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## Foreign aid and democratic consolidation in Zambia

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## Foreign Aid and Democratic Consolidation in Zambia

Lise Rakner\*

February 2012

### Abstract

The study examines Zambia's evolving aid relationship in relation to the country's democratic trajectory. The impact of aid in terms of democratic consolidation is linked to the development of the party system, the efficacy of key democratic institutions, and accountability in relation to tolerance of participation by the media and civil society in the political process. The study suggests that there are many good reasons for so-called traditional donors to phase out aid to Zambia. Zambia has recorded economic growth for the most part of this decade, but poverty levels still stand at near 70 per cent and both equity issues and poor human development indicators provide reasons for concern. The study cautions against an aid exit at a time when economic growth and new foreign partners may strengthen the executive office vis-à-vis civil society, opposition and agencies of restraint. The study argues for an enhanced emphasis on democracy assistance that may strengthen stakeholders and institutions with capacity to hold the executive to account for their policy actions in terms of development.

Keywords: Zambia, aid, democracy, political parties, civil society  
JEL classification: D72, F35, N47

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## 1 Introduction

Zambia's development trajectory represents a paradox. At independence in 1964, Zambia was a middle-income country with a per capita income of US\$752 (in contemporary US\$ figures). Four decades later, Zambia ranks among the poorest countries in the world. In terms of HDI, Zambia is ranked as 150 of 169 countries, mainly due to low life expectancy at birth. Zambia's development record is particularly alarming considering that the developments have occurred in a context of political stability. In the period after 2000, Zambia appears to have turned a corner. Steady growth records have been recorded through a combination of high copper prices and increased FDI. Partly as a result of improved governance performance, Zambia has been granted significant bilateral and multilateral debt relief since 2005. Yet, the 'Zambian paradox' remains as the growth recorded is not a match by equal improvements in terms of human development. Close to half of the Zambian population still lives in extreme poverty and near 70 per cent of the population exist below the poverty line. The distribution of income is skewed and the uneven distribution of wealth is also marked by regional differences and an increasing urban/rural divide.

Zambia's democratic trajectory presents an equally ambiguous picture. Experiencing a peaceful transfer of power from the one-party government of United National Independence Party (UNIP) in the 1991 multi-party election, Zambia was depicted a model of African democratization: The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) staged an electoral turnover without violence, in which the incumbent party was replaced by a cross-ethnic pro-democracy movement. Since then, Zambia has held four multi-party parliamentary and five presidential elections. In the September 2011 elections, the main opposition candidate Michael Sata and the party Patriotic Front (PF) staged the first change of government since the MMD gained power in 1991. Zambia now belongs to a select group of African multi-party systems along with Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Mauritius that have experienced two peaceful electoral turnovers, thus qualifying as a consolidated democracy under result-oriented minimalist definitions such as Przeworski's (1991) definition of democracy as uncertainty of outcome and Huntington's (1991: 267) definition of democracy being consolidated when an incumbent has lost power twice through competitive elections. However, as pointed out by Bogaards (2007), result-oriented definitions of democracy do not always reflect the reality in the sub-Saharan African (SSA) context. Despite the routinization of democracy as witnessed by competitive elections at regular intervals, institutional reforms have failed to produce influential 'watchdogs' and counter-forces against state malpractice and corruption. Over time, a growing concentration of power in the executive office has been witnessed. After two electoral turnovers and fierce political competition, electoral institutions have been routinized, but it is still not possible to argue that democracy in Zambia has been fully institutionalized and that all democratic norms as identified by Dahl (1971) are followed.

How then, has foreign aid impacted on Zambia's process of democratic consolidation? Looking at foreign aid for economic development, again, the case of Zambia presents a mixed picture. More than most other SSA countries, financial aid to Zambia has been tied to the implementation of economic reforms. Since the early 1990s, Zambia has received comparatively high levels of aid per capita, but with significant fluctuations, primarily linked to the various governments' economic governance performance.

Observers have concluded that an economic liberalization agenda has been maintained and has progressed due to persistent donor support and conditionality (Wohlgemuth and Saasa 2008; Oxford Policy Management 2010). At the same time, one of the most persistent findings from this analysis of Zambian public debate and policies is the status quo in terms of a nationalist economic agenda.<sup>1</sup> The reintroduction of agricultural marketing boards that currently buy maize above the selling price signals a significant reversal of the economic liberalization agenda implemented in the 1990s.

The role of foreign aid in terms of fostering a democratic agenda is even more ambiguous. Foreign aid has not challenged the executive dominance witnessed in Zambia, and donor support appears to have ‘nourished’ the politics of informality and patronage based networks. At the same time, democracy assistance has played an important role in terms of creating ‘institutions of restraint in Zambia, helped foster a relatively vibrant civil society and secured continuous multi-party elections. But, as this study will argue, political polarization has shrunk the space for civil society, and there is no guarantee that the new Sata-led government will not adopt some of the autocratic tendencies of its predecessor, simply because many of the institutional guarantees for democratic consolidation are still not in place. As the 1991 transition elections highlighted in Zambia, an electoral turnover is no guarantee for a new government that will adopt democratic practices. Despite an opposition victory, Zambian parties and the party system are fragile, most recently witnessed by the inclusion of former key members of the MMD cabinet in Sata’s new government.

The Zambian aid architecture and relations to foreign aid providers have changed markedly in the past two decades. Most importantly, Zambia has evolved from high donor-dependency to a situation where foreign aid is now less significant in relation to GDP, due to the combined effects of debt relief and economic growth. As a result, some of the major traditional bilateral donors are now phasing out their aid (The Netherlands and Denmark) and others are considering an aid exit (Norway and Germany). While central traditional donors are contemplating an exit, non-traditional donors, especially China but also India and Brazil, are increasingly becoming more active and relevant, not primarily as donor replacements, but rather as trade partners and investors. The combined effects of less aid dependence and new donors imply that the impact of traditional aid and donor conditions now play a less significant role in Zambian public debate than what was the case some years ago.

This study examines how Zambia’s evolving aid relationships have shaped the country’s democratic trajectory. In doing so, the study emphasizes the impact of aid on various components of democratic consolidation in Zambia linked to the developments of the party system, the efficacy of key democratic institutions, and accountability in relation to tolerance of participation by the media and civil society in the political process.<sup>2</sup> The ambiguous findings reflected above suggest, perhaps, that there are many

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<sup>1</sup> These perspectives were presented in interviews with Aloys Lorkeers (Head of Development Section at the EU), Nkuruma Chama Kalaluka (Policy Officer, The Netherlands Embassy), Jan Isaksen (country economist, Norwegian Embassy), at a seminar on 7 July 2011, Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka. Similar sentiments were echoed by members of the opposition, see interview with Given Lubinda (Member of Parliament), Lazarus Chota (Member of Parliament), the Patriotic Front (PF), Lusaka, 6 June 2011, as well as interview with economic analyst, Oliver Saasa, 6 June 2011.

