Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171625 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 13/182
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of the agent's effort and decides whether to reappoint the agent or not. We analyse the stationary Markovian equilibria of this game and examine the consequences of threshold contracts, which forbid reappointment if the principal's utility is too low. We identify the circumstances under which such threshold contracts are welfare-improving or beneficial for the principal.
Schlagwörter: 
principal-agent model
repeated game
reappointment
stationary Markovian strategies
threshold strategies
threshold contracts
asymmetric information
commitment
JEL: 
C83
D82
D86
H11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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