist parties are again exploiting xenophobic feelings. In 2008, they proposed that each demand of naturalization be decided over "democratically", i.e. by popular vote at the local level. In 2009, Swiss citizens voted over a ban of minaret construction. This list of successfully launched popular initiatives hints to the existence of a long and conflicting relationship between Switzerland and its migrants. Spectres of "Italian invaders" and now of "veiled women" and "terrorists" are recurrently invoked in the public arena in order to draw an artificial boundary between "us" and "them" that justifies harsher treatment of migrants while concealing the diversity and inequalities existing among natives. Despite the impossibility of an accepted definition of (the Swiss) national identity, some political parties have managed to instrumentalize successive waves of immigration to strengthen the fear Switzerland may loose its identity to migrants unable to integrate in its society. The repeated failures of demagogic initiatives in the past may have tempered their political significance, but the resounding success of the antiminaret initiative stresses the many open questions that remain concerning the handling of immigration and integration issues in Switzerland.

From a policy point of view, immigration has always primarily been considered as a source of cheap manpower. Federal authorities only had to intervene to control inflows and outflows of workers according to labor market needs. Although Switzerland is often praised for its democratic model and the elaborated political mechanisms it has created to integrate four different linguistic and various religious communities into one same country, its institutions and policies (like in many other countries) don't reach out to non-territorial minorities with the same intensity. At the end of the 1980s it became obvious that many migrants coming to Switzerland would remain permanently and that immigration policy had to be complemented by an integration policy. In 1998, the Parliament created the legal basis for a federal integration policy, and in 2001 a first modest budget was approved (OFM, 2006).

To enable informed policy decisions, social scientists are investigating integration processes (individual and collective processes happening after migration occurred) of migrants. Those can be classified into three general categories, which are not mutually exclusive. Structural integration encompasses moves of a migrant across a society's classes. Legal integration covers changes of a migrant's status and its implications for her conditions of stay. Cultural integration concerns the evolutions happening in behaviors, attitudes, daily life habits, beliefs, etc. (Wanner et al., 2002). Cultural integration processes happen in migrant communities as well as among natives, but minority groups bear the bulk of it. Qualitative studies have generated knowledge over the cultural integration patterns of specific communities residing in Switzerland. However, only few quantitative studies have been conducted on that subject.

Different schools of thought exist in the cultural integration literature. Assimilation theory assumes cultural differences progressively level out whereas multiculturalism insists on their persistence over time (Alba and Nee, 1997). Proponents of de-constructivism and system theories have criticized "groupist" approaches arguing groups are a product of social processes or discourse and do not exist a priori. However, empirical observation tends to hint that none of these theories are adequate and that the relation between ethnicity, identity, behaviors and attitudes is a complex multi-level evolutionary phenomenon (Wimmer 2008). As an example, a study conducted in three Swiss migrant neighborhoods shows that even if migrants do not primarily define themselves in ethnic terms, the majority of their social interactions occur within the group they belong to (Wimmer, 2004). Cultural integration may affect behaviors and attitudes in different ways. Such evidence calls for further research on the level of stability of group boundaries and their transformation, so as to better understand the evolutionary nature of group formation and how groups insert themselves in the host society.

This article contributes to this debate by specifically exploring the cultural integration paths of 8 migrant groups from the first to the second generation. It traces the evolution of selected behaviors and attitudes, which are taken as indicative of cultural integration. To deepen our analysis of these evolutions, we look at them from different perspectives. First, to investigate change and continuity over time (Georgiadis and Manning, 2008), we look at differences across cohorts to see if younger migrants depart from behaviors and attitudes of the first generation more than older migrants do. ¹ Second, to explore the role of intermarriage² as a factor (and not only an outcome) of integration (Waldis, 2008), we look at differences across individuals in endogamous and mixed couples. Can significant patterns be identified? And what is the amplitude of the impact of education? Those are some of the questions we try to explore. We specifically focus on migrant women, as they play a key role in the transmission of cultural traits and in the socialization process of the second generation on whom most policy efforts are targeted. The objective of this study is to highlight convergences and remaining differences across a series of indicators, so as to provide further input for policy thought on nascent integration policies.

In the remainder of this introduction, we briefly summarize immigration history and the evolution of

 $^{^{1}}$ In this text, we designate migrants born before 1970 as "old" and those born after 1970 as "young".

 $^{^{2}}$ As no appropriate word exists, we use the term intermarriage in a broad sense to designate mixed couples, married or in cohabitation.

immigration policy in Switzerland. After reviewing some of the key quantitative studies, we present our choices in the definition of migrant groups and their composition. Section 2 then presents the datasets, indicators and specifications used to investigate cultural integration paths of different migrant groups. Section 3 explores objective behaviors of migrants by examining their position at school (educational achievement and gender education gap), in the couple (marriage, intermarriage, age and education gap between partners, early marriage, cohabitation, fertility, divorce) and on the labor market (labor force participation). Section 4 explores subjective attitudes of migrants by examining their use of national languages, their feelings towards Switzerland as well as their gender, religious and political attitudes. Finally, Section 5 concludes by summarizing key findings and proposes recommendations for future cultural integration policies.

1.1 Immigration history and policy: "Ueberfremdung" and its shadow

For centuries, Switzerland was a country of emigration before becoming an immigration country. In 1850, migrants were almost inexistent in Switzerland. The construction of infrastructure necessary for the unfolding industrial revolution created an excess demand of manpower. At that time, foreigners were perceived as indispensable and welcome. The Swiss government signed recruitment agreements with neighboring countries, granting migrants the same rights as nationals. Two years of residence were sufficient to acquire Swiss citizenship. This policy was in line with the belief that naturalization was the most suitable way to assimilate migrants (Wicker, 2003). Figure 1 shows migrant population progressively rose and reached 15% in 1910, one of the highest rate in Europe.



Figure 1: caption

The outbreak of the First World War signaled the beginning of a lasting change in the perception of migrants as a threat to Swiss culture. Conservative circles brought into the political debate the idea of "Ueberfremdung", the fear that Swiss identity be dissolved by the inflow of too many foreigners. In 1917 the Central Office for Aliens Police was created in order to better monitor alien population. In 1931 the Federal Law on the Settlement and Residence of Foreigners engraved in law the transmutation of "migrants" into "foreigners" (Wicker, 2003). It also made residence and naturalization more difficult for them. In the 1930s, a more malleable version of the "Ueberfremdung" idea, the "Geistige Landesverteidigung" insisted on the duty of individuals to defend typical Swiss values. With Nazi and fascist regimes at the border, liberal

circles progressively rallied around the flag too to promote values such as cultural diversity, democracy or technological progress, be they labeled "Swiss". This episode of Swiss history is important because it had a lasting impact on Swiss collective identity and immigration policy (Riano and Wastl-Walter, 2006). During that period, the proportion of migrant population dropped sharply and reached 5% at the eve of World War II.

In the second half of the 20th century, three successive waves of immigration brought different types of migrants to Switzerland. The defensive attitude inherited from the previous period still weighted on policy decisions. While the government attempted to provide cheap labor to the economy, it always had to pay attention to underlying xenophobic feelings prompt to burst onto the political scene. Like other countries, Switzerland opted for a "Gastarbeiter" system. The first recruitment agreement was signed with Italy in 1948 and was followed by an inflow of Italian manpower. Spaniards came soon after. Despite a quota system, immigration kept rising. In 1970, the Schwarzenbach initiative, which proposed to expel one third of migrants and impose harsher quotas, was rejected only by 54% in one of the highest poll turnout in Swiss history. The federal government reacted by imposing more restrictive quotas, but it is mostly the non-renewal of permits that drove out migrants. This was also a convenient way for Switzerland to export its unemployment. During the 1970s economic crisis 67% of the 340'000 workers who lost their job were migrants. (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003). As the economy recovered in the 1980s, the second wave followed a different pattern. Portuguese, Yugoslav and Turkish workers, as well as refugees from Sri-Lanka, Vietnam or the Middle East also brought their family with them. After a decline in the 1970s, migrant population again exceeded 15% in 1990.

Pressure from European countries for the improvement of conditions for their nationals drove Swiss authorities to reconsider their strategy. The idea to create a point system or to implement a "three circle" policy based on the concept of "cultural distance" of migrants were debated as means to satisfy Switzerland's neighbors without alienating xenophobic voters. De facto, Switzerland started to apply a two circles policy, defining an "inner circle" and an "outer circle". Through bilateral agreements, EU/EFTA citizens are granted the same living and working rights as the Swiss (Mahnig et Piguet, 2003), while for other countries, immigration is restricted to highly qualified individuals only. Beyond the pragmatism of Swiss authorities, this political move also hints to the shift of symbolic barriers and a change in how Swiss define themselves and foreigners (Wicker 2003). However, this new policy could not prevent unwanted migrants to come to Switzerland. During this period, the third wave of migrants was mostly composed of refugees from former Yugoslavia, but also from Africa as well as highly qualified workers, mainly from neighboring countries (Gross, 2006).

Despite different restrictive policies, migrant population has kept rising and now exceeds 20%. As it became obvious many migrants will never return, politicians could not escape the question of their cultural integration anymore. Some cantons had started to use their autonomy in matters of education, religious matters, the attribution of local civic rights to deal with integration-related issues, but their practices are heterogeneous and resources very limited (Cataccin and Bühlent, 2005). The legal basis for a coherent federal policy was only set up in 1998 when integration of migrants became an item on the Swiss political agenda and the Federal Law on the Settlement and Residence of Foreigners was once more amended to allow the government to subsidize social integration of "foreigners". In 2001, a budget of around 10 million Swiss frances was accepted and has barely increased since (OFM, 2006). The previous year, an order of the government defined the objectives of integration and the tasks of the Federal Commission for Foreigners. The Central Office for Aliens Police was changed into a Federal Migration Office (Wicker, 2003). In 2005, a new Federal Law on Foreigners passed defining in depth the objectives and principles of integration policy as well as the competence of the government (OFM, 2006). The fact that a conservative government has initiated such changes during a period where the far right has risen to become the strongest political force in Parliament indicates the design of an integration strategy is politically costly, but indispensable. Like other countries Switzerland is caught between the fear to lose one's national identity and the necessity to adapt to a globalizing economy and society.

1.2 Quantitative studies about Switzerland

The subjects of the few existing quantitative studies relevant for our investigation are briefly presented below and their results will be referred to later if necessary. ³ Qualitative studies are not presented here, but the results of some of them will be mentioned when interpreting our results.

