Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175522 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 1711
Publisher: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the prevalence of vote-buying in democratic elections where stringent restrictions on corporate donations to political parties exist. We combine data from state assembly elections in India with household-level consumer expenditure surveys (conducted by NSSO) over the period 2004-11. Exploiting a difference-in-differences methodology, we estimate the effects elections have on the consumption of various household items: food, clothes, education-related, etc. Moreover, there is heterogeneity in such consumption adjustments across households. Our estimates suggest that legal sources of funds are not sufficient for generating such "spikes" in consumption and indicate the role of the hidden economy in politics.
Subjects: 
Political economy
election finance
black economy
JEL: 
D12
D72
H40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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