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Cultural and Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Flows

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Cultural and Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Flows

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Abstract

This paper studies the intangible costs of international trade by extending the basic gravity equation with measures of cultural and institutional distance, and institutional quality. Analyzing a sample of bilateral trade flows between 92 countries in 1999, we find that institutional distance has a negative effect on bilateral trade, presumably because the transaction costs of trade between partners from dissimilar institutional settings are high. In contrast, we find that cultural distance has a positive effect on bilateral trade. A potential explanation for this finding is that firms prefer trade to host-country production in culturally distant countries. Finally, we find that the institutional quality of both the importer and exporter increases the amount of bilateral trade.

JEL codes: F14

Keywords: bilateral trade, gravity model, cultural distance, institutions

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1. Introduction

Trade costs stemming from geographic distance and formal trade barriers are an important obstacle to international trade (Trefler, 1995; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). For a representative developed country, these costs may be as large as an ad-valorem tax-equivalent of 170% (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). However, observed trade costs do not fully explain international trade flows (Deardorff, 2004), as trade also involves unobserved costs stemming from cultural and institutional differences between countries. Because of these differences, firms have incomplete information about foreign markets and cultures, which causes additional trade costs related to information collection and contract negotiation and enforcement (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004; Berthelon and Freund, 2004; Hofstede, 2001).

In this paper, we empirically examine how cultural and institutional differences between countries and the institutional quality of the importer and exporter affect bilateral trade flows. By doing so, we complement previous empirical trade-flow research in several ways. First, we make an explicit conceptual and empirical distinction between cultural and institutional differences and examine their effects on bilateral trade flows simultaneously. Second, while previous research has typically used measures of cultural *(un)familiarity*, such as dummy variables indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, religion, and colonial past (e.g., Srivastava and Green, 1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; De Groot *et al.*, 2004), we also include a measure of cultural *(dis)similarity* based on the well-established cultural framework of Hofstede (1980). This measure captures the extent of differences in norms and values between countries, and hence allows us to go beyond more traditional measures of cultural familiarity. Finally, while previous research has measured the

institutional dissimilarity between trading partners through a dummy variable indicating whether the partners had comparable governance quality levels (De Groot *et al.*, 2004), we use a novel cardinal measure that captures the *extent* to which these quality levels differ.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects of cultural familiarity and similarity on bilateral trade, while section 3 discusses the effects of institutional quality and differences in institutional quality. Section 4 summarizes our research methodology, while section 5 reports our empirical findings. In section 6, we discuss these findings. Section 7 contains our concluding remarks.

2. Culture and bilateral trade

Many studies have extended the basic trade-flow gravity equation with dummy variables indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, religion, and colonial past (Geraci and Prewo, 1977; Srivastava and Green, 1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Yeyati, 2003; De Groot *et al.*, 2004; Frankel, 1997; Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997; Guiso *et al.*, 2004), with most of them finding that these variables have significantly positive effects on the magnitude of international trade flows. Although this indicates that these variables matter, they only capture cultural familiarity, in the sense that the trading partners will have more knowledge of each others culture and will find it easier to communicate and share information (Rauch, 1999; 2001). However, the fact that trading partners are familiar with each others culture does not mean that their cultures are similar. Cultural familiarity only requires acquaintance between cultures and perhaps some form of endorsement, while cultural similarity goes beyond acquaintance and acceptance, and requires shared norms and values.

We go beyond the level of cultural familiarity by focusing on the concept of cultural distance, which is defined as the extent to which the shared norms and values in one country differ from those in another (Hofstede, 2001; Kogut and Singh, 1988). It is generally acknowledged that a large cultural distance raises the costs of international trade, as large cultural differences make it difficult to understand, control, and predict the behavior of others (Elsass and Veiga, 1994), which complicates interactions (Parkhe, 1991), thus impeding the realization of business deals. Some of the most notable difficulties associated with cross-cultural interaction include those associated with understanding, and particularly those associated with differences in perceptions of the same situation. Differences in perceptions complicate interactions, make them prone to fail, and hinder the development of rapport and trust – factors that generally facilitate the interaction process and lower the costs of trade (Neal, 1998). This suggests that a large cultural distance between countries reduces the amount of trade between them.

The cultural distance between countries is usually assessed through Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of national culture (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). Analyzing survey data obtained from 116,000 IBM employees in 40 countries, Hofstede identified four dimensions along which national cultures differ, namely:²

1. Power distance, which refers to the extent to which people believe that power and status are distributed unequally and the extent to which they accept an unequal distribution of power as the proper way of organizing social systems.
2. Uncertainty avoidance, which refers to the extent to which people are uncomfortable with uncertain, unknown, or unstructured situations.

