Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129283 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) No. 567
Verlag: 
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Hannover
Zusammenfassung: 
Efficiency of the board structure is usually perceived as linked to a higher degree of monitoring. If monitoring improves performance measurement signals, on which a manager is compensated, it can be considered desirable from the manager's point of view. As a result, having a low degree of board independence (many insiders on the board) may incentivize the board to improve its monitoring technology. However, from a dynamic perspective board monitoring is not always desirable, since it can destroy the ex ante efficient trade-off between risk and incentives under the presence of renegotiation possibility. This provides predictions for an optimal board composition seen from a dynamic perspective.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate governance
Board composition
Inside directors
Board incentives
JEL: 
D81
G34
M41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
380.25 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.