<sup>2</sup> The study is informed by primary research from fieldwork in Zambia in addition to analyses of various primary written sources such as aid evaluation reports, party programmes, media reports and

good reasons for so-called traditional donors to phase out aid to Zambia. Zambia's growth indicates that the country should be able to develop and grow from its own resources. Yet, as the study will conclude, equity issues and the country's poor human development indicators provide reasons for concern. While Zambia has recorded economic growth at 6-7 per cent annually for the most part of this decade, poverty levels still stands at near 70 per cent. Cautioning against an aid exit at a time when economic growth and new foreign partners may strengthen the executive office vis-à-vis civil society, opposition and agencies of restraint, the study argues for an enhanced emphasis on strengthening stakeholders and institutions that may hold the executive to account.

The remaining parts of the study are organized as follows. In the next section, Zambia's evolving relationship with its foreign donors is discussed. The study then presents an analysis of Zambia's democratic consolidation, with particular emphasis on party competition, the efficacy of key democratic institutions and the role of media and civil society in the political process. After distinguishing between economic development aid and democracy support, the relationship between democratic developments and foreign aid is discussed.

## **2 Zambia's foreign aid relations**

Zambia's economic performance is closely tied to mineral export earnings. A weak economic environment and the precarious dependence on copper earnings have made foreign aid an important financial resource since the mid-1970s. More than most other SSA countries, financial aid to Zambia has been tied to the implementation of economic reforms, presented as conditions for continued aid from the donor governments. During the one-party period, stability measures and structural reforms negotiated with the multilateral institutions were discontinued. Faced with food riots in urban areas each time comprehensive reforms were attempted, President Kaunda abandoned the economic reforms. An escalating debt burden and increased donor co-ordination made Zambia ineligible for financial assistance from the IFIs in the late 1980s (Saasa 2005).

### **2.1 Foreign aid and economic governance**


The World Bank became involved in Zambia's economic reform programme in 1983 when it introduced a wide range of further policy conditions. Since that time, aid conditionality has been an important part of Zambian politics (Wohlgemuth and Saasa 2008). The result has been marked fluctuations of aid, mainly in relation to the country's compliance with and fulfilment of donor conditions and expectations. Though the Zambian government has protested at times, and even tried to do it alone, it has always had to return to the negotiating table with the donor community led by the IMF and World Bank (Rakner 2003; Wohlgemuth and Saasa 2008: 2).

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NGO reports. In total, 33 people were interviewed and a further 5 took part in a focus group discussion. The respondents included representatives from all major political parties, MPs, public servants, academics, donors, civil society representatives and journalists. The interviews took place between 1 June and 28 June. The interview sources are presented in Appendix 1, whereas the reference list present the written material consulted. I thank Anne-Thora Vardøy-Mutale, Ingvild Aagedal Skage, and Svein-Erik Helle for excellent research assistance.

The continuous crisis of the Zambian economy became the main issue of concern for the growing domestic opposition to the one party system (Rakner 2003). In 1991, with generous aid support from the international donor community, the new MMD government led by a former trade unionist, Frederick Chiluba, began to implement far-reaching economic reforms. For this, the Chiluba government was awarded with generous aid pledges. Since the early 1990s, Zambia has received comparatively high levels of aid per capita, but with significant fluctuations, primarily linked to the various governments' economic governance performance (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Total aid commitments to Zambia according to source (multilateral or bilateral), 1990-2007 (thousands of million 2000 constant US\$)



Source: Calculated from AidData.org (2011).

The importance of aid to Zambia is revealed by its contribution to the Government budget (Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2005). From 2000-05, on average aid accounted for 43 per cent per annum of the total state budget, peaking at 53 per cent in 2001 (Wohlgemuth and Saasa 2008: 2-3). In 2006 and 2007, the figure dropped to below 30 per cent, according to the budget speeches of the respective years. In the budget speech of January 2008, foreign grants and loans fell to 24 per cent, from 28 per cent in the previous year. This relative drop in the contribution of aid to the government budget is mainly due to debt relief, and rising copper prices (Wohlgemuth and Saasa 2008). Table 1 that shows total aid based on commitments allocated on a per person level, illustrates the declining contribution of aid vis-à-vis other forms of government finance, particularly since 2007.

Table 1: Total pledges commitments in aid, population size and aid allocation per person, Zambia, 1990-2010

Year	Total aid pledges (million 2000 US\$)	Population (million)	Aid per person (2000 US\$)
1990	971,617	7,86	123,61
1991	1392,29	8,068	172,57
1992	1364,73	8,272	164,98
1993	784,41	8,478	92,52
1994	821,456	8,693	94,50
1995	1604,35	8,919	179,88
1996	501,112	9,162	54,69
1997	584,684	9,418	62,08
1998	554,782	9,682	57,30
1999	1179,74	9,945	118,63
2000	1140,75	10,201	111,83
2001	507,158	10,45	48,53
2002	565,931	10,693	52,93
2003	1075,97	10,938	98,37
2004	1079,25	11,192	96,43
2005	2163,55	11,462	188,76
2006	1504,22	11,75	128,02
2007	475,425	12,055	39,44
2008	181,157	12,38	14,63
2009	80,2742	12,724	6,31
2010	144,889	12,926	11,21

Source: Calculated from World Bank (2011), AidData (2011).

## 2.2 Democracy assistance

International democracy assistance may be understood as conscious, practical international efforts to encourage, support or influence democratic change and political reform in other countries (Carothers 2009). Following the democratic transitions of the late 1980s and early 1990s, democracy assistance emerged as a key area of support within the international aid community. The relationship between democratization and improving other aspects of governance is complex. While democratization entails diffusing power more evenly across a greater number of actors both within and outside government, strengthening state capacity may call for greater centralization of power and more autonomy in the decision-making process. The good governance agenda, however, has tended to assume that ‘all good things go together’. Only recently have donors started to realize that the choices about forms of governance assistance, i.e. whether to provide support to enhance the bureaucratic capacity of governments or to provide capacity to agencies of restraint outside the government and state, may not work in a mutually reinforcing manner.

Bilateral governments, multilateral organizations and a large number of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been actively engaged in various programmes of democracy assistance. With some variations, the main international actors involved in providing democracy assistance have concentrated their



attention towards elections and electoral systems, institution-building, hereunder national constitutions, the promotion of the rule of law and judicial reform, support the establishment of institutions intended to promote checks and balances and accountability, such as anti-corruption agencies and, more recently, parliaments (Carothers 2010). Support for political parties also falls in this category, but this form of support has remained more limited (Carothers 2006), also in the case of Zambia. Finally, most bilateral aid agencies have since the 1990s provided assistance to civil society, and the principal focus has been on so-called issue-oriented NGOs and the media (Oxford Policy Management 2008).

