Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/156695 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 247
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare a discriminatory pricing regime with a non-discriminatory regime in a competitive bottleneck model where content providers endogenously sort into single or multi-homers. We find that consumer prices rise when the share of single-homers increases in the non-discriminatory case, while they stay constant in the discriminatory pricing regime. A discriminatory pricing regime leads to higher platform profits than the non-discriminatory regime when the share of single-homers are relatively high. When the share of single-homers is relatively high (low), the discriminatory pricing regime leads to higher (lower) consumer surplus and social welfare when compared with the non-discriminatory regime.
Schlagwörter: 
price discrimination
two-sided markets
platforms
platform competition
network effects
JEL: 
D43
L14
L82
L13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-246-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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