Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101779 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1995
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II No. 261
Verlag: 
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft, Konstanz
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper uses a political principal-agent model to analyze the process by which international environmental treaties are negotiated and ratified. To the extent that political principals hire negotiators on the basis of their negotiation skills rather than their policy preferences, negotiators will generally favor more stringent environmental regulations than their principals. Consequently, there will tend to be a greater consensus among negotiators for stringent environmental treaties than among principals. And, treaties will be greener than politically optimal. Historical and statistical evidence from the treaties negotiated at the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro is consistent with the analysis developed.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.48 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.