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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1517
Verlag: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF), Istanbul
Zusammenfassung: 
A party can address only a limited number of issues when in power. What issues to address - the party's agenda - has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent in each period addresses one issue among several issues and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, and preemption depending on how power fluctuates. We discuss efficiency implications of these strategic manipulations.
Schlagwörter: 
agenda setting
multi-issue bargaining
waiting for the moment
seizing the moment
steering
preemption
JEL: 
C78
D72
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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