Measuring the effect of democracy assistance is complicated in part because various donor agencies have different definitions of what is included in this aid category. Finkel et al. (2007) analysis of US foreign assistance to democracy building between 1990 and 2003 finds an effect, and claim that democracy assistance can be effective if it leads to local agency and empowerment. Carothers (2010) also highlights that there is a growing consensus that politics matter for development—and that therefore democracy promotion is important. Wright concludes, after analysing aid to both temporary and long lasting dictatorships, that in general there is a tendency for such aid to foster democratization (Wright 2009). Cornell however, qualifies this conclusion. According to her findings it is in stable authoritarian regimes that there may be a positive impact, but in military regimes it might even be counter productive (Cornell 2008). Overall, there is no consensus in the aid community about which approach democracy assistance works best (Carothers 2010; Levy 2010; Wollack and Hubli 2010).

Interestingly, the form of democracy assistance that has emphasized power diffusion and the capacity of non-state actors to hold government to account—in financial terms a relatively marginal aspect of financial aid—is now challenged by a developmentalist approach to democracy. The developmentalist approach argues for a stronger focus on policy and financial and bureaucratic management, and to give less priority to a pluralist democratic agenda (Gershman and Allen 2006).<sup>3</sup> From a democracy perspective, a so-called developmentalist approach may have significant consequences as studies of aid and power relations have shown that aid provided to enhance the quality of governance, linked to economic performance, often ends up supporting the incumbent and patronage politics linked to the executive (Erdmann and Engel 2007; NORAD 2007; von Soest 2007).


Democracy assistance from Zambia's foreign donors shows a relatively similar pattern to the overall pattern in SSA. In the 1990s, emphasis was first given to macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment, followed by a focus on governance, albeit in an apolitical manner, emphasizing reform of state institutions. Overall, bilateral donors appear to have moved in the same direction, though at times at different speed. As witnessed in Figure 3, the bulk of democracy assistance funding has been allocated to public sector reform, an area where considerable progress has been noted. But, as argued by a number of analysts, in Zambia public sector reforms have taken place in a context of a centralized and personalized nature of power. The donor supported reforms therefore, appear fragile (Oxford Policy Management 2010; Wolgemuth and Saasa 2008).

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<sup>3</sup> See also Carothers (2009, 2010) analyses of the recent challenges to democracy assistance.

Towards the late 1990s, most of Zambia’s bilateral donors added support to democratization and human rights to their aid-portfolios. The democracy support initiatives have included public financial management, the media, the judicial system, and gender policy development, and support to election management. Support to the legislature has been provided through a multi-donor Parliamentary Reform Programme (PRP) since 2002 (Amundsen 2010). As a result, there is a reported increase in the number of people who have access to MPs and the number of visitors to parliament, the public is able to follow the proceedings in the house, and constituency offices have been established, staffed and equipped (ibid). As Figures 2 and 3 indicate, assistance aimed at increasing democratic participation, bettering electoral administration and supporting the free media has increased in a relatively stable manner throughout the 2000s. By 2009 government and civil society assistance had become one of the areas gifted with the most generous aid pledges, as is evident if one compares Figure 2 with Table 1.4 However, the pledges are often still geared towards elections and especially the immediate pre-election period. Thus the assistance seems to be geared more towards electoral events rather than building democratic institutions and political culture.


Figure 2: DAC-ODA commitments to Zambia for government and civil society assistance, 1995-2009 (million current US\$)



Source: Calculations from OECD (2011), *OECD Stat*.

<sup>4</sup> The numbers are not directly comparable as the DAC-ODA numbers are in million current US\$, while the AidData numbers are in million constant 2000 US\$. Nevertheless, the numbers give an indication of the rise in prominence of democracy assistance.

Figure 3: DAC-ODA commitments to Zambia for subfields of government and civil society assistance, 1995-2009 (million current US\$)



Source: Calculated from OECD (2011), *OECD Stat*.

### 2.3 New aid dynamics

In the 1990s, Zambia's development co-operation programmes were negotiated on a one-to-one basis with government, and there was little formal attempt to co-ordinate assistance amongst donors except through the Consultative Group meetings, which started in the mid-1980s and focused on macroeconomic and structural policy reforms (Oxford Policy Management 2008). Some donors did act together on certain issues, such as the constitutional changes banning Kenneth Kaunda from standing in the 1996 elections.<sup>5</sup> Governance became a much more prominent element of the donor dialogue from the late 1990s onwards. As a result, the dynamic of donor engagement with the Zambian Government has changed markedly since the turn of the millennium.

In September 2002, the Nordic Plus countries met in Helsinki and agreed to push forward a joint harmonization process in Zambia (Oxford Policy Management 2008). This was taken forward by the embassies in Lusaka, and the 'Harmonization in Practice' initiative, HIP, was started, which then evolved into Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia. Over time, this alignment process has incorporated more agencies, including the multilateral agencies, the World Bank and the UN system, and is now known as WHIP, the Wider Harmonization in Practice. Through the Joint Assistance Strategy Zambia (JASZ) close to half of Zambia's ODA is now aligned to GRZ's Fifth National Development Plan. The new aid modality signals developments within the donor

<sup>5</sup> The Zambian Constitution was amended shortly before the 1996 elections to ban Zambian citizens born outside Zambia to stand for elections. The constitutional amendment was widely perceived by civil society, the opposition, and Zambia's donors as a ploy by the incumbent, President Chiluba, to ban the former President Kenneth Kaunda from standing for re-election.

community and increased trust in the commitment of the Zambian government to economic development. Some stakeholders have argued that harmonization and the need for consensus may constrain donors that are prepared to take a stronger stance on issues of governance (Oxford Policy Management 2008).

Nevertheless, Zambia's aid history cautions against an overly optimistic view of the new aid paradigm leading to change, and many civil society activists, MPs and observers question the donors' real commitment to harmonization. The JASZ strategy presupposes a common rationality and joint ownership of the policy agenda between government and the donor group. With the bulk of donor funding being channelled to the executive through poverty reduction budget support, aid agencies may risk losing contact with the line ministries and civil society as actors outside the government become marginalized both in terms of funding and dialogue. Evaluations by DFID (2008) and NORAD (2007) have pointed to this paradox and the potential governance risks arguing that harmonization may lead to a further concentration of power in government and the donors at the expense of civil society. These sentiments were echoed by many civil society actors interviewed for this study. The potential effect may be that civil social organizations (CSOs) lose access to information on government and reform issues, which again will hamper their ability to monitor the government's commitment to poverty reduction and governance.

These are significant concerns given that the Zambian government's commitment to poverty reduction is still questioned. According to DFID's recent evaluation of its contribution to the poverty reduction budget support facility, its resources have increased the total fund available to GRZ and have encouraged reform of the public financial management. As a result, public expenditure is now more transparent and potentially more accountable. Beyond this, there is no conclusive evidence that poverty reduction budget support in Zambia has increased pro-poor spending (DFID 2008: viii).

