Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171668 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 15/225
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Often political races are not really competitive, and the path to reelection is smooth for many incumbents. In two-candidate races for office we suggest the introduction of a new re-election rule, which we call the “Score-replication Rule.” This rule requires that, to be reelected, any incumbent has to obtain a percentage of votes that is at least as high as the highest vote-share he/she obtained in any previous election (reduced by some margin). Such a delimiter would restrain negative “incumbency advantages,” and render reelection competitive again. It could also reduce polarization in the United States Congress. Moreover, we suggest how history-bound reelections could be used in European-style proportional election systems.
Schlagwörter: 
History-bound Reelections
Competitive Elections
Incumbency Advantages
Score-replication Rule
JEL: 
D7
D8
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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