Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148226 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics No. V-391-16
Verlag: 
University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Oldenburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on the abatement decisions of countries. This influence affects members of an international environmental agreement as well as outsiders. However, in the case of agreement members, the effects of lobbying are not restricted to the lobby's host-country but spill over to other member countries and have ambiguous effects on the agreement stability.
Schlagwörter: 
interest groups
coalition theory
environmental policy making
international environmental agreements
JEL: 
C72
D72
D78
H41
Q28
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
317.58 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.