## **2.4 The increasing importance of non-traditional donors**

By the mid-1990s multilateral donors, and in particular the IFIs, surpassed the importance of bilateral donors in terms of pledges given. In the period after 2001, however, bilateral flows have more than doubled, and multilateral flows had fallen to 11 per cent of the total by 2005 (Oxford Policy Management 2008). Perhaps the most significant change to the development aid debate in Zambia in the last five years is, however, the enhanced importance of non-traditional donors, most notably China. Chinese engagement in Zambia cannot be regarded as a new phenomenon, as it dates back to the colonial days when China supported the liberation movement. Chinese investment in Zambia began already in the First Republic (Brautigam 2009), and China has been extending assistance to Zambia prior to and after the attainment of independence in 1964.

Chinese development assistance to Zambia differs significantly from that of traditional donors, and comes in three main forms: grants, loans, and economic and technical co-operation (ETC) agreements. The Chinese engagement covers the sectors of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, communications, transport and health (Afrodad). China's aid relationship with Zambia is at a bilateral level and there is little evidence so far of co-ordination between China and other donor agencies (Tjønneland et al. 2006). The exact amount of development assistance from China to Zambia is hard to establish

as data are not provided on a country basis and Chinese aid operates outside organized aid modalities. Moreover, Zambia's bilateral aid agreements with China are confidential, which obscures public scrutiny. Chinese foreign policy and aid commitments have acquired a significance that far exceeds the actual development aid contributions, however. In terms of ODA figures, the assistance provided from China and other non-traditional donors do not appear to make a significant contribution. But, as argued by Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2011), much of Chinese development finance does not constitute official development assistance and instead comes in the form of export credits, grants and concessional loans. Moreover, the significance of Chinese development assistance should be considered in light of the intersection between China's development assistance, trade and investment interests. Chinese multinational companies utilize China's foreign aid practices as leverage for marked access and other investment opportunities (Chileshe 2010). Thus, aid, mainly in the form of concessional loans, serves as a platform for investment from mainly state-aligned Chinese companies. The China Export-Import Bank plays a critical role as an instrument in promoting bilateral trade and investment between Africa and China (Brautigam 2010).

The stated Chinese policy of non-interference has been criticized by NGOs and traditional donors because of its potential negative implications for governance and democratization. Many fear that the enhanced financial influence of the Chinese could hamper efforts to increase aid effectiveness and governance initiatives (Tjønneland et al. 2006). These concerns were echoed by civil society and donor representatives interviewed in 2011. Many claimed that as China will not withhold assistance to Zambia even if the governance situation deteriorates, the leverage of the donor group in terms of both economic and political governance issues was declining.<sup>6</sup> The increasing influence of China became an important issue in the 2006 elections when the main opposition candidate strongly criticized the role of China. Respondents interviewed from both the formerly governing party, the MMD, and opposition parties confirmed that Chinese businessmen and government authorities contribute informal election campaign resources. Representatives from various European donor organizations also complained that China did not share information or act in co-ordination with the donor community at large. The fact that China tends to deal directly with heads of state was considered to weaken the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, as well as constrain the donor harmonization agenda since China, along with India and Japan, do not form part of the JASZ group.

Thus, two significant recent changes in Zambia suggest that aid may become a much less dominant feature of public debate and policy-making. First, as illustrated in Table 1, the proportion of aid allocation to Zambia per person has shrunk rapidly throughout recent years, indicating that Zambia's dependency on development aid from its traditional donors is markedly reduced due to the combined processes of economic growth and debt-relief.<sup>7</sup> Second, the entry of new development partners take a different

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<sup>6</sup> Interview, Peter MacDermott, DFID, Lusaka, 7 June 2011; Kaputo Chenga, Patricia Mwanyisa and Makani Mzyece, GIZ (Germany), 24 June 2011. Similar views were expressed in interview with H.M. Mumba, University of Zambia, 28 June 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Arguably, it is only now after the debt release secured in 2005/06 that it will be possible to see an actual developmental impact of aid. Since the 1970s various Zambian governments have borrowed externally to cover financing gaps caused by fluctuating copper earnings. Until 2005/06, donors provided foreign aid to enable Zambia to pay its foreign debt: non-concessional loans have been used to repay borrowing from private investors, and grants have helped repay non concessional debt.

approach to governance, and Zambia's future governments may be more reluctant to enter into aid agreements with traditional donors that carry political conditionalities. Before discussing how aid has affected democratic developments in Zambia, and thus, what the possible democratic effects of reduced aid may be, the next section assesses Zambia's democratic trajectories.

### **3 Zambia's democratic trajectory 1991-2011**

Zambia's democratic development illustrates the problems of classifying and understanding political developments in countries that find themselves somewhere between autocracies and fully fledged consolidated democracies. Zambia's 'grey zone' status is confirmed in various governance indices, such as the Mo Ibrahim index that find the quality of governance in Zambia to have improved from 2001 to 2008 (see Appendix 4). Freedom House has labelled Zambia as 'partly free' since 1993 in the *Freedom in the World* reports. Afrobarometer data suggest that while 70 per cent of the Zambian respondents view opposition parties as a key element of democracy, only 47 per cent find Zambia to be a democracy. Zambian political parties and civil society operate in an environment relatively open to free and fair debate and the political debates are linked to real political issues. Yet above all, political developments in Zambia in the past decades must be understood within a context of excessive executive dominance. A key question is therefore, how foreign aid has contributed to both aspects of Zambia's democratic trajectory, the open debate and the continued executive dominance.

Zambia belongs to a select cluster of African countries where the opposition secured an electoral victory in the transition elections and the democratic institutions have remained in place. The 1991 political transition in Zambia was closely linked to protest against the economic austerity measures known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Economic grievances were channelled into political demands for multi-party democracy. Soon thereafter, Zambia experienced a peaceful transfer of power from the one-party government of UNIP in a multi-party election and served as a model of African democratization; an electoral turnover without violence, in which the incumbent party was replaced by a cross-ethnic pro-democracy movement, the MMD.

The success of the MMD in the first multi-party elections has been attributed to the organizational reach and mobilizing success of trade union structures, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Since then, Zambia has held three multi-party parliamentary and four presidential elections.<sup>8</sup> In the September 2011 elections, the populist appeals by Michael Sata and the Patriotic Front witnessed the first change of government since MMD gained power in 1991. However, as pointed out by Gyimah-Boadi (2004) and Bogaards (2007), result-oriented definitions of democracy do not always reflect the reality in the context of SSA new democracies. Instead, they argue for more inclusive concepts of democratic consolidation that include viable and competitive party system, respect for and efficacy of key institutions, accountability to citizens, and tolerance of participation by the media and civil society in the political process.

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<sup>8</sup> President Levy Mwanwasa died in 2008, and in a presidential by-election former vice president Rupiah Banda of MMD was elected president.

