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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Tykvová, Tereza | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-02-16T14:49:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-02-16T14:49:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24170 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Syndication, which is a joint realization of one project/oneinvestment by several capital providers, is a long existing phenomenonthat plays a central role in many financial market segments. Withinthis paper we develop a theoretical model focusing on the dynamicaspect of syndication, namely the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysischecks whether repeated relationships and, thus, reputational concernsoutweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract.Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals.The second focuses on who chooses whom. We show that experiencedfinanciers may partner with either other experienced investors (in order to raise the success probability of a project) or with unskilledinvestors (who can gain knowledge). We further demonstrate thatsometimes the syndication is impeded because the financier believesthat his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract(hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem). | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheim | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G32 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Syndication | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Hold-up | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Reputation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Learning | en |
dc.subject.stw | Projektfinanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Investition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unternehmenskooperation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wissenstransfer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lernprozess | en |
dc.subject.stw | Prestige | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sunk Costs | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 502876689 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zewdip:4557 | en |
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