Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101726 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II No. 296
Publisher: 
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft, Konstanz
Abstract: 
For pay-as-you-go financed pension systems, claims may be calculated according to individual contributions (income) or the number of children of a family. We analyse the optimal structure of these parameters in a model with endogenous fertility. It is shown that for both structural determinants there exists no interior solution of the problem of intragenerational utility maximisation. Thus, pure systems are always welfare maximizing. Furthermore, children-related pension claims induce a fiscal externality that tends to be positive. The determination of the optimal contribution rate shows that the widely accepted Aaroncondition is in general a misleading indicator for the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go financed pension systems.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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