Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147318 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6064
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations where selfish regional governments provide regional and federal public goods and the benevolent central government implements interregional earmarked and income transfers. Without residential mobility, unlimited decentralized leadership is efficient only if the center implements redistributive interregional income and earmarked transfers to equate consumption of private and regional public goods across regions. Such policies perfectly align the incentives of the selfish regional governments. With imperfect residential mobility, decentralized leadership is efficient if the center adopts redistributive interregional income and earmarked policies and there is a common labor market in the federation.
Schlagwörter: 
decentralized leadership
earmarked transfers
common labor market
rotten kids
JEL: 
C72
D62
D72
D78
H41
H77
H87
Q28
R30
R50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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