Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175070 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1133
Publisher: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Abstract: 
Can a democracy attract competent leaders, while attaining broad representation? Economic models suggest that free-riding incentives and lower opportunity costs give the less competent a comparative advantage at entering political life. Also, if elites have more human capital, selecting on competence may lead to uneven representation. We examine patterns of political selection among the universe of municipal politicians in Sweden using extraordinarily rich data on competence traits and social background for the entire population. We document four new facts: First, politicians are on average significantly smarter and better leaders than the population they represent. Second, the representation of social background, whether measured by intergenerational earnings or social class, is remarkably even. Third, there is at best a weak tradeoff in selection between competence and representation. Fourth, both material and intrinsic motives matter in selection, as does screening by political parties.
Subjects: 
Political Selection
Political Represenation
Family Background
Competence
JEL: 
H10
H70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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