Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127216 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 399
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs are higher.
Schlagwörter: 
Competitive wage offers
remunerations of politicians
elections
free riding and under provision
incentive contracts
JEL: 
D70
D80
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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