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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kaas, Leo | en |
dc.contributor.author | Madden, Paul | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-09-16 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T11:33:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T11:33:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008040997 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x3434 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Hotelling | en |
dc.subject.keyword | duopsony | en |
dc.subject.keyword | minimum wages | en |
dc.subject.stw | Hotelling Modell | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsnachfrage | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Räumlicher Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mindestlohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Minimum wages and welfare in a hotelling duopsony | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 564784788 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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