² For the details of this analysis, we refer to Hofstede (1980).

3. Individualism vs. collectivism, which reflects the degree to which a society emphasizes the role of the individual as opposed to that of the group.
4. Masculinity vs. femininity, which refers to the extent to which a society emphasizes traditional masculine values such as competitiveness, assertiveness, achievement, ambition, and the acquisition of money and other material possessions, as opposed to feminine values such as nurturing, helping others, putting relationships with people before money, not showing off, and minding the quality of life.

Hofstede assigned each country a score on each cultural dimension that varied between about zero and 100 to indicate how people from different cultures feel about the above societal issues.³ Throughout the years, these scores have become available for an increasing number of countries.

3. Institutions and bilateral trade

Besides cultural differences, we also expect institutional factors to affect international trade flows (cf. Kostova, 1997). First, the quality of a country's formal institutions, such as its legal system that enforces the rule of law and its legislature that imposes economic policies, to a large extent determines security in trade. The effectiveness of a country's formal rules affects inter-personal trust and the ways of doing business. The enforcement of property rights and the adherence to trade contracts with foreign exporters varies significantly between countries

³ Hofstede and Bond (1988) later uncovered a fifth cultural dimension, called 'long-term orientation'. Unfortunately, the scores on this dimension are only available for a limited number of countries, thus reducing its empirical applicability. Moreover, scholars have questioned its added value, as it has been argued to reflect the same underlying cultural values as the individualism dimension (see Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997).

(Zhang *et al.*, 2003), and environmental uncertainty can lead to frictions and conflicts between trading partners (Achrol *et al.*, 1983; Skarmeas *et al.*, 2002). Since international transactions move across jurisdictional boundaries, it is more difficult to enforce trade contracts in international than in domestic settings (Rodrik, 2000). Poorly developed institutions entail negative externalities for private transactions, which raises transaction costs and reduces international trade (Wei, 2000). If trade is supported by an effective rule of law, and if government regulation is transparent and impartial, countries engage in more trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Jansen and Kyvik Nordas, 2004). We thus argue that the quality levels of the institutions of the importer and the exporter have a positive effect on the amount of trade between them.

Moreover, aside from institutional quality, we expect bilateral *differences* in institutional quality to influence trade costs as well. A firm exporting to a foreign country with an institutional quality level comparable to that of the firm's home country is likely to be better able to operate effectively in that country, as it does not incur large adjustment costs stemming from the unfamiliarity and the insecurity related to transaction contingencies in trade. Analyzing a sample of bilateral trade flows between more than 100 countries in 1998 and including a dummy variable indicating whether the trading countries had similar levels of governance quality, De Groot *et al.* (2004) found that countries with comparable governance quality levels generally traded more. Hence, we expect the institutional distance between countries to have a negative effect on bilateral trade flows.

The quality of a country's institutions as well as institutional quality differences between countries can be assessed through Kaufmann *et al.*'s (2003) indicators of governance quality (e.g., Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Based on an unobserved components analysis of several hundreds of variables measuring perceptions of governance drawn from 25 sources

constructed by 18 organizations such as BERI, Euromoney, and the World Bank, Kaufmann *et al.* (2003) identified six dimensions of governance infrastructure quality along which countries differ, namely:

1. Voice and Accountability, which reflects the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in the selection of governments, as well as the extent to which these governments are monitored and can be held accountable for their actions.
2. Political stability, which measures the likelihood that a country's government will be overthrown through unconstitutional interference, such as domestic violence or terrorism.
3. Government effectiveness, which reflects the extent to which the government is able to formulate and implement good policies and deliver public goods. It focuses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies.
4. Regulatory quality, which measures the quality of the actual policies, like the degree of regulation of foreign trade and the incidence of market-unfriendly policies.
5. Rule of law, which measures the degree to which a country's citizens have confidence in the law and abide by the rules of society. It concentrates on the quality of the legal system and the enforceability of contracts.
6. Control of corruption, which reflects the degree to which public power is exercised for private gain.