The uneven process of democratization in Zambia post-1991 reflects the limits of applying regime survival and uncertainty of electoral outcome as key yardsticks of democratic consolidation. After the 1991 election that brought a new party to government, the MMD ensured that rules and regulations of the electoral process remain uncertain. Institutional reforms have failed to produce influential ‘watchdogs’ and counter-forces against state malpractice and corruption. As a result, there has been a growing concentration of power in the executive office. Despite the MMD’s strong electoral mandate and scope for institutional change after 1991, every attempt to reform the constitutional rules that would have allowed more autonomy for the electoral commission, parliament and media have failed. As a result, two decades of multi-party rule under the leadership of MMD have been marked by uncertainties and conflicts concerning the constitutional review processes. Constitutional reforms have been delayed since 1991 and despite its democratic agenda in the 1991 transition elections, the MMD retained the advantages of incumbency and enhanced the position of the executive (Rakner and van de Walle 2009; Rakner 2011).

### 3.1 The nature of party competition in Zambia

Since the democratic turn-over in 1991, the MMD retained power in four subsequent elections. In fact, while Chiluba’s successor in the 2001 elections, Levy Mwanawassa, won with only 29 per cent of the votes, he was re-elected in 2006 with 43 per cent of the vote. At the same time, the MMD narrowly gained control of the parliament (see Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2: Percentage of votes won by Presidential candidates by party in Presidential elections in Zambia, 1991-2011

Party of candidate	1991	1996	2001	2006	2008	2011
MMD	75.8	72.6	28.7	43.0	40.1	36.2
UNIP	24.2	-	10.1	-	-	0.6
ZDC	-	12.7	-	-	-	-
UPND/UDA	-	-	26.8	25.3	19.7	18.5
PF	-	-	3.4	29.4	38.1	42.3

Source: Nohlen et al. (1999); Electoral Commission of Zambia (2011).

Table 3: Percentage of seats won of largest parties in Parliamentary elections in Zambia, 1991-2011

Party	1991	1996	2001	2006	2011
MMD	83.3	87.3	46	48.6	36.6
UNIP	16.6	-	8.6	-	-
ZDC	-	1.3	-	-	-
UPND/UDA	-	-	32.6	17.3	18.6
PF	-	-	0.6	28.6	40

Source: Nohlen et al. (1999); Electoral Commission of Zambia (2011).

Yet, the 2006 elections were notable due to the emergence of an ‘urban protest vote’. Specifically, the PF, under the leadership of an experienced figure in Zambian politics, Michael Sata, won every urban parliamentary seat in the capital of Lusaka and the Copperbelt region as well as seats in most local constituencies (Gould 2007). Sata’s attacks on foreign investors, particularly those from China, for their abuse of the mining workforce and their supposedly corrupt relationship with the MMD resonated with urban Zambians, who were already angered by the negative impact of economic liberalization.

The death of President Mwanawasa in August 2008 led to a new succession crisis within MMD. The Zambian constitution states that a vice-president is only allowed to serve as acting president for 90 days, pending a presidential by-election. As a result, the death of Mwanawasa resulted in political uncertainty and further fragmentation of the party system. In November 2008, the MMD won a narrow victory and the former Vice-President Rupiah Banda became the new president of Zambia with 40.6 per cent of the votes compared with Sata’s 38.6 per cent. Given that the 2008 elections were carried out with the same voters’ registry as the 2006 election, Zambians who had turned 18 after 2006 effectively were disenfranchised during the elections. This possibly cost Sata the victory, given his popularity among the urban youth (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010).

However, Sata’s moment came three years later with an updated voters’ registry. After two closely fought elections in September 2011, Michael Sata won the Zambian presidential election in his fourth attempt. In a context where the incumbent party had vastly superior resources to distribute, the opposition ran a very effective campaign by telling their supporters that it was perfectly acceptable to receive clothes and food distributed by the ruling party, but ‘Don’t Kubeba!’—in other words don’t tell the ruling party that you won’t be voting for them.

### **3.2 Issue based politics**

While Zambian politics is marked by ethnicity and personality, there are also examples of issue-based politics. The various party programmes indicate that the Zambian party system cannot easily be characterized as polarized along a left-right dimension. Lack of ideological distinctions is also reflected in the fluidity of the party system, where it is easy for politicians to cross over to a new party. Nevertheless, economic governance issues have marked political debates between the MMD government, opposition parties and civil society since the mid-1990s (Rakner 2003). In 1993, the MMD coalition started to crumble as a number of central members of government and the MMD Central Committee opposed the implementation of economic reforms (ibid).

Perhaps the strongest indication is found in the significant difference found in voting behaviour between rural and urban constituencies. Arguably, an effect of Zambia’s economic reforms has been to impoverish the urban population while simultaneously increasing its ranks. As witnessed by the Afrobarometer (Appendix 3), urban voters increasingly state that they intend to vote for opposition parties and candidates while the rural constituencies predominantly report that they intend to vote for the incumbent. This finding suggests that the political parties and civil society have been able to mobilize voters on economic issues. Interviews with local party activists suggest that the MMD concentrated on vote-buying in the rural areas during both the 2006 and 2008



elections, and that its treatment of the urban poor proved detrimental to its electoral fortunes in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, where Michal Sata's Popular Front obtained close to 60 per cent of the vote. The PF's campaigns in 2006, 2008 and 2011 brought a new dimension into the electoral debate in Zambia by specifically focusing on poor urban voters (Larmer and Fraser 2007).

### **3.3 The quality of democratic institutions**

Political contestation in Zambia must be understood in the context of excessive executive dominance where the president's prerogatives for allocation of government resources produce important incentives for individual members of parliament to support the president in exchange for increased resources for their constituencies. The president has far-reaching decision-making authority, which includes making key public appointments in the Zambian state and veto powers over decisions by parliament. Opposition members complain about the dominance of the Speaker and the ruling party in selecting committee members, and that they are not actively involved in planning and setting priorities (Amundsen 2010). Rather than formal or informal coalition formation with the opposition parties in the legislature, the MMD government has since 1991 preferred to build coalitions with individual opposition members of parliament to try to secure support. The ability to 'buy off' individual MPs has greatly undermined the effectiveness of the opposition parties.<sup>9</sup> Executive dominance has also meant that the opposition can only use its parliamentary position to check government powers to a very limited extent.

### **3.4 The role of media and civil society in Zambia's democratic developments**

Before the democratic transitions in 1991, Zambian civil society organizations were regarded as comparatively more influential than in many other African states (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 40). After 1991, the nature of Zambian civil society changed. While the political visibility of traditional, member-based interest groups declined, a multitude of new organizations were formed with international donor funding. According to Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003), the changes in the composition of Zambian civil society are explained by two combined factors. First, civil society, especially the trade unions, had achieved their main aim of democratization and getting 'their' government in power. Second, the force of the trade unions declined due to the effects of economic reforms which led to redundancies and dramatic membership loss, as well as internal political conflict. The new NGOs, while strong in numbers, often had some common shortcomings such as lack of members, weak roots in society, weak organization and capacities, donor dependence and lack of lobbying skills.

