Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179142 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest.
Subjects: 
network formation
structural holes
intermediation
firm organization
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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