4. Methodology

In order to assess the impact of cultural distance and institutions on trade flows, we use a gravity model that controls for other variables influencing the amount of trade between pairs

of countries. The basic gravity model relates the amount of bilateral trade between two countries to their economic size (reflected by their GDPs) and the geographic distance between them. The model has long been used to analyze international trade patterns (for an overview, see Frankel, 1997), and has always been successful in providing economically and statistically significant results, while explaining most variation in bilateral trade (Rose, 2005). Although frequently criticized for its lack of a theoretical foundation, Anderson (1979) initiated a series of studies that successfully addressed the relation between economic theory and the gravity model (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003 and 2004).

Our empirical approach closely follows the arguments in the two previous sections. First, following Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), among others, we extend the basic gravity equation with variables reflecting cultural familiarity. Specifically, we include dummies indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, colonial past, or common religion. In the second stage we include our measures of cultural distance, institutional distance and institutional quality. Finally, we include some additional control variables and country-specific fixed effects to check the robustness of our results. The specification of the full gravity equation in our analysis is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \log(T_{ij}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(Y_i) + \beta_2 \log(Y_j) + \beta_3 \log(y_i) + \beta_4 \log(y_j) + \beta_5 \log(D_{ij}) + \beta_6 Adj_{ij} \\ & + \beta_7 RIA_{ij} + \beta_8 Lan_{ij} + \beta_9 Col_{ij} + \beta_{10} Rel_{ij} + \beta_{11} CD_{ij} + \beta_{12} ID_{ij} + \beta_{13} IQ_i + \beta_{14} IQ_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where i and j denote the exporting and importing country, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral merchandise exports (T_{ij}) in thousands of U.S. dollars from country i to j in 1999. The basic explanatory variables are the logs of i and j 's

GDPs (Y_i and Y_j , respectively), their GDPs per capita (y_i and y_j , respectively), and their geographic distance (D_{ij}), and two dummies reflecting whether i and j are adjacent countries (Adj), or share membership in a regional integration agreement (RIA_{ij}). These seven variables form our basic gravity equation. In addition, we include three dummies taking the value of 1 if country i and j share a primary language (Lan_{ij}), colonial history (Col_{ij}), and main religion (Rel_{ij}), respectively, so as to capture i and j 's cultural familiarity. Our variables of interest are indicators of country i and j 's cultural (CD_{ij}) and institutional (ID_{ij}) distance, and their institutional quality (IQ_i and IQ_j , respectively). We have complete data on all explanatory variables for 92 countries (see Table A1).

The bilateral trade data are taken from the United Nations' COMTRADE database, and were accessed through the World Bank's WITS integrated database. The GDP and GDP per capita data come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. All these data are for 1999. We use the country scores on Hofstede's (1980; 2001) four dimensions of national culture to construct the following cultural distance measure:

$$CD_{ij} = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{c=1}^4 (C_{ci} - C_{cj})^2 / V_c \quad (2)$$

where C_{ci} indicates country i 's score on Hofstede's c th dimension and V_c the variance of this dimension across all countries. This measure was developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) and is often used in international business research (e.g., Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001).

Our measures of institutional quality (IQ) and institutional distance (ID) are based on the 1998 scores on Kaufmann *et al.*'s (2003) six dimensions of governance infrastructure quality.⁴ We measure a country's institutional quality by the arithmetic average of the country's scores on all six governance dimensions, since these dimensions are highly correlated. The institutional distance between country pairs is measured in the same way as their cultural distance, i.e. through Kogut and Singh's (1988) index:

$$IQ_i = \frac{1}{6} \sum_{k=1}^6 I_{ki} \quad \text{and} \quad ID_{ij} = \frac{1}{6} \sum_{k=1}^6 (I_{ki} - I_{kj})^2 / V_k \quad (3)$$

where I_{ki} indicates country i 's score on Kaufmann *et al.*'s k th dimension and V_k the variance of this dimension across all countries. For a detailed description of the other variables included in the gravity equation and their data sources, we refer to the appendix.

5. Results

Model 1 in Table 1 depicts the results for the basic gravity equation. It shows that, in line with previous findings, the importer's and exporter's GDP and GDP per capita have positive effects on the amount of trade between them, while geographic distance has a negative effect. Furthermore, adjacent countries trade substantially more than non-contiguous countries (i.e., 153%), confirming the importance of proximity for trade,⁵ while membership in a common regional integration agreement substantially raises bilateral trade as well. Models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 1 extend the basic gravity equation with measures of cultural familiarity. We

⁴ These scores are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Since our bilateral trade data refer to 1999, we decided to use the 1998 scores.

