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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Borck, Rainald | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:40:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:40:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDIW Discussion Papers |x297 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H26 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Tax evasion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | enforcement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | voting | en |
dc.subject.stw | Einkommensteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzverwaltung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerstraftat | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sozialtransfer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 848984102 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp297 | en |
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