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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 20.1999
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
I analyse the effect of ownership structure and bank control on performance. I employ a unique data set of 715 German takeovers to test whether group structure, large shareholders, and bank control affect their value to shareholders. First, I find that takeovers increase bidder value, but generally not that of the business group surrounding it. Second, majority owners provide no clear benefit. Third, bank control is only beneficial if it is counter-balanced by another large shareholder. Fourth, the worst takeovers are completed by firms that are majority-controlled by financial institutions.
Schlagwörter: 
Business groups
German banks
Corporate governance
Takeovers
JEL: 
G34
G32
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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