Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119356 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics of Security Working Paper No. 30
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
To comprehend why a group would intentionally target civilians, we need to understand why other groups do not. In this chapter, we argue that disgruntled groups face three main choices when addressing their dissatisfaction: suffering a disadvantageous peace, engaging in unconventional warfare, or engaging in conventional warfare. We further disaggregate the choice of unconventional warfare into terrorism and guerrilla warfare. By focusing on asymmetrical aspects of the problem and the strategic interactions between the insurgent group, its complicit public, and the superior force of the state, we disentangle the technology of terror.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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