Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171507 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 07/64
Publisher: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Abstract: 
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.
Subjects: 
Baron/Ferejohn model
bargaining in legislatures
open rules
threegroup and four-group equilibria
JEL: 
D7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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