⁵ The percentage trade impact for dummy variable j can be computed as follows: $(e^{\beta_j} - 1) \times 100\%$.

successively add dummies indicating whether the trading partners have a common language, colonial link, and common religion.

Table 1. Gravity estimates: benchmark gravity model extended with cultural familiarity variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Standard model	Common language	Colonial links	Common main religion
Log GDP exporter	1.18*** (77.55)	1.19*** (78.38)	1.19*** (78.69)	1.19*** (78.72)
Log GDP importer	0.94*** (59.08)	0.94*** (59.76)	0.95*** (60.52)	0.95*** (60.54)
Log GDP/cap exporter	0.07*** (4.22)	0.08*** (4.43)	0.08*** (4.55)	0.07*** (4.27)
Log GDP/cap importer	0.07*** (3.55)	0.07*** (3.69)	0.07*** (3.80)	0.07*** (3.59)
Log Distance	-1.03*** (40.89)	-1.03*** (41.49)	-1.05*** (42.16)	-1.05*** (42.14)
Adjacent countries	0.93*** (6.57)	0.76*** (5.27)	0.77*** (5.30)	0.74*** (5.08)
RIA dummy	0.74*** (10.99)	0.61*** (9.33)	0.55*** (8.54)	0.53*** (8.15)
Language dummy		1.09*** (14.23)	0.38*** (3.52)	0.28** (2.56)
Colonial link dummy			0.98*** (10.42)	0.98*** (10.42)
Religion dummy				0.20*** (3.77)
Constant	-35.84*** (73.38)	-36.17*** (74.81)	-36.25*** (75.06)	-36.24*** (75.08)
Observations	7819	7819	7819	7819
Adjusted R-squared	0.72	0.72	0.73	0.73
F-statistic	2636.48	2339.87	2099.81	1891.17

Note: robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable: log of aggregate bilateral export.

The results indicate that country pairs with a similar official language, religion, and colonial past trade more, presumably because these cultural and historical links increase the extent to which countries are familiar with each other. Model 4 shows that the effects of similarity in language, religion, and colonial past remain significantly positive when these variables are jointly entered. However, the effect size and statistical significance of the language dummy

decrease substantially once we control for colonial links, reflecting that countries sharing their primary language often used to have colonial links as well. Adding the common religion dummy results in a similar change in the effect of language commonality, although to a somewhat lesser extent.

To assess and compare the economic impact of the explanatory variables, we calculated their quantitative contributions to the variation in trade flows. The first column in Table 2 presents the standardized beta coefficient, B_{x_j} , for each regressor x_j (see, e.g., Helpman *et al.*, 2004). This coefficient is defined as:

$$B_{x_j} = \left| \frac{\beta_j \times \sigma_{x_j}}{\sigma_{\log(T_{ij})}} \right| \times 100\% \quad (4)$$

It reflects the average variation in trade flows generated by the regressor, relative to the total average variation in trade flows (as measured by the standard deviation in the log of trade flows, $\sigma_{\log(T_{ij})}$). The average variation in trade flows caused by the variation in regressor x_j is computed by multiplying the parameter estimate (β_j) by the standard deviation of the regressor (σ_{x_j}). Apart from the relative importance of each explanatory variable in explaining the variation in trade flows, we are also interested in their absolute effects. The trade impact of the log-linear variables in the gravity model (i.e., the four GDP variables and geographic distance) can be inferred directly from Table 1, as their parameter estimates reflect the elasticity of trade with respect to changes in these variables. The second column of table 2 depicts the trade impact of the dummy variables, measured as the percentage change in bilateral trade when countries have a common characteristic, relative to the situation where

they do not have the characteristic in common. Table 2 shows that most of the variation in trade flows is explained by variations in GDP and geographic distance across countries. Although countries sharing borders or a colonial past trade substantially more, these factors account for only a relatively small part of the total variation in trade.⁶

Table 2. Trade effects: A quantitative illustration.

Based on Specification 4 of Table 1	Beta-coefficient (%)	Trade impact if Dummy=1 (%)
Log GDP exporter	63	–
Log GDP importer	50	–
Log GDP/cap exporter	3	–
Log GDP/cap importer	3	–
Log Distance	26	–
Adjacent countries	3	110
RIA dummy	4	70
Language Dummy	2	32
Colonial link Dummy	8	166
Religion Dummy	2	22

Note: beta-coefficients are defined as the parameter estimate times the standard deviation of the regressor, relative to the standard deviation in trade (see equation 4).

