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Cross-national differences in determinants of multiple deprivation in Europe

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& ECONOMIC RESEARCH

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Non-technical summary

Current income is a key element to assess individual resources, traditionally used in the analysis of poverty. However, individuals with the same resources may suffer different deprivation levels. This is mainly due to the effects of accumulated resources, employment status, educational level, health conditions and housing tenure. The term “multiple deprivation” refers to the exclusion from minimum living standards and it is measured from a set of indicators which reflect the non-affordability of a number of items such durables, good housing conditions and positive social environment.

Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), this paper analyses the socio-economic determinants of multiple deprivation in 11 European countries and explores the reasons for the deprivation gaps between countries.

Despite the large differences in deprivation levels, the determinants of deprivation are shown to be quite similar across European countries. First, the results show that changes in income and deprivation do not strictly coincide and that past income matters more than current income in determining the deprivation level. Second, they highlight the importance of employment status, type of income sources, higher education and home ownership in explaining the deprivation level.

Deprivation differentials across countries are explained by the average level of a number of socio-economic characteristics (e.g. income, number of family members) and their strength in reducing deprivation. For example, in Southern European countries where the level of deprivation is high and income relatively low, an increase in income is more effective than in other countries in reducing the deprivation gap. On the other hand, in the same countries, the family composition, mainly due to the presence of a larger number of individuals with low or null incomes, contributes to explaining an important part of the deprivation gap.

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Abstract

This paper analyses the relationship between deprivation, income and other individual dimensions over time, in eleven European countries, exploiting the longitudinal nature of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). First, the determinants of deprivation are analysed by using fixed effects models for each country separately. Second a decomposition of the deprivation gaps between countries highlights the reasons for the differentials across Europe. The results show that changes in income and deprivation do not strictly coincide. In countries where deprivation is higher, income is more effective in reducing the deprivation differential but the family structure contributes to determine such a gap.

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Key words: ECHP, Europe, multiple deprivation, longitudinal analysis

JEL codes: C23, D63, I32

1. Introduction

It is widely agreed nowadays that poverty has a multidimensional nature. Being poor does not simply mean having low monetary resources. Individuals with the same income may suffer different deprivation levels and experience, for example, poorer living standards due to the effects of accumulated resources, employment status, educational level, health conditions, housing tenure, non-cash income and social benefits. Multiple deprivation is often defined as a situation that reflects low levels of living standards and can be derived from a set of non-monetary indicators (Nolan and Whelan 1996, Atkinson et al. 2002).

In such a multidimensional framework, income is just one of the dimensions over which the individual well-being is considered and its use as a measure of living standards is subject to some limitations (Atkinson et al. 2002). Multiple deprivation indicators can complement income measurement to capture the individual command over resources. Deprivation indicators provide a direct measure of hardship due to the enforced lack of durables, leisure and social activities and housing facilities and they measure a situation which is more stable over time.

The relationship between current income measures and deprivation indicators is not straightforward and is weaker than might have been expected. The empirical evidence at the European level shows that measures of income poverty and deprivation identify different subjects as being at risk of low living standards (Nolan and Whelan 1996; Layte et al. 2001; Whelan et al. 2003, 2004). However, there is very little research which aims at studying the relationship between deprivation, income and other individual dimensions over time. To the best of my knowledge, Berthoud and Bryan (2010) is the only study that analyses the longitudinal determinants of deprivation, but it covers only the UK.

This paper fills the gap making two contributions in a cross-country perspective. The first contribution is to explain the relationship between income and deprivation over time, and to analyse to what extent employment status, income sources, housing tenure and family composition might have a direct effect on the deprivation level. A significant effect would reflect the importance of complementary indicators to poverty measures which usually are based on the level of income without considering income sources and individual characteristics, except household composition. Does a change in income have a direct impact on deprivation? Does a change in household circumstances play a role in absorbing or exacerbating the effect of an income shock on the deprivation level?

Such a longitudinal perspective provides us with a better understanding of the economic situation of the worst off individuals highlighting that income and deprivation index should

play a complementary role in monitoring the hardship suffered by the individuals due to the different policy perspectives inherent in each measurement approach: low current income refers to inequality of opportunity while deprivation implies inequality of living standards (Townsend 1979; Ringen 1987, 1988; Nolan and Whelan 1996; Perry 2002).

The second contribution of the paper is to investigate the reasons for the deprivation differential across countries and to explore how the effectiveness of income in reducing the deprivation gap differs across countries.

In the European Union a multidimensional framework has gained relevance over the past few years. Quantitative non-monetary indicators have employed for monitoring the Lisbon Strategy to fight against poverty and they are used to evaluate the targets of the new Europe 2020 strategy for “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (European Commission 2010). At national level, some countries, such Austria, Ireland and the UK, have already included a set of deprivation indicators in their National Action Plans on Social Inclusion or as part of a more general poverty measurement strategy. Moreover, non-monetary indicators are necessary to allow comparability among the Member States where the level of income may be not appropriate to provide a reliable picture of different living standards.

I use data from the European Community Household Panel, a panel survey for the years 1994-2001, with comparable socio-economic information, for eleven European countries. Exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data, I employ fixed effects models, which allow me to identify the effect of income and other characteristics on the level of deprivation over time taking into account unobserved individual characteristics.

Despite the large differences in deprivation levels the determinants of deprivation are shown to be quite similar across European countries. Differences in deprivation levels in Europe arise through different average endowments (e.g., income) and different strength of these endowments in reducing deprivation. By distinguishing the role of the endowments from their effects on deprivation, this paper sheds light on what mechanisms widen or close gaps across countries. For example, in Southern European countries (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) where the level of deprivation is high and income relatively low, an increase in income is more effective than in other countries in reducing the deprivation gap with the country showing the lowest average deprivation score. On the other hand, in the same countries, the effect of the family structure on deprivation widens the distance from other countries. However, a relevant part of the deprivation gap is attributable to a country specific effect revealing the importance of factors like cultural attitudes, norms, and institutions.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the methodology. The empirical strategy is presented in section 3 with a description of the data, the deprivation measurement approach, some descriptive statistics and the estimation issues. The estimates are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes summarising the main findings of the paper.

2. Model specification and decomposition of deprivation gaps across countries

In order to examine the socio-economic determinants of deprivation, exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data, I specify the following multivariate two-way error component model

$$D_{it} = \alpha + x_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \gamma_t + v_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where the index $i = 1, \dots, N$ refers to the individuals, while the index $t = 1, \dots, T$ refers to the years. Let D_{it} be the deprivation level of each individual i at time t . In the section 3.2 I address the issues related to the derivation of the deprivation score. \mathbf{x}_{it} is a vector of explanatory variables. γ_t is a time-specific effect. v_i is the individual-specific unobserved effect: it differs among individuals but, for any particular individual, it is constant over time. It captures individual unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. wealth, saving preferences, ability to cope and family network) that it is not controlled for in a cross-section analysis. ε_{it} is the error term with the standard properties: zero mean, no serial correlation, homoskedasticity, zero correlation with \mathbf{x}_{it} and with v_i (Wooldridge 2002).

To facilitate cross-country comparisons and to explore the role of the economic endowments in explaining the deprivation differentials across Europe, I adapt the well known decomposition of gender wage gap introduced by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). From the model represented in the equation (1), I can derive $\overline{D^c} = \hat{\alpha}^c + \overline{\mathbf{x}^c} \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^c$, where $\overline{D^c}$ and $\overline{\mathbf{x}^c}$ are respectively the individuals average values of the predicted deprivation level and the explanatory variables in the country c , and $\hat{\alpha}^c$ and $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^c$ the estimated coefficients from the equation (1). After some algebraic manipulations I can write the deprivation gap between two countries, A and B , in the following form:

$$\underbrace{\overline{D^B} - \overline{D^A}}_{\text{GAP}} = \underbrace{(\hat{\alpha}^B - \hat{\alpha}^A)}_{\text{Constant}} + \underbrace{\overline{\mathbf{x}^A}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^B - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^A)}_{\text{Coefficients}} + \underbrace{(\overline{\mathbf{x}^B} - \overline{\mathbf{x}^A})\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^A}_{\text{Endowments}} + \underbrace{(\overline{\mathbf{x}^B} - \overline{\mathbf{x}^A})(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^B - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^A)}_{\text{Interaction}} \quad (2)$$

In the equation (2), the interaction term depends on both differences between coefficients and endowments. The allocation of the interaction term depends on the choice of the reference country and I can rewrite the equation (2) as

$$\overline{D^B} - \overline{D^A} = (\overline{\mathbf{x}^B} - \overline{\mathbf{x}^A})\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^* + \left[\overline{\mathbf{x}^B}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^B - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^*) + \overline{\mathbf{x}^A}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^* - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^A) \right] + (\hat{\alpha}^B - \hat{\alpha}^A) \quad (3)$$

where $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^*$ is the vector of coefficients of the benchmark country. If I consider the country with the lowest average deprivation (i.e. country A) as benchmark for the analysis of the deprivation differentials across countries (judging as reasonable a reduction of the deprivation of the high deprivation country), $\overline{D^B} - \overline{D^A}$ is positive and the equation (3) can be written as

$$\underbrace{\overline{D^B} - \overline{D^A}}_{\text{GAP}} = \underbrace{(\overline{\mathbf{x}^B} - \overline{\mathbf{x}^A})\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^A}_{\text{Characteristics}} + \underbrace{\overline{\mathbf{x}^B}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^B - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^A)}_{\text{Returns}} + \underbrace{(\hat{\alpha}^B - \hat{\alpha}^A)}_{\text{Constant}} \quad (4)$$

where the difference in deprivation attributable to the characteristics corresponds to the endowments term and the difference attributable to the returns corresponds to the sum of coefficients term and interaction term.

The fraction of the deprivation gap attributable to the characteristics is the value of the differences in characteristics evaluated by the lowest deprivation country equation. The part of the gap attributable to the returns is the value of the difference between the high and low deprivation country's equations evaluated at the mean endowment of the high deprivation country (country B). Both the characteristics and return terms of the gap can be split into contributions of each explanatory variable.¹ From equation (4) I can decompose the average differential in deprivation between each country and the benchmark country into differences in characteristics, returns and constant term. The last component captures the difference in the individual factors not identified in the model whose average reflects differences in cultural attitudes, institutions, and norms specific to each country.

3. Empirical strategy

3.1. Data

The analyses of this paper are based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a harmonised longitudinal survey representative of the population of fifteen pre-enlargement

¹ When I analyse the contribution of each explanatory variable to the deprivation gap between countries, the dummy variables included in the model must be transformed. Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) show that for the unexplained part of the gap the subdivision into separate contributions, in case of categorical or dummy variables, is sensitive to the choice of the reference group. I adopt the approach suggested by Yun (2005) who proposes use of normalized regression to identify the constant and all the coefficients of categorical variables. In other words I consider the coefficients of constant and categorical variables that reflect deviations from the grand mean rather than deviations from the reference category. It is an averaging approach based on the average estimates of constant and categorical variables as obtained by a series of regressions with different reference groups.

European Union Member States. The data were collected annually between 1994 and 2001 and provide information about demographic characteristics, employment and job history, income, training and education, health, housing conditions, social relations, migration and life satisfaction for each individual older than 16 years of age. Germany, Luxemburg and the United Kingdom are omitted from my analysis due to the lack or a different formulation of some questions related to the non-monetary indicators, while Sweden is excluded because the national survey is not a panel.

Following the literature on income dynamics (Jenkins 2000) and previous longitudinal analysis of multiple deprivation (Berthoud and Bryan 2010), I follow individuals from one wave to the next, ascribing to each individual the characteristics of the household they belong to at each point in time. The use of the individual as the unit of analysis and the household as the unit of measurement is a superior alternative to defining “longitudinal households” (Duncan and Hill 1985) and produces answers equivalent to cross-sectional analysis of monetary poverty in which it is well-established to weight households by their size.² It is only possible to follow a household as a whole over time if its composition does not change (e.g., there are no new births, a couple split or a departure of a child from the parental home). Focusing on these households would exclude the substantial part of them who experience compositional changes and hence the most dramatic changes in their well-being. According to the tracing rules of the ECHP, all individuals observed in the first wave (i.e. sample individuals) are followed when they change household if they do not leave the country of residence. In addition, individuals who join the household of a sample member are followed as well.

The final data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of seven waves for all countries with the exception of Austria and Finland with only six and five waves respectively. Sample sizes range from 5,072 individuals (20,055 observations) in Denmark to 17,971 individuals (78,322 observations) in Italy.³

The ECHP dataset includes two household income variables. The first reports the current household monthly income as declared by the householder. The second reports the household annual income based on detailed questions asked to each member of the household on each

² In the estimates, standard errors clustered by household are used to relax the assumption of independence within households and to avoid overestimating the accuracy of the results.