Bauer and Riphahn (2005) investigate migrant's achievements at school through the study of intergenerational patterns of educational attainment. Fibbi et. al. (2005) look at statistical differences across gender between naturalized and non-naturalized second-generation migrants. They also propose an analysis of the probability to have a weak education level, to be in the labor force, to be unemployed and to acquire Swiss citizenship by regressing dummies on a set of origin dummies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and 6 former Yugoslavian provinces) distinguishing between naturalized and non-naturalized individuals, and other controls. Wanner et al. (2003, 2005b) prepared comprehensive studies on women labor force participation. Other reports propose statistics only on socio-professional and household characteristics of migrants at large (Wanner 2004), the role of family on immigration (Fibbi et. al. 2005b) or language and religion (OFS 2005).

Quantitative studies on subjective attitudes of migrants are even scarcer as surveys containing such data are costly and usually have a small sample size. Wanner et al. (2002) investigate determinants of values and beliefs of respondents of the SHP, based on data of the two first waves. They regress many variables on origin dummies (Swiss, Italian, Spanish/Portuguese, other EEC/AELE, other Europe, rest of the world) and control if respondents have one or two parents of foreign origin.

This paper is the first to focus on the specific cultural integration paths of different migrant groups from the first to the second generation. Previous articles either only focus on the second-generation or attribute a common factor to the second-generation when considering all migrants. It also differs from existing literature in the way migrant groups are defined. Although European migrants form the bulk of migrant population in Switzerland, we do not mainly focus on European national communities, but we form a limited number of categories, which are geographically more balanced.

1.3 Migrants groups definition and composition

Table 1 shows that in 2000 29% of the Swiss population was of foreign descent and more than 20% foreigners. First-generation migrants are born abroad, whereas second-generation migrants are born in Switzerland, but are of foreign origin. ⁴ The proportion of second-generation compared to first-generation migrants is a rough indicator of the length of stay of a group in Switzerland.

Groups of migrants presented in Table 1 are based on an aggregated United Nations typology and correspond to broad regions of origin. ⁵ Any such groupings can be the subject of a debate. Is it still relevant to distinguish between Southern, Western and Central Europe? Should Turkey be considered part of Eastern Europe as Russia is? There is no simple resolution to such issues, but we will keep in mind the composition of the different groups in our analyses.

The three first groups are significantly larger than the five remaining ones and represent 83% of migrant

³International economic literature on cultural integration has rapidly grown in recent years and it is not possible to review it here. In Switzerland, sociologists and demographers were the first to conduct cultural integration studies based on larger datasets as they became available. Economists mostly kept focused on structural integration in the labor market.

 $^{^{4}}$ More details on categorization issues can be found in Section 2.1.

⁵The list of all countries and the exact group classification is available upon request.

population. The first group gathers Western and Northern Europeans as well as Anglo-Saxons. Three quarters of them are from neighboring Germany (37%), France (26%) and Austria (12%) and are not part of any specific wave of migration. Italians dominate the Southern European group (65%); Spaniards (19%) and Portuguese (14%) are also sizeable communities. The group of Eastern Europeans is largely dominated by former Yugoslavia (85%), but remains heterogeneous. Migrants from this country first came as economic migrants in the 1980s, and then massively as refugees fleeing the civil war after 1991. The largest community comes from former Serbia-Montenegro (48%), but half of them are Muslims from Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina (13%), Macedonia (12%) and Croatia (9%) follow in terms of size.

Immigration from Africa (excluding Maghreb) is more recent and very diverse. The three largest communities come from Angola (13%), Congo (10%) and Somalia (10%). Many of their members are political refugees. The Middle East generated a significant number of political refugees too, but most migrants of the sixth group are workers from Turkey (66%) or Maghreb (20%). Latin Americans mostly come from Brazil (29%) and the Dominican Republic (10%), Columbia and Chile (10% each). The Asian group is similarly heterogeneous, with economic migrants from Thailand (20%), the Philippines (17%), China (15%) or Japan (10%), and political refugees from Vietnam (19%) or Cambodia (4%). The last group of South and Central Asia is clearly dominated by political refugees from Sri-Lanka (59%). Indians (17%) and Iranians (12%) are also sizeable communities.

Region of origin	All	1st generation	2nd generation
Natives (%)	70.78		
Immigrants (%)	29.22	20.07	9.14
Of which (%)			
WE	27.34	28.12	25.65
SE	34.79	28.62	48.35
\mathbf{EE}	21.05	24.06	14.44
AF	2.03	2.51	0.98
TMM	6.84	6.99	6.49
SA	2.82	3.44	1.47
AS	2.52	3.29	0.8
SCA	2.61	2.98	1.82

Table 1: Region of origin and generation

Source: Swiss census, 2000

2 Data and Methods

2.1 Data

We use two main surveys to investigate the patterns of cultural integration in Switzerland: the Swiss census 2000 and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). ⁶ The census covers the 7 million individuals living in Switzerland in 2000 and provides information about the country of birth, first and second nationality, and if an individual is Swiss since birth or not. In this dataset, we define as natives those born in Switzerland and Swiss since birth. First generation migrants are born abroad. We consider a person a second-generation

⁶Like most other contributors to this book, we could use the Labor Force Survey (LFS) to investigate these behaviors as it has several advantages. First, the LFS covers more characteristics than the census. It notably provides information on the number of years spent in Switzerland by first generation migrants. However, as our focus is not the first generation, but the integration path from the first to the second generation, this characteristic is less important. Second, the LFS contains more recent information. It is conducted annually since 1991, and since 2003, it surveys around 65'000 households yearly (50'000 + 15'000 over-sampling the foreign population), which makes it interesting to investigate behaviors of migrants. However, cultural traits don't change very fast, and this advantage does not offset the disadvantage of its smaller sample size. As we explore many unchanging characteristics and focus on specific groups, the large size of the census is the most important factor to consider.

migrant if she is born in Switzerland and her first or second nationality is foreign. ⁷ The SHP started in 1999 with 7'799 individuals answering a detailed questionnaire. New observations from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) were added in 2004 and 2005 and increased the total number to 11'565. The SHP tells if an individual is born in Switzerland or not, and contains information on first, second and even third nationality as well as on first and second nationality of both parents. We consider a person a second-generation migrant if she is born in Switzerland and one of her nationalities or one of her parent's nationalities is foreign. If parents are both of foreign origin, we assign her the nationality of her father.

These two surveys enable us to examine the following objective behaviors and subjective attitudes, which are taken as indicative of cultural integration:

- Educational attainment: the number of years of education ⁸; the sample is limited to individuals aged 25 years or more.
- Marriage: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is married; the sample is composed of all women aged 18 years old or more. We exclude widows.
- Mixed couple: a dummy equals 1 if an individual has a partner from a different origin; the sample is limited to individuals in a couple, aged 18 years old or more. ⁹
- Age gap between partners: the age difference between the woman and her partner; the sample is limited to individuals in a couple, aged 18 years old or more.
- Education gap between partners: the difference in numbers of years of education between the woman and her partner; the sample is limited to individuals in a couple, aged 18 years old or more.
- Early marriage: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is married; the sample is limited to women age between 18 and 25 years old. We exclude widows.
- **Cohabitation**: a dummy equals 1 if an individual lives in cohabitation; the sample is limited to individuals married or living in cohabitation.
- Fertility: the number of children of women aged 40 years old or more.
- **Divorce**: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is divorced; the sample composed of married and divorced women only, aged 18 years old or more.
- Female labor force participation: a dummy equals 1 if a women is in the labor force; the sample is limited to women aged between 25 and 62 years old.
- Main language: a dummy equals 1 if an individual uses one of the four national languages as her main language.
- In favor of more equality between Swiss and foreigners: a dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares to be in favor of more equality.
- In favor of opening Swiss traditions: a dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares to be in favor of opening Swiss traditions to the world.
- Child suffers from working mother: 0 if a respondent does not agree at all with the statement, 10 if she totally agrees; the sample is limited to women.

⁷A small fraction of second-generation migrants are included in the native group as some of them only have the Swiss nationality since their birth. Those who are only Swiss, but were naturalized and are of unknown origin are not included in either category.

 $^{^{8}}$ In the census as well as in the SHP, the available educational variable is categorical. We use a scale proposed by de Coulon et. al. (2003) to compute the number of years of education.

⁹Mixed couples where none of the partners is Swiss are excluded.

- Women penalized in general: 0 if a respondent does not agree at all with the statement, 10 if he totally agrees; the sample is limited to men.
- **Participation to religious services**: a dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares she participates to religious services at least occasionally (not only on special occasions).
- **Prayers**: a dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares she prays at least occasionally.
- **Political affiliation**: 0 if a respondent declares to have extreme left political views, 10 if extreme right.
- Satisfaction with Swiss democracy: 0 if a respondent does not agree at all with the statement, 10 if she totally agrees.

2.2 Specifications

To investigate the evolution of objective behaviors and subjective attitudes, we use two main specifications. The first specification compares the outcomes between first and second generation of migrants:

 $\begin{array}{ll} Outcome_i = & \sum_{j} \beta_j Origin_j * 1stGeneration \\ & + \sum_{j} \gamma_j Origin_j * 2ndGeneration \\ & + \sum_{k} Commonfactor_k \\ & + \alpha X_i' + \varepsilon_i \end{array}$

 β_j and γ_j catch the effect of being a first or second generation migration of origin j compared to being a native. The difference between β_j and γ_j indicate if the second generation rather tends to reproduce behaviors and attitudes of the first generation or to adopt those of natives. In this first specification, we implicitly assume other factors are common among all observed individuals. The second specification allows us to deepen our analysis by introducing additional distinctions. First, as we have no reason to believe that trends in behaviors and attitudes are equally shared among migrants of different origin, we compare outcomes by birth cohort (born before vs. after 1970). Second, to investigate if the composition of the couple has an effect on behaviors and attitudes, and if this effect is similar across origin groups, we compare outcomes by type of couple (endogamous vs. mixed couples). Finally, we also pay attention to gender differences.

$$Outcome_{i} = \sum_{j} \sum_{k} \beta_{j} Origin_{j} * Cohort/Couple/Gender_{k} * 1stGeneration \\ + \sum_{j} \sum_{k} \gamma_{j} Origin_{j} * Cohort/Couple/Gender_{k} * 2ndGeneration \\ + \alpha X'_{i} + \varepsilon_{i}$$

As controls, we always include age, age squared and the number of years of education. With census data, we control for 4 linguistic regions, 16 economic regions and 4 types of communes. With SHP data, we only add year dummies. When looking at specific effects tied to intermarriage on a variable that is observable on individuals whether or not they are in a couple or not (fertility, labor force participation, language) we add three civil status dummies, using married natives as the reference group. Finally, with census data, we always either restrict the sample to women or pay attention to gender differences. With SHP data, we simply add a gender dummy, except when restricting the sample to women/men to examine gender attitudes.