Table 3 extends the gravity model with our variables of interest, i.e. the indicators of institutional quality, and institutional and cultural distance. Surprisingly, the effect of cultural distance on trade is significantly positive, indicating that culturally-dissimilar countries trade more rather than less. This result is robust to controlling for institutional factors. The results also show that the quality of the importer's and exporter's institutions have positive effects on the amount of trade, presumably because high-quality institutions enhance property security

⁶ Apart from the effect size estimate, the variance of the regressors is also important for the variation in trade that they explain. For dummy variables, this implies that the shares of 0 and 1 observations in the sample become important for their economic significance in explaining the variation in trade patterns. This explains why the beta-coefficient for the regional bloc effect is higher than that for contiguity, even though the former's estimated effect size is smaller.

and contract enforceability, and reduce the costs of trade. Institutional distance is negatively related to bilateral trade. This illustrates that traders incur additional transaction costs if they are not familiar with the institutional environment of their foreign trading partners.

Table 3. Gravity equations: cultural distance and institutions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Cultural distance	Institutional distance	Institutional quality	Excluding cultural familiarity controls
Log GDP exporter	1.19*** (78.79)	1.19*** (78.99)	1.21*** (78.90)	1.20*** (77.96)
Log GDP importer	0.95*** (60.75)	0.95*** (60.61)	0.96*** (61.08)	0.95*** (59.85)
Log GDP/cap exporter	0.06*** (3.23)	0.06*** (3.19)	-0.16*** (4.39)	-0.19*** (5.24)
Log GDP/cap importer	0.05*** (2.74)	0.05*** (2.68)	-0.06* (1.68)	-0.09** (2.55)
Log Distance	-1.06*** (42.26)	-1.06*** (42.35)	-1.07*** (42.68)	-1.05*** (41.49)
Adjacent countries	0.76*** (5.23)	0.74*** (5.10)	0.77*** (5.23)	0.95*** (6.60)
RIA dummy	0.54*** (8.28)	0.51*** (7.62)	0.44*** (6.71)	0.63*** (9.16)
Language dummy	0.31*** (2.78)	0.31*** (2.82)	0.32*** (2.87)	
Colonial link dummy	0.98*** (10.45)	0.99*** (10.47)	0.90*** (9.52)	
Religion dummy	0.23*** (4.22)	0.22*** (4.10)	0.22*** (4.03)	
Cultural distance	0.06*** (4.30)	0.07*** (5.01)	0.05*** (3.53)	0.02 (1.21)
Institutional distance		-0.03*** (2.90)	-0.03*** (2.86)	-0.03** (2.45)
Inst. quality exporter			0.43*** (7.55)	0.52*** (8.88)
Inst. quality importer			0.23*** (4.14)	0.31*** (5.53)
Constant	-36.09*** (74.91)	-36.13*** (75.11)	-34.21*** (63.87)	-33.44*** (61.95)
Observations	7819	7819	7819	7819
Adjusted R-squared	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.72
F-statistic	1733.08	1597.79	1351.08	1667.58

Note: robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% .
Dependent variable: log aggregate bilateral export.

Except for GDP per capita, the basic gravity variables are robust to the inclusion of institutional quality, and cultural and institutional distance. The fact that the effect of GDP per

capita becomes negative in model 3 and 4 suggests that the earlier gravity equations suffer from omitted variables bias with respect to institutional quality (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). Specifically, once we control for institutional quality, the effect of GDP per capita may reflect a structural feature of (wealthier) countries. As the share of services in output and expenditures increases with the level of economic development (Chenery, 1960), the share of expenditures on traded merchandise decreases with a country's GDP per capita.

The effects of the cultural familiarity variables remain significantly positive. Apparently, language and colonial ties, religious similarities and cultural distance all reflect distinct channels through which culture affects trade patterns, suggesting that cultural familiarity and cultural similarity are different concepts. However, model 4 shows that the cultural familiarity variables strengthen the effect of cultural distance in terms of size and statistical significance, indicating that the two concepts are related. This is intuitively clear, as cultural familiarity is likely to be negatively associated with cultural distance. The correlation between the cultural familiarity variables and cultural distance leads to omitted variable bias if either type of culture variables is excluded from the model.

Table 4 quantifies the trade effects for the full gravity model, i.e. model 3 in Table 3. The variation in trade flows accounted for by the average variation in cultural and institutional distance, and in institutional quality is between 2 and 10 percent. The variation in trade explained by cultural distance is approximately the same as that explained by common language, religion and adjacency, but is only about one fourth of the variation explained by a shared colonial history. To the extent that a common language and religion, and a colonial history reflect cultural familiarity, this suggests that cultural familiarity accounts for more variation in trade flows than cultural distance.