³ The individuals with household income below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the income distribution have been dropped in each country every year, in order to prevent extreme incomes to influence estimated statistics (see Van Kerm 2007 for a review of different types of data adjustments to deal with extreme incomes).

source of income. Such detailed income variables are collected retrospectively, and so, each wave contains information on the income received over the previous calendar year. The second variable proves to be more stable over time (Berthoud 2004) and closer to the household income as obtained from the registers (Jantti 2004).⁴

Overall attrition rates are quite high in some countries, with proportions of wave respondents lost between the first and the last wave ranging from 43% in Ireland to 18% in Portugal and 8% in Finland. However, previous studies show that although the tendency to lose individuals is more common among individuals at the top of the income distribution in the Southern European countries and Ireland and at the bottom in the remaining countries, attrition has a very small impact on the estimates of key social indicators such as poverty rates (Watson 2003).⁵

I consider thirteen non-monetary dichotomous indicators. Each of them is derived from a household level question in the survey related to the affordability of a specific item presented in Table 1. The thirteen items are considered to cover a well defined domain of deprivation usually referred as Current Life-Style Deprivation (Layte et al. 2001).

⁴ Jantti (2004) compares income variables from the ECHP and the Finnish registers and represents the only example of available comparison of ECHP income values with external micro data

⁵ When including deprivation as a covariate in a model of attrition probability, and using the appropriate base weights for each sample individual in order to correct the individual non-response, I found no significant relationship between deprivation level and the probability of not being in the sample in all countries with the exception of Belgium, France and Spain (see Table A1 in the Annex).

TABLE 1: ECHP QUESTIONS USED TO DERIVE THE DEPRIVATION INDEX

Can the household afford... ?

-
- ... keeping its home adequately **warm**
 - ... paying for a week's annual **holiday** away from home
 - ... replacing any worn-out **furniture**
 - ... buying **new**, rather than second-hand, **clothes**
 - ... eating **meat, chicken or fish (good diet)** every second day
 - ... having **friends or family** for a drink or meal at least once month
 - ... paying scheduled rent/mortgage and utility bills of the **house**
 - ... possession of a **car or van (for private use)**
 - ... possession of **colour tv**
 - ... possession of **video recorder**
 - ... possession of **micro wave**
 - ... possession of **dishwasher**
 - ... possession of **telephone**
-

Notes: The first seven questions are based on a common phrase: "There are some things many people cannot afford even if they would like them. Can I just check whether your household can afford these, if you want them?". The remaining six questions are posed in two steps: in the first step the household respondent is asked to indicate whether or not the household possesses the item. If not a follow up question asks whether this is because of non affordability.

There are marked differences across countries in the average number of the items lacking each year (with larger values in Portugal and Greece) and a quite common downward trend in the lack of items, experienced within each country (see Figure A1 and A2 in the Annex).

In order to test the reliability of the considered items as good proxies of the underlying deprivation concept, it is common to look at the Cronbach's alpha, a correlation index that shows the extent to which a set of questions are all associated with each other.⁶ A threshold commonly used to judge if a dimension is usually identified around 0.70 (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Wave specific estimates show Cronbach's alphas varying between 0.61 in (Austria) and 0.81 (Portugal), suggesting that the deprivation indicators have internal consistency across time ((see Table A2 in the Annex).

3.2. *The deprivation index*

As for the analyses of monetary poverty where each individual's poverty status is defined using data on her needs-adjusted household income, individual's deprivation level is measured using the non-monetary indicators of the household to which he or she belongs, assuming implicitly that the resources are shared equally among all household members. As

⁶ When Cronbach's alpha is transformed for analysing the correlation between dichotomous indicators, it is known as KR-20 (abbreviation for Kurder-Richardson Formula 20).

noted above, this choice is also driven by the nature of the surveys which collect non-monetary indicators only from one reference person in the household who is the head of the household when he/she is economically active or when there is no economically active person in the household.

Following the literature on multiple deprivation (e.g. Nolan and Whelan 1996, Atkinson 2003), I combine the non-monetary indicators into a single deprivation index, using a sum-score approach:

$$D_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^J w_{jt} I_{ijt}$$

where D_{it} is the deprivation level for each individual $i = 1, \dots, N$ at each point in time $t = 1, \dots, T$, over the dichotomous indicators

$$I_{ij} = \begin{cases} 0 = \textit{affordability} \\ 1 = \textit{non affordability} \end{cases} \quad \text{with } j = 1, \dots, J$$

with w_{jt} being the weight corresponding to each indicator j at each point in time t , equal across individuals.

A number of approaches have been used to determine the weight w_{jt} . I consider the two most widely applied. The first approach (i.e. “counting approach”) is to set w_j to 1 for all indicators for every year. The non affordability of any item counts in the same way to the overall deprivation. The second alternative is a version of “prevalence weighting” and it associates to each indicator a weight w_{jt} , corresponding to the percentage of individuals owning the item at each point in time t (Desai and Shah, 1988). The smaller is the proportion of individuals in the population at t with a lack of a given item, the higher the weight assigned to the corresponding indicator, on the grounds that the lack of such an item contributes more to the overall deprivation of the individual. The prevalence weighting is an appropriate way of assigning more importance to items which can be legitimately seen as more strongly indicative of a status of deprivation: being deprived means not having what other individuals have (Whelan et al. 2002). Moreover, such a weighting approach allows the deprivation score of a given individual to increase if his/her conditions do not change but all other individuals are better off. Two distinct aspects are taken into account in this weighting approach: the relative lack of each item in the population and their variation over time.⁷ Utilizing country-specific and time-varying weights, this index takes into account the variations in the possession of any item over time and across countries due to economic, social and cultural

⁷ For a different approach using an annual standardisation of the index see Berthoud and Bryan (2010).

differences. This leads to an important analogy with the usual practice in the analysis of monetary poverty where the contemporary (i.e. varying over time) national median income (i.e. relative to the population of interest) is considered as a benchmark to derive the poverty rates rather than an absolute income value which is constant over time. In order to be comparable across countries, the deprivation index is normalised dividing it by the sum of all weights and, for simplicity of reading, it is multiplied by 100, obtaining a index $D_{it} \in [0,100]$.

The deprivation indexes based on the sum score approach perform at least as well as other more complicated methodologies, with the advantage of transparency and conceptual clarity. Moreover such an approach has been widely used in the derivation of the official indicator of deprivation at EU level. Cappellari and Jenkins (2007) are concerned with the weak theoretical foundations of the sum score approach and proposed an index based on the item response modelling approach (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). However, the two approaches yield very similar patterns of deprivation with correlation between indexes being equal to 0.97, providing a practical justification for the more transparent sum score approach although the item response modelling approach should be explored further in the measurement of multiple deprivation (Cappellari and Jenkins 2007).

Following an increasing consensus in the literature (Whelan et al. 2002), in the analysis I report the estimates based on the prevalence weighted deprivation index as main specification. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis based on the “counting approach” deprivation index confirms the robustness of my findings.⁸

3.3. Descriptive statistics

The deprivation indexes based on counting approach and prevalence weighting are highly correlated, with Spearman rank correlation coefficients, considering only the observations with deprivation index larger than 0, ranging from 0.93 in Denmark to 0.99 in Portugal. Looking at the mean of the two indexes, there are no differences in terms of cross-country differences (the rank of countries is the same with a few exceptions) and trends over time (see Table A3 and A4 in the Annex). For this reason, from now on I refer to the deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, unless otherwise stated.

⁸ In order to test the sensitivity of the main results I also replicated my analyses using an individual measure of deprivation developed by Bossert et al. (2007). Such an axiomatic index resulted strictly correlated with that used in my analyses and a comparison of the main results confirmed the robustness of my findings (see Annex III for details).

Between 1995 and 2000, the average deprivation score decreased in all countries and in particular in Ireland which also improved its position in the country ranking. Although the deprivation score also decreased substantially in Spain, Greece and Portugal, they remained at the bottom of the ranking. The reduction in deprivation level shows an improvement in the well-being of the individuals. However, it may also depend on the easier availability of the fixed set of items over time, their lower prices and a higher social perception of their importance. This implies the need to update the indicators (Gordon and Pantazis 1997) quite often in order to reflect the contemporary importance of different items.

Looking at other summary statistics of the deprivation index across countries (Table 2), it clearly emerges that the Southern European countries face the worse situation in terms of deprivation, not only in terms of average values. On the one hand, considering the proportion of households without any items lacking (i.e. with a deprivation index equal to zero), the lowest value is in Greece (10.5%) and the highest in the Netherlands (77.1%). On the other hand, the values at the top of the deprivation score distribution (i.e. the 99th percentile) range from 37.7 in Denmark to 88.4 in Portugal. The shape of the deprivation distribution differs. Countries with a lower average deprivation show larger spikes at zero and lower maximum values. Consequently they have a higher inequality of the deprivation score. Considering all observations, including zeros, the coefficient of variation of deprivation score ranges from 0.8 in Greece to 2.3 in the Netherlands. As expected, restricting the sample to those with a deprivation score greater than zero, the coefficient of variation is much lower and similar across countries ranging from 0.6 in the Netherlands to 0.8 in Italy, with very limited variation over time (see Table A5 in the Annex).


TABLE 2: STATISTICS OF DEPRIVATION INDEX

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
Average	7.50	5.91	4.60	24.81	15.02	8.00	8.04	10.01	12.27	4.55	24.77
Proportion with index equal to 0	48.47	67.66	68.42	10.55	30.21	52.95	55.19	46.66	28.32	77.08	13.06
Standard deviation	10.71	11.87	8.78	19.35	16.45	11.82	12.95	13.98	14.24	10.39	20.08
99th percentile	43.74	52.20	37.79	75.42	64.78	49.93	59.05	59.02	58.47	44.69	88.48
Maximum value	76.12	91.98	83.68	100.00	100.00	91.93	100.00	91.38	100.00	76.64	100.00
Coefficient of variation	1.43	2.01	1.91	0.78	1.10	1.48	1.61	1.40	1.16	2.28	0.81
Coefficient of variation (obs. with index different from 0)	0.75	0.79	0.68	0.66	0.73	0.70	0.78	0.76	0.83	0.65	0.66
Spearman Correlation between index based on prevalence weighting and index based on counting approach	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.99
Spearman Correlation between index based on prevalence weighting and index based on counting approach (obs. with index different from 0)	0.94	0.96	0.94	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.97	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.99

Notes: Deprivation index based on prevalence weighting. Statistics obtained using individual longitudinal weights. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

Figure 1 reports the average deprivation score and the income poverty rate across countries in the year 2000, showing a common pattern with the other years used in the analysis. Cross-country differences are evident. Denmark had the lowest average overall deprivation index (equal to 3.6) and Greece the highest (22). Generally, the ranking of the countries by poverty is similar to the ranking by deprivation index, with higher average deprivation in the countries having higher poverty rates. Ireland is the most important exception, showing a lower average deprivation than countries with the same poverty rate: this is consistent with the “Irish paradox” of the late 1990s when Irish incomes increased very rapidly, but incomes at the bottom increased less than the average resulting in relatively high monetary poverty rates (Hills 2004).

FIGURE 1: AVERAGE DEPRIVATION INDEX AND POVERTY RATE – YEAR 2000



Notes: Deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see Section 3.2. for details. Individual longitudinal weights used. Poverty rate (%) according to the income poverty line defined as 60% of median equivalent household income by using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Countries abbreviations: AT: Austria. BE: Belgium. DK: Denmark. EL: Greece. ES: Spain. FI: Finland. FR: France. IE: Ireland. IT: Italy. NL: the Netherlands. PT: Portugal. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP.

However there is a mismatch between the individuals defined as income poor and as deprived, both looking at one single point in time and over three years (see Table A7 and Figure A3 in the Annex). Such a mismatch confirms the limitations of income poverty measures in identifying individuals excluded by a minimum level of living standards (Layte et al. 2001, Whelan et al. 2002) and highlights the importance of understanding the temporal relationship between measures of income poverty and of deprivation (Whelan et al. 2003). The extent of the overlap between income poverty and deprivation and the correlation between them suggests that income measures of poverty identify those suffering from low living standards more accurately in the poorest countries than in the others. Moreover, even if the level of deprivation tends to decrease with income, this relationship is not always monotonic, with individuals in the bottom of the income distribution not always being the most deprived (Layte et al. 2001).

A number of common reasons can be suggested for this relationship and for the mismatch between income poverty and deprivation as well: short-term fluctuations of income not immediately reflected in deprivation indicators, availability of resources previously purchased, past outlays for house or durables, accumulated savings or ability to borrow,

support and non-cash benefits from family, neighbours or public institutions, lower expectations and requirements of the poorest in terms of durables, facilities and social activities (Mayer 1993). Moreover, at the bottom end of the income distribution, reported expenditure is often much greater than reported income and also income under-reporting errors are more frequent (Hills 1998). Focusing on the deprivation index, it is possible that low income individuals are no longer aware or are too embarrassed to recognize their own unaffordability of having items which most people have. On the contrary, other individuals with higher income may report a lack of a given item due to a priority of spending money on other items (Perry 2002).

