Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144886 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2016-2
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler's dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Our experimental design allows us to show that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and referencedependent strategic sophistication. We discuss policy implications and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.
Schlagwörter: 
cooperation
traveler's dilemma
social dilemma
loss domain
diminishing sensitivity
cognitive hierarchy
JEL: 
C90
D01
D03
D81
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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