Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146639 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 32-2016
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Schlagwörter: 
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Merger Control
Unilateral Effects
JEL: 
G34
K21
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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