3.4. Estimation issues

The deprivation index described above shows values clustered at 0, corresponding to the observed deprivation level for all individuals without any lack in the indicators used to derive the index. The zero value is not a statistical artefact or due to some kind of censoring. Therefore, following Angrist and Pischke (2009) I employ a linear model rather than a Tobit-type latent variable model which is more appropriate if the data are truly censored.⁹

Given the nature of the analysis and the availability of longitudinal data, it is important to control for any individual unobserved effect. By relaxing the assumption that individual effects are not correlated with regressors (and testing this empirically), the linear fixed effects models are the ones that produce consistent estimates. Under the assumption that unobservable characteristics which influence deprivation do not vary over time they reveal the direct impact of time varying variables.

The robustness of the fixed effects models comes at a price: in a fixed effect specification is not possible to identify the effect of time invariant characteristics separately from the constant term. However, some of the individual characteristics which are time invariant or collinear to the time trend are identified in the model measuring them at household level. They refer either to the head of household (e.g. gender) or to the household itself taking implicitly into account each individual's contribution to the characteristics of the household (e.g. proportion of elderly in the household).

⁹ As a robustness check, the results from the Tobit specification are reported in the Annex. Most of the coefficients, and in particular those related to income variables, from the linear model and the Tobit model are statistically non different in all cases. See Table A9 and A10 in the Annex for Tobit coefficients and their marginal effects, evaluated at the means of the independent variables, computed for the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable, which are comparable with linear coefficients.

Following the standard econometric practice (Allison 2009, Wooldridge 2002), the model has been parameterized using the normalisation that the average of the fixed effects (i.e. the average of the term v_i in equation 1)) is equal to zero. The estimated intercept is then the sample estimate of the average value of the individual fixed effects. This normalisation does not have any effect on the estimated coefficients. The primary advantage of this normalisation is that the average value of the predictions obtained from the model is equal the average value of the dependent variable (i.e. the Deprivation index), which is essential to perform the decomposition of the deprivation gap outlined above.

To relax the assumption of independence within households (i.e. individuals from the same household have the same observed characteristics in each wave), standard errors are adjusted for clustering by household. Furthermore, robust standard errors are used to treat heteroskedasticity. The estimations use the individual survey weights especially designed to take into account attrition in the panel.

The choice of the covariates follows the well-established literature on poverty dynamics (see e.g. Cappellari and Jenkins 2004) summarizing the socio-demographic composition, economic status and labour market attainment of the household to which the individual belong to. Since each individual's deprivation level is measured using a household-level variable, the covariates in the equation (1) are also measured at the household level. As mentioned above, they refer to either the household head (employment status, health condition, gender) or to the household itself (income and income sources, employment status, health condition, housing tenure, composition). In line with the consumption smoothing evidences (Blundell et al. 2008), deprivation may respond to changes in income and other socio-economic characteristics over a period of years rather than immediately. In order to capture this delayed effect, some of the covariates refer to the first and second year previous to the time at which deprivation refers to.¹⁰

Following most academic analyses (e.g. Whelan et al. 2003, 2004) and official Eurostat practice, I use the detailed individual variables to derive the household income. In particular, I follow the approach suggested by Iacovou (2004) constructing the net household income in each year t as the sum of the net personal income, reported at $t + I$, of individuals present in the household at t . If an individual is missing at $t + I$ due to attrition, I impute to her the income provided at t . I deflate net income to the level of prices in the year 2000 in each

¹⁰ The model specifications allow only up to two income lags in order to avoid losing too much information from the relatively short panel. As a robustness check, I verified that the third income lag would be statistically significant only in a couple of countries.

country, using the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HCPI) provided by Eurostat, and I express income in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). The logarithmic specification of unequivalized net income, sensitive to variations at the bottom of the income distribution, is included in the regressions with additional variables (number of adults and children living in the household) to control directly for household size and composition. In order to test whether type and amount of social transfers matter, dummy variables are included for each type of transfer received. Each dummy variable takes a value of one if the specific income source is received and zero if not. Time-specific effects are taken into account including dummy variables for time periods among the other covariates.

4. Determinants of derivation and deprivation gap across countries

In order to explore the role that income, but also other economic attainments, have on the level of deprivation an individual faces, I run linear fixed effects regressions for each country¹¹, controlling for unobserved characteristics of individuals. Moreover, considering each country separately I can analyse the strength of the relationships in each country, controlling for unobserved country differences.

The estimates presented below are robust to the specification of the deprivation index, showing qualitatively the same results as the model which uses the deprivation index based on counting approach as dependent variable (see Table A8 in the Annex).

¹¹ The Hausman specification tests, comparing the fixed effects specification with the random effects specification, suggest a preference for the former in all cases. The statistics, reported at the bottom of the Table 3, indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of individual effects uncorrelated with regressors.

TABLE 3: LINEAR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL – DEPRIVATION INDEX BASED ON PREVALENCE WEIGHTING

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
HH income at <i>t</i>	-1.24** (0.55)	-1.01*** (0.38)	-1.14** (0.58)	-0.78** (0.35)	-1.26*** (0.31)	-2.35*** (0.63)	-1.59*** (0.33)	-1.27** (0.58)	-0.76*** (0.25)	-2.10*** (0.39)	-1.19 (0.98)
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	-0.17 (0.35)	-0.28 (0.31)	-1.21** (0.48)	-4.07*** (0.33)	-1.91*** (0.28)	-0.89 (0.54)	-0.59*** (0.19)	-0.84** (0.40)	-1.16*** (0.22)	-1.48*** (0.26)	-2.31*** (0.52)
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	-0.13 (0.29)	-0.55* (0.28)	-0.23 (0.37)	-0.55* (0.29)	-0.68*** (0.26)	-0.88* (0.47)	-0.33** (0.15)	0.02 (0.48)	-0.41** (0.18)	-0.52*** (0.18)	-0.86* (0.51)
HoH is unemployed	2.30** (0.99)	1.6 (1.11)	3.19*** (0.93)	4.98*** (1.27)	1.49** (0.65)	2.80*** (0.70)	2.28*** (0.64)	4.34*** (0.83)	4.12*** (1.10)	3.67*** (0.69)	3.64** (1.46)
HoH is inactive	-0.61 (0.76)	0.82 (0.66)	2.91*** (0.71)	0.8 (0.71)	0 (0.78)	2.92** (1.43)	0.99* (0.56)	-0.59 (0.76)	0.83 (0.60)	2.36*** (0.47)	2.15*** (0.69)
Proportion of employed people in HH	-0.64 (0.44)	0.45 (0.46)	-0.80* (0.41)	-2.43*** (0.54)	-1.99*** (0.57)	-0.24 (0.64)	-0.96*** (0.30)	-0.56 (0.55)	-1.04** (0.48)	-0.58** (0.29)	-0.87 (0.67)
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	-0.11 (0.77)	0.17 (0.93)	0.03 (0.72)	0.7 (0.92)	1.13** (0.54)	1.74 (1.14)	0.47 (0.59)	1.48* (0.76)	1.75* (0.99)	0.54 (0.62)	0.5 (0.81)
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-0.53 (0.43)	0.54 (0.48)	-0.57 (0.37)	0.02 (0.54)	-0.06 (0.56)	-0.34 (0.44)	-0.09 (0.29)	0.21 (0.57)	0.1 (0.41)	0.12 (0.26)	-0.39 (0.64)
HoH has good health status	-0.34 (0.63)	-0.68 (0.69)	-0.13 (0.68)	-2.09*** (0.55)	-1.85*** (0.72)	-1.38*** (0.52)	-1.75*** (0.61)	-3.37* (1.82)	-1.30*** (0.42)	-0.28 (0.57)	-0.6 (0.48)
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-0.5 (0.54)	-0.01 (0.51)	-0.23 (0.50)	-2.30*** (0.57)	-0.88* (0.50)	-0.79 (0.54)	-0.52 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.72)	-1.71*** (0.41)	-0.29 (0.36)	-1.20** (0.47)
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	-0.83 (0.51)	-0.35 (0.57)	-0.36 (0.83)	-0.3 (0.50)	0.13 (0.60)	-1.62*** (0.58)	-0.19 (0.41)	-1.16 (2.01)	0.28 (0.48)	0.54 (0.54)	0.31 (0.49)
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.38 (0.55)	-0.57 (0.58)	-0.04 (0.52)	-0.21 (0.50)	-0.76 (0.50)	-0.19 (0.46)	0.65** (0.29)	-0.07 (0.67)	0.21 (0.38)	0.38 (0.31)	0.42 (0.49)
HH living in a mortgaged house	0.12 (0.47)	-0.23 (0.45)	0.38 (0.54)	0.82 (0.71)	1.16*** (0.44)	-0.19 (0.81)	0.50* (0.29)	-0.11 (0.60)	2.46*** (0.51)	-0.49 (0.81)	-0.63 (0.67)
HH living in a rented house	-0.75 (0.81)	-0.47 (0.71)	0.84 (0.77)	2.93** (1.27)	2.40* (1.39)	0.14 (0.95)	0.03 (0.41)	3.20** (1.54)	1.30* (0.78)	-0.28 (0.82)	-0.4 (1.36)
HH living in a provided rent-free house	0.02 (0.62)	0.07 (1.27)	-0.14 (1.57)	2.53** (1.19)	1.80** (0.76)	1.38 (1.02)	-0.05 (0.62)	-0.46 (1.91)	1.17* (0.66)	-2.15 (1.36)	1.65 (1.04)
HH receiving private transfers	0.22 (0.52)	0.96** (0.42)	0.39 (0.42)	0.82 (0.62)	0.67 (0.82)	0.6 (0.50)	0.09 (0.29)	-1.18 (1.44)	0.71 (0.65)	1.06** (0.41)	-0.14 (1.90)
HH receiving unemployment benefits	0.35 (0.42)	0.2 (0.47)	0.5 (0.42)	1.34 (0.85)	0.81* (0.49)	0.28 (0.39)	0.91*** (0.30)	0.36 (0.39)	0.63 (0.52)	0.3 (0.43)	-0.24 (0.69)
HH receiving social assistance	2.21 (2.08)	4.66*** (1.78)	1.06 (0.74)	0.06 (1.19)	0.25 (2.36)	2.38*** (0.83)	0.67 (1.56)	0.46 (0.56)	0.93 (1.65)	5.34** (2.10)	-2 (1.36)
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	1.21 (0.98)	0.14 (0.73)	-1.30* (0.78)	0.26 (0.77)	-1.27 (0.81)	-0.76 (0.66)	-1.94*** (0.68)	1.5 (1.19)	0.13 (0.61)	-0.81* (0.42)	1.85 (1.32)
HH receiving family-related allowances	0.23 (0.52)	-0.7 (0.64)	-1.14** (0.47)	-0.41 (0.67)	1.02 (0.82)	-0.5 (0.73)	0.05 (0.44)	-0.5 (0.49)	0.45 (0.42)	0.11 (0.36)	-0.44 (0.54)
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	-0.06 (0.91)	0.11 (0.52)	0.24 (0.37)	2.08** (0.89)	0.1 (0.56)	0.13 (0.58)	0.03 (0.40)	-0.75 (0.83)	0.29 (0.52)	0.16 (0.46)	0.86 (0.71)
HH receiving housing allowance	0.06 (0.69)	-0.67 (1.05)	-0.49 (0.62)	-3.41** (1.70)	3.77** (1.86)	-0.03 (0.61)	1.20*** (0.40)	4.43** (1.77)	0.23 (1.47)	0.66 (0.52)	-9.37** (4.76)
Lone parent HH	0.59 (1.12)	3.13* (1.79)	1.72* (0.97)	4.29** (1.79)	0.47 (0.99)	1.02 (1.20)	0.37 (1.12)	-0.12 (1.60)	-1.64 (1.28)	1.75*** (0.62)	4.57** (2.07)
No. of adults in HH	-0.16 (0.33)	0.34 (0.32)	-0.43 (0.32)	1.39*** (0.36)	0.57* (0.33)	0.49 (0.42)	0.35 (0.24)	0.52 (0.34)	0.63** (0.30)	0.59*** (0.21)	0.22 (0.51)
No. of children in HH	-0.25 (0.40)	0.43 (0.35)	0.15 (0.33)	0.90* (0.48)	0.83* (0.50)	0.39 (0.42)	-0.01 (0.30)	1.44*** (0.40)	1.00** (0.39)	-0.19 (0.23)	0.71 (0.75)
Proportion of elderly in HH	0.98 (1.09)	1.02 (0.85)	-0.54 (1.01)	-2.44** (1.16)	-0.54 (1.12)	0.34 (1.03)	0.4 (0.66)	-1.55 (1.33)	0.61 (0.88)	-1.10** (0.54)	-0.02 (1.34)
HoH is a woman	0.13 (1.18)	3.32** (1.40)	1.38 (0.93)	-2.4 (1.49)	1.36 (1.13)	2.79* (1.52)	3.16*** (1.15)	3.19* (1.71)	1.87** (0.89)	1.08 (0.74)	-1.91 (1.94)
Year 1996		-1.05*** (0.30)	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.31)	0.25 (0.38)		-0.17 (0.21)	-0.18 (0.33)	-0.57*** (0.21)	0.07 (0.15)	-1.72*** (0.35)
Year 1997	0.03 (0.27)	-1.24*** (0.32)	-1.14*** (0.25)	-1.56*** (0.35)	-0.85** (0.34)		-1.00*** (0.22)	-1.78*** (0.44)	-0.83*** (0.25)	-0.24 (0.22)	-2.49*** (0.49)
Year 1998	-0.4 (0.34)	-2.20*** (0.31)	-0.68** (0.33)	-4.53*** (0.39)	-2.58*** (0.35)	-0.97*** (0.24)	-0.96*** (0.22)	-2.60*** (0.54)	-1.05*** (0.29)	-0.92*** (0.18)	-3.54*** (0.43)
Year 1999	-0.93*** (0.31)	-2.18*** (0.41)	-0.93*** (0.31)	-3.97*** (0.41)	-2.62*** (0.38)	-1.86*** (0.27)	-2.06*** (0.22)	-2.82*** (0.67)	-1.28*** (0.27)	-1.20*** (0.18)	-4.50*** (0.45)
Year 2000	-0.89*** (0.33)	-2.57*** (0.38)	-1.48*** (0.30)	-4.65*** (0.41)	-3.53*** (0.40)	-2.54*** (0.29)	-2.27*** (0.24)	-4.39*** (0.59)	-1.53*** (0.30)	-0.76*** (0.22)	-6.82*** (0.51)
Constant	14.88*** (2.44)	12.47*** (2.23)	15.29*** (2.82)	41.98*** (1.95)	28.47*** (2.11)	21.92*** (2.50)	17.63*** (1.64)	18.85*** (3.46)	18.76*** (1.65)	15.85*** (1.82)	38.78*** (3.08)
Number of observations	26294	26301	20055	52391	66969	17995	54831	29508	78322	43134	55414
Number of groups	7014	6313	5072	11990	16009	6759	13065	7998	17971	10888	12102
Wald test (p value)	1.86 (0.00)	5.14 (0.00)	5.88 (0.00)	19.75 (0.00)	14.64 (0.00)	8.72 (0.00)	13.13 (0.00)	12.82 (0.00)	6.29 (0.00)	10.48 (0.00)	12.97 (0.00)
R ² within	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.11	0.02	0.07	0.11
R ² between	0.06	0.2	0.16	0.36	0.36	0.19	0.34	0.35	0.3	0.33	0.26
R ² overall	0.04	0.15	0.13	0.25	0.24	0.16	0.26	0.29	0.21	0.27	0.2
Hausman test (p value)	907 (0.00)	820 (0.00)	623 (0.00)	1523 (0.00)	3023 (0.00)	508 (0.00)	2352 (0.00)	1260 (0.00)	2963 (0.00)	1037 (0.00)	4639 (0.00)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by household

