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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 403-443
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism that generates bounded strategic substitutes - as opposed to strategic complementarities - then this mechanism can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that implements the social choice function. If the social choice function also satisfies some efficiency criterion, then it admits a supermodular mechanism that balances the budget. Building on these results, I address the multiple equilibrium problem. I provide sufficient conditions for a social choice function to be implementable with a supermodular mechanism whose equilibria are contained in the smallest interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique equilibrium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation in environments with general preferences.
Schlagwörter: 
Implementation
mechanisms
learning
strategic complementarities
supermodular games
JEL: 
C72
D78
D83
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