3 Objective behaviors

Integration processes cannot be localized geographically or institutionally, but some units of analysis can be privileged. School is the first place where all second-generation migrants are exposed to natives and native culture. It is supposed to be an important integration mechanism. Couples are part of the private sphere. It is therefore of particular interests to observe differing patterns of integration between individuals in endogamous couples, and partners of mixed couples where cultural accommodations and compromises are a necessity. Finally, the labor market is another mechanism stimulating contacts between natives and migrants outside the household.

3.1 At school

According to recent studies, migrants fare rather well in the Swiss educative system. Focusing on a sample of second generation Italian and Spanish migrants in the cantons of Geneva and Basel, Bolzman and Fibbi (2003) observe their educational achievement are as good as those of natives. Using census 2000 data on 17 years old individuals still in the parental household to analyze intergenerational transmission of educational attainment, Bauer and Riphahn (2007) find evidence of higher intergenerational mobility among second generation migrants at the secondary school level, that their achievements or failures are less dependent upon the level of education of their parents. Fibbi et. al. (2005) observe that naturalized migrants have a lower probability of low education, but this is not the case of non-naturalized first and second generation migrants (except for Spaniards and Germans). But how does the picture change if we enlarge our scope to include non-European migrants of all ages? In this study, we use a scale to compute the number of years of education and the gender education gap. Statistics in table 2 confirm the impressive educational success of Southern Europeans second generation women and men that has been documented in previous studies. African women are in a similar situation. However, results also show that the educational achievement of "Secundas" and "Secundos" ¹⁰ is not characteristic of all second generation migrants. The fact that first-generation migrants are self-selected among the most motivated and capable individuals, the lack of specific knowledge about the Swiss education system and other reasons might explain this.

Despite/due to the observed negative trend, the gender education gap common to all first generation groups is reverted for most second generation women, except for Western Europeans and Latin Americans who have the highest average education levels and Southern European women who make the largest progress from the first to the second generation.

Results in table 3 (plotted in figure 2) confirm migrant women progress more at school than their male counterparts. It seems that second generation men from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb and Eastern Europe remain in a low education equilibrium. The better performance of Western Europeans is not very surprising given the very high education level of the first generation, but the impressive results of second generation Latin Americans, Africans and the tremendous progress of Southern Europeans support the idea that individuals with a mother tongue close to one of the Swiss national languages (in this case Latin languages) fare better at school.

Table 4 provides more detailed information about cohort effects for both genders. A striking result is that the educational level of first generation migrants is generally declining. Another interesting trend is that second generation men from Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb and Eastern Europe who are born after 1970 fare better than those born before 1970.

¹⁰referring to the title of the study of Bolzmann and Fibbi (2003)

	Years of education						Gender education gap	
	Women			Men			(Women -men)	
Origin	Born abroad	Born CH	(2nd-1st)	Born abroad	Born CH	(2nd-1st)	Born abroad	Born CH
Natives		11.56			12.85			-1.29
WE	12.67	12.99	0.32	14.34	13.83	-0.52	-1.67	-0.84
SE	9.63	12.03	2.4	10.23	12.7	2.47	-0.59	-0.66
\mathbf{EE}	10.99	11.19	0.19	11.41	11.53	0.12	-0.42	-0.34
\mathbf{AF}	11.1	12.77	1.67	12.33	13.15	0.82	-1.23	-0.38
TMM	10.36	11.51	1.15	11.39	11.65	0.26	-1.03	-0.14
\mathbf{SA}	12.03	12.5	0.47	13.12	13.78	0.66	-1.1	-1.28
AS	11.62	11.24	-0.38	12.59	12.28	-0.3	-0.97	-1.04
SCA	11.17	11.26	0.1	11.14	10.62	-0.52	0.02	0.64
Total	11.28	12.29	1	11.85	12.95	1.1	-0.57	-0.67

Table 2: Average number of years of education by immigrant group and generation, and gender gap

Source: Swiss census, 2000

Table 3:	Educational	$\operatorname{attainment}$	(I)

	Women		Men	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.928^{***}	0.815^{***}	1.235^{***}	0.367***
	(0.00608)	(0.0145)	(0.00730)	(0.0153)
SE	-2.304^{***}	-0.255^{***}	-2.973^{***}	-0.856***
	(0.00705)	(0.0105)	(0.00658)	(0.0106)
\mathbf{EE}	-1.041***	-1.076^{***}	-1.796^{***}	-1.902***
	(0.00825)	(0.0407)	(0.00838)	(0.0402)
\mathbf{AF}	-1.266^{***}	0.412^{***}	-1.304^{***}	-0.266*
	(0.0241)	(0.141)	(0.0250)	(0.160)
TMM	-1.855^{***}	-0.828^{***}	-2.036^{***}	-1.910***
	(0.0152)	(0.0515)	(0.0131)	(0.0543)
LA	-0.311***	0.272^{**}	-0.468^{***}	0.473^{***}
	(0.0168)	(0.108)	(0.0266)	(0.119)
AS	-0.607***	-1.031^{***}	-0.844***	-1.171***
	(0.0168)	(0.160)	(0.0261)	(0.202)
SCA	-1.150^{***}	-0.983***	-2.324^{***}	-2.983***
	(0.0250)	(0.132)	(0.0203)	(0.147)
Gender	-1.202^{***}			
	(0.00283)			
Observations	4460422			
Pseudo R-squared	0.183			
Ν	4.460e + 06			
11	-1.048e + 07			
<u>a</u> <u>a</u> :	2000 <u>G</u> 1	1 .	. 1	***

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Women				Men			
	Pre-1970		Post-1970		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.926^{***}	0.716^{***}	1.069^{***}	0.533^{***}	1.299^{***}	0.621^{***}	0.933^{***}	0.294^{***}
	(0.00598)	(0.0158)	(0.0208)	(0.0297)	(0.00816)	(0.0192)	(0.0252)	(0.0333)
SE	-2.330***	-0.424^{***}	-2.458^{***}	-0.555***	-2.948^{***}	-0.621^{***}	-2.876***	-0.801^{***}
	(0.00701)	(0.0121)	(0.0232)	(0.0186)	(0.00735)	(0.0141)	(0.0256)	(0.0199)
\mathbf{EE}	-0.979^{***}	-1.822^{***}	-1.771^{***}	-0.676***	-1.592^{***}	-2.196^{***}	-2.569^{***}	-1.110***
	(0.00856)	(0.0528)	(0.0198)	(0.0620)	(0.00963)	(0.0561)	(0.0244)	(0.0739)
AF	-1.274^{***}	0.269^{*}	-2.114***	0.163	-0.829^{***}	-0.0861	-2.279^{***}	-0.0242
	(0.0258)	(0.158)	(0.0508)	(0.277)	(0.0296)	(0.203)	(0.0624)	(0.346)
TMM	-1.905***	-0.840***	-2.424***	-1.347***	-1.820***	-2.018***	-2.516***	-1.440***
	(0.0160)	(0.0648)	(0.0343)	(0.0832)	(0.0152)	(0.0849)	(0.0355)	(0.0892)
LA	-0.208***	0.111	-1.541^{***}	0.368^{*}	-0.0217	0.678^{***}	-1.472^{***}	0.333
	(0.0177)	(0.118)	(0.0370)	(0.222)	(0.0315)	(0.144)	(0.0670)	(0.308)
AS	-0.611^{***}	-1.263^{***}	-1.325^{***}	-0.998***	-0.705^{***}	-1.607^{***}	-0.889***	0.215
	(0.0176)	(0.178)	(0.0385)	(0.319)	(0.0308)	(0.267)	(0.0671)	(0.395)
SCA	-0.948^{***}	-0.764^{***}	-2.444^{***}	-2.911^{***}	-2.032***	-2.846^{***}	-3.172^{***}	-3.046***
	(0.0274)	(0.136)	(0.0500)	(0.344)	(0.0238)	(0.191)	(0.0519)	(0.294)
Observations	2255991				2120707			
Pseudo R-squared	0.177				0.139			
Ν	2.256e + 06				2.121e + 06			
11	-5.163e+06				-5.100e+06			

Table 4: Educational attainment (II)

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

3.2 In the couple

In previous studies (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002; Wanner et al., 2005a) some authors looked at the role of family in the migration process. They observe that compared to natives, second generation migrants tend to remain in the parental household for a longer period and marry after a much shorter cohabitation period with their partner. The overall marriage rate however is converging across migrant groups. In their qualitative study on binational couples, Ossipow and Waldis (2003) analyze interests and strategies of both intermarried partners. Noticing homogamy and heterogamy exists across many dimensions in any couple, they point to the existence of complementary exchanges in each couple.

In this study, we extend this analysis by examining the position of women in general, in endogamous and mixed couples. What choices are women from different origin making when it comes to select a partner? Does origin seem to matter in matching partners? Are women from some groups more likely to contract early marriage and have many children? It is often assumed that migrant from poorer countries are more inclined to form traditional households with clear role distribution within the household, but to what extent are these clichés supported by facts and do such behaviors persist among second-generation migrants? Also, if some behaviors seem more solidly rooted in specific communities, how do women of these communities behave in mixed couples?

3.2.1 Marriage and mixed couples

Figure 5 plots the marginal effects of origin dummies on the probability to be married. First generation women are much more likely to be married than natives. Differences among migrant groups hint to the existence of cultural patterns, Western Europeans displaying the lowest propensity to be married. The decrease in the probability to be married of second-generation women to the level of native women points to at least two possible hypotheses. Either cultural differences in the decision to marry disappears very brutally or there are other strong incentives (for example legal incentives) to marry for first-generation women, which

do not exist for the second generation. Looking at differences across cohorts reveals that young first generation migrants marry more, whereas the opposite is true for the second-generation. This might be due to more stringent legal conditions for entering Switzerland happening in parallel to a cultural trend to marry less which is not migrant-specific. This is true even for women of Central and South Asia, who seems to remain in a very robust and much more traditional equilibrium with a high probability to be married for both generations.