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 from robust standard errors (in parenthesis), adjusted for clustering by household. Individual longitudinal weights used. Dependent variable: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting. HH: household. HoH: head of household. Income values are included as natural logarithm of net income expressed in PPS/1000. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

The first important relationship to be analysed is between deprivation and income: as discussed above, I include in the regressions the current values of income and the values related to the two previous years. As expected, deprivation and income are negatively associated. The evidence that individuals smooth their living standards across periods of income fluctuation is confirmed by the coefficients of both first and second lag of income which are statistically significant in most of the countries. This confirms that generally, changes in deprivation score do not reflect only contemporary changes in income. It reinforces the opinion that a long-term perspective should always be considered in order to determine living standards levels without excessive attention to short-term movements into and out of income poverty or deprivation (Berthoud and Bryan 2010).

Concerning the employment status of the household head, moving out of the labour market coincides with an increase in the deprivation level. The effect is larger than that of becoming inactive. Furthermore, in most of the countries, an increase in the proportion of individuals with a job within the household is associated with a decrease in the deprivation score. Such effects can be seen as the consequences of the security offered by a job stability as opposed to the effects of frequent job change and widespread precariousness. The effect of household head being unemployed in the previous year is statistically significant only in a few countries and is always smaller than the effect of a current absence of job.

As expected, the deprivation level is lower if the household head and other members improve their health status. The effect of health status in the previous year is smaller (and non significant) in all countries with the exception of Finland. Comparing the magnitude of the effects of unemployment and health status, it emerges that the former has a larger impact on deprivation in most of the countries, capturing the liquidity shock caused by the loss of employment of the head of household.

The housing tenure affects the deprivation level in the Southern European countries and Ireland with a clear penalty of moving to rented houses rather than moving to an own house in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Italy. Also moving into a house with an outstanding mortgage or into a free-rented house is associated with an increase in the deprivation score, reflecting the long-term security associated with living in the own house.

Receiving social assistance transfers or housing allowances coincides with a significant increase of the deprivation level in Belgium, Spain, Finland France, Ireland and the Netherlands, countries characterised by relative generous provision of income support schemes. On the other hand, receiving housing allowance contributes to decrease the deprivation level in Greece and Portugal. These are clear evidences that income sources, and

not only income level, matter for the individual well-being reinforcing the view that deprivation index should be a complementary indicator to monetary poverty in the measurement of the hardship suffered by the individuals. An increase in old-age benefits and a larger proportion of old people are associated with a decrease in the deprivation level in Denmark, Greece, France and the Netherlands. The elderly may have adopted a thrifty lifestyle, accumulated durable goods and built up assets during their life in order to prevent lack of resources in the old age and they seem to be less vulnerable than other categories.


Becoming a lone parent and a change in the gender of the head of household from man to woman coincide with a significant increase of the deprivation level in most of the countries, showing the importance of capturing the shock in terms of deprivation caused by a couple split or a new birth outside a partnership.

Following the approach proposed by Yun (2005) and outlined above I can show the extent to which the predicted deprivation gap between each country and the Netherlands is attributable to differences in characteristics, returns and constant term, as shown in the equation (4). I start from the deprivation level predicted using the estimates of the fixed effects models (which exploit the within-individual differences over time arising in each country) and I select the Netherlands as benchmark because it has the lowest average predicted deprivation level.¹²

Figure 2 shows the contribution of characteristics, returns and constant terms (i.e. the terms of the right hand side of the equation (4)) to the deprivation gap of each country with respect to the Netherlands (i.e. the left hand side of the equation (4)).

¹² The results are robust to the choice of the country selected as benchmark. Using Denmark (i.e. the country with the second lowest average predicted deprivation level) the results do not change.

FIGURE 2: DECOMPOSITION OF DEPRIVATION GAP



Notes: Absolute values of deprivation predicted from estimates of linear fixed effects model (Dependent variable: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting). Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

The countries are ordered by their difference in deprivation with respect to the Netherlands (shown by the horizontal dash), ranging from a difference close to zero in case of Denmark to a difference equal to 20 in case of Portugal and Greece.

The contribution attributable to differences in characteristics (shown by the blue bar) is positive and bigger in the countries with a higher deprivation level. This means that part of the deprivation gap is due to a generally lower average level of the socio-economic endowments in such countries than in the Netherlands. It is negative in Denmark and Austria, and close to zero in Belgium and France, where the level of the main socio-economic determinants is quite similar than in the Netherlands.

The component attributable to differences in returns (shown by the red bar) is positive in most of the countries but close to zero in Finland, Spain and Greece. Given the level of the socio-economic endowments, part of the deprivation gap is due to a different strength of these endowments in reducing deprivation.


The third green bar shows the contribution of the constant term. It captures any factors not captured by the model, and it can be seen as a measure of the unobserved differences between European countries. With the exception of Italy, it plays a very important role in explaining the deprivation gap. This is a relevant result in a cross country perspective, usually

not investigated, meaning that the deprivation gap is likely to be explained more by individual factors not identified in the model, whose average reflects differences in cultural attitudes, institutions, and norms specific to each country, rather than the characteristics usually identified in the economic analysis of poverty across countries.

In order to explore some of the reasons for the cross-country deprivation gap explained by the model, I now provide more details of the contribution of the determinants that explain most of the deprivation gap in absolute values: income and family composition. In the following graphs the values show the extent to which each variable, in terms of characteristics and returns, contributes to the deprivation gap. For each variable, they refer respectively to the first and second term of the right hand side of the equation (4).

In the countries where a lower average income than in the Netherlands contributes to an increase in the deprivation gap (positive values in Figure 3 – Right panel), the income return contributes to reduce this differential (negative values in Figure 3 – Left panel). In particular it is true in Greece, Portugal (especially due to the contribution of the first year lagged income) where an increase in income helps to close the gap. On the other hand, in Austria and Belgium, where a higher mean income contributes to slightly reducing the deprivation gap, the effect of an increase in income reduces deprivation less than in the Netherlands. These findings confirm that in the countries characterized by a higher level of deprivation, an increase in income is more effective than in other countries in reducing the deprivation differential.


FIGURE 3: CONTRIBUTION OF INCOME TO THE DEPRIVATION GAP



Notes: Absolute values of deprivation predicted from estimates of linear fixed effects model (Dependent variable: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details).. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

Family composition (in terms of number of adults and children) explains the gap much more in terms of returns than in terms of characteristics (Figure 4). The effects are clearly differentiated in two blocs of countries: in the Southern countries and Ireland the number of children (but also the number of adults in Greece) contributes to an increase in the deprivation gap much more than in the other countries (positive values in Figure 4 – Left panel). In these countries where families traditionally play an important role as a social shock absorber, however, it seems that family itself, mainly due to the presence of a larger number of individuals with low or null incomes and less public support than in other countries, contributes to explaining an important part of the deprivation gap.

FIGURE 4: CONTRIBUTION OF FAMILY COMPOSITION TO THE DEPRIVATION GAP



Notes: Absolute values of deprivation predicted from estimates of linear fixed effects model (Dependent variable: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details). Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

5. Concluding remarks

The longitudinal analyses conducted using the ECHP survey highlight the relationship between income and deprivation over time and the role played by other socio-economic dimensions in absorbing or exacerbating the effect of an income shock on the deprivation level across different countries. The results of the paper arise from two main methodological contributions. First, longitudinal data and methods allow me to control for time constant unobserved individual effects and examine the impact on deprivation of lagged variables such as socio-economic shocks. Second, the decomposition approach highlights the determinants of the differences in average deprivation across countries.

The evidences that income sources and socio-economic endowments, and not only income level, matter for the individual well-being confirm the complementary role of income measures and deprivation index in monitoring the hardship suffered by the individuals.

First, changes in income and deprivation do not strictly coincide and income from the past has an impact on current deprivation. This is in part due to the different phenomena, and their timing, captured by income and deprivation measures and it supports the view that long-term perspective should always be considered in order to determine living standards levels without excessive attention to short-term movements into and out of income poverty or deprivation.

Second, moving into and out of the labour market is important both for the head of household and other members. Also controlling for the fact that individuals with a job have higher income, employment is a protection against low living standards.

Third, home ownership (with or without an outstanding mortgage) has an important impact on deprivation, capturing the effects of different current housing costs and asset formation but also the long-term security associated with living in the own house.

Given such a snapshot, the decomposition of the deprivation gaps between countries shows that part of such gaps arises through different socio-economic endowments and their strength in reducing deprivation in each country than in the Netherlands which is the benchmark of the analysis. However, a relevant part of the deprivation gap is attributable to a country specific effect revealing the importance of factors like cultural attitudes and institutions.

In particular, the Southern countries confirm to be a clustered welfare type within Europe showing that a large part of the deprivation gap is not captured by the common factors identified in the model. In such countries, increases in income (except in Italy) are more effective in reducing the deprivation gap than in other countries. Despite the traditional role played by the family, the effects of an enlargement of the family contribute to increasing the deprivation gap more than in other countries.

