Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/118120 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 88.2003
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.
Schlagwörter: 
Design of climate treaty protocol
Coalition formation
Non-cooperative game theory
JEL: 
C68
C72
H41
Q25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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