Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159218 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 377
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We describe a duopoly model where stockholders assess the relative profitability of delegation versus process innovation. Delegation may not be a dominant strategy. When it is, the game is not necessarily a prisoners' dilemma. Our model yields several equilibria where at least one firm remains entrepreneurial and finds it preferable to undertake cost-reducing R&D activities. Then, we introduce the possibility of using delegation and cost-reducing R&D jointly. The use of R&D investment by entrepreneurial firms is a dominated strategy, so that firms always separate ownership from control, while they don't necessarily combine delegation with process innovation.
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