Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159467 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 626
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we study a two agents asymmetric stag hunt game. The model has an infinity of strict, Pareto rankable Nash equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem is solved by appealing to the stochastic stability concept put forward by Young (1993). We prove two main results. When the action sets are numerable in.nite sets, then for any value of the distributive parameter we can expect the emergence of a norm involving less than maximal cooperation. When instead the action sets are finite sets of a particular type (in the sense that each agent can choose his maximum optimal effort and fractions of this), then for some value of the distributive parameter we can expect the emergence of a norm involving maximal cooperation.
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