Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146517 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge No. 2016/18
Verlag: 
Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Resource-rich dictatorships are more inclined to repress civil society than others. In this paper, we identify a tradeoff between political rents from natural resources and the organizational density of civil society. This organizational density determines the extent to which citizens can threaten the dictator with a revolution. We find that, in the occurrence of a negative oil price shock, regime change becomes likely, whereas a positive oil shock increases the extractive capacity of the dictator. When a negative oil price shock occurs, the persecution of failed revolutionaries can prevent revolution if the probability of revolutionary success is already low ex-ante. Historical and contemporary illustrations are drawn from Iran, the Soviet Union/Russia and Egypt.
Schlagwörter: 
natural resources
dictatorship
civil society
organizational density
persecution
JEL: 
C73
P36
P48
P51
Q34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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