Intermarriages differ from endogamous marriages because they expose migrants to native culture through their partner and his social network in a way that is not possible anywhere else. Table 5 shows the distribution of endogamous and mixed couples. "Other" couples are composed of partners from different origin, but none of them Swiss. We observe that first generation women intermarry more than their male counterpart. Only women from Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb, and South and Central Asia do not, and more surprising, this is accentuated for second generation women belonging to these groups. The intermarriage rate of second generation Western European, Latin American and African women also decreases a lot, but from a very high initial level. Asian women remain in the highest equilibrium despite a slight decrease; Eastern and Southern European second generation women are the only who do enter mixed unions more than their mothers.

Marginal effects of table 6 plotted in figure 6 confirm the intuition conveyed by statistics of table 5: migrant women from Latin America, Asia, Western Europe and Africa (first generation only) are around 50% more likely than natives to enter an mixed couple. Especially Asian women are more likely to choose a Swiss partner than their male counterpart. Women originating from South and Central Asia and Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb are exception in this regard, and more surprising the marginal effect for second-generation women of these groups is negative. Eastern and Southern European women also have a low probability to enter a mixed couple, but it increases for the second generation. It is also interesting to notice that whereas the propensity to choose a native partner rather decreases for second-generation women, it is less the case for men.

This trend also evolves slowly over time: young second-generation female migrant tend to have a lower probability to form a couple with a native compared to their mothers, but this probability is equal or higher for women born after 1970. The same is true for males, and the amplitude of the change is even higher (figures 7 and 8). The only exceptions are again women originating from South and Central Asia and Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb. It is surprising to see that their probability to intermarry decreases for the second generation and younger migrants. This strong preference for endogamy contrasts with trends in other groups.

	Women						Men					
	Born abroad			(2nd-1st)			Born abroad			(2nd-1st)		
Origin	Endo	Inter	Other	Endo	Inter	Other	Endo	Inter	Other	Endo	Inter	Other
Natives	90.8	9.2					86.76	13.24			-	
WE	36.6	53.6	9.8	9.6	-10.6	1	49.5	39.8	10.6	-2.5	0.4	2.1
SE	79.6	15.6	4.9	-13.1	10	3.1	76.5	15.6	7.9	-27.8	22.7	5.1
\mathbf{EE}	82.1	12.2	5.8	-2.3	1.4	0.9	87	8	5	-2	1.7	0.3
\mathbf{AF}	36.6	43.7	19.7	25.3	-18.7	-6.6	44.1	32.7	23.2	17.4	-7.2	-10.2
TMM	78.9	13.1	8	6.3	-5.3	-1	67	20.2	12.8	7.2	-6.9	-0.3
\mathbf{SA}	19.9	57.6	22.6	18.4	-17	-1.4	38.8	37.4	23.8	20.2	-12.3	-7.9
AS	30.3	57	12.7	2.9	-5.6	2.7	73.8	16.4	9.8	-9.1	4.2	4.9
SCA	85.5	8.6	5.9	7.7	-4	-3.7	78.3	12.4	9.3	10.6	-5.9	-4.7
Total	61.5	30.4	8.2				70.6	20.5	8.9			

Table 5: Intere
htnic couples by immigrant group (in %)

Source: Swiss census, 2000; as there is no column for individuals born in Switzerland, natives and 1st migrants are in the same column

Table 6: Mixed couples (women)

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.527^{***}	0.394^{***}	0.528^{***}	0.342***	0.376^{***}	0.555***
	(0.00148)	(0.00389)	(0.00154)	(0.00440)	(0.00570)	(0.00798)
SE	0.0897^{***}	0.183^{***}	0.105^{***}	0.167^{***}	-0.0107^{***}	0.179^{***}
	(0.00152)	(0.00251)	(0.00164)	(0.00290)	(0.00320)	(0.00442)
\mathbf{EE}	0.0499^{***}	0.0983^{***}	0.0667^{***}	0.0784^{***}	-0.00516^{**}	0.0959^{***}
	(0.00157)	(0.00850)	(0.00183)	(0.0113)	(0.00245)	(0.0117)
\mathbf{AF}	0.488^{***}	0.190^{***}	0.514^{***}	0.125^{***}	0.388^{***}	0.302^{***}
	(0.00597)	(0.0365)	(0.00687)	(0.0408)	(0.0122)	(0.0689)
TMM	0.0582^{***}	-0.0257^{***}	0.0944^{***}	-0.0174	-0.0286^{***}	-0.0399***
	(0.00299)	(0.00804)	(0.00369)	(0.0115)	(0.00406)	(0.00965)
LA	0.647^{***}	0.425^{***}	0.649^{***}	0.389^{***}	0.622^{***}	0.521^{***}
	(0.00334)	(0.0293)	(0.00392)	(0.0338)	(0.00734)	(0.0598)
AS	0.591^{***}	0.577^{***}	0.592^{***}	0.589^{***}	0.560^{***}	0.507^{***}
	(0.00346)	(0.0344)	(0.00394)	(0.0400)	(0.00811)	(0.0742)
SCA	-0.00439	-0.0659***	0.0237^{***}	-0.0668***	-0.0625^{***}	-0.0522
	(0.00413)	(0.0173)	(0.00526)	(0.0183)	(0.00507)	(0.0357)
Education	0.00668^{***}		0.00734^{***}			
	(8.23e-05)		(0.000121)			
Observations	2991287		1492037			
Pseudo R-squared	0.125		0.182			
Ν	2.991e + 06		1.492e + 06			
11	-1.174e+06		-546437			
Company Contra company	2000. Standa	nd onnona in m			<0.05 * m <0	1

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.2.2 Different couples: early marriage vs. cohabitation

We now look at trends in how couples are formed. Early marriage is associated with traditional gender role distribution between husband and wife, whereas cohabitating couples may be more fragile, but partners more independent. Table 7 shows most migrant groups across cohorts and types of couples have a higher propensity for early marriage, mostly women from Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb, Central and South Asia. However, this tendency diminishes for all groups at the second generation. It seems that migrant groups with the highest probability to marry also marry youngest.

Cohabitation is a rather recent phenomenon that has developed as more women started to become economically independent and politically empowered. It is not surprising first generation migrants are less likely to choose cohabitation over marriage. However, this propensity increases for the second generation, more so for women of Europe, Latin America and Asia. The coefficients of the post-1970 cohort in Table 7 also clearly indicate a generational change in behavior concerning cohabitation. Whereas migrants born before 1970 behave more or less alike across generation, second-generation migrants born after 1970 converge to the native baseline, although less rapidly for women of Central and South Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb. Mixed couples are much more likely to cohabit than endogamous couples (figure 9). This supports the hypothesis that individuals intermarrying may be more liberal, but that legal incentives for first generation migrants to improve their conditions of stay or that of their partner are strong enough to influence marriage decisions.

Table 7: Early marriage vs. cohabitation (women)

	Barry marriage		eenabitation					
	All		All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.124^{***}	-0.0170***	-0.0240***	0.00376^{**}	-0.0200***	-0.0125***	-0.0403***	0.0375^{***}
	(0.00469)	(0.00288)	(0.000684)	(0.00180)	(0.000768)	(0.00196)	(0.00129)	(0.00397)
SE	0.291^{***}	0.0468^{***}	-0.0607***	-0.0348***	-0.0543^{***}	-0.0415^{***}	-0.0722^{***}	-0.0309***
	(0.00541)	(0.00276)	(0.000528)	(0.000840)	(0.000647)	(0.00101)	(0.000521)	(0.00131)
EE	0.522^{***}	0.191^{***}	-0.0794^{***}	-0.0556***	-0.0655^{***}	-0.0549^{***}	-0.0834^{***}	-0.0596***
	(0.00408)	(0.00960)	(0.000343)	(0.00186)	(0.000556)	(0.00333)	(0.000269)	(0.00203)
AF	0.273^{***}	0.123^{***}	-0.0603***	-0.0630***	-0.0526^{***}	-0.0753***	-0.0710^{***}	-0.0525^{***}
	(0.0119)	(0.0395)	(0.00118)	(0.00634)	(0.00187)	(0.00527)	(0.00113)	(0.0121)
TMM	0.532^{***}	0.232^{***}	-0.0778***	-0.0721^{***}	-0.0694^{***}	-0.0644^{***}	-0.0823***	-0.0763***
	(0.00781)	(0.0115)	(0.000398)	(0.00120)	(0.000779)	(0.00326)	(0.000282)	(0.00101)
LA	0.403^{***}	0.0643^{***}	-0.0663***	-0.0458^{***}	-0.0589***	-0.0441***	-0.0754^{***}	-0.0520***
	(0.00991)	(0.0245)	(0.000679)	(0.00742)	(0.00108)	(0.0100)	(0.000598)	(0.0103)
AS	0.250^{***}	-0.0209	-0.0625***	-0.0495^{***}	-0.0552***	-0.0725***	-0.0742^{***}	-0.0118
	(0.00928)	(0.0231)	(0.000783)	(0.00935)	(0.00116)	(0.00620)	(0.000715)	(0.0249)
SCA	0.432^{***}	0.313^{***}	-0.0772***	-0.0758^{***}	-0.0746^{***}	-0.0772^{***}	-0.0798^{***}	-0.0765***
	(0.0120)	(0.0573)	(0.000497)	(0.00275)	(0.000876)	(0.00353)	(0.000449)	(0.00392)
Education	-0.0183***		0.00272^{***}		0.00247^{***}			
	(0.000271)		(9.92e-05)		(9.97e-05)			
Observations	281477		1531937		1531937			
Pseudo R-squared	0.309		0.132		0.136			
Ν	281477		1.532e + 06		1.532e + 06			
11	-79229		-454518		-452617			

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

3.2.3 Partners' differences: age and education gap

Waldis (2008) stresses heterogamy/homogamy in the couple are not limited to its ethnic dimension, and that complementary/symmetric exchanges happen at different levels. Here we turn to the role of age and education as matching factors in couples. Table 8 shows three clear trends. First there seems to be a difference between European women, which are usually slightly younger than their partner, and non-European women who display larger age gaps. More striking is the fact that non-European first generation migrant women born after 1970 are significantly younger than their partner (figure10). Age gaps might be explained by the fact that males who migrate alone only find a partner later on in their life. Some of them return home to choose a younger partner and then bring her to Switzerland (Wanner et al., 2005a). The age asymmetry is stronger among migrants born after 1970. However, age gaps in mixed couples are even larger for non-EU first generation migrants, which supports the hypothesis that access to a permit or citizenship might be part of complementary exchanges happening in mixed couples (Ossipow and Waldis, 2003).