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Annex I. Data and descriptive statistics

TABLE A1: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS OF ATTRITION PROBABILITY BETWEEN WAVE 2 AND 7 OF THE ECHP

	DK	NL	BE	FR	IE	IT	EL	ES	PT	AT	FI
Individual Deprivation index	0.003	-0.005	0.008***	0.006**	0.005*	-0.001	0.001	0.003	-0.003	-0.002	0.004
HH* income	-0.056	-0.076	-0.119	0.001	0.093	0.148***	0.181***	0.012	0.157*	-0.108	-0.021
HoH* is unemployed	-0.152	0.108	0.044	0.22	0.521**	0.247	0.597***	0.294*	0.415*	0.39	0.044
HoH is inactive	-0.217	-0.05	-0.049	-0.051	0.024	0.023	0.198**	-0.058	0.157	-0.270*	-0.307**
Proportion of employed people in HH	0.079	0.156	0.300*	-0.004	0.144	0.267**	-0.234*	0.134	-0.21	-0.16	-0.067
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	0.399*	0.177	0.292	0.108	-0.642***	0.08	0.002	0.125	0.224	-0.114	0
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-0.049	0.012	-0.141	-0.073	-0.291**	-0.208*	0.116	0.227	-0.002	0.206	0.03
HoH has good health status	-0.277*	-0.239*	-0.402***	-0.313***	-0.17	-0.166*	-0.187*	-0.081	0.02	-0.243*	-0.295*
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-0.603***	-0.167	-0.167	-0.157*	-0.11	-0.341***	-0.186*	-0.174*	-0.419***	-0.132	-0.163
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	-0.092	-0.222*	-0.105	-0.169*	-0.375	-0.055	0.026	-0.105	-0.088	-0.083	0.069
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-0.108	-0.112	-0.093	-0.016	0.084	0.029	-0.117	-0.145	0.067	-0.043	-0.03
HH living in a mortgaged house	-0.014	-0.03	-0.086	0.005	-0.119	0.102	0.008	0.039	0.031	-0.132	-0.066
HH living in a rented house	0.075	0.082	0.181*	0.125*	0.025	0.067	0.506***	0.174**	0.227**	0.303***	-0.018
HH living in a provided rent-free house	0.541	0.001	0.162	0.195*	0.248	0.005	-0.076	-0.092	0.158	0.163	0.191
HH receiving private transfers	0.238	0.185	-0.048	0.315***	0.189	0.343***	0.622***	0.161	0.317	0.534***	0.148
HH receiving unemployment benefits	0.112	0.258**	-0.052	0.006	-0.014	-0.317**	-0.747***	-0.192*	-0.009	-0.342*	0.009
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	-0.309*	-0.162	-0.414***	-0.044	-0.137	-0.061	-0.103	0.091	-0.346**	0.105	0.048
HH receiving family-related allowances	-0.112	-0.368***	-0.412***	-0.274***	-0.284**	-0.16	-0.267**	-0.186	-0.249**	-0.350**	-0.011
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	-0.144	-0.301**	-0.061	-0.105	-0.496**	-0.056	-0.192	-0.13	-0.281*	0.093	0.04
HH receiving social assistance	0.117	-0.075	0.106	-0.264	0.103	-0.005	0.362	0.157	-0.335	0.17	0.274
HH receiving housing allowance	0.205	-0.095	-0.244	0.172**	-0.128	0.583**	-0.243	0.239	1.170**	0.107	0.251
Lone parent HH	0.378*	0.237*	0.181	0.059	-0.094	0.223**	0.034	0.094	0.379**	0.347**	-0.420*
No. of adults in HH	0.315***	0.227***	0.228***	0.114***	0.023	-0.002	0.038	0.013	-0.052*	0.100**	0.288***
No. of children in HH	-0.084	-0.02	0.07	-0.027	-0.008	-0.137***	-0.100**	-0.083**	-0.04	-0.012	0.017
Proportion of elderly in HH	0.550***	0.236*	0.580***	0.03	-0.002	0.217**	0.021	-0.152	0.033	0.041	0.25
Constant	-1.761***	-1.745***	-1.715***	-2.081***	-1.298***	-2.355***	-2.708***	-2.006***	-2.395***	-1.682***	-1.971***
Number of observation	20,055	43,134	26,301	54,831	29,508	78,322	52,391	66,969	55,414	26,294	17,995
Wald test	135.831	130.499	135.196	153.064	57.474	138.125	201.456	70.567	78.931	86.588	63.688
p value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ from robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by household. Deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Individual longitudinal weights used. *: HH = household. *: HoH = head of household. Income values are included as natural logarithm of net income expressed in PPS/1000. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A2: CRONBACH'S ALPHA

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
AT	---	0.65	0.67	0.64	0.62	0.61
BE	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.77
DK	0.65	0.69	0.63	0.69	0.65	0.68
EL	0.76	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.72
ES	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.76	0.76
FI	---	---	0.69	0.71	0.69	0.70
FR	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.75
IE	0.74	0.74	0.73	0.76	0.71	0.70
IT	0.76	0.76	0.70	0.68	0.68	0.69
NL	0.71	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.72	0.71
PT	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.77	0.78

Notes: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A3: AVERAGE DEPRIVATION INDEX BASED ON PREVALENCE WEIGHTING AND COUNTRY RANKING

	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000	
	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>
AT	---	---	8.06	4	7.79	4	7.42	4	6.92	5	7.16	7
BE	7.44	3	6.44	3	6.18	3	5.22	3	5.04	3	4.40	3
DK	5.44	2	5.15	1	4.14	1	4.56	2	4.22	2	3.56	1
EL	27.30	8	27.00	10	25.56	11	22.48	10	23.17	10	21.97	11
ES	17.18	7	17.09	8	15.84	9	13.70	9	13.07	9	11.96	9
FI	---	---	---	---	9.39	6	8.03	5	7.35	6	6.56	6
FR	8.99	4	9.22	5	8.15	5	8.10	6	6.88	4	6.49	5
IE	11.78	5	11.88	6	10.16	7	9.25	7	8.39	7	6.12	4
IT	13.08	6	12.43	7	12.23	8	12.10	8	11.87	8	11.67	8
NL	5.28	1	5.26	2	4.75	2	3.94	1	3.72	1	4.14	2
PT	28.00	9	26.21	9	25.47	10	24.16	11	23.31	11	20.91	10

Notes: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A4: AVERAGE DEPRIVATION INDEX BASED ON COUNTING APPROACH AND COUNTRY RANKING

	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000	
	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>rank</i>
AT	---	10	1.20	4	1.16	4	1.11	4	1.03	5	1.07	7
BE	1.05	3	0.91	3	0.86	3	0.73	3	0.70	3	0.61	3
DK	0.76	2	0.71	1	0.57	1	0.63	2	0.58	2	0.49	1
EL	4.23	8	4.93	10	4.14	10	3.53	10	3.60	10	3.48	10
ES	2.90	7	2.85	8	2.59	9	2.26	9	2.13	9	1.97	9
FI	---	11	---	11	1.43	6	1.18	6	1.07	6	0.94	6
FR	1.33	4	1.35	5	1.19	5	1.16	5	0.98	4	0.92	5
IE	1.68	5	1.71	6	1.44	7	1.33	7	1.20	7	0.87	4
IT	2.15	6	2.04	7	1.99	8	2.02	8	1.96	8	1.94	8
NL	0.72	1	0.72	2	0.65	2	0.53	1	0.51	1	0.57	2
PT	4.78	9	4.52	9	4.42	11	4.23	11	4.11	11	3.77	11

Notes: deprivation index based on counting approach, see section 3.2. for details. Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A5: COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF DEPRIVATION INDEX

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
1995	---	0.80	0.66	0.62	0.76	---	0.78	0.76	0.88	0.62	0.64
1996	0.75	0.78	0.75	0.69	0.73	---	0.78	0.74	0.87	0.66	0.64
1997	0.76	0.81	0.64	0.65	0.71	0.69	0.80	0.74	0.79	0.64	0.66
1998	0.75	0.80	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.79	0.76	0.79	0.68	0.66
1999	0.73	0.78	0.65	0.65	0.72	0.69	0.77	0.73	0.79	0.61	0.65
2000	0.76	0.74	0.66	0.65	0.72	0.73	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.69	0.71

Notes: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Individual longitudinal weights used. Samples restricted to observations with deprivation index different from 0. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	DK	NL	BE	FR	IE	IT	EL	ES	PT	AT	FI
HH* income at <i>t</i>	31.45	26.36	32.46	30.43	28.57	26.25	20.48	26.10	21.31	35.97	23.69
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	31.12	26.14	32.36	30.16	26.71	25.77	20.32	25.02	20.23	35.95	22.83
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	30.16	25.45	31.71	29.77	24.69	25.07	19.98	23.82	19.22	35.54	21.96
HoH* is employed	0.69	0.66	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.58	0.62	0.58	0.70	0.66	0.60
HoH* is unemployed	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.06
HoH is inactive	0.28	0.30	0.34	0.34	0.30	0.39	0.36	0.34	0.26	0.31	0.34
Proportion of employed people in HH	0.48	0.29	0.35	0.36	0.39	0.32	0.32	0.29	0.49	0.45	0.38
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.07
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.49	0.28	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.32	0.32	0.27	0.48	0.45	0.37
HoH has good health status	0.94	0.96	0.95	0.92	0.96	0.87	0.90	0.88	0.77	0.92	0.91
Proportion of healthy people in HH	0.79	0.71	0.79	0.79	0.81	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.72	0.80	0.61
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	0.95	0.96	0.95	0.93	0.96	0.87	0.90	0.88	0.79	0.92	0.92
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.79	0.71	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.72	0.80	0.62
HH living in a owned house	0.09	0.07	0.40	0.33	0.45	0.65	0.77	0.68	0.51	0.38	0.44
HH living in a mortgaged house	0.64	0.51	0.39	0.33	0.40	0.12	0.10	0.18	0.14	0.25	0.32
HH living in a rented house	0.27	0.41	0.19	0.30	0.13	0.18	0.11	0.10	0.25	0.31	0.22
HH living in a provided rent-free house	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.01
HH receiving private transfers	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.06
HH receiving unemployment benefits	0.11	0.05	0.13	0.11	0.20	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.20
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	0.20	0.18	0.22	0.22	0.18	0.32	0.32	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.26
HH receiving family-related allowances	0.24	0.26	0.37	0.20	0.39	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.41	0.38	0.20
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.19
HH receiving social assistance	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05
HH receiving housing allowance	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.10
Lone parent HH	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.05
No. of adults in HH	2.30	2.21	2.60	2.55	3.31	3.08	2.87	3.58	3.44	2.82	2.22
No. of children in HH	0.54	0.57	0.54	0.56	0.81	0.45	0.48	0.56	0.61	0.58	0.53
Proportion of elderly in HH	0.20	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.18	0.20
Number of observations	26,294	26,301	20,055	52,391	66,969	17,995	54,831	29,508	78,322	43,134	55,414

Notes: Average values. Equivalised income values (using the modified OECD equivalence scale) expressed in PPS/1000; Number of adults, Number of children and all proportions are absolute values. Dummy variables related to the social transfers take value one if the amount received is at least equal, in each country, to the 25th percentile of the ratio of the transfer received and the total annual income. Individual longitudinal weights used.

♦: HH = household. ♣: HoH = head of household. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

Table A6 provides a summary of the characteristics of the samples. Average household income is generally higher in the North than in the South: it varies from 35,970 PPS in Austria to 20,480 PPS in Greece. Dummy variables related to the social transfers take value one if the amount received is at least equal, in each country, to the 25th percentile of the ratio of the transfer received and the total annual income. Old-age benefits, mainly private and public pensions, were reported by an average of more than 20% of households in each country, with values equal to 32% in Italy and Greece. Family allowances are distributed much more unequally across countries varying from 3% in Spain and 4% in Italy to 38% in Austria and 41% in Portugal. Housing allowances are relevant only in France (12% of households), Finland (10%) and Denmark (8%). Unemployment benefits affect a higher proportion of households in Finland and Ireland (20%), and Belgium (13%).

Job market participation is differentiated across Europe with lower values in the Mediterranean countries and in Ireland. In Denmark 69% of household heads are employed, 3% unemployed and 28% inactive (mainly retired or students) and the percentage of employed people in each household is equal to 48%. In Spain 58% of household heads are employed, 8% unemployed and 34% inactive with a percentage of employed people in each household equal to 29%.

The percentage of households living in their own houses is high in the Southern countries: 77% in Greece, 68% in Spain and 65% in Italy. However, in countries where such a percentage is very low (7% in the Netherlands, 9% in Denmark), many more households have an outstanding mortgage (64% in Denmark, 51% in the Netherland). Higher percentages of households living in rented houses are reported in the Netherlands (41%) and Austria (31%).


The family structure varies across Europe: the number of adults in each household is higher in Spain (3.58) and in the other Southern countries; however, such countries are characterized by a smaller number of children in each household (0.45 in Italy and 0.48 in Greece) and a larger proportion of elderly in the family (such a proportion varies from 14% in Ireland to 21% in Greece). Lone parents are quite numerous in Ireland (10% of households), and Portugal (8%).