The turn of the millennium saw an increase in new, professionalized NGOs, linked to a new emphasis on civil society in the international donor community. With the new liberal democratic regime and foreign funding, civil society came to be dominated by

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<sup>9</sup> Given Lubinda (Kabwata MP for Patriotic Front) referred to the 10th National Assembly (2006-2011) as a barren institution and that the opposition had not been able to move any significant motions. In his words, 'the only difference from the one-party dictatorship is that the UNIP Central Committee is now called a cabinet'.

the legal community, churches and above all a number of new, professionalized NGOs. There are currently 5,000 NGOs registered in Zambia.

A marked strength of Zambia's civil society is the ability to act together and mobilize around key issues of economic and political governance. One notable example was the Oasis Forum, which was formed to oppose Chiluba's attempt to change the constitution to run for a third term. The Oasis Forum was supported by donors and included a number of NGOs, as well as opposition parties. However, due to excessive presidential powers, civil society has not been able to sustain pressure on government and secure lasting changes in the form of constitutional reform.

Gould (2011) illustrates these paradoxes of Zambian civil society with reference to the Oasis Forum. According to Gould, the Oasis Forum managed to sustain momentum for five of six years before the changing political environment, and a great deal of concerted political manipulation, brought about its demise. Zambia's major civil society alliance was subjected to heavy strains under Mwanawasa's administration, which took decisive measures to dissipate the momentum of the Oasis Forum. Above all, the constitutional reform process that was a key demand of the Zambian civil society was delayed by Mwanawasa, instigating a cumbersome Constitutional Review Commission that took three years to produce a draft constitution. From here, a National Constitutional Conference was established with a mandate to debate the CRC draft. The NCC, seen by civil society and the main opposition party PF to be dominated by MMD loyalists, succeeded in deflecting all of the key liberal reforms advocated by the Forum and its allies. The CRC draft failed to pass parliament in 2010. This failed constitutional reform process therefore demonstrates the limits of civil society in Zambia in the context of strong presidential powers (Gould 2011: 18).

Key informant interviews confirm Gould's argument about weak civil society in Zambia. Some related this weakness to the fact that the political environment in Zambia, which includes political parties, NGOs and the press, is exceedingly polarized. NGO representatives complained that due to the media coverage in Zambia, civil society is increasingly seen as portraying certain partisan positions. Informants argued that civil society associations that had support from the state operated as 'political parties' to the extent that they favoured MMD government politics. As a result, relatively unknown NGOs who favour government policies were perceived to receive considerable coverage in the public press. Other NGOs found it very difficult to get press coverage of their work because of the highly polarized press climate.<sup>10</sup> NGO representatives lamented that due to increased competition for funding and media attention, it was very difficult for the NGO community to speak with one voice.

Prior to the 2011 elections, arguably, the Zambian media appeared very polarized and restricted. The public media functioned as a mouthpiece of the MMD government, and the private media reacted by promoting views of the opposition and anti-government voices. The polarization of Zambia's print media intensified after the main private newspaper, *The Post*, which sells five times more copies of its daily paper than the government papers, chose to support the PF candidate in the 2008 elections. During the 2011 election campaign, such polarization meant that smaller parties, as well as NGOs, experienced 'media blackouts' with no access to media. Community radio appeared

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<sup>10</sup> Interview Kaputo Chenga, Patricia Mwananyisa and Makani Mzyece, GIZ (Germany), 24 June 2011.

somewhat less polarized, but as community radio stations rely on the daily newspapers for news stories, arguably, the polarization of the printed media spills over to community radio.

In addition, media legislation in Zambia is restrictive and very few licenses are provided. The Independent Media Broadcasting Bill has been debated for nine years but has not yet been passed by parliament. As a result, all media licenses are provided by the Minister for Information, and there is clear evidence that licenses are used in order to control the private media. Similarly, the NGO Bill that was passed by Parliament in 2010 now effectively enables government to regulate NGOs who are required to renew their license every 5th year with the Minister of Information.<sup>11</sup> The Freedom of Information Bill was one of PF's main campaign issues, and it will be very interesting to follow the new government's media policies.

#### **4 Foreign aid and democratic consolidation: is there a connection?**

The literature on the impact of aid to economic reform suggests that aid may have been more effective in terms of capacity development and ideas rather than monetary transfers (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002; van de Walle 2001). In the period after 1990, Zambia has deregulated central elements of its economy and, overall, the reforms have been sustained in contrast to the experiences of the 1980s. Thus, the foundations for a shift from a state-oriented to a market economic system have been established. Considering Zambia's background 'stop-go' economic reforms and unsustainable debt, this is perhaps the main 'success story' of foreign aid to Zambia. In the case of Zambia, the fact that economic reforms have been sustained since the early 1990s, as opposed to the stop-go nature of reforms in the 1980s, may be linked to presence of donors and donor agreements. However, as noted in the introduction, a marked opposition to the liberalization measures have formed the political debates in Zambia since the turn of the millennium and the Patriotic Front rhetoric and initial policies in government signals a more nationalist economic direction in Zambia.

Aid agreements and the presence of donors and conditionality dialogues have also added support and legitimacy to the Ministry of Finance and, to a degree, provided this Ministry with autonomy from presidential decrees and pressure. There are also indications that formal regulatory institutions such as the Audit Office have been strengthened with positive results in terms of economic accountability.<sup>12</sup> As will be discussed further below, civil society has become central in terms of restraining executive will in economic policies. However, given the above-mentioned discussion of civil society's weakened role in Zambia's polarized political climate, civil society alone is not an adequate safeguard for vertical or horizontal accountability.

Yet, Zambia's economic policies also display elements of a 'partial reform syndrome' suggesting that political leaders carry out reforms only to the extent that they do not

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<sup>11</sup> Interview Beatrice Grillo (Board Chairperson), Mary Mulenga (Board Vice-Chairperson) Engwase Mwale (Executive Director), Non-Governmental Organizations' Co-ordinating Council (NGOCC). Lusaka, 5 June 2011.

<sup>12</sup> The Anti-Corruption Commission has also been lauded for whistle-blowing on corruption in the Health Ministry (Molenaers et al. 2010).

appear to hurt their own vested interests (Rakner 2003; van de Walle 2001). The continuous concerns with lack of progress in terms of decentralization, civil service and financial management suggest continuity with politics of the past. The issue of sustainability of technical assistance is well illustrated in an overall positive evaluation of DFID's technical assistance support to fund expatriate management teams of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). DFID rates this intervention as a success in terms of increasing capacity and tax/GDP ratios (DFID 2008). However, with the phasing out of DFID finance in 2005, GRZ also reduced its own funding facility and as a result, the autonomy and capacity of ZRA now appears threatened. The example of ZRA points to the crucial importance of donor influence in pressuring for institutions to operate along formal or rational-legal lines in preserving autonomy (von Soest 2007). It also suggests that autonomous agencies of restraint may not be funded by government if donor funding is phased out. These findings are supported by fieldwork observations of the 2011 election campaign that showed the incumbent deploying state patronage to secure a new term in office. The recent relief of Zambia's international debt, along with the renewed profitability of the copper mining industry, may create conditions for economic development in Zambia. But in the absence of independent institutions of restraint, transparency and accountability, the question is whether the gains of economic governance support and current growth scenarios will benefit the majority of the Zambian population.

