Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159403 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 562
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
Under the principle of the Failing Firm Defense (FFD) a merger that would be blocked due to its harmful effect on competition could be nevertheless allowed when (i) the acquired firm is actually failing, (ii) there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase, (iii) absent the merger, the assets to be acquired would exit the market. This paper focuses on potential anti-competitive effects of a myopic application of the third requirement by studying consequences of a horizontal merger on entry in a Cournot oligopoly with a failing firm. If the merger is blocked, entry occurs and consumer welfare is bigger when the industry is highly concentrated because gains due to augmented competition exceed losses due to shortage of output.
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