Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155024 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 71.1999
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full co-operation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all countries at least as well off as they would be by joining coalitions adopting emission abatement policies that maximise their coalition payoff; under the scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries would have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. The simulations show that the transfer scheme yields an allocation in the core of the carbon emission abatement game associated with the RICE model. Finally, we discuss some practical implications of the transfer scheme for current climate negotiations.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental economics
Climate change
Burden sharing
Simulations
Core of co-operative games
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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