Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181309 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7109
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
When searching for productivity spillovers from foreign firms, a firm is typically classified as foreign using a low threshold of direct foreign ownership. Instead, we advocate an ‘ultimate owner’ definition because (i) ultimate ownership includes indirect ownership links that are prevalent in our complex, interdependent world; and (ii) it confers control. Control brings greater willingness to transfer knowledge to foreign affiliates but, paradoxically, also greater potential for spillovers. Adopting this alternate definition of what is foreign turns out to be pivotal for identifying spillovers: while we find no horizontal productivity effects using the low threshold direct ownership definition, we find positive and significant effects under the ultimate-owner definition. Moreover, we find evidence that indirectly controlled foreign firms exert the most persistent horizontal spillovers to domestic firms.
Schlagwörter: 
foreign direct investment
direct vs. ultimate owner
indirect ownership links
control vs. influence
productivity spillovers
JEL: 
F21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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