#### **4.1 The impact of democracy assistance to governance**

Close to two decades of democracy support to Zambia illustrates the paradoxes found in general literature on democracy assistance presented above. Donor support to political parties and parliament has been limited compared to the overall amount of aid transfers going directly to the government, such as general budget support and harmonized aid modalities. The form of aid transfers that have been preferred since the introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy processes have often bypassed formal political processes and institutions. The aid modalities introduced by the turn of the millennium have often meant that donors have agreed to provide funding to governments have not been discussed by political parties—or even in parliament. As a result, aid, even transfers considered to enhance governance, may risk undermining central democratic processes, and enhancing the position of the incumbent.

The role of civil society provides a good illustration. From a foreign aid perspective, support to civil society is often considered 'risk free' and financial aid can be allocated to various governance projects without risk of entering into 'the minefield' of politics. As a result, international financial assistance has played a major role in replacing a grass-roots civil society centered around the Zambian trade union movement with a civil society of professional and issue-based NGOs financed by grants from international donors. Despite the rather negative 'self-appraisals' by civil society representatives of their own capacity and impact, the most viable civil society organizations in Zambia today have been created and sustained by democracy support. As a result, Zambian civil society has on a number of occasions shown its ability to hold government to account. The role of the umbrella association Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) tasked with monitoring the implementation of Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) is an important example. Beyond doubt, donor support has been very important in terms of empowering NGOs to respond to government on issues such as the drafting of the NGO

bill. A notable strength of Zambian civil society is that it has autonomy and capacity to initiate important governance activities. The Oasis Forum and the civil society campaign against Chiluba's third term bid in 2001 is a case in point (Gould 2006). The third term issue clearly illustrates the strengths of civil society and donor co-ordination. In the Zambian case, donors could support the Oasis Forum financially and thereby influence the constitutional debate without risking to be regarded as the 'drivers' of the campaign against the government. This is especially important given the current weakening of civil society highlighted earlier. Their presence will most likely still be essential in post-MMD Zambia. A similar example is found in the lack of progress on decentralization reform is seen by both the political opposition and civil society as an attempt by the incumbent to maintain control over state resource and thereby maintain the rural vote (NORAD 2007; Larmer and Fraser 2007).

Support to election management and institutions display similar paradoxes. On the one hand, international support has enabled the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to enhance the quality of elections through improved voter registration, voter education and transparent voting. Four consecutive multi-party elections point toward an institutionalization of elections. On the other hand, and illustrating how aid becomes part of informal political power games, large sums of donor money to the electoral processes have commercialized all aspects of voting as well as, civic education, and electoral observation.

A significant proportion of democracy support has been directed towards the enhancement of institutions of restraint within government. Financial aid, capacity building and technical assistance have been geared towards enhancing the monitoring and scrutiny capacity of the Audit Office, the anti-corruption agencies and parliament. Yet, donor support to 'enclaves of anti corruption' has been criticized for failing to understand how these institutions link to the informal political processes of patronage and corruption (Oxford Policy Management 2010). On the other hand, the transfer of capacity and ideas linked to a global human rights agenda should not be underestimated. Support and aid agreements may also add legitimacy and weight to government and civil society personnel aiming to enhance political and economic accountability.

The above examples illustrate the complex nature of democracy support. Development assistance has played an important role in terms of creating important institutions of restraint in Zambia. External actors have also to a large extent shaped the nature and focus of civil society in Zambia and the institutionalization of multi-party elections. Yet, while donors have addressed formal, technical aspects of democracy, democracy support have not been able to address underlying political realities linked to corruption, patronage and executive dominance.

## **5 A tentative argument for enhanced democracy support**

The discussion above has suggested that on balance democracy assistance has contributed to strengthen formal institutions and provided capacity for the stakeholders outside government to monitor the actions of government. Democracy assistance has contributed to a relatively vibrant and intellectually challenging cadre of civil society activists in urban areas in Zambia, albeit one that faces challenges posed by political polarization and executive dominance. Democracy assistance has also played a role in the dissemination of ideas about global human rights, poverty eradication, and

accountability. However, foreign aid in support of Zambia's democratic developments must be put in context of an excessive executive dominance, in a highly centralized state structure. Decision-making is centralized from the top-down and the culture of accountability is weak. While donor support on the one hand has strengthened formal institutions through capacity-building and financial support, aid has not been able to address the challenges posted by informal institutions linked to 'big men', corruption and patronage networks. In the case of Zambia, entering a period of reduced levels of traditional aid, the monitoring capacity and advocacy of civil society, parliament and the political parties will be essential in order to enhance the rule-based system of government and institutions. International development assistance should in the future be much more explicit about the aim to support and enhance the capacity of formal political processes, which would include an equal focus on stakeholders outside and inside government.

The new aid modalities introduced—first as conditionality-based lending and later as various forms of budget support mechanism—have meant that the main part of aid allocations have been channelled through the executive branch of government. The changing aid architecture, with stronger emphasis on donor co-ordination and harmonization as reflected in the Paris Declaration (2005), reflects this paradox. According to the Paris Declaration, country ownership is achieved when 'partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions' (Rakner and Wang 2007: 2). However, because country ownership is defined as the incumbent government's right to control its external resources, the distribution of aid budgets has greatly enhanced the financial power of the executive office vis-à-vis civil society and the political opposition. Considering various Zambian governments' unease with a vocal civil society and a free press, it should not be assumed that government funding would guarantee disbursements civil society, institutions of restraint or the electoral commission via government.

Is this a good argument for maintaining aid or has democracy assistance driven an 'institution building agenda' that is unsustainable considering Zambia's level of economic development (Grindle 2004)? There can be no doubt that to a large extent the governance agenda is linked to donor concerns and ambitions. However, one should not dismiss the ambitions and work of many Zambian citizens, NGO representatives and political actors to enhance democratic accountability in Zambia. Moreover, Zambia is now in a position where the country for the first time since the mid-1970s may be able to spend its revenue on development. There is also a growing political debate between political parties and actors about the distribution of revenue and a growing concern over enhanced inequalities in the Zambian society as witnessed in the 2011 election campaign. The increasing importance of Asian export markets and non-traditional development partners also underline the need for enhanced formal rules and enforcement of these rules. In terms of governance, this is an argument in defense of continued democracy assistance.

