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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 52.2003
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set.
Schlagwörter: 
Coalition formation
Farsightedness
Cautiousness
Positive spillovers
Largest consistent set
JEL: 
C70
C71
C72
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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