TABLE A7: OVERLAP BETWEEN INCOME POOR AND DEPRIVED

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
AT	---	37.47	38.47	32.94	33.57	34.21
BE	33.86	31.36	33.36	33.53	31.15	37.54
DK	17.44	13.74	17.14	17.90	20.17	32.85
EL	45.64	44.60	46.32	44.22	43.44	44.83
ES	44.38	42.42	43.29	40.68	44.40	41.41
FI	---	---	21.92	25.33	27.44	22.58
FR	40.18	40.07	40.53	36.68	41.56	38.61
IE	40.99	47.77	42.52	44.15	48.06	42.10
IT	46.10	41.33	45.01	45.67	48.36	44.76
NL	37.23	37.95	31.82	35.86	32.43	28.34
PT	47.13	49.78	52.85	47.52	46.55	48.63


Notes: Deprived are individuals with a deprivation index above the deprivation line. Deprivation line calibrated to obtain the same percentage of individuals deprived and poor (i.e. with household income below the poverty line). Values in percentage terms. Deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Poverty line equal to 60% of median equivalent household income. Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

FIGURE A1: AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITEMS LACKING RELATED TO ECONOMIC STRAIN



Notes: Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP


FIGURE A2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF DURABLES LACKING



Notes: Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

Considering the deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, Figure A3 shows that the overlap between deprived and poor individuals, in the year 2000, varies from only 23% in Finland to 49% in Portugal. In other words, 77% of the poor in Finland are not deprived, 51% in Portugal and so on. If I look at the individuals defined as both poor and deprived over the last three years (i.e. respectively individuals persistently poor and persistently deprived), the overlap between them decreases substantially in all countries. However, if I consider the individuals who were persistently poor but deprived only in the last year, the overlap between them increases.

FIGURE A3: OVERLAP BETWEEN POOR AND DEPRIVED



Notes: Deprived are individuals with a deprivation index above the deprivation line. Deprivation line calibrated to obtain the same percentage of individuals deprived and poor (i.e. with household income below the poverty line). Persistent poor and deprived are individuals in the same condition for three years. Values in percentage terms. Deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Poverty line equal to 60% of median equivalent household income. Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

Annex II. Robustness checks

TABLE A8: LINEAR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL – DEPRIVATION INDEX BASED ON COUNTING

APPROACH

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
HH income at <i>t</i>	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.08)	-0.12*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.19** (0.08)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.19* (0.11)
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.57*** (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.04)	-0.12* (0.08)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.06)
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.05** (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.07)
HoH is unemployed	0.33** (0.14)	0.22 (0.15)	0.44*** (0.13)	0.67*** (0.17)	0.25*** (0.09)	0.44*** (0.10)	0.32*** (0.09)	0.60*** (0.12)	0.56*** (0.14)	0.50*** (0.09)	0.43** (0.18)
HoH is inactive	-0.1 (0.11)	0.13 (0.09)	0.40*** (0.09)	0.15 (0.10)	0.04 (0.11)	0.44** (0.20)	0.13* (0.08)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.12 (0.08)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.10)
Proportion of employed people in HH	-0.09 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.14 (0.09)
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	-0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.10)	0.11 (0.13)	0.20*** (0.08)	0.25 (0.16)	0.07 (0.08)	0.20* (0.10)	0.25** (0.13)	0.07 (0.08)	0.11 (0.11)
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.08)
HoH has good health status	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.28*** (0.07)	-0.29*** (0.10)	-0.22*** (0.08)	-0.23*** (0.08)	-0.49* (0.27)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-0.07 (0.08)	0 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.31*** (0.08)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.16** (0.07)
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.07)	0 (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.17 (0.28)	0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.06 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.1 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)
HH living in a mortgaged house	0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	0.13 (0.10)	0.16** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.07* (0.04)	0 (0.09)	0.40*** (0.07)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)
HH living in a rented house	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	0.39** (0.18)	0.27 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.46** (0.21)	0.20* (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.05 (0.18)
HH living in a provided rent-free house	0 (0.09)	0.01 (0.18)	0 (0.21)	0.29* (0.16)	0.23** (0.10)	0.2 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.25)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.31* (0.18)	0.19 (0.14)
HH receiving private transfers	0.04 (0.07)	0.14** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.11 (0.09)	0.06 (0.12)	0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.15 (0.18)	0.09 (0.08)	0.14** (0.06)	0.04 (0.23)
HH receiving unemployment benefits	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.22* (0.12)	0.12 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.09)
HH receiving social assistance	0.31 (0.30)	0.63*** (0.23)	0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.16)	0.05 (0.31)	0.33*** (0.12)	0.09 (0.21)	0.06 (0.08)	0.11 (0.21)	0.71*** (0.27)	-0.13 (0.15)
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	0.16 (0.14)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.10)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.23** (0.11)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.26*** (0.09)	0.21* (0.11)	0 (0.09)	-0.11* (0.06)	0.18 (0.14)
HH receiving family-related allowances	0.03 (0.07)	-0.1 (0.09)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.08)
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	0 (0.13)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.26** (0.12)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	0.08 (0.09)
HH receiving housing allowance	0.02 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.51** (0.24)	0.48* (0.26)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.61*** (0.24)	0.01 (0.19)	0.09 (0.07)	-1.00* (0.51)
Lone parent HH	0.08 (0.16)	0.43* (0.24)	0.24* (0.13)	0.55** (0.25)	-0.02 (0.15)	0.18 (0.17)	0.05 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.22)	-0.23* (0.13)	0.24*** (0.08)	0.70** (0.28)
No. of adults in HH	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)	0.06* (0.03)	0.08* (0.05)	0.09** (0.04)	0.08*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)
No. of children in HH	-0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.13* (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.14*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.11 (0.09)
Proportion of elderly in HH	0.15 (0.15)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.29* (0.16)	-0.09 (0.16)	0.06 (0.15)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.2 (0.18)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.15** (0.07)	0.03 (0.19)
HoH is a woman	0.04 (0.16)	0.46** (0.19)	0.19 (0.13)	-0.32 (0.20)	0.28* (0.16)	0.38* (0.21)	0.43*** (0.16)	0.41* (0.24)	0.26** (0.13)	0.15 (0.10)	-0.23 (0.26)
Year 1996		-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.73*** (0.04)	0 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.24*** (0.05)
Year 1997	0.01 (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)		-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.35*** (0.06)
Year 1998	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.32*** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.66*** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.08)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.50*** (0.06)
Year 1999	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.06)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.60*** (0.06)	-0.56*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.04)	-0.34*** (0.03)	-0.40*** (0.10)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.63*** (0.06)
Year 2000	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.66*** (0.06)	-0.69*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.04)	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.62*** (0.08)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.97*** (0.07)
Constant	2.20*** (0.35)	1.75*** (0.31)	2.09*** (0.38)	6.26*** (0.27)	4.51*** (0.29)	3.25*** (0.35)	2.49*** (0.22)	2.71*** (0.48)	3.02*** (0.23)	2.14*** (0.24)	6.30*** (0.37)
Number of observations	26,294	26,301	20,055	52,391	66,969	17,995	54,831	29,508	78,322	43,134	55,414
Number of groups	7,014	6,313	5,072	11,990	16,009	6,759	13,065	7,998	17,971	10,888	12,102
Wald test (p value)	1.98 (0.00)	5.57 (0.00)	6.08 (0.00)	48.74 (0.00)	20.4 (0.00)	10.48 (0.00)	15.62 (0.00)	13.56 (0.00)	7.11 (0.00)	10.73 (0.00)	13.76 (0.00)
R ² within	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.07	0.1
R ² between	0.07	0.2	0.16	0.37	0.37	0.18	0.35	0.36	0.32	0.33	0.29
R ² overall	0.05	0.15	0.13	0.26	0.25	0.16	0.27	0.29	0.22	0.27	0.23

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by household

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 from robust standard errors (in parenthesis), adjusted for clustering by household. Individual longitudinal weights used. Dependent variable: deprivation index based on counting approach. HH = household. HoH = head of household. Income values are included as natural logarithm of net income expressed in PPS/1000. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A9: RESULTS FROM TOBIT MODEL – DEPRIVATION INDEX BASED ON PREVALENCE WEIGHTING

