R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot

Delbono, Flavio; Denicolò, Vincenzo

doi:doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5366

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158891

Title:

R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot

Authors:

Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo

Year of Publication:

1988

Series/Report no.:

Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 48

Publisher:

Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna

Abstract:

Since the work of Schumpeter, it has been argued that there may exist a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper we compare the R&D performance of CCournot and Bertrand oligopolists. We model a one-shot noncooperative game in which firms invest in R&D, with the aim of being first in a competition for a patentable cost-reducing innovation.

Persistent Identifier of the first edition:

doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5366

Creative Commons License: