Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162683 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2032
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the effect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and depositors' behavior are endogenous and affected by the amount and form of guarantee. The main insight of our analysis is that guarantees are welfare improving because they induce banks to improve liquidity provision although in a way that sometimes increases the likelihood of runs or creates distortions in banks' behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
panic runs
fundamental runs
government guarantees
bank moral hazard
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-2754-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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