Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175695 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2071
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors.
Schlagwörter: 
lobbying
regulation
political economy
JEL: 
D72
D78
O38
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-2793-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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