Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183378 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1149
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We conduct a contest experiment where participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory we observe substantial investments in spread. We find that both types of investments can be controlled with a three level prize scheme. However, the control is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. The winner-take-all prize scheme has many disadvantages including high spread and heterogeneous behavior. The scheme where only one loser is punished appears superior; it generates high mean, low spread and is most popular.
Schlagwörter: 
Contest
Risk
Spread
Incentives
Institutional Choice
Experiment
JEL: 
C7
D8
D02
D03
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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