However, the age asymetry in mixed couples is balanced by the fact that partners have almost the same education level. Whereas we observed that education only has a small impact on the probability to intermarry, women who intermarry least (from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb) also have the highest education gaps in endogamous couples. One reason for them to intermarry could be to live with a partner that has a similar level of education. In any case, similar education levels seem to be a factor in matching partners of different origin, an important common ground between individuals of different horizons (table 9 and figure 11).

	All		Endo		Inter	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.0702***	0.101***	-0.152***	-0.123**	-0.0732***	0.254^{***}
	(0.0157)	(0.0382)	(0.0249)	(0.0558)	(0.0205)	(0.0576)
SE	0.118^{***}	0.444^{***}	-0.0608***	0.238^{***}	0.695^{***}	0.740^{***}
	(0.0176)	(0.0261)	(0.0195)	(0.0317)	(0.0399)	(0.0498)
EE	-0.424***	0.301^{***}	-0.0267	0.321^{***}	-2.102^{***}	0.235
	(0.0189)	(0.0929)	(0.0209)	(0.108)	(0.0486)	(0.221)
AF	-2.645^{***}	-0.174	-2.280***	1.465^{***}	-3.648***	-3.991^{***}
	(0.0586)	(0.366)	(0.100)	(0.471)	(0.0861)	(0.729)
TMM	-1.174***	0.0996	-0.797***	0.335^{***}	-2.618^{***}	-1.410^{***}
	(0.0349)	(0.116)	(0.0395)	(0.126)	(0.0904)	(0.396)
LA	-1.334***	-0.676**	-0.115	-0.380	-1.734^{***}	-0.892^{**}
	(0.0391)	(0.275)	(0.0877)	(0.440)	(0.0506)	(0.432)
AS	-1.799^{***}	-1.547^{***}	-0.704***	-0.223	-2.457^{***}	-1.866^{***}
	(0.0394)	(0.380)	(0.0727)	(0.695)	(0.0511)	(0.510)
SCA	-1.559^{***}	-1.485^{***}	-1.597^{***}	-1.662^{***}	-1.359^{***}	1.578
	(0.0555)	(0.299)	(0.0607)	(0.312)	(0.175)	(1.262)
Education	0.0721^{***}		0.0776^{***}			
	(0.00181)		(0.00184)			
Observations	1532692		1532692			
Pseudo R-squared	0.028		0.030			
Ν	$1.533e{+}06$		$1.533e{+}06$			
11	-4.704e + 06		-4.702e+06			

Table 8: Age gap between partners

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

	Pre-1970		Post-1970		Endo		Inter	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.213***	-0.260***	0.100^{***}	0.0625^{*}	-0.728***	-0.381***	-0.0148	-0.214***
	(0.00727)	(0.0193)	(0.0237)	(0.0359)	(0.0110)	(0.0247)	(0.00910)	(0.0255)
SE	1.481^{***}	0.870^{***}	1.421^{***}	0.889^{***}	1.941^{***}	1.285^{***}	-0.241^{***}	-0.115^{***}
	(0.00827)	(0.0138)	(0.0218)	(0.0210)	(0.00866)	(0.0141)	(0.0177)	(0.0221)
\mathbf{EE}	0.960^{***}	1.079^{***}	1.030^{***}	0.888^{***}	1.133^{***}	1.312^{***}	0.351^{***}	-0.0355
	(0.00961)	(0.0575)	(0.0163)	(0.0597)	(0.00926)	(0.0478)	(0.0215)	(0.0980)
AF	-0.0763**	-0.0277	-0.105^{**}	1.138^{***}	0.223^{***}	0.514^{**}	-0.518^{***}	0.0206
	(0.0304)	(0.196)	(0.0508)	(0.295)	(0.0444)	(0.209)	(0.0381)	(0.323)
TMM	1.066^{***}	0.938^{***}	1.042^{***}	1.166^{***}	1.405^{***}	1.220^{***}	-0.153^{***}	-0.167
	(0.0181)	(0.0738)	(0.0296)	(0.0728)	(0.0175)	(0.0560)	(0.0401)	(0.175)
LA	0.0777^{***}	-0.0545	-0.293***	-0.00752	0.355^{***}	-0.0862	-0.331^{***}	-0.225
	(0.0201)	(0.142)	(0.0343)	(0.246)	(0.0389)	(0.195)	(0.0224)	(0.191)
AS	0.0349^{*}	0.443^{**}	-0.307***	0.0255	0.669^{***}	1.070^{***}	-0.325^{***}	0.0843
	(0.0197)	(0.199)	(0.0380)	(0.325)	(0.0322)	(0.308)	(0.0226)	(0.226)
SCA	0.968^{***}	-0.00521	1.572^{***}	1.135^{***}	1.467^{***}	0.301^{**}	-0.339***	-0.195
	(0.0300)	(0.150)	(0.0435)	(0.291)	(0.0269)	(0.138)	(0.0775)	(0.559)
Education	0.425^{***}				0.444^{***}			
	(0.000812)				(0.000815)			
Observations	1532556				1532692			
Pseudo R-squared	0.171				0.184			
Ν	1.533e + 06				1.533e + 06			
	-3.467e + 06				-3.455e+06			

Table 9: Education gap between partners

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.2.4 Fertility

Table 10 reports the coefficient estimates of the effect on the number of children of belonging to the first or second generation of a particular group. The sample is restricted to women aged more than 40 years old. Ceteris paribus, migrant woman generally have higher fertility rates than natives. Migrant group effects tend to be smaller for the second generation. Women from Switzerland, Western and Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia have lower fertility rates than Eastern European women, and women from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb, Africa or South and Central Asia have the highest fertility rate. The coefficient of second-generation Asian women is not significant, but they seem to have a fertility pattern different from other non-European migrant groups. Second-generation women from the Middle East, Maghreb and Turkey still display the largest differential, but the drop in their fertility rate is also the largest. As expected, the number of years of education has a negative and significant effect on the completed fertility rate.

Although coefficients of the second generation are not significant, columns 3 to 6 (figure 12) indicate that intermarried migrant women's fertility rate is similar to that of natives. In endogamous couples, first generation from Africa, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb have the highest number of children.¹¹

¹¹It should be noted that in the census data, it is not indicated if the children stem from the current partner of not.

	All		Endo		Inter	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.122***	-0.0561^{***}	-0.180***	-0.0749***	-0.195***	-0.0476*
	(0.00390)	(0.0116)	(0.00708)	(0.0163)	(0.00569)	(0.0250)
SE	0.0766^{***}	0.0617^{***}	0.0122^{**}	-0.0260**	-0.189^{***}	-0.0701^{**}
	(0.00473)	(0.0104)	(0.00562)	(0.0121)	(0.0113)	(0.0277)
EE	0.200^{***}	0.226^{***}	0.273^{***}	0.189^{***}	-0.443***	-0.202
	(0.00611)	(0.0426)	(0.00733)	(0.0469)	(0.0164)	(0.137)
\mathbf{AF}	0.396^{***}	0.325^{***}	0.862^{***}	0.219	-0.0930***	-0.354
	(0.0205)	(0.126)	(0.0428)	(0.173)	(0.0312)	(0.356)
TMM	0.560^{***}	0.339^{***}	0.702^{***}	0.242^{***}	-0.173^{***}	-0.0773
	(0.0121)	(0.0543)	(0.0154)	(0.0613)	(0.0310)	(0.252)
LA	0.167^{***}	0.0883	0.271^{***}	0.0387	-0.200***	-0.0919
	(0.0139)	(0.0850)	(0.0323)	(0.136)	(0.0198)	(0.175)
AS	0.0317^{**}	-0.183	0.375^{***}	0.0226	-0.417^{***}	-0.432*
	(0.0135)	(0.154)	(0.0258)	(0.283)	(0.0191)	(0.225)
SCA	0.410^{***}	0.300^{***}	0.351^{***}	0.0263	-0.193^{***}	0.372
	(0.0228)	(0.102)	(0.0285)	(0.109)	(0.0608)	(0.552)
Education	-0.0588***		-0.0411***			
	(0.000464)		(0.000424)			
Observations	1512842		1512842			
Pseudo R-squared	0.079		0.235			
Ν	1.513e + 06		$1.513e{+}06$			
11	-2.606e + 06		-2.465e+06			

Table 10: Completed fertility rate

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.2.5 Divorce

Like for other indicators, the difference in the probability to be divorced varies across migrant groups, the more traditional tending to divorce less. Second generation migrants divorce more, but like it was observed for cohabitation, there seems to be a cultural trend facilitating divorce that is not origin but cohort-specific (figure 13).

3.3 On the labor market

Wanner et al. (2003) make a thorough analysis of factors impacting on women labor force participation. They notice three factors specifically influence migrant women's behavior in this regard: gender roles imported from the origin country, household income and the fact that some permits are related to a pre-existing work contract. Although migrant women are more likely to be active on the labor market compared to native, women originating from some countries display a significantly lower labor force participation rate. Fibbi et al. (2005) also propose an analysis of the probability to be out of the labor force, focusing on individuals aged 23 to 34 years old. They do not find evidence of lower labor force participation of migrants compared to natives. Their results do not support the hypothesis that "culturally distant" populations would display lower probabilities of female labor force participation. As mentioned before, their report focuses on European migrants, but does the picture change when we include non-European migrant women?

Table 11 shows that although there may be cultural differences leading to varying labor force participation rates among first generation migrant women, second-generation women almost behave like natives. Migrants from South Central Asia and Middle East, Turkey and Maghreb, and Asia remain least likely to be active on the labor market, sticking to a more traditional gender role distribution.