Table 4. Trade effects: quantitative illustration.

Based on Specification 3 of Table 3	Beta-coefficient (%)	Trade impact if Dummy=1 (%)
Log GDP exporter	64	–
Log GDP importer	51	–
Log GDP/cap exporter	7	–
Log GDP/cap importer	3	–
Log Distance	26	–
Adjacent countries	3	116
RIA dummy	3	55
Language Dummy	2	38
Colonial link Dummy	8	146
Religion Dummy	2	25
Cultural distance	2	–
Institutional distance	2	–
Institutional quality exporter	10	–
Institutional quality importer	5	–

Note: beta-coefficients are defined as the parameter estimate times the standard deviation of the regressor, relative to the standard deviation in trade.

Sensitivity analyses

To test the robustness of our results, Table 5 adds several variables capturing geographic characteristics of the trading countries to the full gravity model, i.e. to model 3 in Table 3. Following Raballand (2003) and Rose (2004), among others, models 1 to 4 add the log of the product of the surface areas of the trading partners and four dummy variables indicating whether the partners are landlocked or island nations. These variables capture transport cost margins in trade and, ultimately, cross-country productivity differences (Gallup *et al.*, 1999). In particular, because land and air transport of especially bulk goods is often more expensive than water transport (Frankel, 1997), country pairs with a large combined surface area and landlocked countries incur higher transport costs, while island nations incur lower transport costs. The results of model 1 to 4 support this view. The effects of the institutional and cultural variables remain the same, although the size of their parameter estimates differs somewhat across the various models.

Table 5. Gravity estimates: robustness to geographical factors and country-specific effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Surface area	Landlocked-ness	Islands	all geographical controls
Log GDP exporter	1.28*** (65.01)	1.19*** (77.10)	1.22*** (76.53)	1.27*** (62.91)
Log GDP importer	1.03*** (51.08)	0.94*** (60.00)	0.97*** (58.28)	1.01*** (49.36)
Log GDP/cap exp.	-0.24*** (6.23)	-0.23*** (6.47)	-0.17*** (4.73)	-0.32*** (8.41)
Log GDP/cap imp.	-0.14*** (3.71)	-0.14*** (4.06)	-0.07** (1.97)	-0.23*** (6.03)
Log Distance	-1.05*** (41.29)	-1.11*** (44.37)	-1.09*** (42.58)	-1.10*** (42.37)
Adjacent countries	0.82*** (5.49)	0.80*** (5.40)	0.77*** (5.18)	0.85*** (5.66)
RIA dummy	0.46*** (7.07)	0.41*** (6.26)	0.44*** (6.59)	0.42*** (6.59)
Language dummy	0.37*** (3.37)	0.27** (2.48)	0.32*** (2.85)	0.33*** (3.00)
Colonial link dummy	0.86*** (9.12)	0.78*** (8.25)	0.84*** (8.86)	0.72*** (7.65)
Religion dummy	0.22*** (4.14)	0.25*** (4.77)	0.22*** (4.11)	0.26*** (4.91)
Cultural distance	0.05*** (3.51)	0.06*** (3.97)	0.05*** (3.26)	0.06*** (3.91)
Institutional distance	-0.03*** (2.82)	-0.03** (2.40)	-0.03*** (2.73)	-0.02** (2.33)
Inst. quality exporter	0.44*** (7.64)	0.58*** (9.83)	0.43*** (7.54)	0.58*** (9.87)
Inst. quality importer	0.23*** (4.24)	0.39*** (6.77)	0.23*** (4.15)	0.40*** (6.89)
Log area-product	-0.07*** (6.30)			-0.08*** (6.62)
Landlocked exporter		-0.57*** (7.68)		-0.57*** (7.55)
Landlocked importer		-0.64*** (8.77)		-0.65*** (8.81)
Island exporter			0.33*** (2.90)	0.12 (1.05)
Island importer			0.25** (2.44)	0.01 (0.14)
Constant	-34.88*** (62.60)	-31.36*** (55.45)	-34.57*** (63.41)	-32.12*** (54.06)
Observations	7819	7819	7819	7819
Adjusted R-squared	0.73	0.74	0.73	0.74
F-statistic	1253.87	1203.47	1175.63	1006.21

Notes: robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Dependent variable: log aggregate bilateral export.