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
HH* income at <i>t</i>	-1.808***	-3.303***	-2.673***	-0.427**	-1.046***	-4.719***	-3.752***	-2.427***	-1.088***	-5.850***	-1.182***
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	-0.218	-0.518	-3.238***	-4.311***	-2.301***	-2.196***	-1.419***	-1.775***	-1.447***	-4.133***	-2.325***
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	-0.306	-1.329***	-0.73	-0.546***	-0.753***	-1.680***	-1.180***	-0.095	-0.490***	-2.032***	-0.867***
HoH* is unemployed	3.590***	4.301***	5.493***	4.865***	1.491***	3.489***	3.130***	4.652***	4.267***	7.191***	3.966***
HoH is inactive	-0.07	3.823***	4.958***	0.810**	-0.671**	3.756***	1.271***	0.554	1.128***	5.605***	2.396***
Proportion of employed people in HH	-1.441***	1.279	-0.922*	-2.507***	-2.889***	-0.595	-1.893***	-1.366***	-1.475***	-2.225***	-1.101***
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	-0.156	1.215	-0.661	0.623	1.284***	1.657***	0.865**	0.717*	1.869***	0.718	0.693**
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-1.017***	2.249***	-1.984***	-0.032	-0.148	-0.45	0.015	0.57	-0.065	-1.520**	-0.343
HoH has good health status	-0.137	-1.532**	-0.546	-2.171***	-2.448***	-2.708***	-2.592***	-4.774***	-1.303***	-1.077*	-0.565***
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-1.133**	-0.749	-1.524***	-2.141***	-1.166***	-2.006***	-1.432***	-0.285	-2.433***	-1.258**	-1.309***
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	-0.894**	-1.035	-0.34	-0.3	0.026	-3.358***	-0.33	-1.744***	0.286	0.836	0.285*
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.783*	-2.164***	-0.453	-0.071	-1.154***	-0.679	0.871***	-0.212	-0.073	0.385	0.513**
HH living in a mortgaged house	0.533	0.892	0.745	1.160***	1.593***	0.046	2.104***	1.319***	3.716***	-5.914***	-0.638**
HH living in a rented house	0.055	-0.311	3.209***	-2.141***	-2.192***	-0.044	0.824	4.480***	2.053***	-4.031**	-0.792**
HH living in a provided rent-free house	0.955	-0.238	-1.257	2.776***	2.229***	3.149	0.273	0.687	1.327***	-9.003***	1.209***
HH receiving private transfers	0.306	2.485***	1.631***	0.016	1.443***	0.934*	1.497***	2.889**	0.899***	3.490***	1.289***
HH receiving unemployment benefits	0.755*	-0.983	1.134**	2.559***	1.641***	0.179	0.977***	-0.724**	1.485***	1.374**	-1.086***
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	-1.480***	-0.752	3.628***	0.588**	0.900***	-0.709	-2.200***	-1.396**	0.031	-0.287	0.326
HH receiving family-related allowances	1.014***	-1.186**	0.426	-0.936**	0.604	-0.36	0.728**	-0.183	0.073	0.083	0.903***
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	-1.816***	1.124*	-0.519	1.718***	1.201***	-1.132**	-0.944***	-4.164***	-0.077	1.781**	1.043***
HH receiving social assistance	4.262***	4.036*	2.435**	-1.543**	1.095	3.863***	0.911	0.133	1.429*	2.610***	-2.269***
HH receiving housing allowance	-0.918	-0.671	-1.017	-2.241*	5.386***	1.281**	1.663***	2.787*	2.982***	1.740***	-9.251***
Lone parent HH	0.585	7.592***	2.701**	2.900***	2.614***	3.156**	2.569***	1.990**	-0.108	6.597***	3.943***
No. of adults in HH	-0.359	0.347	-0.214	1.404***	0.462***	1.657***	0.854***	0.923***	0.702***	2.919***	0.303***
No. of children in HH	-0.381	0.894*	0.125	0.941**	0.784***	1.181***	0.38	1.759***	1.190***	-0.184	0.595***
Proportion of elderly in HH	1.544	3.103**	-2.664*	-1.826***	-0.745	-1.069	1.359*	-2.012	1.007**	-3.873***	0.735
Year 1996		-3.012***	-0.49	0.868***	0.014		-0.659***	-0.346	-0.928***	0.282	-1.912***
Year 1997	-0.044	-3.195***	-3.709***	-1.551***	-1.838***		-2.308***	-3.055***	-1.039***	-0.964**	-2.808***
Year 1998	-0.742***	-6.632***	-2.782***	-5.182***	-4.342***		-2.178***	-2.521***	-5.156***	-1.019***	-4.227***
Year 1999	-1.720***	-6.743***	-3.196***	-4.786***	-4.418***		-4.072***	-5.275***	-5.762***	-1.492***	-5.081***
Year 2000	-1.472***	-8.330***	-5.323***	-5.362***	-5.771***		-5.390***	-5.770***	-8.962***	-1.856***	-7.666***
<i>Time-averaged individual values of:</i>											
HH* income at <i>t</i>	-11.097***	-10.023***	-9.885***	-8.937***	-8.163***	-9.604***	-17.118***	-11.374***	-10.400***	-16.678***	-21.979***
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	-2.671	-0.421	10.175***	-3.284***	-5.862***	1.555	0.909	2.16	2.249**	5.335***	9.211***
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	-0.348	-3.253*	-12.215***	-2.055**	-0.963*	-0.103	-0.955	-6.093***	-3.095***	-4.195***	-3.003***
HoH* is unemployed	-4.685	3.69	-7.15	0.428	-1.44	4.628	1.595	-15.200***	14.626***	-12.272***	0.272
HoH is inactive	2.029**	-1.08	-4.372***	1.685***	3.118***	-4.572***	-4.023***	-0.943	0.466	-2.918**	-0.088
Proportion of employed people in HH	8.854***	1.213	6.248**	6.718***	10.777***	-1.015	3.046	-0.131	-2.213	9.963***	8.902***
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	9.310***	-7.904	3.497	0.12	3.227**	-3.337	0.335	10.612***	-9.481***	7.775**	-2.327
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-4.700**	-2.882	-3.539	-1.785	-4.718***	1.919	0.008	3.900*	2.522*	-3.536	-1.409
HoH has good health status	-11.372***	-22.366***	-10.520***	-0.059	-11.122***	-2.207	-13.326***	-11.550***	-8.801***	-17.447***	-4.266***
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-5.238**	6.205	-9.152***	2.573	-4.522***	1.873	-2.197	0.314	-3.790**	-2.541	-9.236***
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	3.692*	7.329*	3.914	-4.095**	3.441**	0.876	2.666	5.831**	2.443*	5.683	-1.637
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	1.44	-8.886**	9.351***	-1.101	-0.512	-0.028	-1.064	1.881	2.609*	-1.891	4.494**
HH living in a mortgaged house	-0.926	3.728***	2.771*	0.173	2.393***	10.588***	2.723***	1.384**	-0.399	20.798***	2.727**
HH living in a rented house	3.489***	11.439***	6.050***	4.007***	3.147***	10.997***	5.879***	6.465***	3.739***	29.633***	8.892***
HH living in a provided rent-free house	0.226	5.682**	-10.96	-2.818**	1.978***	-7.912***	0.832	-3.209	0.173	22.558***	6.490***
HH receiving private transfers	3.184***	7.309***	5.537***	-1.355	-3.588***	5.232***	-3.050***	-2.419	8.027***	4.050*	-8.266***
HH receiving unemployment benefits	7.210***	16.193***	7.716***	7.915***	10.074***	4.560***	7.311***	9.751***	4.629***	11.236***	11.568***
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	-3.854***	2.839*	-9.144***	-0.118	1.871***	3.094**	2.862***	-3.898***	-0.159	1.06	-0.439
HH receiving family-related allowances	-0.788	-1.171	5.860***	6.402***	3.425***	4.971***	-2.459***	0.462	3.017***	-1.311	-6.313***
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	2.509**	1.864	5.561***	2.031*	3.250***	4.445***	4.450***	7.100***	0.721	7.521***	2.968***
HH receiving social assistance	4.717	9.220**	10.894***	4.835**	13.272***	8.728***	4.210***	4.158***	16.384***	5.862***	37.359***
HH receiving housing allowance	11.277***	6.402	7.268***	11.422***	0.081	-1.058	5.965***	11.494***	-5.919**	11.792***	2.482
Lone parent HH	4.120***	1.001	4.929***	3.460***	2.176***	1.188	6.407***	8.326***	3.787***	7.297***	3.335***
No. of adults in HH	5.219***	4.416***	4.541***	3.306***	3.419***	2.081***	5.114***	3.206***	3.730***	4.452***	5.061***
No. of children in HH	3.142***	3.587***	1.181*	0.307	1.715***	0.485	2.159***	1.348***	0.856***	4.867***	5.768***
Proportion of elderly in HH	-0.963	-4.952**	-2.379	-2.548***	-0.531	-2.307	-1.949*	-1.138	-2.639***	2.25	-1.900**
Year 1996		-6.783*	-1.296	-4.236**	-3.354**		4.087*	3.690*	-4.695***	10.027***	10.693***
Year 1997	-2.472	6.501*	13.670***	1.122	6.508***		5.277**	5.116**	-1.929	1.039	-5.422***
Year 1998	-2.394	-4.488	-5.690**	-2.279	-3.654**		-4.756**	-4.801**	3.285	1.711	8.030**
Year 1999	-2.389	12.960***	7.744*	2.252	3.087		4.827*	5.863**	0.46	-8.501***	1.938
Year 2000	2.539	-12.678***	-0.548	-7.128***	1.385		-5.170**	-5.685**	10.699***	6.391***	15.177***
Constant	51.992***	53.439***	43.433***	71.189***	63.911***	41.822***	69.300***	51.726***	47.108***	36.079***	59.986***
sigma_u	11.259***	16.007***	12.976***	10.948***	10.412***	12.833***	13.320***	11.924***	10.146***	17.462***	13.283***
sigma_e	10.013***	15.264***	11.563***	13.041***	13.061***	10.554***	11.789***	11.183***	10.771***	13.505***	9.694***
Number of observations	26,294	26,301	20,055	52,391	66,969	17,995	54,831	29,508	78,322	43,134	55,414
Number of groups	7,014	6,313	5,072	11,990	16,009	6,759	13,065	7,998	17,971	10,888	12,102
Number of observation left censored	12,711	17,345	13,712	4,967	19,919	10,062	29,994	14,919	20,945	34,408	5,930
Number of observation uncensored	13,583	8,956	6,343	47,389	47,040	7,933	24,835	14,589	57,369	8,726	49,433
Number of observation right censored	0	0	0	35	10	0	2	0	8	0	51
Chi-sq. test for exclusion of indiv. means (31df)	989.99	740.05	594.56	1944.43	3907.82	595	2414.23	1363.18	3432.05	957.22	5063.51
Prob > chi2 = 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Dependent variable: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. †: HH = household, ‡: HoH = head of household. Income values are included as natural logarithm of net income expressed in PPS/1000. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

TABLE A10: MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM TOBIT MODEL – DEPRIVATION INDEX BASED ON PREVALENCE WEIGHTING

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
HH* income at <i>t</i>	-0.953*** (0.206)	-1.011*** (0.172)	-0.816*** (0.181)	-0.392** (0.177)	-0.777*** (0.116)	-2.314*** (0.349)	-1.664*** (0.135)	-1.372*** (0.248)	-0.793*** (0.092)	-1.024*** (0.077)	-1.087*** (0.151)
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	-0.115 (0.152)	-0.159 (0.139)	-0.988*** (0.147)	-3.952*** (0.155)	-1.709*** (0.097)	-1.077*** (0.300)	-0.629*** (0.104)	-1.004*** (0.205)	-1.056*** (0.082)	-0.723*** (0.061)	-2.136*** (0.123)
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	-0.161 (0.132)	-0.407*** (0.121)	-0.223 (0.135)	-0.500*** (0.139)	-0.559*** (0.094)	-0.824*** (0.260)	-0.523*** (0.081)	-0.054 (0.189)	-0.357*** (0.073)	-0.356*** (0.056)	-0.797*** (0.103)
HoH* is unemployed (d)	2.050*** (0.384)	1.452*** (0.374)	1.974*** (0.315)	4.548*** (0.448)	1.125*** (0.230)	1.838*** (0.328)	1.489*** (0.223)	2.841*** (0.298)	3.293*** (0.289)	1.564*** (0.196)	3.704*** (0.311)
HoH is inactive (d)	-0.037 (0.281)	1.208*** (0.292)	1.627*** (0.226)	0.744** (0.309)	-0.497** (0.239)	1.896*** (0.302)	0.570*** (0.169)	0.315 (0.269)	0.825*** (0.173)	1.058*** (0.128)	2.213*** (0.236)
Proportion of employed people in HH	-0.759*** (0.213)	0.391 (0.240)	-0.281* (0.144)	-2.299*** (0.289)	-2.146*** (0.233)	-0.292 (0.234)	-0.840*** (0.139)	-0.772*** (0.238)	-1.076*** (0.188)	-0.389*** (0.105)	-1.012*** (0.207)
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i> (d)	-0.082 (0.334)	0.383 (0.314)	-0.198 (0.200)	0.572 (0.416)	0.967*** (0.211)	0.840*** (0.277)	0.391** (0.188)	0.410* (0.232)	1.399*** (0.256)	0.128 (0.108)	0.639** (0.284)
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-0.536*** (0.208)	0.688*** (0.235)	-0.605*** (0.137)	-0.029 (0.276)	-0.11 (0.231)	-0.221 (0.231)	0.007 (0.136)	0.322 (0.234)	-0.047 (0.184)	-0.266** (0.103)	-0.315 (0.199)
HoH has good health status (d)	-0.072 (0.204)	-0.486** (0.242)	-0.169 (0.198)	-2.007*** (0.270)	-1.861*** (0.183)	-1.401*** (0.295)	-1.213*** (0.151)	-2.946*** (0.338)	-0.964*** (0.143)	-0.195* (0.118)	-0.520*** (0.162)
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-0.597** (0.246)	-0.229 (0.211)	-0.465*** (0.167)	-1.963*** (0.278)	-0.866*** (0.208)	-0.983*** (0.247)	-0.635*** (0.137)	-0.161 (0.279)	-1.775*** (0.172)	-0.220** (0.103)	-1.203*** (0.195)
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i> (d)	-0.480** (0.211)	-0.324 (0.238)	-0.105 (0.196)	-0.276 (0.258)	0.02 (0.174)	-1.760*** (0.316)	-0.147 (0.142)	-1.020*** (0.294)	0.208 (0.137)	0.143 (0.108)	0.262* (0.156)
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.413* (0.232)	-0.662*** (0.204)	-0.138 (0.161)	-0.066 (0.266)	-0.857*** (0.207)	-0.333 (0.243)	0.386*** (0.136)	-0.12 (0.261)	-0.053 (0.169)	0.067 (0.100)	0.471** (0.189)
HH living in a mortgaged house (d)	0.283 (0.206)	0.274 (0.231)	0.226 (0.280)	1.068*** (0.339)	1.198*** (0.188)	0.022 (0.263)	0.950*** (0.170)	0.750*** (0.254)	2.823*** (0.193)	-1.045*** (0.305)	-0.585** (0.275)
HH living in a rented house (d)	0.029 (0.350)	-0.095 (0.327)	1.029*** (0.355)	2.910*** (0.509)	1.665*** (0.355)	-0.021 (0.395)	0.368 (0.228)	2.706*** (0.474)	1.526*** (0.261)	-0.689** (0.301)	-0.726** (0.360)
HH living in a provided rent-free house (d)	0.514 (0.332)	-0.072 (0.501)	-0.368 (0.821)	2.576*** (0.518)	1.698*** (0.336)	1.66 (1.094)	0.122 (0.279)	0.394 (0.772)	0.985*** (0.267)	-1.168*** (0.214)	1.117*** (0.331)
HH receiving private transfers (d)	0.163 (0.281)	0.801*** (0.205)	0.521*** (0.179)	0.014 (0.380)	1.091*** (0.395)	0.467* (0.274)	0.686*** (0.180)	1.731** (0.749)	0.664*** (0.229)	0.682*** (0.197)	1.191*** (0.413)
HH receiving unemployment benefits (d)	0.404* (0.210)	-0.295 (0.183)	0.356** (0.156)	2.372*** (0.383)	1.239*** (0.198)	0.088 (0.219)	0.442*** (0.132)	-0.406** (0.186)	1.106*** (0.224)	0.250** (0.122)	-0.993*** (0.231)
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits (d)	-0.764*** (0.242)	-0.228 (0.253)	1.190*** (0.324)	0.540** (0.274)	0.673*** (0.207)	-0.345 (0.463)	-0.945*** (0.194)	-0.774** (0.302)	0.023 (0.155)	-0.05 (0.167)	0.3 (0.216)
HH receiving family-related allowances	0.538*** (0.188)	-0.360** (0.167)	0.131 (0.158)	-0.854** (0.382)	0.452 (0.317)	-0.175 (0.309)	0.326** (0.132)	-0.104 (0.206)	0.053 (0.203)	0.014 (0.100)	0.830*** (0.157)
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits (d)	-0.920*** (0.289)	0.352* (0.207)	-0.156 (0.214)	1.587*** (0.464)	0.903*** (0.225)	-0.546** (0.230)	-0.411*** (0.156)	-2.185*** (0.253)	-0.056 (0.202)	0.327** (0.153)	0.963*** (0.238)
HH receiving social assistance (d)	2.479*** (0.599)	1.366 (0.893)	0.802* (0.410)	-1.404** (0.646)	0.825 (0.683)	2.056*** (0.379)	0.413 (0.316)	0.076 (0.229)	1.064 (0.653)	0.496** (0.196)	-2.061*** (0.431)
HH receiving housing allowance (d)	-0.474* (0.285)	-0.202 (0.612)	-0.302 (0.228)	-2.031* (1.120)	4.257*** (0.727)	0.644** (0.328)	0.761*** (0.156)	1.667* (0.912)	2.269*** (0.833)	0.321*** (0.120)	-8.005*** (0.701)
Lone parent HH (d)	0.313 (0.509)	2.746*** (0.563)	0.896** (0.454)	2.691*** (0.712)	1.997*** (0.537)	1.655** (0.731)	1.205*** (0.310)	1.163** (0.476)	-0.079 (0.366)	1.399*** (0.251)	3.677*** (0.392)
No. of adults in HH	-0.189 (0.130)	0.106 (0.139)	-0.065 (0.099)	1.288*** (0.173)	0.343*** (0.096)	0.812*** (0.214)	0.379*** (0.087)	0.522*** (0.122)	0.512*** (0.085)	0.511*** (0.073)	0.278*** (0.098)
No. of children in HH	-0.201 (0.165)	0.274* (0.166)	0.038 (0.122)	0.863*** (0.239)	0.582*** (0.152)	0.579*** (0.208)	0.168 (0.111)	0.995*** (0.157)	0.867*** (0.132)	-0.032 (0.088)	0.547*** (0.142)
Proportion of elderly in HH	0.814 (0.540)	0.950** (0.434)	-0.813* (0.438)	-1.674*** (0.586)	-0.553 (0.502)	-0.524 (0.700)	0.603* (0.337)	-1.138 (0.703)	0.735** (0.345)	-0.678*** (0.225)	0.676 (0.502)
Year 1996 (d)		-0.877*** (0.110)	-0.148 (0.100)	0.798*** (0.171)	0.01 (0.131)		-0.289*** (0.089)	-0.195 (0.134)	-0.671*** (0.096)	0.05 (0.062)	-1.746*** (0.130)
Year 1997 (d)	-0.023 (0.116)	-0.925*** (0.114)	-1.042*** (0.096)	-1.414*** (0.179)	-1.343*** (0.133)		-0.985*** (0.089)	-1.653*** (0.137)	-0.749*** (0.099)	-0.165*** (0.063)	-2.556*** (0.133)
Year 1998 (d)	-0.387*** (0.119)	-1.802*** (0.109)	-0.795*** (0.103)	-4.656*** (0.184)	-3.096*** (0.135)	-1.042*** (0.114)	-1.071*** (0.092)	-2.698*** (0.140)	-0.735*** (0.103)	-0.673*** (0.059)	-3.562*** (0.137)
Year 1999 (d)	-0.882*** (0.121)	-1.823*** (0.113)	-0.904*** (0.105)	-4.307*** (0.192)	-3.142*** (0.142)	-1.882*** (0.123)	-2.131*** (0.088)	-2.962*** (0.153)	-1.071*** (0.107)	-0.814*** (0.060)	-4.579*** (0.142)
Year 2000 (d)	-0.757*** (0.126)	-2.173*** (0.114)	-1.430*** (0.101)	-4.814*** (0.194)	-4.042*** (0.147)	-2.439*** (0.127)	-2.304*** (0.090)	-4.318*** (0.155)	-1.325*** (0.112)	-0.304*** (0.071)	-6.824*** (0.146)