Looking at cohorts, we see women originating from the EU are more likely to enter the labor force and even more so in the post-1970 cohort. It might be due to a combination of better qualifications and lower fertility rates observed above, and of other factors. Regression results also show that first generation women in mixed couples behave like natives in this regard (table 12 and figure 13)

	Natives	WE	\mathbf{SE}	\mathbf{EE}	AF	TMM	SA	AS	SCA	Total
Born in Switzerland	75.4	81.9	84.1	82.1	82.6	82.9	78.3	71.4	77.5	76
Married	67	73.3	76.7	76.5	78.5	77.3	70.4	66	76.9	67.6
Single	88.7	90.6	93.3	90.9	89.1	90.8	88.2	78.7	81.3	89
Foreign born		72.1	74.6	74.8	75.1	69.3	70.6	68.8	70.3	73
Married		65.2	72.4	73	73.4	67.3	67.4	64.6	68.8	69.6
Single		86.1	83.2	83.2	78.8	78.1	82.1	83.2	77.5	83.8
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Table 11: Women labor force participation (in %)

Source: Swiss census, 2000

	Pre-1970		Post-1970		Endo		Inter	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.0416***	0.0102***	-0.00979***	0.0401***	-0.0864***	0.0299^{***}	-0.0207***	-0.0157***
	(0.00135)	(0.00307)	(0.00374)	(0.00453)	(0.00245)	(0.00426)	(0.00187)	(0.00504)
SE	0.0398^{***}	0.0198^{***}	0.0685^{***}	0.0861^{***}	0.0924^{***}	0.0645^{***}	-0.00802**	0.00188
	(0.00131)	(0.00218)	(0.00300)	(0.00247)	(0.00114)	(0.00208)	(0.00359)	(0.00409)
EE	-0.00753^{***}	0.00879	-0.0433***	0.0574^{***}	0.0482^{***}	0.0883^{***}	-0.0131***	0.00341
	(0.00162)	(0.00935)	(0.00293)	(0.00807)	(0.00140)	(0.00618)	(0.00400)	(0.0193)
AF	-0.00956**	0.0369	-0.0557***	-0.0319	0.0484^{***}	0.0808^{***}	-0.0130*	-0.138*
	(0.00472)	(0.0280)	(0.00834)	(0.0435)	(0.00666)	(0.0290)	(0.00669)	(0.0715)
TMM	-0.0781^{***}	-0.00384	-0.0753***	0.0308^{***}	-0.00123	0.0624^{***}	-0.0305***	0.0461
	(0.00327)	(0.0122)	(0.00544)	(0.0101)	(0.00295)	(0.00819)	(0.00748)	(0.0310)
LA	-0.0883***	-0.00681	-0.143***	-0.0265	0.00415	0.0122	-0.0950***	-0.0408
	(0.00362)	(0.0227)	(0.00661)	(0.0326)	(0.00671)	(0.0349)	(0.00448)	(0.0365)
AS	-0.0954^{***}	-0.127^{***}	-0.187^{***}	-0.124^{**}	-0.0116^{**}	0.00659	-0.107^{***}	-0.108**
	(0.00361)	(0.0369)	(0.00717)	(0.0485)	(0.00570)	(0.0533)	(0.00455)	(0.0463)
SCA	-0.0768***	-0.0111	-0.151^{***}	-0.00811	-0.0114**	0.0433^{**}	-0.0913***	-0.0335
	(0.00555)	(0.0259)	(0.00840)	(0.0522)	(0.00462)	(0.0215)	(0.0161)	(0.112)
Education	0.0177^{***}				0.0171^{***}			
	(0.000133)				(0.000131)			
Observations	1795117				1795117			
Pseudo R-squared	0.0461				0.0928			
Ν	1.795e + 06				$1.795e{+}06$			
11	-934436				-888678			

Table 12: Labor force participation (women)

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4 Subjective attitudes

Beside influencing behaviors, integration processes also affect daily habits, values and beliefs. In this fourth part, we explore the evolution of migrants' use of national languages, of their feelings towards Switzerland, and of their attitudes concerning gender, religious and political issues. To investigate cultural integration paths in these subjective dimensions, we use SHP data (except for language). The smaller sample size reduces the significance of results obtained. We therefore do not interact gender and origin (except for gender attitudes) or type of couples and origin dummies.

4.1 Language

Knowledge of one of the four national languages is fundamental not only to succeed at school and on the labor market, but also to understand native culture and develop enriching social relationships in the host society. It is therefore not surprising that a substantial part of the federal budget devoted to cultural integration was spent on subsidizing organization offering language courses for migrants (OFM, 2006), or that it is considered a prerequisite for naturalization. It is also considered a fundamental external sign of integration by partners in mixed couples (Ossipow and Waldis, 2003).

Table 14 shows second-generation migrants are much more likely to declare one of the main national languages as their main language. What is more surprising is young second-generation migrants do so more than those born before 1970 whereas no such trend is detectable among first generation migrants. Many hypotheses could be made to explain this. It might be that Swiss educational institutions have become better at transmitting national language or that younger second-generation migrants are more willing to adopt a national language as their own.

Differences across migrant groups remain, Western and Southern Europeans being always more likely to adopt national languages. As expected, Asians and South and Central Asians display lower probabilities, but it is striking to observe a similarly low probability for Latin Americans, who seem to be much more attached to their mother tongue than other Latins from Southern Europe.¹²

First generation migrants with a Swiss partner have a slightly higher probability to adopt a national language than those in endogamous couples. However, the picture is more heterogenous for second-generation migrants, Africans and Latin Americans visibly putting more emphasis on keeping their mother tongue.

 $^{^{12}}$ As Italian is a national language, the author tested this by keeping migrants of Italian origin out of the sample. Results are available upon request.

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970		Endo		Inter	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.29***	-0.061***	-0.24***	-0.071	-0.34***	-0.046***	-0.10***	0.017^{***}	-0.068***	0.024^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(-0.001)	(-0.002)	(-0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)
SE	-0.41***	-0.05***	-0.33***	-0.05***	-0.52^{***}	-0.04***	-0.24***	0.01^{***}	-0.13***	0.03^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.0008)	(0.001)	(-0.001)	(-0.002)	(-0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0007)	(0.002)	(0.0004)
\mathbf{EE}	-0.73***	-0.34***	-0.70***	-0.49***	-0.70***	-0.23***	-0.19^{***}	-0.28***	-0.44***	-0.017^{**}
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(-0.008)	(-0.002)	(-0.005)	(0.0004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)
\mathbf{AF}	-0.61***	-0.23***	-0.54^{***}	-0.28***	-0.57***	-0.17^{***}	-0.12^{***}	-0.04**	-0.38***	-0.16***
	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(-0.027)	(-0.005)	(-0.022)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.044)
TMM	-0.72^{***}	-0.30***	-0.65***	-0.39***	-0.68***	-0.23***	-0.18^{***}	-0.19^{***}	-0.41***	-0.08***
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(-0.011)	(-0.003)	(-0.006)	(0.0007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.016)
LA	-0.84***	-0.35***	-0.80***	-0.45***	-0.78***	-0.23***	-0.21***	-0.13***	-0.75***	-0.34***
	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(-0.020)	(-0.003)	(-0.017)	(0.001)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.033)
AS	-0.84***	-0.37***	-0.80***	-0.60***	-0.77***	-0.17^{***}	-0.20***	-0.32***	-0.74***	-0.43***
	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.002)	(-0.029)	(-0.003)	(-0.022)	(0.001)	(0.048)	(0.003)	(0.045)
SCA	-0.83***	-0.45***	-0.78***	-0.49***	-0.78***	-0.37***	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.60***	-0.19**
	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.002)	(-0.023)	(-0.004)	(-0.028)	(0.001)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.0756)
Education	0.000465^{***}		0.00142^{***}				0.00407^{***}			
	(8.30e-06)		(1.68e-05)				(3.25e-05)			
Obs.	4942902		4942902				4942902			
Ps. R-sq.	0.533		0.535				0.339			
Ν	4.943e + 06		4.94E + 06				4.943e + 06			
11	-671042		-668672				-950499			

Table 13: Main language

Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.2 Feelings towards Switzerland

One could assume that in a perfectly egalitarian and non-discriminatory society, no one would request more equality between natives and foreigners. Table 14 shows that all migrants living in Switzerland are in favor of more equality compared to natives, first generation more so than second-generation migrants, except for those likely to have darker skin color or identified as Muslim (South and Central Asians, Africans and individuals originating from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb). Another interesting observation is migrants of the younger cohort have a more pronounced opinion than those born before 1970. Asked whether they are in favor of opening Swiss traditions to world influence, results look similar (figure 16) supports the hypothesis that migrants feel more could be done to facilitate their integration in the Swiss society and culture.

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.153^{***}	0.0559^{***}	0.155^{***}	0.0364^{***}	0.136^{***}	0.0866^{***}
	(0.00892)	(0.0107)	(0.00955)	(0.0138)	(0.0228)	(0.0164)
SE	0.207^{***}	0.103^{***}	0.206^{***}	0.103^{***}	0.199^{***}	0.102^{***}
	(0.00873)	(0.0101)	(0.00940)	(0.0127)	(0.0210)	(0.0158)
EE	0.104^{***}	0.0875^{***}	0.0884^{***}	0.0148	0.133^{***}	0.165^{***}
	(0.0193)	(0.0294)	(0.0245)	(0.0441)	(0.0307)	(0.0371)
AF	0.0233	0.0691	-0.0754	0.0527	0.221^{***}	0.107
	(0.0531)	(0.0861)	(0.0681)	(0.104)	(0.0652)	(0.153)
TMM	0.00597	0.137^{***}	-0.0230	0.0998^{**}	0.0607	0.174^{***}
	(0.0374)	(0.0304)	(0.0470)	(0.0457)	(0.0608)	(0.0396)
LA	0.186^{***}	0.0310	0.193^{***}	0.0364	0.171^{***}	0.0226
	(0.0271)	(0.0546)	(0.0326)	(0.0681)	(0.0477)	(0.0913)
AS	0.0505	-0.212*	0.0111	-0.217^{*}	0.130	-0.202
	(0.0626)	(0.111)	(0.0792)	(0.128)	(0.0990)	(0.225)
SCA	0.0270	0.104	0.0443	0.0651	-0.00383	0.182
	(0.0576)	(0.0760)	(0.0706)	(0.0975)	(0.0991)	(0.115)
Education	0.0261^{***}		0.0262^{***}			
	(0.000939)		(0.000943)			
Observations	40692		40692			
Pseudo R-squared	0.0389		0.0393			
Ν	40692		40692			
11	-25581		-25568			

Table 14: In favor of more equality between Swiss and foreigners

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15: In favor of opening Swiss traditions