6. Discussion

Although the effects of institutional quality and institutional distance on bilateral trade flows are generally as expected, this is not the case for the effect of cultural distance, as we find it to be positive rather than negative. The different costs associated with serving foreign markets in different ways may provide an explanation for this counterintuitive finding. There are two ways in which firms can serve foreign markets: they can export their products, i.e. produce them at home and sell them (or have them sold) abroad, or they can produce and sell them locally, i.e. in the host country (Caves, 1996). The international business literature argues that although the costs of export are likely to increase with cultural distance, the costs of local production are likely to increase even faster, because, compared to trade, local production requires closer interactions with a wider variety of local stakeholders such as employees, unions, suppliers, and government agencies (Hennart, 2000; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Moreover, the larger the cultural distance between two countries, the larger the differences in their organizational and management practices (Kogut and Singh, 1988). These differences make the transfer of home-country practices to production subsidiaries located in culturally dissimilar environments difficult and costly (Gómez-Meija and Palich, 1997).

Because of the high costs and uncertainty of successfully operating production facilities in culturally distant countries, firms expanding into such countries tend to opt for entry modes requiring relatively little resources, such as exporting (Dunning, 1993). Firms are generally unwilling to commit substantial resources to production subsidiaries located in culturally distant markets, as this would substantially reduce their ability to withdraw from the market should the venture turn out to be unsuccessful (Hill *et al.*, 1990). Furthermore, since managers are usually not familiar, comfortable, or even in agreement with the values, behaviors and practices of cultures that are truly foreign to them, they perceive a higher level of uncertainty

when entering culturally distant countries (Caves, 1996), leading them to avoid high-commitment entry modes (Root, 1998).

Thus, the positive effect of cultural distance on trade may be explained by the fact that although the costs of trade increase with cultural distance, those of host-country production increase even more, leading firms to prefer trade over host-country production. In order for bilateral exports to increase with cultural distance, the substitution effect of host-country production by trade has to be large enough to compensate the decrease in exports by firms not engaged in host-country production. An explicit examination of the existence of this substitution effect would require data on the sales of firms' foreign production affiliates, but unfortunately these are not readily available for the large majority of countries included in our sample.

Our finding that the impact of institutional distance on bilateral trade flows is negative suggests that the substitution effect described above does not exist for institutional differences. This indicates that the costs of trade increase equally fast with institutional distance as those of host-country production, presumably because foreign exporters are to the same extent faced with the idiosyncratic institutions of their target countries as foreign firms producing and selling their goods locally in these countries.

7. Conclusion

This paper examines the effects of cultural and institutional variables on the amount of bilateral trade between 92 countries. Acknowledging that previous studies have addressed the role of a shared language, colonial past, and religion in otherwise standard gravity models, we argue that these variables only capture cultural familiarity. Using Hofstede's (1980) four

dimensions of national culture, we also analyze the effect on bilateral trade of cultural distance, reflecting differences in cultural values and norms. In addition, we estimate the impact on trade of the quality of the institutions of the importing and exporting countries, as well as the impact of bilateral differences in institutional quality, using Kaufmann *et al.*'s (2003) dimensions of governance quality. We find that the institutional quality of both the importer and exporter has a positive effect on the amount of trade between them. We also find that institutional distance has a negative effect on bilateral trade flows, while cultural distance has a positive effect. The international business literature suggests that this is because firms prefer trade to host-country production in culturally distant countries, but further research is required to substantiate this claim.

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Table A.1. Countries included in the sample

1	Albania	36	Indonesia	71	Slovenia
2	Argentina	37	Iran	72	South Africa
3	Armenia	38	Ireland	73	South Korea
4	Australia	39	Israel	74	Spain
5	Austria	40	Italy	75	Sri Lanka
6	Azerbaijan	41	Jamaica	76	Surinam
7	Belgium	42	Japan	77	Sweden
8	Bhutan	43	Jordan	78	Switzerland
9	Brazil	44	Kenya	79	Syria
10	Bulgaria	45	Kuwait	80	Tanzania
11	Burkina Faso	46	Latvia	81	Thailand
12	Canada	47	Lebanon	82	Trinidad
13	Chile	48	Lithuania	83	Turkey
14	China	49	Luxembourg	84	Ukraine
15	Colombia	50	Malawi	85	United Kingdom
16	Costa Rica	51	Malaysia	86	United States
17	Croatia	52	Malta	87	Uruguay
18	Czech republic	53	Mexico	88	Venezuela
19	Denmark	54	Morocco	89	Vietnam
20	Dom Republic	55	Nepal	90	Yemen
21	Ecuador	56	Netherlands	91	Yugoslavia
22	Egypt	57	New Zealand	92	Zambia
23	El Salvador	58	Nigeria		
24	Estonia	59	Norway		
25	Ethiopia	60	Pakistan		
26	Finland	61	Panama		
27	France	62	Peru		
28	Georgia	63	Philippines		
29	Germany	64	Poland		
30	Ghana	65	Portugal		
31	Greece	66	Rumania		
32	Guatemala	67	Russia		
33	Hong Kong	68	Saudi Arabia		
34	Hungary	69	Singapore		
35	India	70	Slovakia		

