Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171619 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 13/176
Versionsangabe: 
March 2016
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher under price competition than when prices are fixed. The price decline under competitive prices superimposes quality competition. More customer information does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud.
Schlagwörter: 
Credence good
Expert
Fraud
Price competition
Reputation
Overcharging
Undertreatment
JEL: 
D82
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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