			110-1510		POSt-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.137***	0.0630***	0.266***	0.0322	-0.350***	-0.125*
((0.00903)	(0.0105)	(0.0450)	(0.0561)	(0.103)	(0.0713)
SE (0.170^{***}	0.0968^{***}	0.0738	-0.0434	-0.665***	-0.214^{***}
((0.00935)	(0.0100)	(0.0530)	(0.0563)	(0.117)	(0.0692)
EE (0.0675^{***}	0.109^{***}	0.964^{***}	0.0951	0.975^{***}	0.473^{***}
1	(0.0200)	(0.0281)	(0.107)	(0.177)	(0.144)	(0.183)
AF -	-0.0115	-0.0432	0.953^{***}	0.246	0.343	1.330^{**}
1	(0.0538)	(0.0937)	(0.258)	(0.438)	(0.343)	(0.636)
TMM	0.0373	0.131^{***}	1.188^{***}	-0.0577	0.516^{**}	0.519^{***}
1	(0.0363)	(0.0301)	(0.188)	(0.201)	(0.249)	(0.195)
LA	0.155***	-0.000266	0.309*	0.549**	-0.559**	0.0418
1	(0.0286)	(0.0557)	(0.171)	(0.276)	(0.249)	(0.390)
AS (0.0337	-0.101	0.656^{**}	-0.141	0.489	-0.460
1	(0.0635)	(0.109)	(0.323)	(0.477)	(0.510)	(0.854)
SCA -	-0.0146	0.0428	1.300***	0.0477	0.955* [*]	1.029
1	(0.0594)	(0.0818)	(0.268)	(0.417)	(0.390)	(0.636)
Education	0.0255***	. ,	0.0718***	. ,	. ,	. ,
1	(0.000931)		(0.00364)			
Observations 4	40829		40985			
P. R-squared	0.0338		0.031			
N 4	40829		40985			
	-25598		-84619			

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.3 Gender attitudes

Turning to gender attitudes, our results show that the more traditional behaviors migrants display in the couple are in line with the more conservative subjective attitudes prevailing among first generation migrants. To observe how women internalize the traditional role of mothers, we first exclude men from the sample. Compared to natives, migrant women are likely to believe children suffer when the mother is working, except Western European women. It might also be that the more precarious conditions migrant women face make them feel that their work does harm their children. Then, to observe how sensitive males are to specific discrimination women are suffering from, women are excluded from the sample. Compared to natives, male migrants from Western, Southern Europe and Latin America are the only ones to be more sensitive than natives to this issue. However, although women suffer from specific forms of discrimination, the same might be true for male migrants originating from these regions (figure 17). Looking at the second generation, it appears more difficult to identify meaningful differences. It might be that attitudes of second-generation migrants concerning gender issues converge relatively fast to the Swiss average, while behaviors need more time to change (see results on behaviors in the couple, and findings of Wimmer (2004) cited above).

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	All		Pre-1970	0	Post-1970	/
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.215*	-0.189	-0.302**	-0.0540	0.333	-0.367*
	(0.113)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.158)	(0.295)	(0.189)
SE	0.768^{***}	-0.126	0.681^{***}	-0.129	1.104^{***}	-0.111
	(0.142)	(0.119)	(0.159)	(0.153)	(0.315)	(0.186)
\mathbf{EE}	0.805^{***}	0.238	0.773^{***}	1.195^{**}	0.872^{**}	-0.796
	(0.223)	(0.394)	(0.280)	(0.544)	(0.365)	(0.569)
\mathbf{AF}	0.981^{*}	-1.392	1.551^{**}	-0.998	0.355	-1.850
	(0.559)	(0.982)	(0.768)	(1.329)	(0.816)	(1.456)
TMM	2.495^{***}	-0.421	2.364^{***}	-0.807	2.719^{***}	-0.101
	(0.492)	(0.333)	(0.627)	(0.498)	(0.791)	(0.446)
LA	1.019^{***}	0.0389	0.324	-0.950	2.280^{***}	1.041
	(0.336)	(0.617)	(0.418)	(0.871)	(0.560)	(0.872)
AS	1.686^{**}	1.254	1.909^{***}	1.031	0.561	1.490
	(0.665)	(1.329)	(0.729)	(1.879)	(1.627)	(1.879)
SCA	3.307^{***}	-1.094	3.342^{***}	-1.504	3.250^{**}	-0.670
	(0.870)	(1.152)	(1.085)	(1.628)	(1.456)	(1.628)
Education	-0.229^{***}		-0.231^{***}			
	(0.0103)		(0.0103)			
Observations	15482		15482			
P. R-squared	0.069		0.071			
Ν	15482		15482			
11	-40226		-40213			

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.405^{***}	0.258^{***}	0.454^{***}	0.121	-0.314*	0.00632
	(0.0914)	(0.0979)	(0.0759)	(0.108)	(0.179)	(0.127)
SE	0.162	-0.0170	-0.121	0.393^{***}	0.0374	0.284^{**}
	(0.101)	(0.0923)	(0.0998)	(0.103)	(0.209)	(0.119)
EE	-1.145^{***}	-0.346	-0.581^{***}	0.564	-0.682***	-0.00813
	(0.190)	(0.261)	(0.185)	(0.395)	(0.239)	(0.386)
\mathbf{AF}	-0.982**	0.565	0.989^{*}	-1.196	0.191	1.370
	(0.434)	(0.761)	(0.505)	(1.029)	(0.565)	(1.030)
TMM	-0.996***	-0.183	0.423	-0.0344	-0.0263	-0.513
	(0.249)	(0.370)	(0.415)	(0.344)	(0.505)	(0.315)
LA	0.192	0.869^{*}	0.148	-0.456	-0.176	0.981
	(0.359)	(0.459)	(0.246)	(0.674)	(0.305)	(0.613)
AS	-0.818	-0.562	-0.693	1.479	1.113	2.900^{**}
	(0.590)	(1.076)	(0.461)	(1.456)	(1.128)	(1.456)
SCA	-1.282^{***}	-1.402^{*}	-0.372	0.795	-0.0152	-0.0152
	(0.356)	(0.795)	(0.841)	(1.261)	(0.892)	(1.261)
Education	0.0721^{***}		0.101^{***}			
	(0.00714)		(0.00651)			
Observations	19449		23880			
P. R-squared	0.064		0.064			
Ν	19449		23880			
11	-46418		-55939			

Table 17: Women penalized in general (Men)

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.4 Religious attitudes

Results concerning religious attitudes are similar to those observed for gender attitudes. First generation migrants are more likely to visit places of worship than natives. More assiduous attendance of religious offices could be explained by the fact that it is a social act strengthening the cohesion of communities. The hypothesis that religion fulfills more a social than a spiritual function among migrant communities is supported by the fact that migrants are not more inclined to pray than natives, and that second generation migrants are not more religious than natives either. Particularly interesting is the fact that migrants from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb seem very close to natives in their propensity to attend religious offices or to pray. The qualitative study of Gianni et al. (2005) on Muslims in Switzerland draws similar conclusions.

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.110***	-0.0310***	-0.0867***	-0.0125	-0.194***	-0.0730***
	(0.00981)	(0.0117)	(0.0103)	(0.0145)	(0.0190)	(0.0167)
SE	0.0423^{***}	0.0233^{*}	0.0602^{***}	0.0401^{***}	-0.0145	-0.00609
	(0.0130)	(0.0123)	(0.0135)	(0.0151)	(0.0301)	(0.0175)
\mathbf{EE}	0.0798^{***}	-0.0332	0.0364	-0.0324	0.123^{***}	-0.0510
	(0.0247)	(0.0334)	(0.0281)	(0.0455)	(0.0370)	(0.0442)
\mathbf{AF}	0.176^{***}	0.00642	0.224^{***}	-0.0593	0.0645	0.239
	(0.0548)	(0.0968)	(0.0634)	(0.111)	(0.0798)	(0.151)
TMM	0.0337	-0.145^{***}	0.102^{**}	-0.116^{***}	-0.146^{***}	-0.139^{***}
	(0.0390)	(0.0297)	(0.0456)	(0.0447)	(0.0496)	(0.0388)
LA	0.112^{***}	0.0135	0.158^{***}	0.0790	0.101^{*}	-0.196^{***}
	(0.0380)	(0.0632)	(0.0441)	(0.0780)	(0.0608)	(0.0739)
AS	0.0845	-0.0236	0.138^{*}	0.0685	0.00271	
	(0.0718)	(0.108)	(0.0804)	(0.136)	(0.110)	
SCA	0.261^{***}	0.0445	0.328^{***}	0.0410	0.171^{*}	0.0185
	(0.0571)	(0.0925)	(0.0620)	(0.106)	(0.0928)	(0.180)
Education	-0.0127^{***}		-0.0143***			
	(0.000989)		(0.000906)			
Observations	32887		37679			
P. R-squared	0.0334		0.0330			
Ν	32887		37679			
11	-19718		-22640			

Table 18: Probability to participate to religious offices more than for special occasions

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Probability to pray at least occasionally

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	-0.123***	-0.0416***	-0.0885***	-0.0314**	-0.197***	-0.0640***
	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.0107)	(0.0135)	(0.0249)	(0.0159)
SE	0.0603^{***}	0.0505^{***}	0.0445^{***}	0.0377^{***}	0.0848^{***}	0.0604^{***}
	(0.0106)	(0.00972)	(0.0115)	(0.0125)	(0.0220)	(0.0131)
EE	0.0219	-0.0685**	0.0120	-0.0352	0.0631^{**}	-0.103**
	(0.0193)	(0.0318)	(0.0228)	(0.0441)	(0.0268)	(0.0430)
\mathbf{AF}	0.138^{***}	-0.153	0.182^{***}	-0.244**	0.0845	0.0111
	(0.0361)	(0.0975)	(0.0388)	(0.118)	(0.0584)	(0.137)
TMM	-0.0521	-0.0527	-0.0720*	-0.0103	-0.0673	-0.0294
	(0.0359)	(0.0345)	(0.0426)	(0.0480)	(0.0561)	(0.0420)
LA	0.0980^{***}	0.112^{***}	0.143^{***}	0.140^{***}	0.123^{***}	0.0659
	(0.0287)	(0.0426)	(0.0298)	(0.0531)	(0.0404)	(0.0709)
AS	0.0118	-0.0701	-0.0184	0.0286	0.106	-0.216
	(0.0598)	(0.105)	(0.0722)	(0.113)	(0.0716)	(0.179)
SCA	0.131^{***}	0.100	0.161^{***}	0.0400	0.0694	0.170^{*}
	(0.0383)	(0.0684)	(0.0419)	(0.0980)	(0.0717)	(0.0905)
Education	-0.00666***		-0.0117^{***}			
	(0.000860)		(0.000788)			
Observations	41601		48207			
P. R-squared	0.0471		0.0293			
Ν	41601		48207			
11	-24118		-28654			

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.5 Political attitudes

Finally, turning to political attitudes, it appears all migrants are more leaning to the left than the conservative Swiss majority, except for second generation Asians and Africans, but their coefficients are not significant. It also appears that migrants from countries with democratic traditions (Western and Southern Europeans, Latin Americans) are less likely to express satisfaction with Swiss democracy than migrants coming from regions were political regimes are mostly undemocratic. Natives seem to be the most critical of their own political system.