Notes: Marginal effects, evaluated at the means of the independent variables, are computed for the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable: deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see section 3.2. for details. Standard errors in parenthesis.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. *: HH = household. *: HoH = head of household. Income values are included as natural logarithm of net income expressed in PPS/1000. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

Annex III. Sensitivity analysis

In a recent contribution Bossert, D'Ambrosio and Peragine (2007, hereafter *BDP*) provide an axiomatization of a new individual measure of deprivation. Starting from an indicator of functioning failure they derive the following deprivation index as the product of lack of identification and aggregated alienation of each individual:

$$BDP_i(q) = 0 \quad \text{if } B_i(q) = 0 \text{ where } B_i(q) = \{j \in N \mid q_j < q_i\}$$

$$BDP_i(q) = \underbrace{\alpha_i \frac{B_i(q)}{N}}_{\text{lack of identification of } i} * \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{j \in B_i(q)} (q_i - q_j)}{N}}_{\text{aggregate alienation of } i} \quad \text{if } B_i(q) \neq 0$$

where q is an indicator of functioning failure. It is compatible with any way in which the measure of individual functioning failure may be performed: it could incorporate weights that reflect the relative importance of functioning failures. The parameter α_i allows the individuals to be treated in a different way from one another.

Depending on the way in which q is derived, the BDP_i index draws heavily on the counting approach also used in this paper. Nevertheless it has the advantage of providing proof of some desirable properties of such an index and of defining it within a theoretical framework. In particular, Bossert et al. (2007) show that the BDP_i index satisfies the following axioms: normalization, focus, conditional anonymity, linear homogeneity, translation invariance, deprivation additivity, population proportionality and deprivation proportionality (for detailed discussion and proof, cfr. Bossert et al. 2007).

Within such a theoretical framework, I use the deprivation score (i.e. D_i) as an indicator of functioning failure (i.e. q in the BDP_i index) and I derive the BDP_i index to provide a sensitivity analysis of the deprivation index used throughout the paper and to test the

robustness of the main results. The parameter α_i in the BDP_i index is set equal to 1: given their own functioning failure all individuals are treated impartially.

Table A11 shows the correlation between D_i and BDP_i indexes in each country in the year 2000. It is always significant at 1% with values ranging from 0.92 (Greece) to 0.99 (Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands) confirming that both indexes capture the same pattern of deprivation.

TABLE A11: CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPRIVATION INDEX AND BDP INDEX

AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
0.98	0.99	0.99	0.92	0.96	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.96	1.00	0.92

Notes: Deprivation index based on prevalence weighting, see Section 3.2. for details. BDP: deprivation index defined by Bossert, D'Ambrosio and Peragine (2007). Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP

As expected, the results of the fixed effects regression using as dependent variable the BDP_i index (see Table A12) are very similar to those already discussed in the paper, in terms of sign and statistical significance of each variable. In particular it is true for the relationship between deprivation and income and for the impact of different employment status and housing tenure.

TABLE A12: RESULTS FROM LINEAR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL – BDP INDEX

	AT	BE	DK	EL	ES	FI	FR	IE	IT	NL	PT
HH* income at <i>t</i>	-0.563	-0.888***	-0.848*	-0.305	-0.827***	-1.637***	-1.230***	-0.896**	-0.509***	-1.680***	-0.505
HH income at <i>t-1</i>	-0.177	-0.246	-0.935**	-2.184***	-1.191***	-0.529	-0.454***	-0.539*	-0.758***	-1.315***	-1.260***
HH income at <i>t-2</i>	-0.052	-0.449**	-0.24	-0.309*	-0.599***	-0.734*	-0.227*	-0.047	-0.273**	-0.466***	-0.303
HoH* is unemployed	1.667**	1.378	2.367***	3.214***	0.509	2.060***	1.610***	3.502***	3.366***	3.089***	2.208**
HoH is inactive	0.303	0.609	1.849***	0.334	-0.579	1.838*	0.449	0.131	0.710*	1.856***	1.441***
Proportion of employed people in HH	-0.575*	0.224	-0.615*	-1.515***	-1.028**	-0.143	-0.601**	-0.616	-0.735**	-0.478*	-0.534
HoH was unemployed at <i>t-1</i>	0.038	0.14	-0.112	0.188	0.625	1.155	0.389	1.280**	1.284	0.574	-0.173
Proportion of employed people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	-0.519	0.285	-0.353	0.196	0.079	-0.236	-0.087	0.049	0.204	0.076	-0.198
HoH has good health status	-0.456	-0.619	-0.166	-1.492***	-0.980**	-0.828**	-1.535***	-2.449*	-0.925***	-0.276	-0.391
Proportion of healthy people in HH	-0.269	-0.234	-0.248	-1.250***	-0.817**	-0.766*	-0.631**	-0.352	-1.153***	-0.348	-0.792**
HoH had good health status at <i>t-1</i>	-0.722**	-0.199	-0.405	-0.281	0.186	-0.983**	-0.277	-0.573	0.196	0.492	0.166
Proportion of healthy people at <i>t-1</i> in HH	0.316	-0.507	-0.093	-0.03	-0.602*	-0.115	0.453*	0.278	0.121	0.321	0.429
HH living in a mortgaged house	0.036	-0.21	0.298	0.551	0.843***	0.008	0.318	-0.086	1.340***	-0.37	-0.372
HH living in a rented house	-0.901	-0.234	0.518	1.579**	2.415**	0.527	0.225	2.135	0.588	-0.181	-1.339
HH living in a provided rent-free house	-0.166	0.252	0.006	1.168	1.542**	0.417	0.165	-0.309	0.635	-1.659	1.178
HH receiving private transfers	-0.386	0.769**	0.789**	0.342	1.678**	0.57	0.511*	0.999	1.23	1.762***	0.031
HH receiving unemployment benefits	0.329	-0.323	0.145	1.368**	1.012**	-0.043	0.598	-0.386	0.764**	0.247	-0.547
HH receiving old-age/survivors benefits	3.902**	3.202*	2.151**	-0.752	0.608	3.833***	1.11	1.037*	1.712	3.223***	-1.62
HH receiving family-related allowances	-0.575	-0.972*	0.414	-0.057	-0.014	-0.386	-0.782*	-0.05	0.162	-0.461	0.285
HH receiving sickness/invalidity benefits	0.631	-0.224	-0.029	-0.396	0.351	-0.514	0.158	-0.523	-0.056	-0.012	0.67
HH receiving social assistance	-0.339	0.029	-0.189	1.058*	0.496	-0.4	-0.808	-2.660*	-0.292	0.024	1.01
HH receiving housing allowance	-0.682	0.194	-0.691	-1.702	3.877**	0.965	1.163**	1.867	1.367	0.505	-7.149
Lone parent HH	0.429	4.179***	1.748**	1.254	1.086*	1.648**	1.537*	1.32	-0.344	1.868***	2.189**
No. of adults in HH	-0.216	0.134	-0.575*	0.823***	0.261	0.252	0.102	0.276	0.382	0.469***	-0.029
No. of children in HH	-0.28	0.239	-0.066	0.533**	0.548*	0.183	-0.199	0.941***	0.630**	-0.175	0.494
Proportion of elderly in HH	1.063	1.008	-0.9	-1.592**	-0.066	0.071	0.192	-1.539	0.098	-1.014**	0.665
Year 1996		-0.592**	0.038	-0.683***	0.34		-0.072	-0.03	-0.294*	0.106	-0.491**
Year 1997	0.155	-0.662***	-0.523***	-0.091	0.123		-0.278	-0.640**	-0.967***	-0.008	-0.664
Year 1998	-0.056	-1.187***	-0.1	-0.195	-0.341	-0.16	-0.195	-0.740*	-1.311***	-0.428***	-1.083***
Year 1999	-0.37	-1.065***	-0.352	-0.31	-0.315	-0.813***	-0.694***	-0.611	-1.323***	-0.699***	-1.293***
Year 2000	-0.428*	-1.190***	-0.661***	-0.587**	-0.553**	-1.067***	-0.757***	-1.444***	-1.387***	-0.473**	-1.246***
Constant	9.333***	10.455***	11.765***	16.218***	15.144***	14.570***	12.841***	12.403***	10.591***	13.300***	14.218***
Number of observations	26,294	26,301	20,055	52,391	66,969	17,995	54,831	29,508	78,322	43,134	55,414
Number of groups	7,014	6,313	5,072	11,990	16,009	6,759	13,065	7,998	17,971	10,888	12,102
Wald test	1.868	3.002	4.469	9.365	6.45	6.053	6.382	5.684	6.341	9.008	4.576
p value	0.003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R ² within	0.016	0.015	0.042	0.029	0.028	0.056	0.021	0.057	0.026	0.052	0.043
R ² between	0.041	0.2	0.134	0.267	0.312	0.22	0.319	0.307	0.264	0.291	0.184
R ² overall	0.029	0.148	0.106	0.177	0.207	0.178	0.237	0.247	0.177	0.235	0.135

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 from robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by household BDP index: deprivation index defined by Bossert, D'Ambrosio and Peragine (2007). *: HH = household. *: HoH = head of household. Income values are included as natural logarithm of net income expressed in PPS/1000. Individual longitudinal weights used. Source: author's analysis of the ECHP