Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108060 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2004/7
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
This paper draws up an empirically based comparative analytical model called by its constructor as the Interactive party-state model (IPS). It details the elements, the principles of connection of these elements and the principle of operation of the whole party-state construct. It also defines the specific principles of operation based on the characteristics of the structure, the specific motivations and behavior deriving from those. The model reveals the structural reasons of the differences in power distribution and describes how these structural differences imply different frequency of meeting structural constraints for reproduction, different time-span for recreating cohesion and different means of resource acquisition for selfreproduction, leading to different paths of development and transformation. The IPS model points to the consequences of these different dynamics on the location, pace, sequence of reforms and the regime these reforms occur.
Subjects: 
party-states
comparative model
transformation
soft budget constraints
reforms
decentralization
disintegration
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
382.15 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.