Table 20: Political affiliation								
	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970			
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1 st	2nd		
WE	-0.541***	-0.215***	-0.244***	-0.199***	-0.408***	-0.261***		
	(0.0737)	(0.0789)	(0.0487)	(0.0632)	(0.107)	(0.0790)		
SE	-2.080***	-0.826***	-0.699***	-0.311***	-0.236	-0.696***		
	(0.0861)	(0.0783)	(0.0650)	(0.0646)	(0.149)	(0.0767)		
\mathbf{EE}	-1.875***	-0.281	-0.0401	0.246	-0.859^{***}	-0.766***		
	(0.153)	(0.226)	(0.129)	(0.204)	(0.174)	(0.207)		
AF	-2.546***	0.622	-1.400***	0.00356	-1.421***	-0.0678		
	(0.366)	(0.641)	(0.310)	(0.496)	(0.448)	(0.665)		
TMM	-1.193^{***}	-0.584^{**}	-0.0230	-0.0981	-1.091^{***}	-0.841***		
	(0.266)	(0.248)	(0.206)	(0.228)	(0.263)	(0.229)		
LA	-1.716***	-0.830**	-0.868***	-0.450	-0.411	-1.206***		
	(0.250)	(0.400)	(0.187)	(0.307)	(0.257)	(0.421)		
AS	-1.212**	0.396	-0.290	0.0140	-1.118**	-0.600		
	(0.484)	(0.740)	(0.355)	(0.543)	(0.510)	(0.940)		
SCA	-2.182***	-0.298	-0.394	-0.0682	0.257	-1.721**		
	(0.392)	(0.619)	(0.355)	(0.482)	(0.448)	(0.701)		
Education	0.0921^{***}		-0.0547^{***}					
	(0.00643)		(0.00398)					
Observations	40985		41707					
P. R-squared	0.053		0.036					
Ν	40985		41707					
11	-108135		-90115					

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	All		Pre-1970		Post-1970	
Origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
WE	0.168^{***}	-0.0178	0.266^{***}	0.0322	-0.350***	-0.125*
	(0.0416)	(0.0445)	(0.0450)	(0.0561)	(0.103)	(0.0713)
SE	-0.0534	-0.102^{**}	0.0738	-0.0434	-0.665***	-0.214^{***}
	(0.0486)	(0.0441)	(0.0530)	(0.0563)	(0.117)	(0.0692)
\mathbf{EE}	0.975^{***}	0.293^{**}	0.964^{***}	0.0951	0.975^{***}	0.473^{***}
	(0.0864)	(0.127)	(0.107)	(0.177)	(0.144)	(0.183)
\mathbf{AF}	0.744^{***}	0.598*	0.953^{***}	0.246	0.343	1.330^{**}
	(0.206)	(0.361)	(0.258)	(0.438)	(0.343)	(0.636)
TMM	0.950^{***}	0.257^{*}	1.188^{***}	-0.0577	0.516^{**}	0.519^{***}
	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.188)	(0.201)	(0.249)	(0.195)
LA	0.0386	0.390^{*}	0.309^{*}	0.549^{**}	-0.559**	0.0418
	(0.141)	(0.226)	(0.171)	(0.276)	(0.249)	(0.390)
AS	0.608^{**}	-0.212	0.656^{**}	-0.141	0.489	-0.460
	(0.273)	(0.417)	(0.323)	(0.477)	(0.510)	(0.854)
SCA	1.192^{***}	0.348	1.300^{***}	0.0477	0.955^{**}	1.029
	(0.221)	(0.349)	(0.268)	(0.417)	(0.390)	(0.636)
Education	0.0695^{***}		0.0718^{***}			
	(0.00363)		(0.00364)			
Observations	40985		40985			
P. R-squared	0.029		0.031			
Ν	40985		40985			
11	-84666		-84619			

Table 21: Satisfaction with Swiss democracy

Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5 Discussion

The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows:

- From the study of cultural integration indicators selected for this chapter, it clearly appears integration processes are at work between first and second-generation migrants of all groups observed, although significant differences remain between behaviors and attitudes of the 8 groups we have formed:
 - At school, men from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb and Eastern Europe seem stuck in a low educational equilibrium. However, young second-generation migrants have improved their performance and the gender gap is declining, due to the progresses made by second-generation women. Differences across groups are specifically obvious when looking at the position of women in the couple. Migrant women from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb are least likely to intermarry, even less than their male counterparts, and they display more traditional behaviors in most of the indicators examined. On the labor market, migrant women are slightly less likely to be active, but this difference disappears at the second generation, except for Asians
 - Patterns concerning migrants' subjective attitudes are more difficult to identify. Our results show "linguistically distant" migrants are less likely to declare one of the four national languages as their main language. Migrants' feelings toward Switzerland show there still are barriers and discriminations they perceive more strongly, particularly those with dark skin and those likely to be identified as Muslims. The more traditional behaviors observed in migrant couples are matched by more conservative attitudes towards gender issues, but only for the first generation. It might be that attitudes evolve more rapidly in a new social environment than behaviors do. Minor differences in religious attitudes vanish at the second generation, which supports the hypothesis that religious office attendance fulfils a social (and to some extent an economic function) rather than a spiritual function. Concerning political attitudes, migrants seem to be more satisfied with (Swiss) democracy, and they lean more to the left than natives.

- The general convergence pattern that we observe from the first to the second generation has no match across cohorts. Although we observe some cultural trends are not origin-specific, but cohort specific (see paragraph on cohabitation or divorce), results of too few indicators support the hypothesis that younger migrants would integrate better than migrants born before 1970. This might be due to changes in immigration flows and to circumstances in Switzerland.
- Convergence is particularly at work in mixed couples, where first-generation women of all origin already adopt native behaviors (including women from South and Central Asia, from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb), stressing the weakness of the "cultural distance" argument. First and second-generation migrants in endogamous couples reproduce more traditional behaviors. Although we cannot capture individual traits that impact on the partner choice, this analysis leads us to the conclusion that the interplay between household members, given the characteristics of individuals, of the household and of their social environment ("household dynamics") has an important role in integration processes.
- Education always has the expected significant effect on examined indicators. Its impact is non-negligible on fertility, but it is modest for most indicators.

The review of our indicators reveals cultural integration processes, which are at work in various ways in the different groups, contribute to overall convergence. The most striking and lasting differences we can observe across groups do not relate to educational achievement, religious or political attitudes, but to gender related attitudes and even more to gender related behaviors. Differences are more pronounced in endogamous couples in general, specifically for women from South and Central Asia, from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb.

As such, the decision to marry at an early age or to live in cohabitation, age and education gaps between partners, the preferred number of children and opinions of gender issues are private matters. However, they also influence the position women have in the household and in our society. Previous studies have called to focus less on individuals in migration studies, and more on families, as they are key in socializing second-generation migrants on whom most policy efforts are targeted (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002). Others have observed some migrant groups are more inclined to reproduce traditional family structures and relationships (Moret et al., 2007) and have very pronounced gender attitudes that may be exacerbated by migration (Gianni et al., 2005).

Based on our own findings, we recommend to better take into account migration-related gender issues and migration-specific "household dynamics" in the design of future cultural integration policies. It is on purpose that we avoid the term "family" and prefer to use the term "gender" and "household dynamics". First, the term family evokes the image of married couple with children, whereas a household is not associated with any particular structure (traditional or not). Second, implicitly or explicitly insisting on the unity and intergenerational solidarity existing in (migrant) families conceals the fact that migrant households may be confronted by specific problems. Constraints imposed by migration require specific household arrangements, which facilitate the division of labor among members and a clearer distribution of gender roles within the couple. Those constraints can intensify gender issues, which also exist, although to a different degree, among native couples. Education, labor market and other policies can and should be used to influence integration of migrants in Swiss society, but more targeted programmes (next to existing language, civic and other programmes) and policies could be designed to address gender issues, which arise or are exacerbated by migration, and migration-specific dynamics that develop in migrant households.

Such programmes should not so much aim at informing migrants about what is considered conform to Swiss values concerning gender or family, but about their individual rights. Moreover, programmes should support associations and organizations, which contribute to empower migrants in general (when confronted to the precariousness of their legal situation, the diminished job security, discrimination, etc.), and migrant women in particular (when confronted to situations of domestic violence, forced marriage, etc.) to exercise their rights. Given the ease with which extremist parties exploit such problems and the proportions cultural integration issues can reach in the public debate, it is important that more decent financial support is granted by lawmakers to actors involved in such work. Finally, the difficult situation some migrant women face should not conceal that, although gender equality is claimed to be a fundamental value of Western societies, it is a relatively recent "acquis", particularly in Switzerland,¹³ and that much remains to be done.

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 $^{^{13}}$ The emancipation of women is particularly recent in Switzerland. The fact Switzerland was not militarily involved in any of the World Wars of the last century delayed the entry of women on the labor market and their access to economic independence compared to other industrialized countries. This and other factors in turn slowed down the acquisition of the voting right for women, who obtained this political right in 1971 only.

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7 Graphs



Figure 2: caption



Figure 3: caption



Figure 4: caption



Figure 5: caption



Figure 6: caption



Figure 7: caption



Figure 8: caption



Figure 9: caption



Figure 10: caption



Figure 11: caption



Figure 12: caption



Figure 13: caption



Figure 14: caption



Figure 15: caption



Figure 16: caption



Figure 17: caption



Figure 18: caption



Figure 19: caption