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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 859
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
I investigate two versions of a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may either exploit its own private pool or exploit a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. In both models, there emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on the assumptions on technology and demand, the aggregate exploration effort is either constant or increasing in the number of firms.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Q30
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