Appendix. Data description

Apart from the institutional and cultural indicators that were already discussed at length in the main text, we use both country-specific and bilateral data from various sources in our empirical analyses. The GDPs of the exporting and importing countries are examples of country-specific variables, while geographic distance, adjacency, and common language and religion, among others, are examples of bilateral characteristics that we take into account for each pair of countries. Below we will describe our data and sources in more detail.

- The dependent variable is the log of the amount of bilateral merchandise exports, which results in two observations for each country pair, i.e. the export flows from country i to j , and those from j to i . These data come from the United Nations' COMTRADE database for bilateral trade flows and refer to 1999. We use reported imports rather than reported exports, because the former provides a better coverage. We use mirror import flows that correspond to the export flows.
- The source of the GDP and GDP per capita data is the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2000 - on CD Rom). Both GDPs are in constant U.S. dollars at 1995 prices and refer to 1999.
- The data on geographic distance, common border, common official language, common regional trade agreement, common dominant religion and common colonial history come from various sources, and have kindly been made available on the internet by several researchers and research institutes. Specifically, we use OECD data for regional integration agreements, Sala-i-Martin's (1997)⁷ database for religions and colonial backgrounds, and Jon Haveman's International Trade Data⁸ for distance, contiguity and language. This part of our database is available upon request from the corresponding author. Some remarks on these variables are:
 - In line with previous research, we measure the geographic distance between two countries as the straight line distance between their capitals. This measure is likely to overestimate the distance of trade, although this overestimation is larger for

⁷ See <http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm>.

⁸ See <http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html#gravity>.

neighboring countries than for those located far away from each other. For a discussion on the use and usefulness of other, more sophisticated measures of geographic distance, we refer to Frankel (1997, chapter 4). In general, more sophisticated geographic distance measures produce similar results, and cannot eliminate the measurement error for contiguous countries.

- The common border dummy takes the value of one if two countries are adjacent. Adjacency requires either a land border or a small body of water as a border. This variable captures the effect of historical relations between adjacent countries as well as the measurement error in the distance variable.
- We use OECD data on major regional integration agreements (RIAs) to determine whether pairs of countries take part in a particular RIA.⁹ We created a dummy variable that takes the value of one if both countries take part in the same RIA.
- To assess whether two countries have the same official language, we use the fourteen languages distinguished by Jon Haveman, i.e. Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. We used CIA's World Factbook to extend the number of countries and languages¹⁰. In case none of the above applied and no further language data were available, countries were assigned to the categories 'other language' or 'non available'. The dummy variable reflects whether or not two countries have at least one official language in common.
- Cultural and/or historical ties between countries may also consist of a common dominant religion or a shared colonial past. Data for these variables come from Sala-i-Martin (1997). Using the percentage of the population adhering to one of seven major religions (i.e., Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jewish religion, Islam, and Protestantism), he assigned country pairs a value of 1 if their dominant religion is the same. For some countries, two religions were equally dominant over the others. In these cases, both religions were considered to be the dominant ones.
- The dummy variable common colony reflects whether country pairs share a colonial history. The data consider the British, French and Spanish empires only. In contrast to

⁹ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf>

¹⁰ See <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>

the original data source, we also include these colonizers themselves into the respective empires. In this way, the figures identify shared colonial relations for pairs of countries.

- We include several other geographical variables as well. In sum:
 - The data on island nations have kindly been made available by Hildegunn Kyvik Nordas (from Jansen and Kyvik Nordas, 2004). We created a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the exporting country is an island. A second dummy indicates whether or not the importing country is an island.
 - We collected the data on landlocked countries and land areas from the CEPII gravity database.¹¹ A separate dummy for landlocked countries is included on the export and import side. Land area is measured in square kilometers.

¹¹ See <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm>