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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 123.2003
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.
Schlagwörter: 
Conformity
Bounded Rationality
JEL: 
C70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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