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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Braun, Sebastian | en |
dc.contributor.author | Dwenger, Nadja | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kübler, Dorothea | en |
dc.contributor.author | Westkamp, Alexander | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-08 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-10T14:21:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-02-10T14:21:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55225 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-201 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | I20 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | college admissions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experiment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | quotas | en |
dc.subject.keyword | matching | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Gale-Shapley mechanism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Boston mechanism | en |
dc.subject.stw | Hochschule | en |
dc.subject.stw | Studienfach | en |
dc.subject.stw | Angebot | en |
dc.subject.stw | Quotenregulierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Studierende | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nachfrage | en |
dc.subject.stw | Matching | en |
dc.subject.stw | Shapley-Wert | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 684938618 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII2012201 | en |
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