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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5639
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse whether, when and how local office-holders respond to the personal, economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and/or remuneration of local office-holders. Using data from all 589 Belgian municipalities over the period 1977-2014, local politicians are found to purposefully influence population growth through policy measures aimed at stimulating net in-migration when approaching important population thresholds. We provide evidence that strategic housing policy decisions – i.e. granting additional building permits early in the election cycle to maximize population growth just before the ‘deadline’ to surpass a population threshold – act as a key mechanism.
Schlagwörter: 
rent-seeking
political agency
regression discontinuity designs
building permits
JEL: 
H70
J18
R23
R38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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