## Appendix 1: List of people interviewed

1. Chembe Nyangu, Deputy National Secretary of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD, ruling party), Interviewed on 1 June 2011.
2. Fred Mutesa, president of Zambia for Empowerment and Development (ZED, small opposition party) as well as an academic and consultant, Interviewed on 3 June 2011.
3. Mike Mulongoti, MMD veteran, recently fired from his position as Minister of Works and Supply and expelled from the MMD after wanting to compete for vice presidency in the party. He has been the campaign manager and chairman for elections for the MMD in the last 2 elections. He also served as information minister and chief government spokesperson under president Mwanawasa. Interviewed on 3 June 2011.
4. Cris Akufuna (Public Relations Manager), Brown Kasaro (Deputy Director for IT and main donor contact) and Ms.Mulemba (Legal Counsel), Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). Interviewed on 4 June 2011.
5. Dimitra Ioannou, legal/election expert for the EU exploratory mission for elections. Interviewed on 4 June 2011.
6. Francis Z. Simenda (Vice president for political affairs) and Mrs.Chinyama (chairperson for women), United Party for National Development (UPND, second largest opposition party). Interviewed on 4 June 2011.
7. Bhizeck Jube Phiri, Professor of history at the University of Zambia, has also been a part of the Zambian constitution making process (the NCC). Interviewed on 4 June 2011.
8. Neo Simutanyi, academic scholar and director of Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Interviewed on 4 June 2011.
9. Lee Habasonda, director of Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD). Interviewed on 5 June 2011.
10. Beatrice Grillo (Board chairperson), Mary Mulenga (Board Vice chairperson) Engwase Mwale (Executive Director), Non Governmental Organisations' Co-ordinating Council (NGOCC). Interviewed on 5 June 2011.
11. Rueben Lifuka (President) and Goodwell Lungu (Executive Director), Transparency International Zambia (TIZ). Interviewed on 6 June 2011.
12. Alex Ng'oma, Lecturer of political science at the University of Zambia and president of the Foundation for Democratic Processes (FODEP). Interviewed on 6 June 2011.
13. Given Lubinda (Member of Parliament), Lazarus Chota (Member of Parliament), the Patriotic Front (PF, the largest opposition party). Interviewed on 6 June 2011.
14. Oliver Saasa, Professor of economics and director of an independent consulting company (Premier Consult). Interviewed on 6 June 2011.
15. Chansa Kabwela (Chairperson of the Press Freedom Committee and editor), Sheikh S. Chifuwe (Programme Manager of the Press Freedom Committee), The Post Newspaper (The largest private newspaper in Zambia). Interviewed on 6 June 2011.
16. Peter MacDermott, UK Department for International Development (DFID). Interviewed on 7 June 2011.
17. Aloys Lorkeers (Head of Development section at the EU), Nkuruma Chama Kalaluka (Policy Officer, Netherlands Embassy), Jan Isaksen (Country economist, Norwegian Embassy), Gilbert Kalyandu (Norwegian Embassy), Namayuba Chiyota (Norwegian Embassy), Patricia Mwanysa (GIZ), Makani Mzyece (GIZ), Sydney Watae (USAID), Tori Hoven (Charge d'affaires, Norwegian Embassy), members of the governance group for donors in Zambia. Presentation and group discussion held on 7 June 2011.

18. Nkuruma Chama Kalaluka, Policy Officer for private sector and governance at the Embassy of the Netherlands. Interviewed on 7 June 2011.
19. Michael Soko, from the governance section at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Interviewed on 7 June 2011.
20. Barbara Nöst, programme manager at the Zambian Governance Foundation (ZGF, a basket fund for civil society). Interviewed on 9 June 2011.
21. Patrick Mucheleka, Executive Director of Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR). Interviewed on 23 June 2011.
22. Kaputo Chenga, Patricia Mwanyisa and Makani Mzyece, members of the good governance team at German Development Corporation, GIZ. Interviewed on 24 June 2011.
23. Eugene Kabilika, Programme Specialist for governance and human rights at CARITAS Zambia (Catholic Church mother body for the Episcopal Commissions of justice, peace and development). Interviewed on 27 June 2011.
24. Hangoma Moonga Mumba, lecturer at UNZA in development studies and political consultant. Interviewed on 28 June 2011.



## Appendix 2: Mo Ibrahim's index on African governance (0-100)

Zambia:	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04	04/05	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09
Overall	49.4	50.4	50.3	50.8	50.5	51.9	54.4	54.8	54.9
Safety & Rule of Law	65	64.8	63.7	64.9	64.9	64.5	64.2	66.2	63.8
Participation & Human Rights	47	51.2	52.2	51.7	52.2	56.1	61.3	57.1	56.2
Sustainable Economic Opportunity	44.4	43.5	43.1	43.9	45	45.7	47.8	47.5	48.6
Human Development	41.3	42.4	42.4	42.5	39.9	41.5	44.3	48.4	50.9
Domestic Political Persecution	62.5	56.3	56.3	56.3	50.	50	50	62.5	50
Political Terror Scale	62.5	50	50	50	50	50	50	62.5	50
Political participation	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.2	46.2
Free & Fair Elections	55.6	55.6	55.6	55.6	55.6	61.1	66.7	66.7	66.7
Political Rights	33.3	50	50	50	50	66.7	66.7	66.7	66.7
Freedom of Association & Assembly	63	63	79.6	63	63	57.4	51.9	53.7	38.9
Free Press (Freedom House)	39.2	41.8	41.8	39.2	40.5	40.5	40.5	39.2	40.5
Quality of Public Administration	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	56.3

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2011).


### Appendix 3: Closeness and affiliation with political party in Zambia

Do you feel closeness to any particular party? Which party is that? (%)		Urban	Rural
2005	Yes, feels close to party	46	56
	<i>If close, which party?</i>		
	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	15	23
	Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)	5	1
	Patriotic Front (PF)	10	6
	United Party for National Development (UPND)	13	21
	Others	57	49
	Total	100	100
2009	Yes, feels close to party	54	63
	<i>If close, which party?</i>		
	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	13	28
	Patriotic Front (PF)	28	13
	United Party for National Development (UPND)	6	17
	Others/Don't Know/Refused to Answer	53	42
	Total	100	100
If a National Election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? (%)			
2005	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	19	31
	Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)	5	1
	Patriotic Front (PF)	19	9
	United Party for National Development (UPND)	16	23
	Others/Don't Know/Refused to Answer/Would not vote	41	36
	Total	100	100
2009	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	14	30
	Patriotic Front (PF)	42	19
	United Party for National Development (UPND)	13	21
	Others/Don't Know/Refused to Answer/Would not vote	31	30
	Total	100	100

Notes: Results are weighted.

Source: Afrobarometer, Rounds 3 and 4.

#### Appendix 4: Ibrahim index of African governments, 2010



Notes: \*Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, CAR, Sudan, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, DRC, Chad and Somalia ranked lower than Togo, and in this order, from 42, 65-7, 86.

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010).

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